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Document 1148 21st November 1988 
AGENDA 
of the second part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session 
Paris, 5th-8th December 1988 
I. Report of the Council 
Thirty-fourth annual report of the Council 
(first part) 
11. Political questions 
1. Europe and the aftermath of the war 
between Iran and Iraq 
2. The reactivation and enlargement of 
WEU - reply to the annual report of 
the Council 
Ill. Defence questions 
1. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-third 
annual report of the Council 
2. Verification: a future European satellite 
agency 
IV. Technical and scientific questions 
1. Scientific and technical aspects of arms 
control verification by satellite - reply 
to the thirty-third annual report of the 
Council 
2. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal 
V. Budgetary and administrative questions 
1. Draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the 
financial year 1989 
2. Accounts of the administrative expend-
iture of the Assembly for the financial 
year 1987 - the auditor's report and 
motion to approve the final accounts 
VI. Parliamentary and public relations 
Young people and defence - the role of 
parliaments 
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Report tabled by Mr. Martino on behalf of the 
General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of 
the General Affairs Committee 
Report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Fourre on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments 
Report tabled by Mr. Malfatti on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions 
Report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration 
Report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration 
Report tabled by Mr. She/ton on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions 
Document 1149 
Morning 
ORDER OF BUSINESS 
of the second part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session 
Paris, 5th-8th December 1988 
MONDAY, 5th DECEMBER 
Meetings of political groups 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Opening of the second part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session. 
2. Examination of credentials. 
3. Address by the President of the Assembly. 
21st November 1988 
' 4. Adoption of the draft order ofbusiness of the second part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session. 
3.30 p.m. 
5. Address by Mr. Dumas, Minister of State, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France. 
6. Action by the Presidential Committee: 
presentation of the report tabled by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly. 
Debate. 
7. Address by Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU. 
8. Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq: 
presentation ofthe report tabled by Mr. Martino on behalf of the General Affairs Committee. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
TUESDAY, 6th DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Young people and defence - the role of parliaments: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Shelton on behalf of the Committee for Parliamentary 
and Public Relations. 
Debate. 
Votes on the draft resolution and draft order. 
2. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Defence industry in Spain and Portugal: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
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2. Draft budget of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1989: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft budget. 
3. Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly for the financial year 1987 - the 
auditor's report and motion to approve the final accounts: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Linster on behalf of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration. 
Debate. 
Vote on the motion to approve the final accounts. 
WEDNESDAY, 7th DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Presentation of the first part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council by Sir Geoffrey 
Howe, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Chairman-
in-Office of the Council. 
2. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU - reply to the annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Com-
mittee. 
Debate. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. The reactivation and enlargement of WEU - reply to the annual report of the Council: 
Resumed debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
2. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Tummers on behalf of the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. 
Debate. 
Vote on the draft recommendation. 
THURSDAY, 8th DECEMBER 
Morning 10 a.m. 
1. Verification: a future European satellite agency: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Fourre on behalf of the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments. 
2. Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite - reply to the thirty-
third annual report of the Council: 
presentation of the report tabled by Mr. Malfatti on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions. 
Joint debate. 
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11 a.m. 
3. Address by Mr. Manzolini, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy. 
Afternoon 3 p.m. 
1. Verification: a future European satellite agency: 
Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verification by satellite - reply to the thirty-
third annual report of the Council. 
Resumed joint debate. 
Votes on the draft recommendations. 
CLOSE OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH ORDINARY SESSION 
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Dear President, 
INFORMATION LETTER 
from Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs 
(June-July 1988) 
29th July 1988 
London, 26th July 1988 
In order to meet the legitimate wish of the parliamentary Assembly ofthe organisation to be kept 
better and more regularly informed of the activities of the intergovernmental organs of WEU, the Per-
manent Council has decided to add a newsletter to the other items of information it already provides, 
such as the replies to recommendations and written questions or the annual report. 
This letter has been drafted and issued by the Secretary-General under his own responsibility but 
with the approval of the Chairman-in-Office. 
The frequency of its despatch will be related to the pace and substance of the activities of the 
intergovernmental organs but will also take account of the need to keep both you and the other members 
of the Assembly fully and regularly informed of developments. 
To this end, enclosed herewith is a summary of the main activities of the WEU intergovernmental 
organs over the period June-July 1988. 
* 
* * 
During these two months, the international situation has continued to be dominated by the 
intense activity which has been its hallmark for some three years, particularly as regards the situation in 
the USSR and in the Warsaw Pact, East-West relations, the transatlantic relationship and developments 
in Western Europe. 
Convincing evidence of this can be found in just some of the events or positions adopted during 
this period: 
- the ReaganjGorbachev summit (29th May-2nd June 1988), 
- the declaration by Mr. Shevardnadze to the United Nations on 8th June 1988 and the develop-
ments in the conventional stability talks, 
- the North Atlantic Council in Madrid (9th-10th June 1988), 
- the speech by Mr. Dukakis on 14th June 1988 to the Atlantic Council, 
- the western economic summit (19th-21st June 1988), 
- the nineteenth conference of the Soviet Communist Party (28th June-lst July 1988), 
- the arms control proposals put forward by Mr. Gorbachev in Warsaw on 11th July 1988, 
- the Anglo-German summit on 11th July 1988, 
- the Italian-Spanish summit on the same day, 
-etc. 
Mr. Charles GoERENS, 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
* 
* * 
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These developments have been followed closely by the intergovernmental organs ofWEU, in par-
ticular by: 
- its Permanent Council, 
- its Special Working Group, meeting at the level of either "heads" or "'deputies". 
On each major item, exchanges of information and views have taken place enabling each member 
state to be fully informed of the positions of the others the aim being, wherever possible, to harmonise 
views. 
Furthermore, the Permanent Council - as the body responsible for co-ordinating the 
organisation's activities- the Special Working Group and the Group of Defence Ministers' Representa-
tives have, during the months of June and July 1988, addressed the following three main problems: 
(a) WEU enlargement; 
(b) implementation of the " platform on European security interests "; 
(c) preparation of a report on arms control and defence requirements. 
(a) With regard to the enlargement ofWEU, the Special Working Group- under the direction of the 
Permanent Council- has been preparing the meetings with the two candidate countries. This prepar-
atory work consists in formulating questions of a politico-military nature to be put to the candidate 
countries. The working group has also turned its attention to the legal and institutional aspects involved 
in the possible accession of the countries concerned. On this latter point, the Special Working Group is 
planning a meeting with legal national experts in September. ' 
To date, three meetings with the candidate countries have taken place. They are chaired by the 
country holding the WEU presidency, the first inaugural meeting dealing with matters of protocol took 
place in The Hague on 21st June and 6th July 1988. The main aim ofthese meetings, conducted sepa-
rately with Portugal and Spain, is to examine whether the candidate countries can meet, and if so how, 
the commitments arising from the modified Brussels Treaty and the legal " acquis " (patrimony) which 
has accrued since WEU reactivation in 1984, such as the " platform " adopted by the Council of Min-
isters on 26th and 27th October 1987 in The Hague. 
More specifically, the meetings aim to determine the attitude taken by the candidate countries to: 
(i) the obligation to adhere to the principles of risk- and burden-sharing in both the nuclear and 
conventional fields; · 
(ii) the commitment to defend any member state at its borders, as enshrined in Article V of the 
modified Brussels Treaty and in the " platform on European security interests "; 
(iii) the need to ensure that the level of contribution of each member state of WEU to the 
common defence adequately reflects its capabilities; 
(iv) the commitment to improve consultations and expand co-ordination in the field of defence; 
(v) the role of the defence ministers in WEU; 
(vi) the role of WEU in concerting policies on crises outside Europe insofar as they affect our 
security interests. 
These exchanges of view with Spain and Portugal are taking place in a very cordial atmosphere. 
WEU ministers will discuss this issue, in the light ofthe progress achieved, at their next meeting on 14th 
November 1988 in London. 
The next expert-level meeting with the two candidate countries is planned for 16th September 
1988. 
(b) The Special Working Group has been mandated by ministers to prepare - under the authority 
and at the instigation of the Permanent Council - a report on the implementation of the " platform on 
European security interests " in time for the 1988 autumn ministerial meeting. This report will review 
developments in the strategic situation in Europe and their implications and also the consequences for 
European defence co-operation of the commitment contained in Article V of the ,modified Brussels 
Treaty. The report will focus on the need to expand co-operation between the WEU member countries 
on the basis of the "platform" and with particular regard to: 
- the development of consultation among the Seven; 
- defence contributions; 
- development of bi- and multilateral co-operation aimed at strengthening s~curity; 
- arms co-operation. 
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The aim will be to present concrete recommendations for the new co-operation measures. 
The report will also examine the approach to the out-of-area issue and the European defence 
identity, i.e. as it is seen in Europe and in the outside world. 
The Special Working Group is helped in this task by the Group of Defence Ministers' Representa-
tives and its work is based on the many contributions supplied by the national delegations. 
(c) At their meeting on 18th-19th April1988, WEU ministers also tasked the Special Working Group 
to prepare - under the direction of the Permanent Council - a report on arms control and defence 
requirements. 
Under the mandate given to it, the Special Working Group will prepare its report on the basis of 
the following questions: 
- goals of conventional stability talks seen in a European perspective; 
- consequences for Europe of possible developments in the START talks; 
- role in Europe's security of the nuclear and conventional components of deterrence; 
- defence burden-sharing within the Atlantic Alliance and possible initiatives in this respect from 
European allies that are members of WEU which aim at developing sound and balanced trans-
atlantic relations. 
The work ofthe Special Working Group is continuing on the basis of various national contribu-
tions; it is also assisted in this task by the Group of Defence Ministers' Representatives. 
All the contributions are at present being studied with a view to the preparation of the 
abovementioned report in time for the autumn ministerial meeting. 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Permanent Council, the Special Working 
Group and the Group of Defence Ministers' Representatives have had to meet very frequently under 
my chairmanship. 
It should be pointed out that the negotiations proper with the Spanish and Portuguese - as 
opposed to the preparation of negotiating positions of the seven member states - are taking place under 
the direction of the representative of the presidency, who is acting as spokesman for the seven govern-
ments. 
Apart from this essentially political activity, the Permanent Council has continued to fulfil its 
responsibilities as regards the administration of WEU. 
Institutional problems, personnel and budget questions feature regularly on its agenda. 
It is in this context that it is continuing discussions about the problem of collocating and restruc-
turing the ministerial organs, though no agreement has been reached so far; it has nevertheless kept up 
its effort in this field and ensured that the current state of affairs has no adverse effect on the smooth 
running ofWEU. For example, it has decided to increase the degree of participation from the Paris min-
isterial organs in the activities of the London-based working groups. 
* 
* * 
As to the situation in the Gulf, the national operations carried out by five of our member coun-
tries are continuing though they are based on political concertation within WEU and co-ordinated under 
the aegis of the organisation. 
Consultations have taken place between Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
leading, last June, to the signing of a memorandum covering a joint operational command for vessels of 
these three countries in the Gulf, this arrangement entered into force on 1st July 1988. 
* 
* * 
In the area of public relations, the work begun and extended since the effective reactivation of 
WEU has continued. In this context, I have given talks to the following institutions: 
- 31st May 1988 at 12.00 - Centre for Strategic and International Studies - Washington. Talk on 
the subject: "WEU, the beginning of a European pillar of the alliance?"; 
- 31st May 1988 in the evening- Carnegie Endowment for International Peace- Washington. 
Dinner discussion with Mr. Bereuter, member of the United States House of Representatives, 
on the topic " Burden-sharing or burden relief"; 
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I 
- 1st June- Mid-Atlantic Club- Washington. Talk on the subject" Strengthening the European 
pillar of the alliance "; 
- 3rd-5th June - Ditchley Park. Participation in a colloquium on the SUibject "International 
security without nuclear weapons? "; 
- 17th June - Central London European Club and the Club Europeen Francais - London. Con-
ference on the subject " The defence of Europe "; 
- 23rd June - Royal Defence College and alumni of the NATO Defence College - London. 
Debate on "The future security of Western Europe"; 
- 24th June - Academic Commission of the United States Atlantic Council (as part of a study 
trip organised by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) - Maastricht. Talk on the subject 
" The prospects for European defence integration "; 
- 4th July - International Student Movement for the United Nations - Driebergen (Nether-
lands). Talk on the subject " International arms trade and its influence on politics, peace and 
development " as part of a colloquium organised on this subject; 
- 20th July - Royal Air Force Club - London. Participation in a seminar organised by the 
United States Defence Department on the subject of arms co-operation. Talk on" WEU and 
armaments co-operation". I 
* 
* * 
As every year, the date of 1st July marks the change-over in the presidency. Once again we have 
closed a year of (Netherlands) presidency on an extremely positive note. The year just ended has in fact 
been the one in which reactivation has been given concrete expression by the adoption of the" platform 
on European security interests", the co-ordination of operations in the Gulf and the strengthening of the 
dialogue between the member countries on questions of European security and defence. The Nether-
lands presidency has also" kicked off" the exchanges of view with Portugal and Spain concerning the 
possible accession of these countries to WEU. The prospects ofthe coming year augur just as well; the 
United Kingdom presidency has immediately made it known that, whilst consolidating the groundwork 
done by the Netherlands, it would seek to pursue the same course with the following four objectives: 
- a study of the key commitments contained in the WEU " platform " aimed at encouraging 
better practical contributions to our common defence; 
- using WEU to conduct frank discussions and to study new ideas aimed ~t strengthening the 
European pillar of the alliance; 
- extending our fruitful co-operation in the Gulf by making WEU a body for the co-ordination of 
our thinking on out-of-area problems; 
- achieving a satisfactory outcome to the negotiations with Spain and Portugal. 
I hope, Mr. President, that these details and information will prove useful bolh to you and to the 
members of the Assembly and will, by virtue of their substantive nature and frequency, enable you to 
keep abreast of the activities of the intergovernmental organs of Western European Union. 
17 
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Document 1151 5th September 1988 
Replies of the Council to Recommendations 455 to 460 
RECOMMENDATION 455 1 
on European co-operation in armaments research and development-
guidelines drawn from the colloquy 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recognising the importance of maintaining a defence industrial base within the member nations 
of WEU based on an economic division of work and adapted to the relevant threat; 
(ii) Conscious that the budgetary allocations for defence are not likely to grow as much as the cost of 
new defence equipment in real terms, and that therefore better use needs to be made within Western 
Europe of existing financial provisions for defence; 
(iiz) Aware that new technologies offer improved solutions to some ofthe security problems facing the 
western alliance; 
(iv) Believing that the IEPG has proved itself an effective instrument for harmonising the operational 
requirements and re-equipment timescales of the armed forces of Western Europe and that, without 
detracting from the political responsibilities of the WEU Council of Ministers and Assembly, it is now 
ready to be assigned a greater role in promoting joint military research; 
(v) Concerned that in spite of numerous successful collaborative equipment projects, governments in 
Western Europe have proved themselves unsuccessful as yet in organising a unified military research 
effort to eliminate the wastefulness of duplicated national research programmes; 
(vi) Hopeful that a more rational utilisation can be achieved of national armaments research, testing, 
trials and development establishments by opening them to use by the armed forces and armaments 
companies of other countries, 
(vii) Concerned by the increase in clandestine sales of arms to belligerent countries, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
1. To fulfil their role, repeatedly emphasised by the Council, as members ofWEU to provide politi-
cal impetus to bodies concerned with arms co-operation by taking decisive action to accelerate the for-
mulation of a common policy in IEPG for military research and more cost-effective armaments devel-
opment in Western Europe; 
2. To establish a European advanced defence research agency concerned with conventional capaci-
ties funded from a common budget initially provided by WEU nations and later by other European 
NATO member countries as well; 
3. To help the IEPG to meets its goals more rapidly by: 
(a) affording the IEPG better political support through a regular 
institutionalised dialogue with the Assembly of WEU; 
(b) granting it a small permanent international specialist secretariat as recommended in the EDIS 
report "Towards a stronger Europe"; 
4. To encourage individual countries to collaborate in the use of each other's armaments research, 
testing, trials and development establishments; 
5. To mobilise more effectively the work of the universities and of the civilian research community 
for defence research with a corresponding mechanism to permit civilian industry to benefit commercial-
ly from the results of military research but without effecting any reduction in research and development 
for non-military purposes; 
6. To involve defence manufacturers much more closely in the formulation of operational require-
ments both on a national and European basis. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1988 during the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session (2nd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Scientific, Technological 
and Aerospace Questions (Document 1141 ). 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 455 
1. The Council continues to attach great importance to enhancing co-operation in the field of arma-
ments research and development, the aim being to save costs, reduce duplication, promote growing 
standardisation of equipment and hence genuine interoperability between forces. 
2. The WEU will continue to play an appropriate role in this process which is an integral part of the 
security policy which its members defined in the Rome declaration and The Hague platform. The 
member states intend to use the existing WEU structures as well as other means df co-operation in order 
to give a new impulsion to European co-operation in research on the questions
1 
of security and arma-
ments. 
3. Although the Council considers that it does not fall to the WEU to provide the secretariat of the 
IEPG as they are two distinct organisations, it is, however, convinced that the progress which can be 
achieved by the organisation in the pursuit of a policy of co-operation amongst the Seven in the matter 
of defence and armaments, cannot but be helpful to the activities of the IEPG. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd August 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 8th August 1988. 
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RECOMMENDATION 456 1 
on naval aviation 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Aware that the security ofthe highly-industrialised countries of Western Europe depends on access 
to overseas markets and sources of raw materials; 
(ii) Conscious that the defences of Western Europe and of North America are interdependent and that 
the coalition defence of Western Europe provided through the NATO alliance depends on the mainte-
nance of secure lines of communication across the North Atlantic for the essential process of reinforce-
ment and resupply from Canada and the United States, for which SACLANT's Striking Aeet Atlantic 
with its naval air and anti-submarine assets plays a key role; 
(iii) Noting that both recent events in the Gulf and experience in other previous conflicts have demon-
strated the importance of seapower generally and of organic naval air power in particular, and not only 
lead to the recognition of the strategic and economic necessity for Western Europe to retain possession 
and availability of national merchant fleets of adequate size, but justify the suggestion that developments 
in the structure and ownership of international merchant shipping merits serious consideration; 
(iv) Recognising that the strong growth and development of the Soviet navy since the early 1960s into a 
formidable bluewater instrument of long-range projection of power and political influence is one of the 
most significant strategic developments of recent years; 
(v) Approving warmly the construction of new aircraft-carrying vessels by France, Italy, Spain and the 
United Kingdom, to operate a variety of air defence, attack and STOVL aircraft as well as anti-submarine, 
assault and AEW helicopters; 
(vi) Welcoming the enhancement of naval and maritime aviation being undertaken by the navies and 
air forces of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Portugal 
and the United Kingdom; 
(vii) Anxious that the remarkable sophistication and impressive operational capability, as well as the 
large numbers of Soviet submarines should not be allowed to affect adversely the balance of power 
between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; 
(viii) Believing that the current superiority in naval aviation and especially in strike carriers enjoyed by 
NATO is a strong factor in favour of effective deterrence and the preservation of peace which ought to be 
maintained, unless and until a multilateral and verifiable agreement with the USSR to reduce this capacity 
is secured; 
(ix) Appreciating the inherent flexibility, speed of response and freedom of operation without the con-
straints of fixed land bases which endow naval aviation with a uniquely important role in exerting politi-
cal influence in crisis management and limiting the escalation of conflict; 
(x) Understanding that war at sea or hostilities outside the NATO area, such as the war between Iran 
and Iraq, could precipitate wider conflict unless controlled by the appropriate application of external polit-
ical pressure and, if necessary, force, and that consequently the western alliance must retain assets such as 
naval aviation which are as relevant to operating outside the NATO area as within it and to limited con-
flict as to all-out war, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Urge Western European nations to maintain their significant naval force improvement plans: 
(a) by encouraging France to pursue its aircraft carrier construction programme through the entry-
into-service of two CHARLES DE GAULLE-class ships; 
(b) by encouraging the United Kingdom to put into service at least one aviation support ship to 
complement the aviation training ship RFA ARGUS and thereby to retain a capability for 
heliborne amphibious assault, and to proceed as soon as possible to upgrade Sea Harrier aircraft 
to FRS 2 standards; 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 7th June 1988 during the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session (3rd sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Wilkinson on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 1139). 
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(c) by encouraging Italy to procure STOVL aircraft, preferably with an air defence capability, 
to supplement the ASW helicopters presently embarked in the aircraft-carrying cruiser, 
GARIBALDI; 
(d) by encouraging the entry-into-service on the part of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal of new, or new versions of existing maritime patrol air-
craft; 
2. Persuade at least the member countries with naval forces currently in the Gulf to work together to 
create a European standing naval force with organic naval aviation including air defence, airborne early 
warning, attack, anti-submarine and heliborne assault assets for deployment under single command and 
unified control to areas outside the NATO theatre where Western Europe's security interests are at stake 
in emergency or war; 
3. Affirm its support for naval collaborative equipment programmes such as the EH-101 and NH-90 
helicopters, the T-45 Goshawk and AV-8B aircraft, and the NFR-90 anti-submarine frigate, and related 
weapon systems; 
4. Discuss with NATO governments ways of ensuring that priorities between purely air force and mar-
itime air missions are so organised that: 
(a) naval commanders have a sufficiency of air assets under their direct control which cannot be 
diverted elsewhere by national air forces; 
(b) the procurement of new air force maritime attack aircraft such as a replacement for the Bucca-
neer and the A-7 Corsair in Royal Air Force and Portuguese Air Force service respectively 
receive the priority which from the naval point of view they deserve; 
5. Explore with the governments of the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom and possibly Italy, 
the feasibility of co-operation in the field of Harrier pilot training on the lines of the tri-national Tornado 
training establishment (TTTE). 
DOCUMENT 1151 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 456 
1. The Council recognises that, in an era when long-range precision-guided missiles can be launched 
from submarines, ships and aircraft, the contribution made by naval aviation to maritime defence is of 
great importance. The Council welcomes the programmes initiated by member nations and other 
alliance countries to update and enhance their naval aviation capabilities. It warmly supports collabo-
ration on equipment programmes and would encourage increased co-operation on training where this is 
practicable and of benefit to all the parties concerned. 
2. As regards point 2 of the Assembly's recommendation, in the present circumstances the Council 
considers that the close and effective concertation of national naval forces - in which the WEU plays an 
important role - represents the best approach. A supranational European naval force for deployment 
out of area, with the assets listed in paragraph 2 of the recommendation, would not be an appropriate 
response to current circumstances in the Gulf. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd August 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 8th August 1988. 
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RECOMMENDATION 457 1 
on the organisation of European security 2 
The Assembly, 
i) Welcoming the progress made towards the reactivation ofWEU under Netherlands presidency, in 
particular the adoption of the platform on 27th October 1987, the co-ordinated action of member coun-
tries to ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf and the invitation to Portugal anq Spain to join WEU; 
(ii) Regretting, however, that the WEU ministerial organs have not yet been coUocated and that their 
restructuring has not been completed; 
(iii) Also regretting the impossible position of the Assembly because of the tardy communication of 
the annual report of the Council to the Assembly, deploring the Council's reluctance to inform the 
Assembly of its activities through the channels provided for in the treaty and the Charter of the Assem-
bly and, finally, insisting that ministers see to it that their officials comply with the time-scale agreed 
with the Council; 
(iv) Noting that international public opinion is still hardly aware that WEU is being reactivated; 
(v) Considering that reactivation implies not only increased intergovernmental activity but also a 
redefinition of the specific role of the organisation's permanent structures; 
(vi) Noting that the number of budgetary posts still vacant in the WEU ministerial organs would 
allow the Assembly's requirements to be met without waiting for the restructuring of the WEU minister-
ial organs to be completed; 
(vii) Also noting the petition addressed to the Assembly on 22nd March 1988 by Mr. Hintermann, for-
mer Assistant Secretary-General of WEU, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Continue to study the various implications of the platform adopted in The Hague and transmit 
the results to the Assembly; 
2. Ensure the maintenance of a co-ordinated naval presence of its members in the Gulf as long as 
freedom of navigation is not guaranteed and, at the same time, take new steps to promote the applica-
tion of Resolution 598 of the Security Council; 
3. Inform international public opinion more adequately of the nature and scale of its operations in 
that area; 
4. Pursue urgently the negotiations on the accession of Portugal and Spain to the modified Brussels 
Treaty and their effective participation in the Western European security system and take action to facil-
itate the accession to WEU of all the European member countries of the Atlantic Alliance who wish to 
join and who commit themselves in advance to the same conditions as governed the Portugese and 
Spanish cases; 
5. Specify how it intends to implement the political impetus it decided to give, in the Rome declara-
tion, to co-operation in armaments matters; 
6. Define an active role for the Secretariat-General in the procedure for consultalions between mem-
ber countries that it has just introduced and in the regular communication of information to the Assem-
bly and the public on its activities, including the transmission on time of the annual report of the 
Council; 
7. Describe forthwith the status and tasks of the WEU agency and transmit to the Assembly the text 
of the studies it has undertaken to communicate to it; 
I. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1988 during the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session (5th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. van der Sanden on behalf of the General Affairs Committee (Doc-
ument 1138). 
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8. Start or pursue, in the appropriate framework and with the possible assistance of the agency, con-
sultations on burden-sharing in the alliance, disarmament or the verified limitation of armaments and 
problems facing Western Europe's security because of measures taken by its allies which might modify 
the deployment of NATO forces and, finally, inform the Assembly of the results ofthese consultations; 
9. Accord the Assembly here and now the wherewithal to restructure the Office of the Clerk in 
accordance with its 1987 memorandum. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 457 
1. The Council is already studying the follow-up to the WEU platform and the European security 
situation. Reports on both will be submitted to the Ministerial Council in Nov:ember. 
2. WEU member states will continue, while appropriate, to maintain a naval presence in the Gul£ 
The Council recognises the importance of keeping international public opinion informed of these activ-
ities. 
3. On enlargement, substantive negotiations with Spain and Portugal have already begun. The 
Council does not believe that it would be practical to consider further applications until these negotia-
tions have been concluded. Thereafter, however, any further applications to join the WEU will be con-
sidered on their merits. ' 
4. The Council attaches importance to the commitment contained in the platform to " pursue efforts 
to maintain in Europe a technologically advanced industrial base and intensify armaments 
co-operation". It will pursue this objective, as appropriate, within the WEU and in other multilateral 
European fora, among which the IEPG plays an important role in the field of armaments research and 
co-operation. 
5. The Secretariat-General is already fully involved in the consultation procedure between member 
states. The Council considers that it also has an important role in the communica1lion of information to 
the Assembly and the public. The Council fully recognises the need to ensure that in future the annual 
report of the Council is transmitted to the Assembly in time. 
6. The future role and tasks of the Agency are linked to the ongoing discussions on the restructuring 
of the WEU. While awaiting an interim agreement, the Council recognises the need to consider any nec-
essary measures to ensure the effective use of the ministerial organs in Paris. 
7. As the President of the Council, Mr. van den Broek, indicated in his speech to the Assembly on 
8th June, the Council has now agreed to the provision offour additional posts to strengthen the Office of 
the Clerk of the Assembly. 
I. Communicated to the Assembly on 1st September 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on the same day. 
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RECOMMENDATION 458 1 
on the budgets of the ministerial organs of Western European Union 
for the financial years 1987 (revised) and 1988 2 
The Assembly, 
(i) Noting that, in communicating the budgets of Western European Union for 1987 (revised) and 
1988, the Council has complied with the provisions of Article VIII (c) of the Charter; 
(ii) Recognising that: 
(a) future development of the budgets is stymied whilst there is no positive decision on timing 
and place for collocation; 
(b) the Council has thankfully removed pension payments outside the expenditure of the Assem-
bly, thereby enabling the Assembly to prepare realistic budgets; 
(iiz) Nevertheless noting that: 
(a) the budgets of the ministerial organs, based on the former organograms of the Secretariat-
General and the Paris agencies, take no account of the many posts that have become vacant in 
recent years; 
(b) consequently, estimates for "Personnel costs" in the budgets of the ministerial organs are 
excessive and lead to the build-up of a reserve that can be used subsequently for other pur-
poses, as was the case in 1987; 
(c) for the budget of the Paris agencies alone, the Council has decided to block a sum ofF 4 926 000 
(corresponding to six posts already vacant in 1987 and seven others which will become vacant 
in 1988), thereby making this sum unavailable for other requirements such as the creation of 
four new posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly; 
(d) the Council has also reserved the right to consider the Assembly's request for these four posts 
in the general context of the collocation of the ministerial organs and their restructuring, 
although no political decision on this point seems imminent; 
(e) application of the zero growth criterion is meaningless when related to budgets which do not 
reflect the true financial implications of the activities of the organs concerned or, in general, 
their requirements, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Without further delay, follow up the decision taken by the Council of Ministers in The Hague on 
27th April1987 to collocate the ministerial organs ofWEU and give them a new organogram with new 
terms of reference and new tasks; 
2. Decide consequently: 
(a) to have a general revision made of the budget of the ministerial organs for 1988 to take 
account of this new integrated single agency situation; 
(b) to separate the pensions budget of the ministerial organs from the operating budget; 
(c) to ensure greater clarity in the budget of the ministerial organs and prevent sums earmarked 
for staff salaries and allowances being used for other purposes; 
3. In the meantime, give urgent consideration to the Assembly's proposal to create four new posts in 
the Office of the Clerk; 
4. Agree to study the problem of twin-grading at every level of the hierarchy in order to determine 
the conditions for possible promotions so as to improve the staffs career prospects; 
5. Above all, recognise that the reactivation and credibility ofWEU is dependent on these decisions. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 8th June 1988 during the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session (5th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Morris on behalf of the Committee on Bud-
getary Affairs and Administration (Document 1142). 
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6. Examine the consequences for the security of Western Europe as a whole of~anada's decision to 
transfer to the Federal Republic the brigade now earmarked for deployment in Norway; 
7. Continue to study the implications of the platform of 27th October 1987 with a view to defining 
the disarmament and arms control aspects of European security requirements: 
(i) in particular, specify the importance for Western European security of conventional disarma-
ment establishing a balance at the lowest level in that field without which any agreement to 
reduce short-range weapons would worsen the consequences of the present imbalance; 
(ii) urge the early conclusion of a fully satisfactory agreement on chemical disarmament, i.e. pro-
viding for stringent verification procedure; 
(iii) urge the United States Government not to reduce the levels of American troops stationed in 
Europe without a satisfactory agreement on duly-verified conventional disarmament; 
8. Regularly exchange information as necessary with the United States Government on the aims and 
action of forces of member countries and the United States in the Gulf; 
9. Extend its own exchanges of views to include all threats to international peace. 
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REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 459 
1. The Council fully recognises the importance of keeping governments, parliaments and publi 
opinion in the member countries of the Atlantic Alliance informed of the activities of the reactivate 
WEU. 
2. The Council is already giving consideration to the question of burden-sharing and will associat 
the Agency with this work where appropriate. It is also continuing to study the development of tht 
WEU platform and the implications of arms control for European security. 
3. The Council does not consider that it would be appropriate for the WEU to examine the effect on 
European security of Canada's decision to transfer to the Federal Republic of Germany the brigade now 
earmarked for deployment in Norway. This matter has already been discussed within the alliance, where 
some steps have recently been announced to compensate for the Canadian decision. 
4. The United States Government has been kept fully informed of the activities of WEU member 
states in the Gulf. 
5. The Council already discusses international issues whenever it considers them to be relevant to 
the work of the WEU. 
l. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd August 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 8th August 1988. 
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RECOMMENDATION 460 1 
on disarmament 2 
The Assembly, 
\ 
{i) Welcoming the recent summit meeting in Moscow between the leaders oftne United States and 
the Soviet Union as a further step towards arms limitation; 
(ii) Welcoming the ratification of the INF treaty by the Senate of the United States (as recommended 
in Resolution 77 adopted by the Assembly on 2nd December 1987) and the Supreme Soviet of the 
USSR; 
(iii) Disappointed that a bilateral agreement on reductions in strategic weapons systems was not ready 
in time for the summit meeting, but convinced nevertheless that there is a firm basis for such an agree-
ment, incorporating effective means of verification, and that this should be seen as of paramount impor-
tance; 
(iv) Recalling and approving the Council statement in The Hague, that Western European Union will 
pursue an active arms control and disarmament policy exploiting " all opportunities to make further 
progress towards arms reductions, compatible with our security and with our priorities "; 
(v) Convinced that the European nations and particularly Western European Union members should 
contribute substantially to the process of arms control, · 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Continue to press for the earliest opening of negotiations on conventional stability concentrating 
on asymmetrical reductions in conventional forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals and 
for progress on all three baskets of the CSCE, particularly the one on human rights, in order to contrib-
ute to the maintenance of international peace and understanding; 
2. Express full support for a properly verifiable bilateral agreement between the United States and 
the Soviet Union which would provide for at least a 50% reduction in strategic missile forces; 
3. Apply the principles defined in The Hague platform to determine and uphold European security 
interests in the context of negotiations on disarmament and the control of armaments; 
4. Press member governments to initiate urgent research into verification technology so that West-
ern Europe is ready to contribute practically to conventional arms control agreements; 
5. Associate the WEU Agency closely with its reflection and work on disarmament and arms con-
trol, ensuring that the considerable expertise and experience acquired by the Agency for the control of 
armaments is not neglected and dissipated at the very moment that considerations such as verification 
are assuming paramount importance, and instruct the Agency inter alia to: 
(a) study conditions for conventional disarmament respecting European security require-
ments; 
(b) study methods of verifying conventional and chemical disarmament. 
1. Adopted by the Assembly on 9th June 1988 during the first part of the thirty-fourth ordinary session (6th sitting). 
2. Explanatory memorandum: see the report tabled by Mr. Kittelmann on behalf of the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments (Document 1147). 
31 
DOCUMENT 115 1 
REPLY OF THE COUNCIL 1 
to Recommendation 460 
1. The Council recalls that its approach to disarmament will continue to be determined and upheld 
by the principles in The Hague platform. 
2. The Council supports the objective of balanced and verifiable arms control agreements and agreed 
with the Assembly that further progress towards arms reductions must be compatible with our security. 
3. A major priority in this field would be the achievement of a START agreement cutting United 
States and Soviet strategic arsenals by approximately 50%. The Council supports the efforts of the 
United States and the Soviet Union to reach such an agreement as soon as possible as it could enhance 
strategic stability. 
4. The launching of negotiations on conventional stability remains a major priority in the arms 
control field. The establishment of a stable and secure balance of conventional forces remains the 
objective of these negotiations. The Council hopes that the negotiations can begin in 1988, following the 
satisfactory conclusion of the discussions on a mandate for them. The negotiations should take place in 
the context of a balanced outcome to the Vienna follow-up meeting, which will also cover the question 
of human rights. 
5. As part of their work programme, the WEU agencies have studied in detail questions relating to 
conventional disarmement and, in particular, problems relating to the technology of verification. As the 
recommendation suggests, the agencies' skills in this area will continue to be appropriately utilised. 
6. The Council strongly advocates the establishment of a global and effectively verifiable ban on 
chemical weapons as soon as possible. 
1. Communicated to the Assembly on 3rd August 1988 and received at the Office of the Clerk on 8th August 1988. 
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Letter from the President of the Assembly 
to the Auditor submitting the accounts 
for the financial year 1987 
5th April 1988 
(b) Statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits 
(Appendix 11); 
Dear Mr. Van de Velde, 
(c) Contributions (Appendix Ill); 
(d) Provident fund (Appendix IV). 
As is customary, after being audited these 
tables will be signed by the President of the 
Assembly, the Clerk of the Assembly and the 
Chairman of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration before being sub-
mitted to the Assembly. 
In accordance with Article 13 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly of WEU, 
I have the honour to submit to you the accounts 
for the financial year 1987 in accordance with the 
statements attached hereto, which refer to: 
1. (a) Summary of income and expenditure 
financial position as at 31st 
December 1987 (Appendix I); 
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2. The statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a 
saving ofF 153 549, whereas the final statement 
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of income and expenditure shows a credit 
balance of F 35. The difference between these 
two figures, i.e. F 153 514, represents a deficit of 
receipts over estimates: 
F F 
- Bank interest 60 523 
- Sundry receipts 58 569 
- Sale of publica-
tions 34 571 
- Contributions 7% 431 823 
- Receipts for 1987 
estimated in the 
budget 
585 486 
739 000 
- 153 514 
3. Excess expenditure under Heads I, 11 and 
V of the operating budget, amounting to 
F 251 695 has been met by transfers from other 
heads of the budget. 
4. All contributions for the financial year 
1987 (revised 1987 budget) have been received 
from the Secretary-General of WEU London. 
5. Amounts in the Assembly's provident 
fund are incorporated with those of the other 
organs of WEU and the joint fund is adminis-
tered by the Secretary-General in consultation 
with the Clerk of the Assembly. 
On 31st December 1987, these amounts 
totalled F 4 425 218 as shown in Appendix IV. 
On that date there remained two loans to two 
staff members amounting to F 281 340. 
The Secretary-General has continued to 
receive advice from the advisory panel set up 
within WEU and from outside bankers on the 
investment of these funds. On 31st December 
1987, the fund was held by Montagu Investment 
Management Limited in London. 
6. Also appended to the accounts of the 
Assembly are the reports on the funds attributed 
to the political groups drawn up in accordance 
with the directives issued by the Presidential 
Committee (document A/WEU/CP (86) 39) as 
follows: 
- Communist Group; 
- Federated Group of Christian Demo-
crats and European Democrats; 
- Liberal Group; 
- Socialist Group. 
These reports will be considered as an 
integral part of the accounts of the Assembly; 
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they give details of the use of credits included in 
Sub-Head 30 of the operating budget of the 
Assembly. 
Yours sincerely, 
Charles GoERENS 
President of the Assembly 
Mr. J. VAN DE VELDE 
Premier President de la 
Cour des Comptes 
Rue de la Regence 2 
B- 1000 BRUXELLES 
Report of the External Auditor 
to the Assembly of Western European Union 
on the accounts for the financial year 1987 
4th July 1988 
I have audited the accounts of Western 
European Union for the financial year 1987 in 
accordance with Article 14 of the Financial Reg-
ulations of the Assembly in order to appraise the 
correct management of the budget and the book-
keeping. 
The final statement of income and 
expenditure shows a credit balance of F 35 
whereas the statement of budget authorisations, 
expenditure and unexpended credits shows a 
saving ofF 153 549. 
The difference, i.e. F 153 514, stems from 
a deficit in sundry receipts which are F 585 486 
instead of the estimated F 739 000. 
The total saving in the budget may be 
summarised as follows: 
Head I 
Permanent 
staff 
Head II 
Temporary staff 
Head Ill 
Expenditure 
on premises 
and equipment 
Head IV 
General adminis-
trative costs 
Head V 
Other expend-
iture 
Head I 
Pensions, allow-
ances and social 
charges 
Total: 
Total 
credit Total 
after expenditure Balance 
transfer 
F F F 
9 990 469 9 990 469 0 
2 888 065 2 888 065 0 
I 316 740 I 217 686 + 99 054 
I 829 065 I 777 443 + 51 622 
I 500 636 I 500 636 0 
I 486 050 I 483 177 + 2 873 
+153549 
The financial situation on 31st December 
1987 is therefore less good than it was on 31st 
December 1986. 
In this respect it should be noted that in 
1986, bank interest was F 129 456, whereas in 
1987 it was F 60 523. 
We have to point out that under Article 6 
of the Financial Regulations transfers between 
heads are not authorised. 
Furthermore, we have ascertained that 
accounts of expenditure incurred are not kept as 
prescribed by Article 12 of the Financial Regula-
tions. 
Apparently this shortcoming will be rem-
edied in the course of the financial year 1988, fol-
lowing Office Notice 245 of 13th April 1988. 
I thank the President, the Clerk and staff 
of the Assembly for the willingness with which 
all requests for information were met and for 
their co-operation and assistance in the exercise 
of my duties as Auditor. 
Jeroom L.-E. VAN DE VELDE 
(Premier President de la 
Cour des comptes de Belgique) 
Commissaire aux Comptes 
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Financial statements of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
for the financial year 1987 
Certificate of the Auditor 
4th July 1988 
In application of Article 15 of the 
Financial Regulations of the Assembly of 
Western European Union, I have examined the 
appended financial statements of the Assembly 
comprising the summary of income and expend-
iture and the statement of assets and liabilities 
for the financial year 1987. 
My examination included verification of 
the books and other relevant documents that I 
deemed necessary. As a result of this exami-
nation, my opinion is that these statements are a 
correct record of the financial operations con-
ducted during the 1987 financial year, that these 
operations were in conformity with the budget 
estimates, the financial reg~lations, the financial 
instructions and other decisions of the legislative 
authority, and that they are a correct record of 
the financial situation for the year ended 31st 
December 1987. 
Jeroon L.-E. V AN DE VELDE 
(Premier President de la 
Cour des comptes de Belgique) 
Commissaire aux Comptes 
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APPENDIX I 
Summary of income and expenditure for the financial year 1987 
(in French francs) 
Per attached statement 
Assessments of member states (see Appendix Ill) 18272025 
Miscellaneous 
(A) Sundry receipts 
Bank interest ............................................... . 60 523 
Sundry receipts ............................................. . 58 569 
Sale of publications ......................................... . 34 571 
(B) Pensions 
Contributions (7%) ......................................... . 431 823 
585 486 
18857511 
Expenditure under budget authorisation ...................... . 18 605 781 
Expenditure in excess of budget authorisation on Heads I, 11 and V. 251 695 
Total expenditure (see Appendix II) .......................... . 18 857 476 
Excess of income over expenditure ........................... . F 35 
Financial position as at 31st December 1987 
Assets 
Cash at bank ............................................... . 
Sundry advances ........................................... . 
Accounts receivable ......................................... . 
Liabilities 
Accounts payable ........................................... . 
Excess of income over expenditure ........................... . 
Charles GoERENS 
President of the Assembly 
Certified correct: 
Georges MouuAs 
Clerk of the Assembly 
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985 048 
291 264 
321 289 
F 1 597 601 
1 597 566 
35 
F 1 597 601 
Roger LINSTER 
Chairman of the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration 
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APPE 
STATEMENT OF BUDGET AUTHORISATIONS, EXPENDITUI 
(in Frer 
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET Total budget for 1987 
HEAD I - PERMANENT STAFF 
Sub-Head 1 Basic salaries 7 180 000 
Sub-Head 2 Allowances 
2.1. Expatriation allowance 628 000 
2.2. Household allowance 281 900 
2.3. Allowance for children and other dependent persons 255 000 
2.4. Rent allowance 33 000 
2.5. Education allowance 60 000 
2.6. Allowance for language courses 2 000 
2.7. Overtime 50000 
2.8. Home leave 20000 
Sub-Head 3 Social charges 
3.1. Social security 945 700 
3.2. Supplementary insurance 290 000 
3.3. Provident fund 144 000 
Sub-Head 4 Expenses relating to the recruitment and departure of 
permanent officials 
4.1. Travelling expenses of candidates for vacant posts 3 000 
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival and departure of per-
manent officials and their families 2000 
4.3. Removal expenses 16 000 
4.4. Installation allowance 4000 
Sub-Head 5 Medical examination 8 000 
Total of Head I 9 922 600 
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llX 11 
ND UNEXPENDED CREDITS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1987 
ancs) 
Transfers Total after 
+ - transfers 
59 834 7 239 834 
9 902 637 902 
7 985 289 885 
1 139 256 139 
3 518 36 518 
3 129 63 129 
1 075 925 
21 137 71 137 
6 Ill 13 889 
16 879 928 821 
7 897 282 103 
1 046 142 954 
1 055 1 945 
730 1 270 
2000 14 000 
311 3 689 
1 671 6 329 
106 644 38 775 9 990 469 
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APPENDIX 11 
Total Unexpended 
expenditure credits 
7 239 834 -
637 902 -
289 885 -
256 139 -
36 518 -
63 129 -
925 -
71 137 -
13 889 -
928 821 -
282 103 -
142 954 -
1 945 -
1 270 -
14 000 -
3 689 -
6 329 -
9 990 469 -
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PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET Total budget for 1987 
HEAD 11 -TEMPORARY STAFF 
Sub-Head 6 Staff recruited for sessions of the Assembly 
6.1. Sittings service 1 021 875 
6.2. Interpretation service 350 000 
6.3. Translation service 700 000 
6.4. Other services 40000 
Sub-Head 7 Interpretation staff required for Assembly work between 
sessions 506 000 
Sub-Head 8 Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 60000 
Sub-Head 9 Social charges 
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 4000 
9.2. Provident fund for interpreters 90000 
9.3. Insurance for interpreters 3 000 
Total of Head 11 2 774 875 
HEAD Ill - EXPENDITURE ON PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT 
Sub-Head 10 Share of joint expenditure on the Paris premises 444 000 
Sub-Head 11 Hire of committee rooms 15 000 
Sub-Head 12 Technical and other installations for Assembly sessions 345 000 
Sub-Head 13 Various services for the organisation of sessions 45 000 
Sub-Head 14 Maintenance of the premises of the Office of the 
Clerk 18 000 
Sub-Head 15 Purchase or repair of office furniture 28 000 
Sub-Head 16 Purchase of reproduction and other office equipment 32 300 
Sub-Head 17 Hire and maintenance of reproduction and other office 
equipment 366 700 
Total of Head Ill 1 294 000 
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Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
+ - transfers expenditure credits 
242 1 022 117 1 022 117 -
80 827 430 827 430 827 -
122 700 122 700 122 -
489 39 511 39 511 -
11 320 517 320 517 320 -
44 637 104 637 104 637 -
1 323 2 677 2 677 -
21 373 68 627 68 627 -
773 2 227 2 227 -
137 148 23 958 2 888 065 2 888 065 -
444 000 344 946 99 054 
12 076 2 924 2 924 -
42249 387 249 387 249 -
7 052 37 948 37 948 -
16 739 1 261 1 261 -
4 793 32 793 32 793 -
3 246 29 054 29 054 -
' 14 811 381 511 381 511 -
61 853 39 113 1 316 740 1 217 686 99 054 
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PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET Total budget for 1987 
' 
HEAD IV - GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS 
Sub-Head 18 Postage, telephone, telex and transport of documents 480 000 
Sub-Head 19 Duplication paper, headed writing paper and other 
office supplies 258 000 
Sub-Head 20 Printing and puplication of documents 1 190 000 
Sub-Head 21 Purchase of documents 60000 
Sub-Head 22 Official cars 115 000 
Sub-Head 23 Bank charges 500 
Total of Head IV 2 103 500 
HEAD VI - OTHER EXPENDITURE 
Sub-Head 24 Travelling and subsistence allowances and insurance 
for the President of the Assembly, chairmen of corn-
mittees and rapporteurs 160 000 
Sub-Head 25 Expenses for representation 200 000 
Sub-Head 26 Committee study missions 5 000 
Sub-Head 27 Official journeys of members of the Office the Clerk 350 000 
Sub-Head 28 Expenses of experts and the auditor 70000 
Sub-Head 29 Expenditure on information 311 000 
Sub-Head 30 Expenses for political groups 311 000 
Sub-Head 31 Contingencies and other expenditure not elsewhere 
provided for 3 000 
Sub-Head 32 Non-recoverable taxes 20000 
Total of Head V 1 430 000 
Total 17 524 975 
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Transfers Total after Total Unexpended 
+ - transfers expenditure credits 
18 930 461 070 461 070 -
926 258 926 258 926 -
301 576 888 424 836 802 51 622 
I 4 840 55 160 55 160 -
50 470 165 470 165 470 -
485 15 15 -
51 396 325 831 1 829 065 1 777 443 51 622 
4 547 164 547 164 547 -
144 199 856 199 856 -
1 994 3 006 3 006 -
42 556 392 556 392 556 -
14 637 55 363 55 363 -
43 988 354 988 354 988 -
311 000 311 000 -
2 350 650 650 -
1 330 18 670 18 670 -
91 091 20455 1 500 636 1 500 636 -
448 132 448 132 17524975 17 374 299 150 676 
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PART 11: PENSIONS BUDGET Total budget for 1987 
HEAD I - PENSIONS, ALLOWANCES AND SOCIAL CHARGES 
Sub-Head 1 Pensions and leaving allowances 
1.1. Retirement pensions 1116000 
1.2. Invalidity pensions 207 000 
1.3. Survivors' pensions 50 000 
i 
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' pensions 
I 1.5. Leaving allowances 
Sub-Head 2 Family allowances 
2.1. Household allowances 48 000 
2.2. Children's and dependants' allowances 26 000 
2.3. Education allowances 6 650 
Sub-Head 3 Supplementary insurance 32 400 
Total of Head I 1 486 050 
Total 19 011 025 
The expenditure figures include charges for goods delivered and services rendered by 31st December 1987, and paid for up 
Charles GoERENS 
President of the Assembly 
44 
Georg 
Clerk 
Transfers Total after 
+ - transfers 
5 579 1 121 579 
2 920 209 920 
2 127 47 873 
2 441 45 559 
4 229 21 771 
3 777 2 873 
4 075 36 475 
12 574 12 574 1 486 050 
460 706 460 706 19 011 025 
>t March 1988, in accordance with the Financial Regulations of the Assembly. 
)ULIAS 
e Assembly 
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APPENDIX II 
Total Unexpended 
expenditure credits 
1 121 579 -
209 920 -
47 873 -
45 559 -
21 771 -
- 2 873 
36 475 -
1 483 177 2 873 
18 857 476 153 549 
Roger LINSTER 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
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APPENDIX Ill 
STATEMENT OF SUMS RECEIVED FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL 
OF WEU LONDON IN RESPECT OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WEU ASSEMBLY 
BUDGET FOR 1987 
Contributions 1987 1987 budget 1987 budget Net Member states 600ths overpaid contributions 
in 1986 Budget (1st revision) (2nd revision) required 
F F F F F 
Belgium 59 (-) 2 039 1 730 310 57 196 9 833 1 795 300 
France 120 (-) 4146 3 519 275 116 330 20000 3 651 459 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 120 (-) 4146 3519275 116 330 20000 3 651 459 
Italy 120 (-) 4146 3519275 116 330 20000 3 651 459 
Luxembourg 2 (-) 69 58 655 1 938 334 60 858 
' 
Netherlands 59 (-) 2 039 1 730 310 57 196 9 833 1 795 300 
United Kingdom 120 (-) 4146 3 519 275 116 330 20000 3 651 459 
600 (-) 20 731 17 596 375 581 650 100 000 18 257 294 
1986 Budget surplus . . .. . . . .. .. . . . . . .. .. . .. .. 20 731 
Transfer of credits to the financial year 1988 . . 6 000 
(Article 9 of the Financial Regulations) 
1987 Budget .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 18 272 025 
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PROVIDENT FUND 
ACCOUNT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31st DECEMBER 1987 
F 
Balance brought forward: 
Accounts of staff members as at 1st January 1987 3 826 415 Withdrawals 
Contributions of staff members and of the 
Assembly of Western European Union 209 428 Management fee 
Repayments of loans by staff members 84 468 
Interest received during the year 300 492 
Gain on valuation at 31st December 1987 58 907 Accounts of ex1stmg 
31st December 1987 
4 479 710 
Charles GoERENS 
President of the Assembly 
Georges MouuAs 
Clerk of the Assembly 
in French francs 
F 
36 885 
17 607 
staff members as at 
4425218 
4 479 710 
Roger LINSTER 
Chairman of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
I have examined the foregoing account. In my opinion the account presents fairly the financial position of the provident fund at 31st December 1987. 
4th July 1988 
Jeroom VAN DE VELDE 
Premier President de 
la Cour des Comptes de Belgique, 
Commissaire aux Comptes 
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APPENDIX V 
1987 Balance sheet for the Communist Group 
Assets 
1. Surplus at 31st December 1986 (bank accounts, cash) 
2. Interest ................................................................. . 
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1987 ................. . 
Liabilities 
I. Expenditure 
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) ....................................... . 
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ................ . 
3. Seminars and meetings .................................................. . 
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) ...................... . 
5. Interpretation costs ...................................................... . 
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) ............................ . 
7. Sundry expenses ........................................................ . 
11. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (bank accounts, cash) .......................... . 
Total ................................................................. . 
Signatures of the Treasurer ............................ . 
and two auditors of the group ......................... . 
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F 
35 973 
13 825 
5 162 
5 556 
4 630 
2 305 
3 225 
1 270 
35 973 
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APPENDIX VI 
1987 Balance sheet for the Federated Group 
of Christian Democrats and European Democrats 
Assets 
1. Surplus at 31st December 1986 (bank accounts, cash) 
2. Interest ................................................................. . 
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1987 ................. . 
Total ................................................................. . 
Liabilities 
I. Expenditure 
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) ....................................... . 
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ................ . 
3. Seminars and meetings ............................................•...... 
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) ...................... . 
5. Interpretation costs ...................................................... . 
F 
165 177.81 
6 501.11 
131 266.00 
302 944.92 
66 405.00 
5 606.08 
5 492.46 
39 986.38 
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 8 407.00 
7. Sundry expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 458.30 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 355.22 
II. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (banks accounts, cash) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176 589.70 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302 944.92 
Signatures of the Treasurer ............................ . 
and two auditors of the group ......................... . 
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APPENDIX VII 
1987 Baltmce sheet for the Liberal Group 
Assets 
1. Surplus at 31st December 1986 (bank accounts, cash) 
2. Interest ................................................................. . 
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1987 ................. . 
Total .............................................................. · .. . 
Liltbilitiu 
I. Expenditure 
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) ....................................... . 
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ................ . 
3. Seminars and meetings .................................................. . 
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) ...................... . 
5. Interpretation costs ...................................................... . 
6. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) ............................ . 
7. Sundry expenses ........................................................ . 
II. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (banks accounts, cash) ......................... . 
Total ..................................................... · · · · · · · · · · · · · 
Signatures of the Treasurer ............................ . 
and two auditors of the group ......................... . 
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F 
44 612.99 
1472.95 
49 783.00 
95 868.96 
32 413.00 
6 000.00 
12 200.00 
4 633.00 
3 055.00 
17.71 
37 550.25 
95 868.96 
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APPENDIX VIII 
1987 Balance sheet for the Socialist Group 
Assets 
1. Surplus at 31st December 1986 (bank accounts, cash) 
F 
182 365.99 
2. Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 118.63 
3. Appropriations granted by the Assembly of WEU for 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 978.00 
4. Sundry assets ........................................................... . 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 462.62 
Liflbilities 
I. Expenditure 
1. Secretarial staff (salaries, insurance) ....................................... . 64 871.50 
2. Administrative expenses (postage, telephone, office supplies) ................ . 512.80 
3. Missions and meetings ................................................... . 22 790.30 
4. Travel and subsistence (members and secretarial staff) ...................... . 2 818.00 
5. Seminars ............................................................... . 
6. Interpretation costs ...................................................... . 
7. Representational expenses (receptions, dinners) ............................ . 
8. Sundry expenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 199.15 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 191.75 
II. Surplus at 31st December 1987 (banks accounts, cash) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175 270.87 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 462.62 
Signatures of the Treasurer ............................ . 
and two auditors of the group ......................... . 
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Accounts of the administrative expenditure of the Assembly 
for the financial year 1987 
27th September 1988 
MOTION TO APPROVE THE FINAL ACCOUNTS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1987 1 
The Assembly, 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur 
Having examined the final accounts ofthe Assembly for the financial year 1987, together with the 
auditor's report, in accordance with Article 16 of the financial regulations, 
Approves the accounts as submitted and discharges the President of the Assembly of his financial 
responsibility. 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Lmster (Chairman); Mrs. Pack, Mr. Sinesio (Alternate: Fassino) (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Biefnot 
(Alternate: Eicher), Mrs. Blunck (Alternate: Ahrens), MM. Bohl, Chartron, Dhaille, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Greco. de Jong. 
Klejdzinski (Alternate: Buchner), Morris. Noerens, Oehler, Rathbone, Rautz, Redmond (Alternate: Lord), Tnglia (Alternate: Gwgu 
Demartini), Worrell, Z1erer. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed m Italics. 
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DRAFT SUPPLEMENTARY BUDGET OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
OF THE ASSEMBLY FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 1988 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 2 
by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur 
APPENDICES 
I. Estimates of expenditure relating to the creation of four new posts in the 
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly 
11. Recapitulation of changes in the establishment of the Office of the Clerk of 
the Assembly 
Ill. Organogram of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Linster (Chairman); Mrs. Pack, Mr. Sinesio (Alternate: Fassino (Vice-Chairmen): Mr. Biefnot 
(Alternate: Eicher), Mrs. Blunck (Alternate: Ahrens), MM. Bohl, Chartron, Dhaille, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Greco. de Jong. 
Klejdzinski (Alternate: Buchner), Morris, Noerens, Oehler, Rathbone, Raut1, Redmond (Alternate: Lord), Triglia (Alternate: Gzagu 
Demartmi), Worrell, Zierer. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are pnnted in italics. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. According to Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the WEU Assembly: 
" 1. Each year, following a report of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
drawn up in collaboration with the Presidential Committee, the Assembly shall approve a provi-
sional statement of its expenditure, divided into heads and sub-heads. 
2. The Assembly may, if necessary, approve supplementary estimates of expenditure. " 
2. Further to this provision, the present report sets out the Assembly's additional requirements in 
the light of: 
(a) the decision taken by the WEU Council of Ministers to authorise the creation of four new 
posts in the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly. This decision was communicated to the 
Assembly by Mr. van den Broek, Chairman-in-Office of the Council, in his address on 
8th June 1988 (cf. Official Report of Debates); he also specified that the Council was prepared 
to approve a supplementary Assembly budget setting out the financial implications of creating 
the four new posts as from 1st July 1988 (cf. Official Report of Debates); 
(b) the payment of two new pensions which, as they relate to early retirements, were not taken 
into account when preparing the ordinary 1988 budget. The WEU Budget and Organisation 
Committee has already authorised their inclusion in a revised budget for 1988 (cf. minutes of 
the 132nd meeting, document BR (87) 3 Final, 20th January 1988, page 18). 
3. In regard to the four new posts, the table at Appendix I sets out the budget estimates affecting 
various sub-heads of Head I and the criteria governing their calculation. It was considered that three of 
the four posts (head of the private office, bookkeeper and assistant) might be filled by permanent WEU 
officials as from 1st July 1988 and that the fourth (controller) might be filled by an outside candidate as 
from 1st September 1988. As a result ofthe creation ofthe four new posts, the total establishment ofthe 
Office of the Clerk of the Assembly will be increased from 27 to 31, as shown in Appendix II. 
Appendix Ill shows the new organogram ofthe Office ofthe Clerk of the Assembly and includes the four 
new posts. 
4. For the year as a whole, the two new pensions will cost F 290 000, broken down as follows: 
Pensions.................................................................. F 276 000 
Household allowance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 7 000 
Supplementary insurance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 7 000 
F 290 000 
This amount is included in Part II (Pensions) of the supplementary budget which also shows total con-
tributions to the pension scheme payable by the four new officials which, as receipts, are deducted from 
expenditure. 
5. To sum up, the total supplementary amount requested in the operating and pensions budgets is 
F 833 000, account being taken of receipts. 
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Revised budget estimates of the Assembly for the financial year l988 
Heads and sub-heads 
Head I- Permanent staff 
SuB-HEAD: 
1 - Basic salaries .......................... . 
2 - Allowances ............................ . 
3 - Social charges ......................... . 
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and 
Draft budget 
for 1988 
(initial) 
7 200 000 
1422 000 
1 421 000 
Supplementary 
budget 
342 000 
86000 
62000 
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Budget 
for 1988 
(revised) 
7 542 000 
1 508 000 
1 483 000 
77 000 departure of permanent officials . . . . . . . . . . 154 000 231 000 
5 - Medical examination .................... 1---__;8;_0.:...0;_0_-4----------"----8~00.:...0~ 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 205 000 567 000 10 772 000 
Head I!- Temporary staff 
SuB-HEAD: 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 285 000 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly 
2 285 000 
work between sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 500 000 - 500 000 
8 - Temporary staff for the Office ofthe Clerk 80 000 - 80 000 
9 - Social charges .......................... ~-1=-=2:..:.9....;0:..:0;.;:.0_-+----------l--..:.1 =29:_:_00=0:..___.j 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 994 000 - 2 994 000 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 
SuB-HEAD: 
10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises .............................. . 
11 - Hire of committee rooms ............... . 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions ..................... . 
13 - Various services for the organisation of ses-
sions ................................. . 
14 - Maintenance of the premises of the Office of 
the Clerk .............................. . 
15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture .... . 
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office 
equipment ............................ . 
17 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction and 
424 000 * 
15 000 
365 000 
45 000 
18 000 
43 000 
11 000 
424 000 
15 000 
365 000 
45 000 
18 000 
43 000 
11 000 
other office equipment .................. 1----=-37..c:2;_0.:...0..c:0_-4--------"----'-3_7;_2 -'-0..:..00~ 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 293 000 * - 1 293 000 
* Including F 6 000 carried over from the financial year 1987. 
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Draft budget Supplementary Budget Heads and sub-heads for 1988 for 1988 
(initial) budget (revised) 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
Sus-HEAD: 
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of 
documents ............................. 490 000 - 490 000 
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing paper 
and other office supplies ••• 0. 0 0 ••• 0 •• 0 0. 264 000 - 264 000 
20 - Printing and publication of documents ... 1 214 000 - 1 214 000 
21 - Purchase of documents .................. 60000 - 60 000 
22 - Official cars ............................ 115 000 - 115 000 
23 - Bank charges ........................... 500 - 500 
Total .................................. 2 143 500 - 2 143 500 
Head V- Other expenditure 
Sus-HEAD: 
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances and 
insurance for the President of the Assembly, 
chairmen of committees and rapporteurs .. 155 000 - 155 000 
25 - Expenses for representation .............. 210 000 - 210 000 
26 - Committee study missions ............... 5 000 - 5 000 
27 - Official journeys of members of the Office 
of the Clerk ............................ 370 000 - 370 000 
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor ...... 60000 - 60000 
29 - Expenditure on information •• 0 0 0 0 0 ••• 0 0 0 320 000 - 320 000 
30 - Expenses for political groups ............. 327 000 - 327 000 
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not 
elsewhere provided for .................. 3000 - 3 000 
32 - Non-recoverable taxes ................... 20000 - 20 000 
Total .................................. 1 470 000 - 1 470 000 
OPERATING BUDGET ....................... 18 105 500 567 000 18 672 500 
RECEIPTS ••••• 0 0. 0 •••••• 0 0 0 •• 0 ••••• 0 0 0 0 0 260 000 - 260 000 
NET TOTAL OPERATING BUDGET ••• 0 ••••• 0 0 •• 17 845 500 567 000 18 412 500 
PENSIONS ............................... 2 396 000 290 000 2 686 000 
RECEIPTS • 0 0. 0 0 0 •••••• 0 0 0 0 0 •••••••• 0. 0 •• 440 000 24000 464 000 
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET ............... 1 956 000 266 000 2 222 000 
NET TOTAL BUDGET ....................... 19 801 500 833 000 20 634 500 
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APPENDIX I 
Estimates of expenditure relating to the creation of four new posts in the Office 
of the Clerk of the Assembly 
Head of Controller, Accountant, Assistant, private office, 
A2/l, A2/1, B3/1, B3/11, 
non-French, non-French, French, French, 
not locally locally locally Budget locally recruited, recruited, recruited, Total 
recruited, 
married, married, married, married, 
no children. 2 children. I child. 2 children. 
Recruitment: Recruitment: Recruitment: Recruitment: 
1.7.88 1.9.88 1.7.88 I. 7.88 
Sub-Head 1 - Basic salaries ... 110 880 73 920 67 392 89 604 341 796 
Sub-Head 2 - Allowances 
2.1. - Expatriation allowance ... 22 176 14 784 - - 36 960 
2.2. - Household allowance .... 6 652.80 4 435.20 4 043.52 5 376.24 20 507.76 
2.3.- Allowance for children and 
other dependent persons .. - 8 472 6 354 12 708 27 534 
Sub-Head 3 - Social charges 
3.1. - Social security .......... 15 248.88 10 165.92 9 769.38 12 568.08 47 752.26 
3.2. - Supplementary insurance . 4736.13 3 444.60 2 637.06 3 650.63 14 468.42 
Sub-Head 4 - Expenses relating 
to the recruitment 
and departure of 
permanent offi-
cials 
4.1. - Travelling expenses of 
candidates for vacant 
posts ................... 5 000 5 000 
4.2. - Travelling expenses on 
arrival and departure of 
permanent officials and 
their families ........... 5 000 5 000 
4.3.- Removal expenses ....... 30000 30 000 
4.4. - Installation allowance .... 37 000 37 000 
159 693.81 192 221.72 90 195.96 123 906.95 566 018.44 
TOTAL 
(round 
figures) 
342 000 
37 000 
21 000 
28 000 
48 000 
14 000 
5 000 
5 000 
30000 
37 000 
567 000 
N.B. Estimates are based on the scales in force as from 1st July 1987 plus 4% to take account of adjustments that are to come into 
force on I st July 1988. 
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APPENDIX 11 
Recapitulation of changes in the staff of the Office of the Clerk 
proposed in the 1988 budget (revised) 
Revised 1988 Grade Duties budget budget for 1988 
H. C. Clerk 1 1 
A6 Assistants to the Clerk 2 2 
A5 Counsellors 4 4 
A4 First secretaries 2 2 
A2 Controller ; Head of private office 2 -
A2 Translators ; Documentalist 3 3 
B6 Chief accountant 1 1 
B4 Qualified assistants 7 7 
B3 Accountant 1 -
B3 Bilingual shorthand-typists 4 3 
B3 Switchboard operator 1 1 
C6 Head of reproduction department 1 1 
C4 Assistants in reproduction department 2 2 
31 27 
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+or-
-
-
-
-
+ 2 
-
-
-
+ 1 
+ 1 
-
-
-
+4 
Presidential Committee Office of the Clerk Pnvate Office of the President 
Clerk (HC) 
Clerk (HC) Oerk Assistant (A6) [Head of pnvate office (A2)] 
(Pohtlcal Affairs) 
(84)3 Oerk ASSIStant (A6) Assistant (Adm and Fmance) Assistant (83/4) 
AsSIStant (84) 
-I I 
-
--------------------------------------------------, 
' 
I I I ' 
' 
Commlttee Service Press and External AdmmistraUon and Translation and ' 
' 
Slttmgs Service • 
Relations Service Fmance Service Pubhcat10ns Service 
' 
- Head of Service (A6) I (A6) 2 
-
Head of Service (A5) Head of Service r-- Head of Service (A5) 5 Clerk 
Assistant (83/4) Assistant (83/4) [Controller (A2)] ASSIStant (83/4) Assistant (84) 
4 Journalists . I 
~ 
~ Q 
Committee on Defence 2 Assistants . I I French Section SttUngs and Amendments • 
Questions and Armaments . I Messenger Committee on Budgetary General Services 2 Presidential Counsellors Affairs & AdmmistratiOn Reviser (A4/5) -
Secretary (A5) 
Translator (A2) 2 Parliamentary Secs 
Assistant (83/4) - Secretary (A6) 2 Controller (A2) r-- 2 Assistants 
(84) 4 (84) 4 1--- ASSIStant (83/4) Assistant Assistant 
Temporary Staff* 
General Affairs Comm1ttee 4 Revisers Mmutes• 
:::. 
~ ;s 
:: 
.a. 
s. 
~ 
1--- Secunty Mall and Arduves 5 Translators -Secretary (A6) I 
-
7 Assistants 2 Parliamentary Secs 
(A6)2 Head of the Archives (84) 1---ASSIStant (83/4) Head of Servtce 2 Assistants I Assistant . 
Assistant (84)4 I Messenger . 
English Section 
Committee on Scientific, Office of the Register of Speakers • 
Technologtcal Sergeant-at-arms • Reviser (A4/5) 
and Aerospace Questtons Reproduction & Equipment 
Translator (A2) -I Sergeant-at-arms 
Secretary (A5) Head of Servtce (C6) 1--- ASSistant (83/4) I Asststant 15 Ushers -
ASSIStant (83/4) 2 ASSIStantS (C4) Temporary Staff* 1 Messenger 14 Temporary Staff . 
1 Cloakroom attendant 3 Revtsers 
~ ;l> '"0 ~ '"0 ~ tTl 
.a. z t:l 
s. -~ >< 
Q -
-~ 
* Commtttee on Rules of 3 Translators Summary Record • 
Procedure and Pnvtleges Medtcal Service • 6 Asststants 
Personnel Sectton t-- 2 Heads of Sectton Clerk (HC) r-- 6 Summary reporters 
Assistant (83/4) 3 - Head of Servtce (A6) 2 1 Doctor 6 ASSIStants 
.a. 
s. 
~ 
~ 
Asststant (84)4 
Commtttee for Parliamentary Verbattm Report • 
and Pubhc Relations Others Services 
Accounts Sectton 1--- 2 Heads of Sectton 1--- Secretary (A4) 1--- 21 Verbattm reporters 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
fAssmant (83J4lj - Ch1ef accountant (86) t Switchboard operator (83) 15 Assistants 
[Accountant (83)] 
0 
Research Department Typmg Pool* 0 
n 
'---
PPR Secretary (A4) Interpreters '--- 14 Asststants 
c::: 
:::: 
PPR Assistant (83/4) 
I The duttes of Head of the Commtttee Servtce and Secretary of the General Affam (a) recruited for sesstons 
I 1 Freelance mterpreter Committee are exerctsed by the Oerk Assistant for Pohttcal Affa1rs. 2 The duues of Head of the Admmtstratton and Fmance Service, Secunty and Per-co-ordmator sonnet and Secretary of the Committee on Budgetary Affatrs and Admmtstratton are 
l'T'l 
z 
....; 
Documentation Sectton - 13 Freelance mterpreters exercised by the Oerk Assistant for Admmtstratton and Fmanctal Affatrs 
• Ad hoc service/staff recrutted 3 Duttes exerctsed by the asststant to the Clerk. 
for sesSIOnS. (b) recrutted between 4 Duttes exercised by the asststant to the Head of the AdmiDtstratton and Fmance 
-VI 
!,;.) 
Documentahst (A2) sesstons Servtce. 
. 
NB. Posts ID brackets are those 150 workiDg days S. The duues of Head of the Translauon Servtce are exerctsed by the semor revtser, ASSiStant whose creatton has been autho- smce 1st October 1986 the English revtser Hts asststant helps htm ID the exerctse ofhts 
nsed by the Councll duttes. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. General 
1. 1988 was marked by two Council decisions which will have considerable budgetary implications 
in the coming years, i.e.: 
- acceptance of the proposal to create four posts in the framework of the restructuring of the 
Office of the Clerk; 
- the invitation to Spain and Portugal " to open the appropriate discussions with a view to their 
possible accession". 
2. The four new posts were already included in a supplementary budget for 1988 as from the date of 
their respective creation. Consequently, estimates for 1989 under Head I of this budget were calculated 
on the basis of the new organogram. 
3. The accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU will mean adapting the means at the Assembly's dis-
posal. It will therefore have major financial implications. The Office of the Clerk has studied the 
arrangements that will have to be made to take account ofthe future membership of the Assembly. Inter 
alia, it is planned to install two additional simultaneous interpretation booths in the chamber of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council, to recruit two more teams of interpreters and to strengthen the five tradi-
tional teams during sessions, to strengthen the teams of verbatim reporters and translators, to rearrange 
the meeting rooms and, finally, to assign appropriate offices to the Spanish and Portuguese Delegations. 
It is clear, however, that none of these steps can be taken before the accession of these two countries to 
WEU. Only then will the Assembly be able to ask the Council for the necessary funds by submitting a 
supplementary budget. 
2. The ordinary operating budget for 1989 
4. The ordinary budget for 1989 therefore merely renews Assembly appropriations with the one 
exception of those relating to the Press and External Relations Service (see Head V below). Admittedly. 
there is a difference ofF 1 646 500 between the net total of this budget (F 20 059 000) and the net total 
of the revised operating budget for the previous financial year (F 18 412 500), i.e. an increase of 8.94%. 
But this increase reflects the incidence on the two budgets of the creation of four new posts in the Office 
of the Clerk of the Assembly. The corresponding cost was included in the supplementary budget for 
1988 for six months (three posts) or four months (one post) whereas, in the 1989 budget, it has been 
included for the whole year. To this difference, which amounts to about F 604 000, should be added the 
reduction in ordinary receipts due to lower bank interest credited to WEU accounts (F 125 000). The 
real growth rate in the draft operating budget for 1989 is therefore only 4.9%, corresponding to a dif-
ference of F 91 7 500 compared with the revised budget for 1988. 
5. An analysis of the trend of Assembly budgets from 1988 to 1989 allows more details to be given 
about estimates for the various categories of expenditure. 
6. Head I- The growth rate of 10.08% is due to the implications of the four new posts referred to in 
paragraph 4 above, the granting of steps in the grade of a number of officials in accordance with the pro-
visions of the Staff Rules and expected changes in salary scales that are to be proposed by the 
Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts. 
7. Head II- Expenditure under this head was estimated on the basis of the traditional organisation 
of services for sessions. Only under Sub-Head 7 "Interpretation staff required for Assembly work 
between sessions " is there an increase ofF 50 000 to take account of the more intensive programme of 
committee meetings which already heralds the relevant sub-head being overspent in 1988. Conversely. 
estimates under Sub-Head 8 " Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk" have been reduced by 
F 50 000 to take account of the fact that the creation of two new grade B posts will reduce the need for 
such staff who are normally recruited only to cover the absence of permanent officials. 
8. Head Ill- Estimates under this head conform with current contracts for the maintenance of the 
Paris premises and the supply of equipment and other services during sessions or for the normal oper-
ation ofthe Office ofthe Clerk of the Assembly. They are based on actual charges in 1988 increased by 
3% to take account of the foreseeable trend of prices in 1989; they also take account of the inclusion in 
the modernisation and maintenance programme for the equipment of the Office of the Clerk 
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(Appendix IV) of the proposed purchase of computer desks for three assistants (including the two new 
recruits) using word processors and the renewal of the current maintenance contract for the two word 
processors purchased in 1988. The difference between the 1989 estimates and the sums granted in 1988 
is therefore justified. 
9. Head IV- No further comment is necessary since the estimates concerned merely renew the sums 
granted in 1988 increased by a growth rate of 2%. 
10. Head V- Expenditure under this head is directly and strictly related to parliamentary work. A 
rather large increase appeared necessary under Sub-Head 27" Official journeys of members of the Office 
of the Clerk". Officials have to accompany the Presidential Committee, the other committees and 
rapporteurs for meetings outside Paris. The Assembly's activities have increased in line with a pro-
gramme of work approved by the Presidential Committee after close examination of both political and 
budgetary requirements. It should be underlined that estimates under this sub-head (F 400 000) are less 
than actual expenditure in 1988 which - according to a valid estimate - will amount to F 450 000 com-
pared with a sum ofF 370 000 in the budget. The difference might be offset by savings under other sec-
tions of the budget. It should also be underlined that there is an increase ofF 90 000 under Sub-Head 29 
"Expenditure on information", which will be used mainly to improve the working conditions of the 
Assembly's Press and External Relations Service. The latter has produced a proposal for a general com-
munications strategy aimed at improving the circulation of information between WEU and public 
opinion. To this end, it has prepared a list of possible actions among which the following were given pri-
ority for inclusion in the budget for the financial year 1989: 
- purchase of a personal computer to allow the effective management of an enlarged press list 
and the drafting and page-setting of documents such as press files, session editorials and 
various other texts for the press; 
- systematic monitoring of the press in member countries; for the time being, it is planned to 
take out an annual subscription only for the country having the chairmanship-in-office of the 
Council; 
- intensification of press contacts abroad including annual visits by the head of service to present 
WEU member countries and countries that are to accede to the treaty. 
11. Receipts - Receipts in this draft budget are far lower than those in the 1988 budget. Bank interest 
credited to WEU as from 1985 has fallen steadily due to a reduction in the interest rate and to the fact 
that in recent years member countries' contributions have been paid later than in earlier years. some-
times leaving WEU accounts with a negative balance. Receipts from bank interest have fallen as follows: 
1985 - F 265 165 
1986 - F 129 456 
1987 - F 60 523 
Until the financial year 1988, the shortfall was offset by savings in each budget overall; for the next 
financial year, a realistic estimate has to be made, taking account, however, of a return to normal in the 
payment of contributions which occurred in the first part of 1988. 
3. Pensions budget 
12. In 1988, as well as the two new retirement pensions taken into account when this year's budget 
was prepared, pensions are to become payable to two other officials who unexpectedly are retiring pre-
maturely. Furthermore, another pension will be payable as from 1st November 1988 to an assistant who 
is also retiring prematurely. The first two were included in a supplementary budget whereas consider-
ation will be given to the possibility of offsetting payment of the pension in November and December 
by savings under other sections of the budget. At the present juncture, no further pensions are expected 
in 1989. There is therefore an increase of 12.78% in the draft budget for 1989 compared with the pre-
vious budget, the sums requested corresponding to eleven retirement pensions, one invalidity pension 
and one survivor's pension. Appendix VII shows the trend of pensions budgets from 1984 to 1989. It is 
interesting to note that during this period the net amount spent on pensions increased by a factor of7.45. 
4. Summary of the Assembly's operating and pensions budgets 
13. A summary of estimates in the Assembly's draft budgets for 1989 (expenditure and receipts) is 
given in the table at Appendix V, setting out growth rates in each head, receipts and the net total com-
pared with the previous year. For the operating budget alone, Appendix VI shows the implications of 
each head for total expenditure and the net total of that budget (expenditure and receipts). For the pur-
poses of comparison, data relating to the revised budget for 1988 are given in the same table. 
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Summary of estimates of expenditure and receipts 
for the financial year 1989 
Details Expenditure 
PART 1: Operating budget 
Section A: Expenditure 
Head I: Permanent staff 11 858 000 
Head 1/: Temporary staff 3 083 000 
Head Ill: Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 1 442 500 
Head IV: General administrative costs 2 186 500 
Head V.· Other expenditure 1 624 000 
Section B: Receipts 
20 194 000 
NET TOTAL 
20 194 000 
PART 11: Pensions budget 
Section A: Expenditure 
Head I: Pensions, allowances and social 
charges 3 010 000 
Section B: Receipts 
3 010 000 
NET TOTAL 
3 010 000 
NET TOTAL BUDGET 
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Receipts 
135 000 
135 000 
20 059 000 
20 194 000 
504 000 
504 000 
2 506 000 
3 010 000 
22 565 000 
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Budget estimates 
PART I: OPERATING BUDGET 
Section A - Expenditure 
Head I - Permanent staff 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for for expenditure expenditure 
1989 1988 in 1988 in 1987 
Sub-Head 1 - Basic salaries 8 320 000 7 542 000 7 500 000 7 239 834 
Sub-Head 2 - Allowances: 
2.1. Expatriation allowance 825 000 
2.2. Household allowance 380 000 
2.3. Allowance for children and 
other dependent persons 475 000 
2.4. Rent allowance 82 000 
2.5. Education allowance 65 000 
2.6. Allowance for language courses 2 000 
2.7. Overtime 50000 
2.8. Home leave 20000 
1 899 000 1 508 000 1 680 000 1 369 524 
Sub-Head 3 - Social charges: 
3.1. Social security 1 120 000 
3.2. Supplementary insurance 350 000 
3.3. Provident fund 160 000 
1 630 000 1 483 000 1 460 000 1 353 878 
Sub-Head 4 - Expenses relating to the recruit-
ment and departure of permanent 
officials 
4.1. Travelling expenses of candi-
dates for vacant posts 
4.2. Travelling expenses on arrival 
and departure of permanent 
officials and their families 
4.3. Removal expenses 
4.4. Installation allowance 231 000 212 000 20 904 
Sub-Head 5 - Medical examination 9000 8 000 8 000 6 329 
TOTAL OF HEAD I 11 858 000 10 772 000 10 860 000 9 990 469 
Explanations 
Sub-Heads I and 2 
Estimates under these two sub-heads cover emoluments (basic salary and allowances) paid to per-
manent staff in accordance with Chapter Ill of the Staff Rules of the Office of the Clerk of the WEU 
Assembly. They are calculated on the basis of global salaries in application of the scales in force on 1st 
July 1988 1, adjusted in accordance with an expected increase of 4.5% as from 1st July 1988 and 3.5% as 
from 1st July 1989. Adjustments taken into account amount to F 697 173. 
I. These scales are worked out by the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts and approved by the WEU Council 
and the councils of the other co-ordinated organisations (NATO, OECD, Council of Europe, ESA). In accordance with the com-
mittee's !59th report, salaries are adjusted with effect from 1st July of each year. Furthermore, should the cost of!iving between 
1st July and 31st December rise by more than 3%, a corresponding percentage adjustment is made. (This threshold. initially 2%. 
was raised to 3% in the 19lst report.) 
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Estimates take account of the financial implications of the creation of four new posts (three as 
from 1st July 1988 and one as from 1st September 1988) and the payment of the various allowances cor-
responding to the family position of officials transferred from the Paris ministerial organs to the 
Assembly. 
The organogram of the Office of the Clerk is given at Appendix I. A list of officials, showing their 
grades, is given at Appendix 11. 
Sub-Head 3 
Estimated expenditure for " Social charges " is based on commitments stemming from: 
- application of the social security agreement signed between Western European Union and the 
Government of the French Republic on 2nd June 1979 (Sub-Head 3.1) 2; 
- application of the convention on complementary collective insurance (Sub-Head 3.2) 3; 
- application of Article 27 of the Staff Rules providing for the employer's contribution to the 
Provident Fund, amounting to 14% of basic salary, for staff not affiliated to the pension scheme 
(Sub-Head 3.3). 
Sub-Head 4 
No officials are expected to leave in 1989. Estimates under this sub-head are therefore given pro mem. 
Sub-Head 5 
The sum requested is to cover the cost of the medical check-up which all members of the staff 
must undergo under Article 9 of the Staff Rules. Medical check-ups for WEU staff in Paris are carried 
out at the OECD medical centre. 
Head 11- Temporary staff 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for for expCIIlditure expenditure 
1989 1988 in 1988 in 1987 
Sub-Head 6 - Staff recruited for sessions ofthe 
Assembly 
6.1. Sittings service 1 107 000 
6.2. Interpretation service 419 000 
6.3. Translation service 800 000 
6.4. Other services 40000 
2 366 000 2 285 000 2 190 000 2 173 508 
Sub-Head 7 - Interpretation staff required for 
Assembly work between sessions 550 000 500 000 533 000 517 320 
Sub-Head 8 - Temporary staff for the Office of 
the Clerk 30000 80 000 64000 104 637 
Sub-Head 9 - Social charges 
9.1. Insurance for temporary staff 
other than interpreters 12 000 
9.2. Provident fund for inter-
preters 120 000 
9.3. Insurance for interpreters 5 000 
137 000 129 000 110 000 92 600 
TOTAL OF HEAD 11 3 083 000 2 994 000 2 897 000 2 888 065 
2. Under this agreement, WEU staff benefit from the French general scheme, with the exception of family allowances and old-age 
pensions. 
3. Under this convention, WEU staff benefit from complementary insurance in the event of sickness or temporary or permanent 
disability. Furthermore, in the event of the death of an insured person, the insurance company pays a lump sum to the benefici-
aries he has named. 
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Explanations 
Sub-Head 6 
Estimates under this sub-head relate to: 
(a) Salaries and, where appropriate, per diem allowances, allowances for travelling time and the reim-
bursement of travelling expenses of temporary staff recruited for sessions (sittings, interpretation and 
translation services). A list of such staff, showing their respective duties and salaries, is given at 
Appendix Ill. 
Salaries are calculated in accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1987 in the co-ordinated 
organisations (on the basis of salaries paid to permanent staff of comparable grades), adjusted in the 
same way as for permanent staff, the rate of increase being 6.33%. These adjustments amount to 
F 124 602. 
In application of the agreement signed between the co-ordinated organisations and the Interna-
tional Association of Conference Interpreters (IACI), the salaries of interpreters are calculated on the 
basis of the scale in force for grade L4.8 staff, increased by 6%. 
(b) Lump-sum payments made to staff recruited for various services during sessions (doctor, post 
office technician, typewriter mechanic, etc.). 
Sub-Head 7 
This sub-head shows the sums paid to interpreters recruited for simultaneous interpretation at 
meetings of parliamentarians between sessions (salaries and where appropriate per diem allowances, 
travelling time and travelling expenses). 
Estimates are based on a total of 160 working days (of which 60 in Paris and 100 elsewhere). Sal-
aries and working conditions are the same as for interpreters recruited for sessions (cf. Sub-Head 6). 
Their salary adjustment for 1989 amounts to F 38 000. 
Sub-Head 8 
Estimates under this sub-head relate to the salaries of additional staff of all grades which the 
Office of the Clerk may have to recruit in 1989. They include an overall sum for salaries, possible trav-
elling expenses and insurance. The sum requested is far lower than in 1988 since it is expected that fewer 
staff will have to be recruited from outside due to the creation of two new grade B3 posts authorised in 
1988. 
Sub-Head 9 
Estimates under this sub-head correspond to the following social charges: 
Insurance for temporary staff other than interpreters 
Staff recruited for Assembly sessions are insured with the Van Breda insurance company against 
the risks of death, accident or sickness, 60% of the premium being paid by the Office of the Clerk and 
40% by staff. The estimates take account of the updating of the capital and premium as from May 1988. 
Provident fund for interpreters 
In accordance with the agreement between the co-ordinated organisations and the IACL WEU 
has to pay into the conference interpreters' fund or, where appropriate, another provident fund, a contri-
bution of 14%, which is added to a contribution of 7% by interpreters. 
Insurance for interpreters 
A Lloyds insurance policy, taken out through the intermediary of Stewart Wrightson in London, 
covers interpreters for accidents, sickness and temporary or permanent disability preventing them from 
working. The premium of 1.1% of their fees (lower rate) is divided between the Office of the Clerk (0. 7%) 
and the interpreters (0.4%). 
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Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for for expenditure expenditure 
1989 1988 in 1988 in 1987 
Sub-Head 10 - Share of joint expenditure on 
the Paris premises 438 000 424 000 402 000 344 946 
Sub-Head 11 - Hire of committee rooms 15 000 15 000 - 2 924 
Sub-Head 12 - Technical and other installa-
tions for Assembly sessions 407 000 365 000 395 000 387 249 
Sub-Head 13 - Various services for the organ-
isation of sessions 47 000 45 000 46 000 37 948 
Sub-Head 14 - Maintenance of the premises of 
the Office of the Clerk 18 000 18 000 5 000 1 261 
Sub-Head 15 - Purchase or repair of office fur-
niture 67 000 43 000 43 000 32 793 
Sub-Head 16 - Purchase of reproduction and 
other office equipment 10 500 11 000 11 000 29 054 
Sub-Head 17 - Hire and maintenance of repro-
duction and other equipment 440 000 372 000 383 000 381 511 
TOTAL OF HEAD Ill 1 442 500 1 293 000 1 285 000 1 217 686 
Explanations 
Sub-Head 10 
Sums requested under this sub-head cover the Assembly's 30% share of joint expenditure on the 
Paris premises as calculated by the single WEU agency, which is responsible for managing such expend-
iture. 
Sub-Head 11 
For meetings outside Paris, Assembly bodies normally have committee rooms with simultaneous 
interpretation equipment made available to them by the national delegations concerned. However, in 
certain cases the Assembly may have to pay for hire of a room or the cost of installing portable interpre-
tation equipment in rooms not so equipped. Sums requested under this sub-head are to allow the 
Assembly to cover such expenditure if necessary. 
Sub-Head 12 
As its title indicates, this sub-head relates to expenditure for the installation of simultaneous inter-
pretation equipment, telephone booths, telex, two metal-detecting doors necessary for improving 
secU:rity measures, screens, etc., in the premises of the Economic and Social Council during Assembly 
sesswns. 
Estimates take account of the foreseeable rise of 3% in the cost of services in 1989. 
Sub-Head 13 
Expenditure under this sub-head relates to contracts for the provision of various services during 
Assembly sessions (removal of equipment, cleaning of premises loaned by the Economic and Social 
Council, etc.). 
Estimates take account of the foreseeable rise of 3% in the cost of services in 1989. 
Sub-Head 14 
The same sum is requested as for the previous financial year to allow minor repairs to be carried 
out to the premises of the Office of the Clerk. 
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Sub-Heads 15, 16 and 17 
Sums under these sub-heads are justified by the five-year modernisation and maintenance pro-
gramme for equipment given at Appendix V to this budget. 
Head IV- General administrative costs 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
Sub-Heads for for expenditure expenditure 
1989 1988 in 1988 in 1987 
Sub-Head 18 - Postage, telephone, telex and 
transport of documents 500 000 490 000 490 000 461 070 
Sub-Head 19 - Duplication paper, headed writ-
ing paper and other office sup-
plies 270 000 264 000 260 000 258 926 
Sub-Head 20 - Printing and publication of 
documents 1 238 000 1 214 000 900 000 836 802 
Sub-Head 21 - Purchase of documents 63 000 60000 60000 55 160 
Sub-Head 22 - Official cars 115 000 115 000 100 000 165 470 
Sub-Head 23 - Bank charges 500 500 500 15 
TOTAL OF HEAD IV 2 186 500 2 143 500 1 810 500 1 777 443 
Explanations 
Sub-Head 18 
The increase ofF 10 000 as compared with 1988 is calculated on the basis of an average inflation 
rate of 2%, this being the minimum foreseeable. In view of the increase in the Assembly's work, 
involving a considerable increase in the cost of the various means of communication, steps have been 
taken to reduce the cost of mailing documents as far as possible. 
Sub-Head 19 
In spite of the considerable increase in reproduction work and the larger number of staff in the 
Office of the Clerk, the increase in the estimate as compared with 1988 is slight and is due solely to the 
variation of prices in this sector. 
Sub-Head 20 
Estimates under this sub-head take into account the expected increase in costs (2%). 
Sub-Head 21 
There is a slight increase in estimates under this sub-head as compared with 1988 due to the need 
to purchase a wider range of documentation essential for the preparation of studies and reports. 
Sub-Head 22 
Expenditure relating to the hire of a chauffeur-driven car when the President of the Assembly is in 
Paris and the cost of servicing, repairs and insurance for the official car are charged to this sub-head. 
Costs for the latter are increasing from year to year and consideration will have to be given to replacing 
this official car, which was registered in 1981. 
Estimates for 1989 remain unchanged compared with 1988 as it is expected that there will be less 
need to hire a car for the President of the Assembly. 
Sub-Head 23 
The estimate of F 500 remains unchanged. 
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Head V - Other expenditure 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual Sub-Heads for for 
1989 1988 expenditure expenditure 
Sub-Head 24 - Travelling and subsistence 
allowances and insurance for 
the President of the Assembly, 
Chairmen of committees and 
rapporteurs 160 000 155 000 155 000 164 547 
Sub-Head 25 - Expenses for representation 220 000 210 000 220 000 199 856 
Sub-Head 26 - Committee study missions 5 000 5 000 - 3 006 
Sub-Head 27 - Official journeys of members of 
the Office of the Clerk 400 000 370 000 450 000 392 556 
Sub-Head 28 - Expenses of experts and the 
auditor 70 000 60000 71000 55 363 
Sub-Head 29 - Expenditure on information 410 000 320 000 390 000 354 988 
Sub-Head 30 - Expenses for political groups 336 000 327 000 327 000 311 000 
Sub-Head 31 - Contingencies and other 
expenditure not elsewhere pro-
vided for 3 000 3 000 - 650 
Sub-Head 32 - Non-recoverable taxes 20000 20000 20 000 18 670 
TOTAL OF HEAD V 1 624 000 1 470 000 1 633 000 1 500 636 
Explanations 
Sub-Head 24 
The cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for members of the Assembly for sessions and 
committee meetings is borne by the governments of member countries as are those of members of the 
Bureau and Presidential Committee. 
The Assembly bears the cost of travelling and subsistence allowances for the President of the 
Assembly on official visits and of rapporteurs and, when appropriate, committee chairmen when these 
visits are connected with the preparation of a report or the running of the Assembly. Journeys by com-
mittee chairmen and rapporteurs are subject to approval by the Presidential Committee. 
Estimates take account of the foreseeable rise in per diem allowances and travelling expenses. 
Sub-Head 25 
The increase of 4.76% compared with the 1988 budget, based on experience, is due mainly to the 
foreseeable rise in the cost of meals in different types of restaurant in the Paris area. 
Sub-Head 26 
Sums under this sub-head are to cover extraordinary expenditure linked with committee study 
missions. As these sums cannot be foreseen accurately, the same amount has been requested as last year. 
Sub-Head 27 
The 8.1% increase in sums requested for 1989 compared with last year is justified by: 
- the increase in per diem allowances approved by the Council with effect from 1st July 1988 
(229th report of the Co-ordinating Committee of government budget experts); 
- the increased activities of the Assembly which require more frequent travel by members of the 
Office of the Clerk for organising and holding meetings and visits of the various Assembly com-
mittees. Meetings and visits are authorised by the Presidential Committee on the basis of half-
yearly programmes of work submitted by the various committees and of sums available in the 
budget. 
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Sub-Head 28 
Estimates for 1989 have been increased by F 10 000 over the previous financial year to secure the 
assistance of experts for the colloquy to be held in Florence in March 1988. 
Sub-Head 29 
The increase ofF 90 000 is requested mainly to allow the press service to improve its methods of 
work, as explained in the explanatory memorandum. 
Sub-Head 30 
The estimate under this sub-head is divided between the political groups. By decision ofthe Presi-
dential Committee, each group has an equal fixed share and a further sum in proportion to the number 
of members listed. Also by decision of the Presidential Committee, as from the financial year 1987, the 
political groups have had to submit balance sheets at the close of the financial year. All these balance 
sheets are appended to the accounts of the Assembly and are consequently subject to verification by the 
auditor. 
Sub-Heads 31 and 32 
The same amounts are requested as for 1988. 
PART 1: OPERATING BUDGET 
Section B - Receipts 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
for for receipts receipts 
1989 1988 in 1988 in 1987 
1. Sales of publications 25 000 50 000 30 000 34 571 
2. Bank interest 100 000 200 000 100 000 60 523 
3. Social security reimbursements 10000 10000 10 000 58 569 
4. Levy on basic salaries of Grade A officials - - - -
ToTAL REcEIPTs 135 000 260 000 140 000 153 663 
Explanations 
Estimates for the sale of publications, bank interest and social security reimbursements are calcu-
lated on the basis of experience. It should be pointed out that bank interest in 1988 is far less than esti-
mated due to lower interest rates for deposits and to lower credit balances, as explained in the explan-
atory memorandum. 
In accordance with the decisions of the Council, no levies are planned on the basic salaries of 
grade A officials. 
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Section A - Expenditure 
Head I - Pensions, allowances and social charges 
Estimates Budget 
Sub-Heads for for 
1989 1988 
Sub-Head 1 - Pensions and leaving 
allowances 
1.1. Retirement pensions 2 466 000 
1.2. Invalidity pensions 228 000 
1.3. Survivors' pensions 52 000 
1.4. Orphans' or dependants' 
pensions -
1.5. Leaving allowances -
2 746 000 2 429 000 
Sub-Head 2 - Family allowances 
2.1. Household allowances 110 400 
2.2. Children's and other 
dependants' allowances 40 600 
2.3. Education allowances 40000 
191 000 192 000 
Sub-Head 3- Supplementary insurance 73 000 65 000 
TOTAL OF HEAD I 3 010 000 2 686 000 
Explanations 
Sub-Heads 1 and 2 
In 1989, the Assembly will be paying thirteen pensions, as follows: 
- eleven old-age pensions; 
- one invalidity pension; 
- one survivor's pension. 
DOCUMENT 1154 
Expected Actual 
expenditure expenditure 
m 1988 in 1987 
2 473 837 1 379 372 
178 706 67 330 
70 450 36 475 
2 722 993 1 483 177 
Estimates for expenditure under these two sub-heads are calculated in accordance with the provi-
sions of the pension scheme rules. 
Sub-head 3 
Pensioners are insured against the risk of sickness in accordance with Article 19bis of the col-
lective convention in force. 
Estimates for expenditure under this sub-head correspond to the proportion of the premium paid 
by the Assembly. 
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PART II: PENSIONS BUDGET 
Section B - Receipts 
Estimates Budget Expected Actual 
for for receipts receipts 
1989 1988 in 1988 in 1987 
Contributions by permanent officials 504 000 464 000 450 000 431 823 
Explanations 
Estimated receipts are calculated on the basis of contributions to the pension scheme paid by per-
manent staff of the Office of the Clerk of the Assembly (7% of basic salary) affiliated to the pension 
scheme. 
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Grade 
H. C. 
A6 
A5 
A4 
A2 
A2 
B6 
B4 
B3 
B3 
B3 
C6 
C4 
APPENDIX 11 
Table of establishment of the Office of the Clerk 
of the Assembly for 1989 
Duties 
Clerk 
Clerk Assistants 
Counsellors 
First secretaries 
Controller; Head of private office 
Translators ; Documentalist 
Chief accountant 
Qualified assistants 
Accountant 
Bilingual shorthand-typists 
Switchboard operator 
Head of documents reproduction service 
Assistants in documents reproduction service 
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1 
2 
4 
2 
2 
3 
1 
7 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Salaries of staff recruited for Assembly sessions 
1. Sittings service 
Daily 
Duties Number No. of remu- Total Total days neratwn F F 
F* 
Counsellors to the President of Assembly ........ 1 a 16 915 14 640 
1 b 18 1 545 27 810 42 450 
Heads of sections .............................. 1 a 8 875 7 000 
2b 10 1 413 28 260 
1 a 8 1 236 9 888 45 148 
Sergeant-at-arms ............................... 1b 16 1 265 20240 20 240 
Parliamentary secretaries ....................... 2a 8 751 12 016 
2b 10 1 265 25 300 37 316 
Precis writers •••••• 0 0 ••• 0 ••••• 0 0 0 ••••••••••••• 3a 8 635 15 240 
3b 10 1 265 37 950 53 190 
Verbatim reporters • 0 •• 0. 0 0 0 ••••• 0 •••• 0 0 0 0 •• 0 0. 7a 8 1 101 61 656 
14 b 10 1 265 177 100 238 756 
Assistants ..................................... 10 a 8 386 30 880 
2a 16 386 12 352 
1 a 22 386 8 492 
1 b 18 728 13 104 
1b 12 728 8 736 
23 b 10 728 167 440 
6b 10 786 47 160 288 164 
Head usher ................................... 1 a 10 353 3 530 
Installations usher ............................. 1 a 24 353 8 472 
Ushers: 
Security control •••• 0 ••• 0 0 ••••••••• 0 •• 0 0 ••• 0 0 5a 8 320 12 800 
Sittings office 0 0 0 ••• 0 ••••••• 0. 0 0 0 •••••••••• 0. 4a 8 320 10 240 
4b 10 662 26 480 
Messengers .................................. 3a 10 320 9 600 
Cloakroom attendant ••••••• 0 0 0 0 •• 0 •••• 0 ••••• 1 a 8 320 2 560 
Offset-assemblers .............................. 13a 10 320 4,1 600 
Mechanic ............................... 1 a 8 320 2 560 117 842 
115 843 106 
Adjustment for 1989 ....................................................... 53 369 
896 475 
Travelling expenses ........................................................ 210 000 
1 106 475 
Rounded up to 1 107 000 
* In accordance with scales in force on 1st July 1987. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
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2. Interpretation service 
Duties Number No. of Total days F 
Interpreters ................................. 8a 8 380 000 6b 10 
14 380 000 
Adjustment for 1989 ....................................................... 24 054 
404 054 
Travelling expenses •• 0. 0 •• 0 •• 0 •••• 0 0 ••••• 0 ••••• 0 •••••••• 0 ••••••••••••••• 0 0. 15 000 
419 054 
Rounded up to 419 000 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
N.B. On 1st July 1987, the daily remuneration of interpreters amounted to F 2 586. In addition, interpreters recruited outside 
Paris are entitled to payment for time spent in travelling (one or two half days as appropriate), a daily allowance (per diem) corres-
ponding to that of a Grade L4 permanent official, plus reimbursement of their travelling expenses. 
3. Translation service 
Daily 
Duties Number remuneration Estimates 1 Total 
F F 
Revisers .................... 3a 1 021 76 575 
4b 1 651 165 100 241 675 
Translators .................. 3a 802 60 150 
5b 1 432 179 000 239 150 
Assistants ................... 5a 386 67 550 
2a 444 31 080 
4b 728 101 920 
2b 786 55 020 255 570 
28 736 395 
Adjustment for 1989 ....................................................... 46 613 
783 008 
Travelling expenses •••••••••••••••• 0 0 •••• 0 ••••••••••••••• 0 0 •• 0 •••• 0 •••••••• 17 000 
800 008 
Rounded up to 800 000 
I. Based on 25 days for revisers and translators and 35 days for assistants. 
a. Recruited locally. 
b. Recruited outside Paris. 
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Ref. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
APPENDIX IV 
Five-year modernisation and maintenance programme for the equip1$ent 
of the Office of the Clerk 
(The estimates given may fluctuate with the trend of prices) 
Modernisation and Budgets Equipment 
equipment programme 1989 1990 1991 1992 
A. Reproduction 
equipment 
1 RX 1065 photocopier Hire (rate blocked). 39 600 57 600 74000 74000 
Maintenance. 25 000 25 000 25 000 25 000 
1 RX 3107 photocopier Property of the Assembly. 
Maintenance (blocked rate). 2200 2200 2200 2 200 
4 Gestetner offset 1 type 311 (1984). 
machines Maintenance (indexed rate). 8 100 8 100 8 100 8100 
1 type 329 (1985). 
Maintenance (indexed rate). 5 500 5 500 5 500 5 500 
1 type 339 ( 1986). 
Maintenance (indexed rate). 6 500 6 500 6 500 6 500 
1 type 2200. 
Maintenance. 750 750 75@ 750 
3 Electrostatic 1 Gestetner PM/9 ( 1980) 
stereotypers. No maintenance contract. 
1 Gestetner DT 1 (1985). 
Maintenance (annual indexed 
rate). 1400 1400 1400 1 400 
1 Gestetner 100 PM ( 1986). 
Maintenance (annual indexed 
rate). 2 850 2 850 2 850 2 850 
1 Gestetner 1 00 Purchased in 1978, this machine 
binding machine is in good condition. The old 
maintenance contract has been 
cancelled in the light of expe-
rience. 
1 Logabas-Ordina 7630 Purchased in 1977, this machine 
assembling machine is serviced when required, since 
with stapling the cost of a maintenance 
machine contract is exorbitant. The 
estimate is based on experience. 5 000 5000 5 000 5 000 
1 AM International Property of the Assembly. 
addressograph 5000 Maintenance (indexed rate). 3 800 3 800 3 800 3 800 
1 Fortematic 655 This machine is serviced when 
' 
paper-cutting required. A single annual service 
machine is enough to keep it in good 
working order. 700 700 700 700 
1 Orpo-Planax Property of the Assembly. 
binding machine Normal maintenance by the staff 
concerned is enough to keep it in 
good working order. 
l Orpo-Thermatic Property of the Assembly. 
binding machine Normal maintenance by the staff 
concerned is enough to keep it in 
good working order. 
77 
1993 
74000 
25 000 
2 200 
8 100 
5 500 
6 500 
750 
1 400 
2 850 
5 000 
3 800 
700 
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Ref. 
No. Equipment 
B. Typewriters and 
calculators 
(a) Office of the Clerk 
Modernisation and 
equipment programme 
11 8 01ivetti ET 121 Purchased between 1981 and 
electronic typewriters 1983, these typewriters are in 
very good condition. 
12 1 Olivetti ET 221 Purchased in 1983, this type-
electronic typewriter writer 1s m very good 
13 1 Olympia SGE 51 
long-carriage 
electric typewriter 
(French keyboard) 
14 3 Olivetti calculating 
machines 
15 
16 
17 
(b) For use during 
sessions 
6 Olympia SGE 51 
electric typewriters 
(2 English keyboards 
4 French keyboards) 
4 RX 60 15 electronic 
typewriters 
(English keyboard) 
1 IBM electronic 
typewriter 
(French keyboard) 
18 2 ET 109 
(Italian keyboard) 
18 bis 1 Editor electric 
typewriter 
(Italian keyboard) 
19 21 Olympia 
mechanical 
typewriters 
( 19 with English 
keyboards, 2 with 
French keyboards) 
condition. 
This machine is part of the old 
stock and will remain in service 
as long as possible. 
These machines are in good 
working order. 
These machines are part of the 
old stock and are assigned to 
national delegations. 
These machines were purchased 
in 1986 and are assigned to 
session services. 
Assigned to the sittings office. 
Assigned to the Italian Dele-
gation and the Italian summary 
reporters in replacement of two 
other Olivetti electric typewriters 
no longer in stock. 
Purchased between 1966 and 
1979, these typewriters are used 
only occasionally because they 
are old models and the staff are 
no longer used to working on 
such machines. It is planned to 
keep the best of them in reserve 
in case of electricity cuts. 
20 Electronic typewriters To meet the requirements of the 
various services during Assembly 
sessions, and subject to the pos-
sible purchase of other type-
writers, the following hire pro-
gramme is envisaged for each 
session: 
- 13 machines with English 
keyboards 
- 15 machines with French 
APPENDIX IV 
Budgets 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
keyboards. 30 600 30 600 30 600 30 600 30 600 
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No. 
21 
Equipment 
(c) Maintenance and 
repairs 
C. Miscellaneous 
equipment 
22 2 UHER 5000 
dictaphones 
1 Sony BM 80 
~2 bis 1 UHER 4000 
dicta phone 
23 11 Grundig Stenorette 
dictaphones 
Modernisation and 
equipment programme 
All typewriters and calculators 
are serviced twice a year, before 
each session, by a mechanic 
recruited for the purpose. 
However, a lump sum should be 
earmarked for possible repairs at 
other times. 
Purchased in 1971 and 1987, 
these dictaphones are in good 
condition. It is not planned to 
replace them in the period 1989-
1992. 
To purchase. 
Purchased between 1963 and 
1987, these dictaphones are in 
good condition. It is not planned 
to replace them in the period 
1989-1990. 
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Budgets 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
7000 7 000 7 000 7000 7 000 
10 500 
24 1 Grandjean Purchased in 1974, this machine 
stenotyping machine is in good working order. 
25 
D. Word processors 
and computers 
26 10 Word processors/ 
computers 
9 Olivetti 
ETS 2010 
1 Olivetti M 24 
E. Office furniture 
27 Various offices 
28 Various offices 
Provision for an overall sum in 
the budget for possible repairs to 
equipment in this category. 4 000 
These have been hired on a five-
year leasing basis. The two 
contracts expire m December 
1989, September 1991 and March 
1993 respectively. 
4 000 4 000 4000 4000 
Cost of hire. 240 000 116 000 95 000 34 000 23 000 
Maintenance contract (indexed). 57 000 57 000 57 000 57 000 57 000 
Purchase of computer desks for 
three word-processor operators. 32 000 
Replacement of various items of 
furniture 35 000 35 000 35 000 35 000 35 000 
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Breakdown by budget classification 
Budget classification Ref. No. Budgets 
Head Sub-Head in programme 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Ill 15. Purchase or repair of office furniture 27 32000 - - - -
28 35 000 35 000 35 000 35 000 35 000 
67000 35 000 35 000 35 000 35 000 
Ill 16. Purchase of reproduction and other 
office equipment 22 bis 10 500 - - - -
Ill 17. Hire and maintenance of reproduction 
and other office equipment 1 64 600 82 600 99000 99 000 99 000 
2 2200 2 200 2 200 2200 2 200 
3 20 850 20 850 20 850 20 850 20 850 
4 4 250 4 250 4 250 4250 4250 
6 5000 5000 5 000 5 000 5 000 
7 3 800 3 800 3 800 3 800 3 800 
8 700 700 700 700 700 
20 30600 30 600 30600 30 600 30600 
21 7000 7000 7000 7000 7 000 
25 4000 4000 4000 4000 4000 
26 297 000 173 000 152 000 91 000 80000 
440 000 334 000 329 400 268 400 257 400 
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APPENDIX V 
Trend of the Assembly budget from 1988 to 1989 
1988 1988 %b-a 1989 %c-b 
revised a b 
a b c 
A. Operating budget 
Head I. Permanent staff 10 205 000 10 772 000 5.55 11 858 000 10.08* 
Head 11. Temporary staff 2 994 000 2 994 000 - 3 083 000 2.97 
Head Ill. Expenditure premises 
and equipment 1 293 000 1 293 000 - 1 442 500 11.56 
Head IV. General administrative ' 
costs 2 143 500 2 143 500 - 2 186 500 2.00 
Head V. Other expenditure 1 470 000 1 470 000 - 1 624 000 10.48 
Total expenditure 18 105 500 18 672 500 3.13 20 194 000 8.14* 
Receipts 260 000 260 000 - ' 135 000 -48.07 
Net Total 17 845 500 18 412 500 3.17 20 059 000 8.94* 
B. Pensions budget 
Pensions and leaving allowances 2 396 000 2 686 000 12.10 3 010 000 12.06 
Receipts 440 000 464 000 5.45 504 000 8.62 
Net Total 1 956 000 2 222 000 13.59 2 506 000 12.78 
GENERAL NET TOTAL (A+ B) 19 801 500 20 634 500 4.20 22 565 000 9.35* 
* If account is taken of the creation of four new posts, included for part of 1988 and the whole of 1989, growth rates become 
4.47 %, 4.91 %, 4.98% and 5.55% respectively. 
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APPENDIX VI 
Percentage of credits under the various heads of the operating budgets for 1988 revised and 1989 
Revised budget for 1988 1989 
%of %of 
Amount Amount 
A B A B 
A. Operating budget 
Head I. - Permanent staff 10 772 000 57.69 58.50 11 858 000 58.72 59.12 
Head 11. - Temporary staff 2 994 000 16.03 16.26 3 083 000 15.27 15.37 
Head Ill. - Premises and equipment 1 293 000 6.93 7.02 1 442 500 7.14 7.19 
Head IV. - General administrative 
costs 2 143 500 11.48 11.65 2 186 500 10.83 10.90 
Head V. - Other expenditure 1 470 000 7.87 7.98 1 624 000 8.04 8.09 
TOTAL A (expenditure) 18 672 500 100.00 101.41 20 194 000 100.00 100.67 
Receipts 260 000 1.41 135 000 0.67 
TOTAL B (net) 18 412 500 100.00 20 059 000 100.00 
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APPENDIX VII 
Trend of the pensions budget 
(1984 = 100) 
Year Net total Index 
1984 336 000 100 
1985 300 500 89 
1986 546 000 162 
1987 1 057 050 314 
1988 2 222 000 661 
1989 2 506 000 745 
N.B. Until 1983, receipts exceeded expenditure. 
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Draft budget of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly for the financial year 1989 1 
Opinion of the Council 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
APPENDICES 
I. The Secretary-General's note on the WEU Assembly draft budget for 1989 
11. Letter from Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General ofWEU, to Mr. Moulias, Clerk of 
the Assembly 
Ill. Table showing modifications approved by the Council 
Explanatory Memorandum 
1. The draft budget ofthe Assembly for 1989, 
transmitted to the Council for its prior opinion 
in accordance with Rule 48.3 of the Rules of Pro-
cedure of the Assembly, was examined very 
closely by the WEU Budget and Organisation 
Committee. Having noted that the total oper-
ating budget - even when account was taken of 
Assembly estimates 
Head II ...................... 3 083 000 
Head Ill 0 •• 0 ••••••• 0 0 ••• 0 •••• 1 442 500 
Head IV 0 •••• 0. 0. 0 •• 0 •• 0. 0 ••• 2 186 500 
Head V ...................... 1 624 000 
8 336 000 
2. At its meeting in London on 15th 
November 1988, the Presidential Committee 
examined the abovementioned reductions. It 
considered that the reduction ofF 336 000 in the 
total operating budget did not seem liable to 
have a serious effect on the Assembly's activities. 
However, it decided to charge to Head IV the 
reduction ofF 24 000 recommended for Head V 
since the latter concerns particularly the work of 
the various Assembly bodies. 
3. In accordance with this decision, the 
initial draft budget has been reduced by 
F 336 000. The draft operating budget of the 
Assembly is thus reduced from F 20 059 000 to 
F 19 723 000, i.e. a nominal rate of increase of 
7.11% compared with the previous budget and a 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
the implications of the four new posts created in 
the Office of the Clerk - exceeded the zero 
growth rate, that committee proposed the fol-
lowing reductions in estimates under Heads 11 to 
V, the Assembly being left free to make the nec-
essary adjustments within each head (see 
Appendix I). 
Reductions Amended estimates 
83 000 3 000 000 
92 500 1 350 000 
136 500 2 050 000 
24000 1 600 000 
336 000 8 000 000 
real rate of increase of 3.83%. The difference 
between these two rates - as specified in the 
explanatory memorandum to Document 1154 -
is due to the fact that, since the four new posts in 
the Office of the Clerk were created in the second 
half of 1988, their financial implications affected 
the 1988 budget only partially. 
The net grand total (operating budget plus 
pensions budget) amounts to F 22 229 000, rep-
resenting a nominal increase of 7.73% compared 
with the budget for the previous financial year 
and a real increase of 4.80%. 
4. A breakdown of the total reduction of 
F 336 000 between the various heads of the 
operating budget is given at Appendix Ill. 
Members of the committee: Mr. Linster, (Chairman); Mrs. Pack, Mr. Sinesio (Alternate: Giagu Demartini) (Vice-Chairmen); 
MM. Biefnot, Bohl, Chartron, Mrs. Blunck (Alternate: Ahrens), Mr. Dhaille, Dame Peggy Fenner, MM. Greco (Alternate: 
Fassmo), de Jong (Alternate: de Kwaadsteniet), Klejdzmski, Morris, Noerens, Oehler, Rathbone, Rauti, Redmond, Triglia, 
Worrell, Zierer (Alternate: Buchner). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in Italics. 
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APPENDIX I 
Secretary-General's Note 
WEU Assembly draft budget for 1989 
1. The WEU Assembly draft budget for 1989 (Assembly Document 1154 of 27th September 1988) 
was circulated to the Budget and Organisation Committee on 11th October 1 !)88 under reference 
B (88) 24 and was examined during the committee's meeting on 8th November 1988 (BR (88) 2, to be 
circulated). 
2. As presented, the 1989 estimates were as follows: 
Operating budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 20 059 000 
Pensions budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 506 000 
Total ............................... F 22 565 000 
These figures resulted in increases over the total for 1988 (from the Assembly's draft supple-
mentary budget for 1988, C-B (88) 10) of 8.94% for the operating budget and. 9.35% for the total 
including pensions. Excluding the recent addition of four posts to the Assembly establishment table, 
these figures would become 4.98% and 5.55% respectively. 
3. The Budget and Organisation Committee's conclusions and recommendations are summarised 
below: 
General observations 
The principle of " zero real growth " was reconfirmed by all delegates as being applicable to the 
operating budgets of the Assembly, due allowance being granted in statistical comparisons for the four 
new posts added to the Assembly establishment table during the course of 1988. Delegates further 
acknowledged their obligation to preserve the financial autonomy accorded to the Assembly (C (87) 92, 
C (87) 123 and C (87) 142) and to this end limited their recommendations to total allocations of heads, 
although the discussions embraced all the detailed proposals for the sub-heads from which these are 
compiled. Appreciation was expressed of the clarity and attention to detail evident in the presentation of 
the 1989 proposals. It was generally agreed that these proposals were marginally in excess of the " zero 
real growth " ideal for operating costs. Since estimates of personnel costs (Head I} were considered real-
istic, reductions would be sought in other areas of the operating budget. The recommended amendments 
per head and in total are listed in Annex A. 
Head I - Permanent staff 
After examining the basis of the calculations of staff expenditure proposals for 1989 the com-
mittee concluded that no alteration should be sought. 
Head II- Temporary staff 
The committee discussed in detail the level of proposals in respect of temporary staff and were 
satisfied that these were subject to thorough control. It was considered that the proposed allocation of 
sub-head 8, temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk, was however of a provisional nature. Similar 
considerations on other sub-heads prompted the committee to recommend a reduction ofF 83 000 to 
the total of Head 11. 
Head Ill - Expenditure on premises and equipment 
Certain sub-heads are typical of the sharing of joint expenditure for the premises. From the full 
details of the modernisation and equipment proposals, it was concluded that economies could be 
achieved in the course of 1989 operations, enabling the committee to propose a reduction ofF 92 500 to 
the total of Head Ill. 
Head IV - General administrative costs 
Attention was focused upon the proposals regarding printing and publication of documents 
(sub-head 20) which it was recognised were within the scope of managerial control and subject to alter-
native methods of execution. A limited degree of inter-relation between this subject and the allocation 
proposed for sub-head 29 of Head V, expenditure on information, was noted. Before making a final 
decision the committee decided to review Head V. 
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Head V- Other expenditure 
Consideration was given to the public image of the Assembly, dependent to a certain amount 
upon activities represented by the financial proposals contained within this section. 
Section B receipts 
To complete their scrutiny of the operating budget the committee examined the estimations of 
1989 receipts. It was established that no connection could be drawn between sub-head 1, sale ofpublica-
tions, and the expenditure foreseen against sub-head 29 of Head V. It was noted that sub-head 4, levy, 
could now be deleted. 
Conclusions regarding Heads IV and V 
The committee felt that they had sufficiently explored the underlying details of the final heads of 
the operating budget to agree upon further reductions ofF 136 500 in Head IV and F 24 000 in respect 
ofHead V. 
Part // - Pensions budget 
The proposals contained in this part of the draft budget were accepted by the committee. 
4. As a result of the foregoing recommendations, as summarised in Annex A, the estimates of the 
Assembly draft 1989 budget would be amended as follows: 
Operating budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . F 20 059 000 336 000 19 723 000 
Pensions budget ................. . F 2 506 000 2 506 000 
Total ....................... . F 22 565 000 336 000 22 229 000 
5. The increase over the supplementary budget for 1988 (which included F 6 000 brought forward 
from 1987) would be: 
Operating budget ........... . 
Pensions budget ............ . 
Total budget ............... . 
7.11% (operating budget excluding Head I = 2. 94%) 
12.78% 
7.73% 
When allowing for the effect of the four new staff posts the committee was of the opinion that this 
result was commensurate with expected inflation levels in France and satisfied the general concept of 
" zero real growth ". 
6. The committee could recommend the Council to give a favourable opinion on the Assembly's 
draft budget for 1989 as amended above. 
7. The Council's opinion will be sought at the next meeting to be held on 23rd November 1988. It is 
recalled that this opinion should be conveyed to the Assembly before the next part-session opens on 5th 
December 1989. 
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ANNEX A 
1989 draft budget of the Assembly 
Part I: Operating budget 
Initial less Amended = Reductions proposals allocations 
Section A: Expenditure 
Head I .................................... 11 858 000 11 858 000 -
Head 11 .................................... 3 083 000 3 000 000 - 83 000 
Head Ill .................................... 1442 500 1 350 000 - 92 500 
Head IV .................................... 2 186 500 2 050 000 - 136 500 
Head V .................................... 1 624 000 1 600 000 - 24000 
Sub-total ................................ 20 194 000 19858000 -336 000 
Section B: Receipts ..................... , ..... 135 000 135 000 -
Total .................................... 20 059 000 19 723 000 -336 000 
Part Il: Pensions budget 
Section A: Expenditure ........................ 3 010 000 3 010 000 -
Section B: Receipts ........................... 504 000 504 000 -
Total .................................... 2 506 000 2 506 000 -
Total 1989 budget 
Part I and Part 11 ............................ 22 565 000 22 229 000 -336 000 
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APPENDIX 11 
Letter from Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
to Mr. Moulias, Clerk of the Assembly 
APPENDIX 11 
London, 23rd November 1988 
I have the honour to inform you that, at its meeting today, the Council examined the draft budget 
of the Assembly for 1989 and, in accordance with the procedure in force, expressed a favourable opinion 
on this amended budget as given in document C-B (88) 16. 
I enclose copies of this documents. 
Mr. G. MouLIAS, 
Clerk of the Assembly of 
Western European Union, 
43, avenue du President-Wilson, 
75775 Paris Cedex 16. 
88 
Alfred CAHEN 
Secretary-General 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Table showing modifications approved by the Council 
Heads and Sub-Heads 
Head I- Permanent staff 
Sus-HEAD: 
1 - Basic salaries .......................... . 
2 - Allowances ............................ . 
3 - Social charges ......................... . 
4 - Expenses relating to the recruitment and 
departure of permanent officials ......... . 
Draft budget 
for 1989 
(initial) 
8 320 000 
1 899 000 
1 630 000 
5 - Medical examination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 000 
Reductions made 
by Budget and 
Organisation 
Committee 
' 
Draft budget 
for 1989 
(reduced) 
r---------~r---------~----------~ 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 858 000 
Head II- Temporary staff 
Sus-HEAD: 
6 - Staff recruited for sessions .............. . 
7 - Interpretation staff required for Assembly 
2 366 000 
11 858 000 
66000 2 300 000 
work between sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 550 000 - 550 000 
8 - Temporary staff for the Office of the Clerk 30 000 15 000 15 000 
9 - Social charges ......................... ·r--__ 13_7_0_0_0_+--__ 2_0_0_0_-+ __ 13_5_0_0_0----; 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 083 000 83 000 3 000 000 
Head Ill- Expenditure on premises and 
equipment 
Sus-HEAD: 
10 - Share of joint expenditure on the Paris 
premises . : ............................ . 
11 - Hire of committee rooms ............... . 
12 - Technical and other installations for 
Assembly sessions ..................... . 
13 - Various services for the organisation of ses-
sions ................................. . 
14 - Maintenance of the premises of the Office of 
the Clerk .............................. . 
15 - Purchase or repair of office furniture .... . 
16 - Purchase of reproduction and other office 
equipment ............................ . 
1 7 - Hire and maintenance of reproduction and 
438 000 
15 000 
407 000 
47 000 
18 000 
67000 
10 500 
38 000 
10000 
7000 
5 000 
17 000 
10 500 
400 000 
5 000 
400 000 
47000 
13000 
50000 
other office equipment .................. r---4_40 __ 00_0 __ -+ _____ 5 _00_0 ____ +---__ 4_3_5_0_0_0----1 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 442 500 92 500 1 350 000 
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Heads and Sub-Heads 
Head IV - General administrative costs 
SuB-HEAD: 
18 - Postage, telephone, telex and transport of 
documents ............................ . 
19 - Duplication paper, headed writing paper 
Draft budget 
for 1989 
(initial) 
500 000 
Reductions made 
by Budget and 
Organisation 
Committee 
Draft budget 
for 1989 
(reduced) 
500 000 
and other office supplies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270 000 - 270 000 
20 - Printing and pubication of documents . . . . 1 238 000 160 500 1 077 500 
21 - Purchase of documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 000 - 63 000 
22 - Official cars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 000 - 115 000 
23 - Bank charges ........................... I-------=-5-=-00.::.__-+--------!------=-50::..:0=-------J 
Total.................................. 2 186 500 160 500 2 026 000 
Head V - Other expenditure 
SuB-HEAD: 
24 - Travelling and subsistence allowances and 
insurance for the President of the Assembly, 
chairmen of committees and rapporteurs .. 
25 - Expenses for representation ............. . 
26 - Committee study missions .............. . 
27 - Official journeys of members of the Office 
160 000 
220 000 
5000 
160 000 
220 000 
5000 
of the Clerk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400 000 - 400 000 
28 - Expenses of experts and the auditor . . . . . . 70 000 - 70 000 
29 - Expenditure on information . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410 000 - 410 000 
30 - Expenses for political groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336 000 - 336 000 
31 - Contingencies and other expenditure not 
elsewhere provided for . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 000 - 3 000 
32 - Non-recoverable taxes ................... I-----=2-=-0-=0-=-0-=-0-1------------11----=-20:::....::.00.:..:0=----J 
Total.................................. 1 624 000 - 1 624 000 
OPERATING BUDGET • . . . . . . • • . . . . . • . . • . . . . . • • . . 20 194 000 336 000 19 858 000 
RECEIPTS ..................................... l----1-=-3-=-5....:0...:.0-=-0-l----------4f----..::.1.::..35::.....::..00.::..0~ 
GRAND ToTAL ........•..•.•...••...••....••.. t----20--'--05--'9--'0--'0...;..0 ---I---'3=-=3-=-6-=-0_;_00.::.__-+___;:1_;_9...:.7.::..23~00:....:0~ 
PENSIONS..................................... 3 010 000 - 3 010 000 
RECEIPTS ...................................... l---....:5....::0...:.4....:0...:.0.::..0_1----------4f-----=-5-=-04..:....:..00.::..0~ 
NET TOTAL PENSIONS BUDGET ................. ·l--__:2=....::..50::..:6:...0::..:0::.;0:._-+------------1r----=..2.::.5.::.06:::....::.00:::.:0~ 
NET TOTAL BUDGET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 22 565 000 - 22 229 000 
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First part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council 
to the Assembly of Western European Union 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
A. Introduction 
B. The work of the Council 
C. The work of the reinforced Council and the Special Working Grdup 
D. Enlargement 
E. Situation in the Gulf 
F. Institutional questions 
G. The work of the Mediterranean Sub-Group 
H. Defence resources 
I. WEU communications system 
J. Relations with the Assembly 
ANNEXES 
I. Enlargement negotiations 
11. Press guidelines circulated following the meetings on 15th February and 
11th May 1988 organised by the Netherlands Presidency on the Gulf 
Ill. Statement on recent events in the Gulf published by the Council of Min-
isters in The Hague on 19th April 1988 
A. Introduction 
1. This report covers the period from 1st 
January to 30th June 1988. During this period 
the WEU continued its process of revitalisation. 
In particular, the reinforced Council and the 
Special Working Group developed further as val-
uable fora for considering European security 
questions. The discussion of topical security 
questions in the first-mentioned body proved to 
be particularly useful. The reinforced Council 
was also instrumental in preparing the ground 
for the discussions now under way with Portugal 
and Spain about their possible accession. The 
European effort in support of freedom of navi-
gation in the Gulf demonstrated that the WEU 
can make a practical contribution to the pro-
tection of collective security interests and the 
decision was taken to invite Portugal and Spain 
to open negotiations with a view to their joining 
the WEU. WEU has an important role to play in 
defining and developing a European defence 
identity which will help strengthen the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
2. The active role of the WEU during this 
period was reflected in the growing number of 
tasks assigned to it by the Ministerial Council 
and the increasing number of meetings at all 
levels. Greater interest in the WEU was also 
91 
being shown both in Europe and elsewhere. The 
member states recognised the need to respond to 
this interest by improving the public relations 
effort of the organisation. One issue that was not 
resolved was that of restructuring. However, the 
lack of progress in the administration area has 
not been allowed to damage the real work of the 
WEU, namely the consideration of current 
security issues affecting Europe from both a 
defence planning and an arms control per-
spective. 
3. The work programme of the ministerial 
organs for the first half of 1988 was largely deter-
mined by the WEU ministerial meeting in The 
Hague on 26th and 27th October 1987. At that 
meeting, the platform on European security 
interests was adopted. In addition, ministers 
considered a number of questions including: 
- enlargement; 
- the restructuring of the ministerial 
organs; 
- security in the Mediterranean; 
- the setting up of a WEU communica-
tions system; 
- improved management of defence 
resources. 
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4. The work programme for the first half of 
1988 was designed to follow up these questions 
and to prepare for the ministerial meeting in The 
Hague on 18th and 19th April 1988. Although 
the Council has responsibility of co-ordinating 
the work programme, the Special Working 
Group produced the two main reports for min-
isters. These covered European security in a 
changing international environment and the 
question of enlargement to include Spain and 
Portugal. The issues of restructuring and the 
setting-up of a communications system were 
dealt with by the Council, while the Mediter-
ranean Sub-Group considered security in the 
region and the Defence Representatives Group 
questions concerning defence resources. Subse-
quent sections ofthis report will examine each of 
these areas in more detail. 
B. The work of the Council 
5. The primary role of the Permanent 
Council during the first half of 1988 continued to 
be the co-ordination of the work of the minis-
terial organs. To this end, the Council received 
regular reports about the work of the agencies 
and the working groups and sought to ensure the 
smooth running of the organisation. In addition, 
the Council examined a number of reports pre-
pared by the agencies in Paris. A number ofthese 
were subsequently passed to expert working 
groups for more detailed consideration. 
6. These reports included those on " The 
recent evolution of the Soviet attitude with 
regard to Western Europe and the impact of this 
evolution on security policy " which was trans-
mitted to the Assembly on 25th February 1988 
and on " The experience gained in verification of 
controls on forces and conventional arma-
ments " which was transmitted to the Assembly 
on 17th June 1988. 
7. The Council also held regular informal 
discussions on topical questions on security 
issues. Such discussions have helped member 
states to harmonise their views on a range of 
issues. One example of this was the Council's 
handling of the visit of United States Deputy 
Secretary of Defence Taft to a number of 
European capitals to discuss questions relating to 
burden-sharing. 
8. The Council kept the question of restruc-
turing of the ministerial organs under review. 
This question will be covered separately later in 
the report. 
9. It has been suggested that the Council 
should be restructured to take account of the fact 
that it is the reinforced Council and the Special 
Working Group who now take the lead in dealing 
with major political questions. It is generally 
agreed by member states that there could be 
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some advantage in such a restructuring. How-
ever, this could only be carried out as part of a 
more general restructuring of the ministerial 
organs. 
C. The work of the reinforced Council 
and the Special Working Group 
10. The reinforced Council, composed of 
political directors of the foreign ministries 
together with their defence ministry counter-
parts, and the Special Working Group were 
responsible for preparing much of the agenda for 
the WEU ministerial in The Hague in April. In 
particular, the group prepared a report on 
" European security in a changing international 
environment". This report considered the 
impact of developments in EastjWest relations 
on Europe's security interests and stimulated a 
valuable discussion at the ministerial meeting. 
11. The reinforced Council and the Special 
Working Group had useful exchanges of views 
on a number of key topics in the fields of 
European security and arms control. These 
included burden-sharing, prospects for conven-
tional and chemical arms control and short-
range nuclear weapons. Such discussions helped 
both to clarify the positions of member states 
and to identify specific European interests in 
these areas. 
12. The question of enlargement, which will 
be the subject of a subsequent section of this 
report, was also considered by the reinforced 
Council and the Special Working Group which 
were responsible for putting forward a recom-
mendation to ministers. 
13. At the Ministerial Council in The Hague 
on 18th and 19th April 1988, the Special 
Working Group was entrusted with two main 
tasks. The first was to prepare, under the 
authority of the Permanent Council, a report on 
how to give effect to the platform of European 
security interests for the November Ministerial 
Council. 
14. The report will concentrate on the need for 
closer co-operation between WEU member states 
on the basis of the platform. It will examine in 
particular: 
- the development of consultation 
between the member states; 
- member states' defence contributions; 
- the development of bi- and multilateral 
co-operative arrangements in order to 
reinforce common security; 
- armaments co-operation; 
- how to improve consultation on crises 
outside Europe which may affect their 
common security. 
15. The objective of the report will be to come 
forward with practical recommendations to 
enhance member states' contributions to the 
common defence. In this task, the Special 
Working Group will be assisted by the Defence 
Representatives Group and will work on the 
basis of contributions submitted by national del-
egations. 
16. The second major task resulted from the 
discussion on East/West relations that took place 
in The Hague. The WEU Ministerial Council 
instructed the Special Working Group, under the 
direction of the Permanent Council, to produce a 
report on arms control and European defence 
requirements. The ministerial mandate instructed 
the group to prepare its report on the basis of 
four fundamental questions: 
- the objectives of future negotiations on 
conventional stability seen from a 
European prospective; 
- the implications for Europe of possible 
developments in the START negotia-
tions; 
- the role of the conventional and nuclear 
components of deterrence for security in 
Europe; 
- defence burden-sharing within the 
Atlantic Alliance and possible initia-
tives from the European allies who are 
members of the WEU which aim at 
developing sound and balanced transat-
lantic relations. 
17. Work on this report began immediately 
after The Hague ministerial and it will be sub-
mitted to ministers for discussion at the London 
ministerial in November. 
18. The Special Working Group was also 
given responsibility for the conduct of the 
enlargement negotiations with Portugal and 
Spain. 
D. Enlargement 
19. WEU ministers, at their meeting in The 
Hague on 19th April, decided " to invite, in con-
formity with Article XI of the modified Brussels 
Treaty, Portugal and Spain to enter the necessary 
discussions with a view to their possible 
accession ". This invitation resulted from the 
conclusions of the October 1987 ministerial 
which laid down general principles relating to 
enlargement, notably that the WEU was not a 
closed shop and that enlargement must reinforce 
the organisation and not damage its cohesion. 
20. In its first meeting of January 1988, the 
Council considered the question of enlargement 
and instructed the Secretary-General to establish 
a basic dossier covering the political, juridical 
and practical aspects of enlargement. On the 
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basis of this, further discussions took place in 
both the Council and the Special Working 
Group. As a result of the political will of the 
member states, and the strong support of the 
Assembly for enlargement, it proved possible to 
reach agreement in time for the invitation 
referred to above to be issued to Spain and Por-
tugal at the April ministerial. The decision to 
invite Spain and Portugal to open negotiations 
with a view to becoming the first new members 
of the WEU for more than 30 years reflected 
their longstanding expressions of interest in 
joining the WEU and their willingness to accept 
the provisions of the modified Brussels Treaty, 
the Rome declaration and the platform. 
21. This was made clear by the preamble to 
the invitation to Spain and Portugal which stated 
that: " The Council of Ministers of the WEU 
took note of the fact that Portugal and Spain, 
fully engaged in the construdtion of Europe and 
members of the Atlantic Alliance, have formally 
indicated that they are ready to adhere to the 
modified Brussels Treaty, that they accept 
without reservation and in all their parts the 
Rome declaration of 27th October 1984 and the 
platform adopted at The Hague on 27th October 
1987 and that they are willing to participate fully 
to giving effect to them ". 
22. The opening session of the discussions 
with Portugal and Spain took place on 26th May 
in The Hague in the presence of political 
directors and of representatives of ministries of 
defence. The primary function of this session 
was to agree on the way in which the 
enlargement negotiations would be conducted 
(See Annex 1). 
23. The first sessions of substantive discus-
sions with both Portugal and Spain took place on 
21st June in London. At these meetings a pro-
gramme of work was agreed. 
E. Situation in the Gulf 
24. The Council, in the second part of its 
thirty-third report to the Assembly, referred to 
the co-ordination and co-operation which has 
taken place in the Gulf between WEU member 
states, in conformity with Article VIII of the 
modified Brussels Treaty. This action was taken 
at the initiative of the Netherlands Presidency. 
25. Since January 1988 this co-operation has 
continued. A number of mceetings have taken 
place between senior officials of the foreign and 
defence ministries of member states. The press 
guidelines that were issued following these 
meetings are included in the annex to this report 
(See Annex 11). 
26. In addition, at the Ministerial Council 
in The Hague on 18th and 19th April 1988, 
the Chairman-in-Office, Mr. van den Broek, 
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informed his colleagues of the latest information 
regarding military incidents in the Gulf. A dis-
cussion of the situation followed as a result of 
which a ministerial declaration was issued on 
19th April. This stressed in particular the impor-
tance of the early acceptance of UN Resolution 
598 by all sides and of the freedom of navigation 
in the Gulf. The full text of the declaration is in 
the annex to this report (See Annex Ill). 
27. Mr. van Eekelen, the Defence Minister of 
the Netherlands, noted during the press con-
ference which concluded the April Ministerial 
Council, that the WEU's action in the Gulf had 
proved justified and effective. For the first time, 
not only had Belgian and Dutch units operated 
under joint command and in close co-operation 
with British frigates, but also Italian mine-
sweepers had offered their assistance to the 
whole of the fleet in the area. For its part, France 
has maintained an aero-naval group in the region 
throughout the period and has participated, in 
co-ordination with its partners, in mine-
sweeping operations. The Federal Republic of 
Germany has provided back-fill naval forces in 
the Mediterranean and Luxembourg has made a 
financial contribution towards the cost of opera-
tions in the Gulf. 
28. Further consultations subsequently took 
place between Belgium, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom, leading to the signing of a 
memorandum setting up a common operational 
command for the ships of these three countries 
from 1st July 1988. In addition to this, there has 
been a close co-operation both between general 
staffs in capitals and between commanders in the 
field. 
29. From a European point of view, the 
WEU's activities in the Gulf have been 
extremely positive. They have demonstrated that 
close concertation and consultation between the 
WEU member states as well as operational 
co-ordination among the units in the area are 
possible and have shown that the WEU has an 
important role to play in considering a European 
approach to problems outside Europe. The activ-
ities in the Gulf have also demonstrated 
Europe's willingness to play a full part in 
assuming the risks and responsibilities of the 
common defence. This has been particularly 
important at a time when this subject has been 
assuming greater political importance both in 
Europe and the United States. The WEU's role 
has also attracted considerable media publicity 
which has helped to raise the organisation's 
profile. 
F. Institutional questions 
30. At its meeting of October 1987 in The 
Hague, the Ministerial Council decided to fuse 
the three agencies responsible for studying ques-
tions of security into a single agency under the 
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authority of the Secretary-General and endorsed, 
in principle, the collocation of the ministerial 
organs in a single place. 
31. Between January and April 1988, the Per-
manent Council and the Institutional Working 
Group considered this question in detail and 
produced a report for the April ministerial in 
The Hague. At this meeting, the Ministerial 
Council took the following decisions: 
- the contracts of members of the minis-
terial organs in Paris would be extended 
on 1st July 1988 for a period of six 
months; 
- within a period of two weeks the Secre-
tary-General would formulate new pro-
posals, to be considered by the Per-
manent Council, concerning the 
restructuring of the Paris organs in the 
prospective of future collocation. These 
proposals would take into account the 
wish of the Assembly to strengthen the 
Office of the Clerk. 
32. The Secretary-General produced his pro-
posals which are still under consideration. 
However, the President of the Council, Mr. van 
den Broek, in his speech to the Assembly on 8th 
June during the first part of the Assembly's 
thirty-fourth ordinary session announced that 
the Council could agree to the request for the 
Office of the Clerk to be strengthened. 
33. Although no decisions have yet been taken 
on the future restructuring of the organisation, 
this has not been allowed to impede its work. 
However, the Council is continuing to make 
every effort to reach agreement on future restruc-
turing. In the meantime, the maintenance of the 
status quo will obviously call for measures 
regarding the composition and functions of 
the Secretariat-General and the future single 
agency. 
G. The work of the Mediterranean Sub-Group 
34. In the first half of 1988 the Sub-Group on 
Security in the Mediterranean met three times. It 
defined its work programme on the basis of four 
meetings per year. Its aims and working methods 
were spelt out on the basis of the Franco-Italian 
report which had defined its sphere of compe-
tence. 
The sub-group is the place for consultation 
and joint reflection on all questions affecting 
security in the Mediterranean. Where appro-
priate, this consultation will lead to the formu-
lation of positions or joint recommendations 
that may be transmitted to the Permanent 
Council. 
The sub-group is competent to analyse all 
factors of destabilisation and developments in 
the countries situated in the vulnerable areas 
both as regards internal politics and interna-
tional relations, whether bilateral or multilateral 
and including their specifically military 
aspects. 
In this connection, the sub-group com-
mented on recent events in the region and ana-
lysed their implications. In particular, discussion 
covered Cyprus and Malta. 
Moreover, two troubled areas, the Balkans 
and the Maghreb, have been examined in greater 
detail. These consultations continue. 
H. Defence resources 
35. The question of improved use of defence 
resources was discussed at a successful seminar 
organised by the Netherlands Presidency on 14th 
and 15th March in The Hague. The follow-up to 
this seminar is being considered by the Defence 
Representatives Group. 
I. WEU communications system 
36. The introduction of such a system which 
ministers considered desirable at their Hague 
meeting on 28th October 1987 was approved by 
the Permanent Council on 27th January 1988. 
Through the efforts of the Netherlands 
Presidency and the effective co-operation 
between the technical services in Paris and 
London which, in a first stage served as relays, 
the actual introduction of the system was 
announced at the Council meeting on 1Oth 
February. 
Each foreign ministry of the member 
countries now possesses a terminal. 
Initially used only for timetables and work 
programmes, the system soon proved very useful 
for transmitting amendments or additions to 
basic documents and for the exchange of various 
information relating to questions addressed by 
the Council or the working groups. 
It is now much appreciated as a flexible 
and speedy instrument of work and the Council 
is inclined to make increasing use of it. It uses 
also the system to speed up its procedure for 
replying to Assembly recommendations and 
written questions and also for transmitting its 
bi-annual report. 
The Council has also considered the possi-
bility of installing a terminal at the Secretariat-
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General to avoid having to go through the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London. 
In the Organisations's jargon, this system is 
called " WEUCOM " (in French " UEOCOM "). 
J. Relations with the Assembly 
37. Relations with the Assembly have been 
frequently discussed by the Council; with a view 
to improving both official and unofficial com-
munications procedures between the two bodies, 
the Chairman-in-Office has paid particular 
attention to this problem, as acknowledged by 
members of the Assembly in their joint mee-
tings 1• 
The Assembly's request concerning the 
restructuring of the Office of the Clerk has finally 
been met without waiting for the completion of 
the restructuring of the ministerial organs in 
Paris. 
The Assembly was informed accordingly 
on 8th June in Paris by Mr. van den Broek, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council when he 
addressed the first part of the thirty-fourth 
ordinary session. 
For his part, the Secretary-General 
addressing the Assembly on the same day, res-
ponded favourably to the Assembly's suggestion 
that he should transmit to it a regular political 
bulletin informing it ofthe activities of the inter-
governmental organs. 
The Permanent Council on 15th June 
agreed that the Secretary-General would transmit 
an information letter under lhis own responsi-
bility, after presenting it to the Presidency. 
The frequency of sending the letter to the 
President of the Assembly would be related to 
the pace and substance of the activities of the 
intergovernmental organs and would take 
account of the need to keep the Assembly fully 
and regularly informed of developments. 
At the above Council meeting the future 
United Kingdom Presidency, in agreement with 
the Netherlands Presidency, agreed to follow the 
procedure adopted for the previous session of the 
Assembly as regards the preparation of replies to 
recommendations and written questions. 
I. Letter of 24th May 1988 from the President of the 
Assembly to the Chairman-in-Office of the Council. 
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ANNEX I 
Enlargement negotiations 
1. The following procedures were agreed for the negotiations at the meeting in The Hague on 26th 
May: 
- that the participants would be high-level representatives of the foreign and defence ministries 
of each member state. Meetings would be chaired by the representative of the Presidency who 
would act as WEU spokesman and be assisted by the Secretary-General; 
- that the meetings, which would be of a confidential nature, would take place, in principle, at the 
seat of the secretariat; 
- that separate discussions would take place with Spain and Portugal. 
2. The meeting also laid down the following objectives for the negotiations: 
- to examine the legal problems and to assess their implications; 
- to inform the two candidate countries of the obligations which existing WEU members have 
undertaken and the way in which effect is being given to them; 
- to ensure that the two candidate countries are fully aware of the political and military commit-
ments involved in accession to the WEU; 
- to confirm the two candidate countries' acceptance of these commitments; 
- to identify with the two candidate countries the forms of their contribution to the objectives of 
the platform and its development. 
3. At the end of the session, the Presidency made the following press statement: 
" The official opening of the discussions with Portugal and Spain with a view to their possible 
accession to the WEU took place today, 26th May 1988, in The Hague. This follows the decision 
of the WEU Council of Ministers of 18th April 1988. 
It is the first time since 1954 that discussions on WEU enlargement have taken place. The delega-
tions of WEU member states, of Portugal and of Spain, proceeded to an exchange of views on all 
the aspects relating to accession and agreed the procedures to be followed. They noted with satis-
faction the opening of these discussions. 
The next session will take place in June. " 
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ANNEX 11 
WEU meeting on the Gulf of 15th February 1988: 
Press guidelines for the Presidency 
High officials from the ministries of foreign affairs and defence of the member states of the 
Western European Union met on 15th February 1988 at The Hague. They again underlined the need to 
maintain solidarity. 
They reviewed developments in the Gulf region since their last meeting on 7th December 1987, 
and reaffirmed their intention to further deepen their consultation process, and to consider possibilities 
for rationalisation, fully respecting the national character of their respective missions. 
They reviewed the activities of the naval points of contact for intensifying co-ordination in mine 
counter-measure activities between WEU member nations in the Gulf. 
The next meeting of the naval points of contact will be held in Paris. 
WEU meeting on the Gulf of 11th May 1988: 
Press guidelines for the Presidency 
Following the statement adopted by the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union at its 
meeting of 19th April 1988 in The Hague, high officials from the ministries of foreign affairs and 
defence of member states met on 11th May 1988 at The Hague to discuss recent developments in the 
Gulf. 
They reiterated the importance of maintaining the freedom of navigation and safety of shipping in 
the Gulf. 
They noted that the WEU members which maintain a naval presence in the Gulf provide, in 
accordance with long-standing time-honoured maritime traditions, assistance to shipping in distress, in 
application of established international rules. 
They expressed appreciation for all measures which could contribute to achieving those aims and 
they noted with great interest the recent statement of the United States Government in this respect. 
They will continue their diplomatic efforts, particularly within the EPC framework, to support all 
endeavours towards the full and early implementation of Resolution 598 ofthe Security Council, which 
is the only framework for an overall solution to the problems raised by the Iraq~Iran conflict. 
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ANNEXIII 
Statement on recent events in the Gulf 
(19th April 1988) 
ANNEX Ill 
The member states of WEU expressed their grave concern at the recent increase in hostilities in 
the Gulf following new mining activities and attacks against merchant shipping in the area. 
They stress the necessity of respecting the principle offree navigation. Several member states con-
tribute to the safeguarding of this right by their maritime presence in the Gulf. The member states 
reaffirm the importance of such a contribution to the maintenance of freedom of navigation. 
They urgently call for an immediate end to all mining and other hostile activities against shipping 
in international waters, taking into account that such activities can call for measures for self defence. 
They will continue their diplomatic efforts, particularly within the EPC framework, to support all 
endeavours towards the full and early implementation of Resolution 598 ofthe Security Council, which 
is the only framework for an overall solution to the problems raised by the Iraq-Iran conflict. 
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INFORMATION LETTER 
from Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs 
(August-September 1988) 
12th October 1988 
London, 12th October 1988 
Dear President, 
In my letter of 26th July 1988, I had the honour to review - for you and the members of the par-
liamentary Assembly ofWEU- the main activities of the intergovernmental organs ofWEU during the 
period June-July 1988. 
You will find below a summary of these activities in August and September. 
Like the previous one, this letter has been drafted and issued by me under my own responsibility. 
* 
* * 
While the summer recess naturally slowed down WED's activities in August, it did not prevent it 
from following current events closely and reacting whenever necessary. 
Thus, sustained attention was paid to developments in the war between Iran and Iraq and their 
impact on the situation in the Gulf and representatives of the seven member states met in London on 
3rd August- on the initiative of the British presidency- to review the first real progress recorded in the 
search for a peaceful solution to the war and to draw the possible consequences for the presence in the 
region of warships from five of our member states which are helping to ensure respect for freedom of 
navigation there. 
On that occasion, they welcomed Iran's decision to accept Security Council Resolution 598. They 
expressed the hope that this would lead to the early, full implementation of the resolution under the 
aegis of the United Nations Secretariat-General. 
They also studied the possible implications of this decision for the role of their naval forces in the 
Gul£ They expressed satisfaction at the solidarity that has been a characteristic of their activities in the 
Gulf. They agreed to follow developments, to keep each other informed and to meet again when nec-
essary to consult each other in the same spirit of solidarity, with the aim of continuing to act in a con-
certed and coherent manner. 
With the same concern for a concerted and coherent approach, member states continued their 
consultations in September. 
There has been a continuous response to this joint political reflection in the form of technical 
co-ordination ensured, on the spot, between fleet commanders and, in the admiralties, between naval 
experts who met periodically. 
All these procedures allowed actions by five member countries in the Gulf to be adapted harmoni-
ously to an evolving situation. 
It is important to specify that the two member states not present in the Gulf continued to show 
their WEU solidarity with the five others in the same way as before. 
Mr. Charles GoERENS, 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
* 
* * 
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Furthermore, the Permanent Council - meeting in its normal form or strengthened by the 
political directors of the ministries for foreign affairs and representatives of the ministries of defence -
and its Special Working Group- meeting at the level of heads or deputies- pursued their exchanges of 
information and consultations on recent topical matters concerning European security: 
- the situation in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact; 
- East-West relations, with particular regard to arms control; 
- the transatlantic relationship. 
* 
* * 
The same organs, together with the Group of Defence Ministers' Representatives, continued their 
work on: 
- implementation of the platform on European security interests; 
- arms control and defence requirements. 
Two reports - one on each of these subjects - are now being drafted for submission to the min-
isters at their meeting on 14th November. 
The first will develop member states' views on each of the principles set out in paragraph Ill (a) 4 
of the platform and make relevant recommendations to the ministers. 
The second will deal with: 
- the START negotiations; 
- talks on conventional stability; 
- the role of the nuclear and conventional aspects of deterrence in European security; 
- defence burden-sharing in the Atlantic Alliance; 
- the contribution to joint defence. 
Furthermore, the relevant group of experts is continuing to assess the situation in the Mediter-
ranean and has paid more particular attention to the Balkans, on the one hand, and the Maghreb and the 
Machrek, on the other, all, of course, in the context of European security. 
* 
* * 
The negotiatiOns on enlargement are being continued with Portugal and Spain and a third 
meeting with the Portuguese and Spanish delegations was held on 16th September. 
At this stage, the six points listed in paragraph (a) of my letter of 28th July have all been tackled. 
The candidate countries were informed by the presidency and the other member states of the way 
the latter view and implement the responsibilities defined in these points. These candidate countries, for 
their part, indicated how they intend, in this connection, to assume their role and commitments in the 
framework of the organisation. 
The exchanges of views were very searching on both sides. 
Another meeting is planned for 11th October during which certain points will have to be taken 
further. 
In addition, legal experts of the member states have met twice and are to meet again in the near 
future to adopt a position in regard to procedure and instruments of accession and to finalise certain 
matters relating to the impact that the accession of two new members may have on the organisation's 
budgetary situation, the composition of the staff of the administrative organs, etc. 
On 14th November, the Council of Ministers will review current discussions. It should be noted 
that they are being held in an excellent atmosphere further enhanced by the success of the visit to 
Madrid by Mrs. Thatcher, Prime Minister of the country now exercising the presidency of WEU. 
* 
* * 
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The Permanent Council continued to examine the problem of collocatidg the WEU adminis-
trative organs. 
* 
* * 
In the area of public relations, I first wish to note, and pay tribute to, the importance of the official 
visit you made as President of the Assembly to London from 20th to 23rd September. 
It was undeniably a great success and was welcomed by the entire Council. It contributed to the 
influence of our organisation and to the development of the close working relationship between the 
Assembly and the Council for which you strive and to which, as you know, the Council and I are 
strongly attached. 
Furthermore, at Lille University on 30th September I spoke on "The European pillar" in the 
context of a colloquy organised by the University on 29th and 30th September on "European 
co-operation and the Atlantic Alliance " with the assistance of the Fondation Francaise pour les Etudes 
de Defense Nationale and the Secretariat-General of NATO. 
In Brussels on 8th October, I shall be speaking on" What security Europe: an overall problem?" 
from the tribune of Realites Europeennes du Present. 
* 
* * 
Thus you can see that the pace of the organisation's activities has not slackened and the objectives 
set by the British presidency that were listed in the penultimate paragraph of my letter of 28th July are 
well on the way to being attained. 
* 
* * 
You will have received very recently the first part of the Council's annual report to the Assembly 
for 1988 that will have enlightened you more fully and more systematically than this letter about WEU's 
progress. Believe me when I say the Council is happy that it has been possible to send this report to the 
Assembly in time for it to be able to pursue its work effectively. 
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Alfred CAHEN 
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Young people and defence - The role of parliaments 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 2 
by Mr. She/ton, Rapporteur 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DRAFT RESOLUTION 
on young people and defence - the role of parliaments 
DRAFT ORDER 
on young people and defence - the role of parliaments 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Shelton, Rapporteur 
I. Introduction 
11. General remarks 
Ill. International youth work without WEU 
18th October 1988 
IV. What young people have to gain from the activities of parliaments 
V. Conditions for enhancing the Assembly's dialogue with young people 
VI. Action taken in parliaments on texts adopted by the WEU Assembly 
VII. Conclusions 
1. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Pontdlon (Chairman); MM. Ewmg, Stegagnmi (Vice-Chairmen); Mr. Buchner (Alternate: 
Mrs. Luuk), MM. Burger, de Chambrun, De Bondt, De Hoop Scheffer, Fiandrotti. Mrs. Fischer. Mrs. Hennicot-Schoepges, 
MM. She/ton, Tummers, Kempmatre. 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are pnnted 111 Italics. 
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Draft resolution 
on young people and defence - the role of parliaments 
The Assembly, 
(i) Stressing the importance of obtaining young people's understanding and support for Western 
European defence and security policy; 
(ii) Stating however that so far young people are not given enough opportunity to be told about 
WEU's role in this area; 
(iii) Convinced that a closer involvement of young people in the work of the WEU Assembly could 
enhance considerably their understanding of the specific European problems of defence and 
security; 
(iv) Welcoming the exemplary initiative taken by the Bundestag in organising a youth and parliament 
session once a year; 
(v) Regretting however that the Assembly's present means do not allow it to take meaningful initia-
tives for a more intensive dialogue with young people, 
CALLS ON MEMBER PARLIAMENTS 
To make the necessary organisational and financial arrangements to al1ow members of the 
Assembly to invite at least once a year a group of young visitors, including journalists, to visit Paris for 
briefings at the seat of the Assembly during or between sessions and to meet WEU parliamentarians and 
officials. 
Draft order 
on young people and defence - the role of parliaments 
The Assembly, 
(i) Stressing the importance of obtaining young people's understanding and support for Western 
European defence and security policy; 
(ii) Stating however that so far young people are not given enough opportunity to be told about 
WEU's role in this area; 
(iii) Convinced that a closer involvement of young people in the work of the WEU Assembly could 
enhance considerably their understanding of the specific European problems of defence and 
security; 
(iv) Welcoming the exemplary initiative taken by the Bundestag in organising a youth and parliament 
session once a year; 
(v) Regretting however that the Assembly's present means do not allow it to take meaningful initia-
tives for a more intensive dialogue with young people, 
INVITES ns PRESIDENTIAL CoMMITTEE 
To include the organisational and financial implications of enhancing the Assembly's dialogue 
with young people in its further deliberations on a new information policy for the Assembly. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Shelton, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. It is widely recognised that - particularly 
in the present period of East-West relations -
the younger generation's necessary support of 
western security and defence policy calls for par-
ticular attention. The importance of WEU 
member government's information activities in 
this area was underlined in Mr. Burger's report 
on public information activities on security and 
defence matters in WEU member countries 1• 
2. The purpose of the present report is to 
examine the role parliaments and especially the 
Assembly of WEU might play in enhancing the 
dialogue on these questions with young people. 
Conversely, this is not a report on young people's 
reflections and preoccupations. It merely seeks to 
study the question of whether young people are 
given enough opportunities of being properly 
informed and advised in security and defence 
matters. 
3. The activities of parliaments in such a 
matter which forms a part of public relations, are 
concentrated in two main areas: 
- following and controlling the actions 
of governments and, at international 
level, those of the relevant defence 
organisations; 
- developing their own policy of dia-
logue. 
4. Chapter 11 to V hereafter highlight the 
problems related to this particular subject. At the 
same time, the Committee for Parliamentary and 
Public Relations continued its traditional activ-
ities with a view to bringing the work of the 
Assembly to the attention of national parlia-
ments and inviting them to follow it up. These 
activities are summarised in Chapter VI. 
II. General remarks 
5. Approaching young people in security and 
defence questions has always been a delicate 
problem. These matters are often the subject of 
controversial and emotional debates in parlia-
ments, political parties, among the general public 
and even in families. Nobody wishes to intro-
duce any kind of partial indoctrination, poli-
ticisation or just military education of young 
people. 
6. At present disarmament problems play a 
crucial role in East-West relations. But how is it 
I. Document 1112, 15th October 1987. 
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ensured that our young generation may under-
stand western interests and positions in this 
area? Security matters should never be explained 
in an isolated way without convincing the rel-
evant age group that there are fundamental 
common values to be defended in their very 
interest, and that the reason of their country's 
membership of the alliance and Western 
European Union is the collective determination 
of all member countries to fortify and preserve 
these common values. 
7. Some of them are described in the pre-
amble to the modified Brussels Treaty when the 
signatory countries declared their resolution: 
" To reaffirm their faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of 
the human person ... " 
" to fortify and preserve the principles of 
democracy, personal freedom and political 
liberty, the constitutional traditions and 
the rule of law, ... " 
" to afford assistance to each other in 
accordance with the Charter of the United 
Nations, in maintaining international 
peace ... " 
8. There is no indication that young people 
are less inclined towards the abovementioned 
values than the older generation. On the con-
trary. With the present easing of East-West con-
frontation, however, it is more and more difficult 
to convince the following generation that these 
values might be in danger and that they can 
never be taken for granted. 
Ill. International youth work without WEU 
9. An alliance such as Western European 
Union and its member countries which are 
seeking the necessary public support for security 
policy should therefore have a special interest in 
keeping in close touch with the younger gene-
ration. 
10. However, since the transfer, in 1960, of the 
exercise of WEU's social and cultural responsi-
bilities under Articles 11 and Ill of the modified 
Brussels Treaty to the Council of Europe (with 
the exception of those exercised by the WEU 
Public Administration Committee), WEU no 
longer has a permanent section capable of estab-
lishing a dialogue with the younger age group in 
the member countries. 
11. It is worth recalling that until 1960 the 
Secretariat-General of WEU had a Cultural 
Committee composed ofHeads of Cultural Rela-
tions Departments at the Foreign Office and 
Secretaries-General of the Ministries of Edu-
cation of the seven member states. This com-
mittee acted through the intermediary of sub-
committees such as: 
- a universities sub-committee, 
- a government officials sub-committee 
(later called Public Administration 
Committee), 
- a films sub-committee, 
- an education sub-committee, and, last 
but not least, 
- a youth sub-committee. 
12. Particularly the latter was one of the most 
active, organising courses and meetings on 
various subjects for young people (for instance in 
19 56 one in the United Kingdom on " young 
people's problems arising from military service ") 
exchanges of young workers, school-linking, etc. 
13. The decision to transfer all such activities 
to the Council of Europe was motivated by the 
idea of rationalising the European institutions 
and by the concern to avoid duplication of work. 
In its fifth annual report to the Assembly on 
7th March 1960 2 the WEU Council stressed that: 
" the Council's competence under Articles 
11 and Ill of the revised Brussels Treaty is 
in no way diminished. Only the existing 
activities pursued in the social and cul-
tural fields are transferred to the Council 
of Europe and, if the arrangements prove 
unsatisfactory, they can always be recon-
sidered by the WEU Council. " 
14. But in fact, all relevant structures were 
abolished and consequently the WEU Assembly 
stopped reporting on the activities of WEU in 
the cultural and social fields. The then existing 
contacts with youth problems were lost. 
15. So far in the framework of WEU's reacti-
vation, it seems that no particular attention has 
been paid to the importance of a dialogue with 
young people. The Council's document on 
" WEU and public awareness " published on 
23rd April 1985, makes no reference to this 
special problem. The present structure of the 
Secretariat-General allows only a very limited 
approach to press, information and public rela-
tions matters. 
16. In order to provide proper information, 
adequate knowledge of the thoughts and preoc-
cupations of the age group at which the infor-
mation is directed, is crucial. This calls for units 
able to establish a permanent dialogue with the 
relevant age group and to keep in contact with 
2. Document 159. 
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the various organisations responsible for youth 
questions. There is no question of calling for a 
reactivation of WEU activities in the cultural 
and social fields. But the absence of contacts 
between WEU and the younger generations is of 
sufficient importance to wonder whether our 
organisation should not take advantage of the 
work and experience in these matters of other 
international organisations in which WEU 
member countries are represented. 
17. In NATO, for instance, on the initiative of 
the North Atlantic Assembly, a separate post of 
youth officer was created in the NATO infor-
mation service in 1983 in order to centralise the 
alliance's efforts in youth questions and to facil-
itate contacts between young people in the 
various member countries. The role of this 
officer, who works within the team responsible 
for public relations, is threefold and consists of: 
- establishing, on a strictly individual 
basis, contact with young people who 
are university students, have political 
responsibilities or are opinion-formers 
because of their interest in NATO 
and/or their potential ability to prop-
agate information amongst those with 
whom they mix; 
- organising colloquia, visits and confer-
ences at NATO headquarters or 
outside; 
- liaising between NATO and the youth 
sections of the Atlantic Associations of 
the sixteen alliance countries which 
themselves organise conferences, visits 
to military installations, and so on. 
Members of these sections, usually very 
dynamic, have an interlocutor in the 
NATO Youth Officer who can help 
them to create a structure in which to 
develop their activities, and who can 
assist them in making the various con-
tacts they may need. 
18. Furthermore, each year NATO awards a 
number of advanced research fellowships to 
nationals of member countries. For the period 
1988/1989 twenty-two such fellowships have 
been announced. 
19. WEU would also be well advised to follow 
the wide range of activities developed in the 
Council of Europe and the European Com-
munity in the area of youth questions, as well 
as intergovernmental youth co-operation in 
Europe. On 11th and 12th April 1988, the second 
conference of European ministers responsible for 
youth questions was held in Oslo on " strategies 
for European youth policies towards 2000 ".The 
final text adopted by the conference establishing 
a programme of work states inter alia " that 
young people are strongly committed to ... the 
maintenance of peace". 
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20. But the organisations contributing consid-
erably to the maintenance of peace, such as the 
Atlantic Alliance and Western European Union 
were not taken into consideration in the various 
proposals and recommendations of the con-
ference. They were directed exclusively to the 
Council of Europe, the European Community 
and the European youth organisations connected 
with them. This is not surprising since both the 
Council of Europe and the European Com-
munity are the organisations which have 
developed the most impressive activities and 
funds for the dialogue with young people. 
21. For instance the European Youth Centre, 
set up by the Council of Europe is an educational 
institution designed to provide international 
youth organisations in Europe with a meeting 
place and forum involving approximately one 
thousand five hundred young Europeans each 
year. According to its programme for 1988, 
thirty-seven study sessions have been envisaged, 
one of which had a security aspect. It was a youth 
peace seminar held in Strasbourg on 19th-26th 
June 1988 on "Helsinki and beyond". 
22. Substantial financial support for interna-
tional youth activities is provided by the 
European Youth Foundation set up by the 
Council of Europe in 1972. The foundation's 
statute states that it may provide support to such 
youth activities "as serve the promotion of 
peace, understanding and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms ". In 1986, the 
foundation supported some hundred and twenty 
projects on various subjects. Since 1986 was 
international peace year, fourteen projects were 
directly connected with that theme. Two of them 
might be quoted: 
A seminar held in Norway by the Interna-
tional Union of socialist youth on " Peace, 
disarmament and security in Europe". 
The second was a meeting organised in 
Malta by the same organisation on 
" nuclear-weapon-free areas in the Medi-
terranean basin as a means of closer 
co-operation and peace in that region". 
23. Both the European Youth Centre and the 
Foundation have important links with the dif-
ferent youth organisations at national and inter-
national level. The same applies to the European 
Community which supports and finances many 
youth activities and makes efforts to inform 
young people about the various community pol-
icies and achievements. 
24. As the examples mentioned above show, 
only some aspects of security and defence such as 
problems of peace and disarmament play some 
part in the annual programmes. 
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25. This is a consequence of the strict sepa-
ration of responsibilities between institutions 
responsible for cultural and social affairs, to 
which youth questions are supposed to belong, 
and those responsible for defence and security. 
In view of the danger of overlapping of responsi-
bilities between the relevant international 
organisations, it would be unrealistic to wish 
WEU to have a say in establishing the annual 
programmes and subjects to be chosen in 
meetings and seminars organised for young 
people in the framework of the Council of 
Europe and the European Community. 
26. There are certainly informal means and 
opportunities for WEU and particularly for its 
Secretary-General to make more use of these 
various forums for holding conferences and dis-
cussions with young people on subjects handled 
by our organisation 3• But without working out 
its own channels and methods of dialogue with 
young people, WEU's means of influencing their 
perception of security policy remain minimal. 
IV. What young people have to gain 
from the activities of parliaments 
27. In the present unsatisfactory situation the 
Assembly of Western European Union might 
have a crucial role to play since it is the only 
European parliamentary body empowered by 
treaty to discuss security and defence issues. It 
would be very instructive for young people to be 
made more aware of the fact that through the 
existence and activities of the WEU Assembly 
European defence and security policy is demo-
cratically supervised. 
28. Furthermore, the Assembly's debates as 
well as those in national parliaments, can be par-
ticularly useful for developing independent 
opinions among young people interested in the 
relevant subjects, since they provide a spectrum 
of the various, often controversial positions and 
arguments. 
29. Nevertheless, there is a wide gap between 
ambitions and reality. At present, relations 
between young people and the Assembly are 
almost non-existent. Only very occasionally 
groups of young people can follow the 
Assembly's work in Paris during sessions or are 
briefed by officials from the Office of the Clerk. 
Unlike the practice in some national parlia-
ments, in the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe and the European Parliament, 
WEU Assembly members are not, or only excep-
tionally, involved. In member countries, the 
younger age group's opportunity of being 
3. Of the fifteen conferences given by the Secretary-General 
in 1987, at least four were for youth associations or stu-
dents. 
informed about the Assembly's activities is 
hardly better 4• 
30. In order to elaborate proposals for 
improving the Assembly's dialogue with young 
people, it might be useful to learn from the policy 
followed by member parliaments in this respect, 
since they have the exclusive competence to 
decide on their countries' defence and security 
policy. 
31. The following questionnaire was therefore 
sent to WEU member parliaments: 
- " whether, and to what extent, your par-
liament - in the context of its public 
relations work - ensures that the 
younger generation can follow and 
understand its work on foreign policy 
matters, with particular regard to 
security and defence; 
- which bodies are responsible and what 
means are used in your parliament for 
attaining these aims; 
- whether, and to what extent, there is 
co-ordination between your parliament 
and your country's government with a 
view to interesting young people in 
these matters and informing them in an 
appropriate manner; 
- whether, and to what extent, the 
younger generation in your country is 
able to participate directly or indirectly 
in parliamentary debates on defence 
and security policy". 
32. When these questions were chosen, your 
Rapporteur was aware that defence and security 
matters form only a part of the wider range of 
problems a parliament has to debate. Fur-
thermore, national parliaments have quite dif-
ferent traditions and ways of seeing their role vis-
a-vis the public. The replies so far received from 
parliaments provide very useful information. 
The following examples may demonstrate how 
different parliaments have developed their 
public relations policies. 
33. Like all parliaments which have replied to 
the questionnaire, the Italian Parliament has no 
programmes specially designed to make young 
people aware of problems relating to foreign 
policy and defence and security policy. However, 
it is not rare for private associations and other 
institutions concerned to take initiatives in this 
area by calling on parliamentarians, including 
members of the Foreign Affairs and Defence 
Committees of both chambers, who participate 
as guests, rapporteurs or chairmen. 
4. See the report by Mr. Chenard on the impact of the WEU 
Assembly's activities on parhaments and public opmwn. 
Document 1135 (27th April 1988). 
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34. In the United Kingdom, no general public 
relations work is carried out by the British Par-
liament. It does not have a budget or staff of civil 
servants for such activities. Television and 
broadcasting of parliamentary proceedings have 
been authorised only recently. But parliament 
plays host to journalists of inost national news-
papers and gives many of tnem special facilities 
for contacting parliamentarians. The House of 
Commons Library Department includes a public 
information office. It is left to the initiative of 
individual members of the public to ask this 
office for information. Associated with this office 
is an Education Officer, who has special respon-
sibility for supplying schools with information 
about parliament. Since the select committees on 
foreign affairs and defence regularly hold public 
hearings and publish up to a dozen reports there 
is no lack of public information on defence and 
security issues. Nevertheless there is no special 
emphasis in school programmes on these 
issues. 
35. When, in April 1987, Mr. Terlezh then a 
member of the United Kingdom Delegation to 
the WEU Assembly, asked the United Kingdom 
Secretary of State for Education and Science if he 
would take steps to make available to children of 
school age information on United Kingdom par-
ticipation in WEU and oth~r organisations the 
answer was as follows: 
" My right hon. Friend has no plans to do 
so. He hopes, however, that where oppor-
tunity to do so arises in the school cur-
riculum, pupils' understanding of the 
United Kingdom's relationships with its 
European neighbours including the func-
tions and work of the European Com-
munity, the Council of Europe and 
Western European Union will be 
developed as part of the process of 
learning about the political process and 
economic matters. " 
36. The situation in the German Bundestag is 
rather different. Its large administration includes 
a public relations section and a visitors section. 
In the context of an overall programme for vis-
itors to the Bundestag, groups of school children 
and young people of military service age may 
follow debates in plenary sitting, including 
debates on matters relating to security and 
defence policy. 
37. Futhermore, the Parliamentary Commis-
sioner for the Armed Forces briefs groups of 
school children visiting parliament at the invi-
tation of members about his tasks in assisting the 
Bundestag in the exercise of its parliamentary 
supervision of the armed forces. 
38. Once a year, the Bundestag organises a 
" youth and parliament " session at which young 
people can discuss political problems with 
members of parliament. The last youth and par-
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liament session was held in Bonn from 25th to 
27th September 1988 to which four hundred and 
fifty young people were invited as follows: 
193 by CDU/CSU members of 
parliament; 
160 by SPD members; 
40 by FDP members; 
36 by members of Die Grunen; and 
20 selected by the Deutsche 
Bundesjugendring. 
39. In the framework of this event a number 
of round tables were organised in which partici-
pants had the opportunity to discuss various 
t?pical polit~cal subjects with members of par-
hament. Th1s year the four Bundestag parlia-
mentary groups agreed to organise eleven round 
tables under the chairmanship of members of 
parliament. Some of their subjects might be 
quoted: 
First round table: motivations for young 
people's political commitment - the state 
of responsibility and action of young cit-
izens in a liberal state; 
Seventh round table: military and civilian 
service - young people's obligations to 
society; the admission of women to the 
Bundeswehr; compulsory military service 
for all? 
Tenth round table: how do we ensure 
peace? - Defence, detente and disarm-
ament. 
40. The characteristic of the round tables is 
that members of the Bundestag chair them and 
apply. Bl!-n~estag rules. P~rticipants' speaking 
tlme 1s hm1ted to three mmutes. During these 
round tables, speakers are chosen for the fol-
lowing day's c_losing joint sitting, to which they 
have _to subm1t a report. This closing sitting is 
held m the chamber of the Bundestag. Partici-
pants sit in members' seats. Members of the Bun-
destag parliamentary groups taking part occupy 
the government and Bundestag benches. The 
President of the Bundestag or his representative 
chair the sitting and apply Bundestag rules again. 
The Bundestag meets the cost of participants' 
travel and hotel accommodation and the cost of 
meals in Bonn. 
~ 1_. . _The detailed description of this Bundestag 
~mtlatlve seems to be justified since it is unique 
m WEU member countries and gives young 
people an opportunity to participate directly in 
the political work of parliament. 
42.. ~o parliament _has reported any co-
or~matwn or co-operation with governments in 
th1s aspect of public relations matters. The 
importa~ce of political parties in keeping close 
touch w1th young people has been underlined by 
the Netherlands Delegation. 
43. Apart from national parliaments it is also 
worth examining the situation in international 
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parliamentary bodies. The North Atlantic 
Assembly for instance, has devoted part of its 
wo~k to problems of the so-called successor gene-
ratwn. In October 1979, the then Committee on 
Education, Cultural Affairs and Information 
created a working group to study how youth is 
informed about international politics in general 
and Atlantic affairs in particular, and to rec-
ommend appropriate action to improve the suc-
cessor generation's appreciation of the Atlantic 
Alliance. 
44. The North Atlantic Civilian Affairs Com-
mittee created a sub-committee on the successor 
generation which was replaced bv a sub-
committee on Public Information on Defence 
and Security after presenting its final report in 
1 ~85. Their parliamentarians have had meetings 
w1th students and were invited by the Atlantic 
Council of the United States to hold conferences 
on NATO in American universities. 
45. As for the European Parliament. it is well 
known that it devotes a large part of its activities 
to youth problems, particularly through its Com-
mittee on Social Affairs and Employment and its 
Committee on Youth, Culture, Education and 
Sport. In both committees, the Youth Forum of 
the European Community is represented as a 
permanent observer. 
46. The Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe is represented in the European 
Youth Centre and in the European Youth Foun-
dation. Through its Committee on Culture and 
Education it regularly studies youth questions 
and preoccupations of young people. 
47. As a result it must be realised that 
organisations such as NATO, the European 
~om~unity and the Council of Europe, 
mcludmg their parliamentary bodies, are 
devoting quite a substantial part of their activ-
ities and financial means to youth questions and 
to their dialogue with young people. For this 
purpo_se _some have created their own youth 
orgamsatwns, and all have established various 
links and ~ol?municatio_n means with young 
people prov1dmg them w1th a permanent possi-
bility of dialogue. 
48. How long can WEU, as the only European 
defence organi~ation, and its Assembly, the only 
European parhamentary body responsible for 
defence and security matters, manage without 
the necessary dialogue with young people on 
these matters? 
V. Conditions for enhancing the Assembly's 
dialogue with young people 
~9.. This problem is a financial and organ-
lS~tlonal on~ .. In fact, few actions are possible 
w1thout add1t10nal financial means and without 
reorganising the Assembly's methods of work. 
.. 
50. The fact that some members of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe are 
represented in the European Youth Centre and 
in the European Youth Foundation could be 
advantageous for the WEU Assembly, provided 
parliamentarians have an opportunity of influ-
encing the activities and programmes of these 
organisations. But this possibility is somewhat 
theoretical. 
51. Hosting more groups of young visitors at 
the seat of the Assembly, as is done in the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and 
the European Parliament, might be an excellent 
means of arousing the interest of the relevant age 
group and informing them about the subjects 
handled in WEU. Such initiatives require addi-
tional financial means. But since some member 
countries give their delegation members an 
opportunity to invite individuals or groups to 
visit the seat of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe, it might be worth asking 
national parliaments to introduce similar pro-
cedure for visiting the Assembly of Western 
European Union. In these cases the cost would 
be covered by member countries. 
52. Additional financial means would be 
required for the Assembly itself, however, if it 
were to take the following initiatives: 
- creating WEU Assembly scholarships as 
is done in NATO; 
- editing in a large number of easily 
readable information documents in all 
official languages, especially intended 
for young people; 
- producing an audiovisual presentation 
of the Assembly mainly for visitors in 
Paris. 
53. Financial and organisational measures 
are required if the following measures are 
envisaged: 
- organising colloquies, round tables and 
conferences for young people on sub-
jects related to security and defence 
matters (as is done in NATO or in the 
Bundestag); 
- establishing contacts with the appro-
priate committees responsible for youth 
problems of the North Atlantic 
Assembly, the European Parliament and 
the Council of Europe, in order to profit 
from their experience. 
54. It is gratifying that the Presidential 
Committe recently started to reconsider the 
Assembly's overall information policy, when it 
endorsed the draft budget of the administrative 
expenditure of the Assembly for the financial 
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year 1989, submitted by the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration. In this 
draft budget, an increase of F 90 000 for 
" expenditure on information " has been pro-
posed, which will be used mainly to improve the 
working conditions of the Assembly's Press 
Service. To this end the latter had produced a 
proposal for a general communications strategy. 
Thus the estimates for 1989 for information pur-
poses are now F 410 000 (Budget for 1988: 
F 320 000). This is still a very modest sum con-
sidering that in 1981 already the European 
Parliament's information budget was 2 800 000 
European currency units (i.e. F 14 million) and 
the information budget of the Council of Europe 
for the same year was about F 3 300 000. 
55. It is to be welcomed that thanks to the 
decision taken by the Presidential Committee 
there is now a chance to improve relations with 
the press. 
56. Press relations are an important part of a 
new overall Assembly information policy. The 
problems of improving contacts with young 
people is another. It is obvious that the measures 
mentioned above for establishing a more 
intensive dialogue with the younger generation, 
cannot be financed by 1989 estimates for 
"expenditure on information". If the Assembly 
is determined to do more in the youth sector, it 
must decide how much importance it intends to 
attach to its youth work in relation to its other 
activities in the framework of a more effective 
overall communications strategy. This new 
strategy does not concern only the activities of 
the Office of the Clerk but also the working 
methods of the Assembly itself and its com-
mittees. 
57. The Presidential Committee should 
therefore continue its deliberations on these 
problems. It will be necessary to submit to it all 
the other elements of an information strategy in 
which the Assembly's youth policy must be given 
an important place. In this connection the Com-
mittee for Parliamentary and Public Relations 
should make a meaningful contribution. At the 
same time, its role should be re-examined and 
the question is can it undertake such a broad 
spectrum of tasks in present working condi-
tions. 
VI. Action taken in parliaments 
on texts adopted by the WEU Assembly 
58. One of the tasks of our committee is to 
select from texts adopted by the Assembly those 
which, in its opinion should be debated in 
national parliaments. At its meeting in Paris on 
9th June 1988, the committee decided to draw 
the attention of parliaments of member countries 
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more particularly to the following recommenda-
tions adopted by the Assembly: 
- 455 on European co-operation in arma-
ments research and development -
guidelines drawn from the colloquy; 
- 457 on the organisation of European 
security; 
- 459 on co-operation between Europe 
and the United States and Canada in 
security matters; 
- 460 on disarmament. 
59. Furthermore, it decided to transmit Order 
71 and the report by Mr. Chenard on the impact 
of the WEU Assembly's activities on parliaments 
and public opinion to national parliaments. 
60. Following a proposal of the committee, the 
President of the Assembly transmitted not only 
the texts of recommendations but also the corre-
sponding reports to all Presidents of member 
parliaments expressing the wish that they be the 
subject of speeches or questions. 
61. In its report on the first part of the thirty-
fourth ordinary session of the WEU Assembly to 
the German Bundestag dated 21st July 1988, the 
German Delegation for the first time made 
special reference to the texts selected by the 
Committee for Parliamentary and Public Rela-
tions. 
62. In Luxembourg, the President of the 
Chamber of Deputies informed the Chamber at 
its meeting on 16th June 1988 of the texts trans-
mitted by the President of the WEU Assembly 
announcing that they would be transmitted to 
the Committee for Foreign Affairs. 
63. At the meeting of the Belgian Chamber of 
Representatives on 14th June 1988, the Pres-
ident of the Chamber informed the Chamber of 
the recommendations transmitted by the Pres-
ident of the WEU Assembly which were to be 
referred to the Committees for Foreign Affairs 
and Defence. 
64. Your Rapporteur can only appeal once 
again to all delegations to keep in mind the need 
pointed out in the previous report by Mr. 
Chenard to use all possible means in order to 
increase the impact of the WEU Assembly's 
work on national parliaments and public 
opmwn. 
65. In a letter dated 6th July 1988, Mr. 
Pontillon, Chairman of the committee, sent com-
mittee members a number of draft questions on 
subjects covered in the selected recommenda-
tions emphasing that "in order to improve the 
impact of the work of the Assembly in our 
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national parliaments, it is essential for as many 
representatives as possible to put questions on 
the basis of the texts adopted or to refer to these 
texts in their speeches or parliamentary 
action". 
66. So far, your Rapporteur has information 
about an initiative taken by Mr. Hill when he 
used the proposed model questions to put ten 
written questions in the House of Commons on 
Recommendations 455, 457, 459 and 460. 
Answers were given on 29th July 1988 by Mrs. 
Chalker, Minister of State for Foreign and Com-
monwealth Affairs. 
67. In the Luxembourg Chamber of Deputies, 
on 14th July 1988, Mr. Konen, Mr. Linster and 
Mr. Hengel, also using the model questions, put 
several questions on Recommendations 457 and 
459. These questions were answered on 25th 
August 1988 by Mr. Poos, Minister for Foreign 
Affairs. 
68. On 13th July 1988, Mr. N atali put four 
written questions in the Italian Senate on Rec-
ommendations 449, 455, 457 and 459. The 
answers of the Italian Government are not yet 
known. No information on follow-up activities 
was reported from Belgium, France, Germany 
and the Netherlands. 
VII. Conclusions 
69. Compared with other organisations such 
as NATO, the European Community and the 
Council of Europe together with their parlia-
mentary bodies, neither the WEU Council nor 
the Assembly makes any special effort to 
establish a dialogue with the younger generation. 
The consequence is that they cannot exert any 
influence on the way security and defence ques-
tions, if they are discussed with young people, 
are presented. Furthermore, it is not certain that 
the specific European aspects of defence and 
security problems are properly explained. In 
view of the necessity of public support for 
WEU's activities, the lack of contact with young 
people is serious. But with its present working 
conditions and financial means the Assembly 
will not be able to do much to improve the situ-
ation. The dialogue with young people should be 
given an important place within the Presidential 
Committee's further reflections on the 
Assembly's information policy. 
70 Apart from efforts made by several WEU 
Assembly members in the United Kingdom, 
Luxembourg and Italy in putting questions to 
their governments on the basis of texts adopted 
by the Assembly, the impact of its work in 
member parliaments is still inadequate. 
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Amendments 1 and 2 
Young people and defence- the role of parliaments 
AMENDMENTS 1 and 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Hardy 
5th December 1988 
1. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft resolution, leave out " and support". 
2. In paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft order, leave out "and support". 
l. See 8th sitting, 6th December 1988 (amendments withdrawn). 
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Disarmament - reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur 
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on disarmament - reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
submitted by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur 
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I. Adopted m committee by 11 votes to 2 with 2 abstentions. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ktttelmann (Chairman); MM. de Beer, Foum? (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Alloncle (Alternate: 
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Irmer, Jung (Alternate: Koehl), Konen, de Kwaadstemet, Mrs. Lalumiere, MM. Lemmrich (Alternate: Niegel), Matraja, Pecchioli 
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N.B. The names of those takmg part m the vote are pnnted in ttahcs. 
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VI. Aspects of deterrence: the different Europes and public perceptions 
VII. Conclusion 
APPENDICES 
I. Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the elimination of their intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles 
11. The Montebello decision, Annex to the final communique of the autumn 
ministerial meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) Monte-
bello, Canada (27th October 1983) 
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Introductory Note 
The committee as a whole met in Geneva on 25th and 26th July 1988, when it was briefed by the 
following representatives to the Conference on Disarmament: 
H.E. Miss Tessa A.H. Solesby, Ambassador, Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation: 
H.E. Mr. Adolfo R. Taylhardat, Ambassador, Venezuelan Permanent Representative to the 
United Nations; 
H.E. Mr. Pierre More!, Ambassador, Leader of the French Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Max L. Friedersdorf, Ambassador, Leader of the United States Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Paul J. von Stulpnagel, Ambassador, Leader ofthe Federal Republic of Germany's Dele-
gation; 
H.E. Mr. Chusei Yamada, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Leader of the Jap-
anese Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Youri K. Nazarkin, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Leader of the 
Soviet Delegation. 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur conducted interviews as follows: 
14th December 1987- Soviet Embassy, Paris 
Mr. Viktor P. Karpov, Head of the Disarmament Department, Soviet Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs. 
4th March 1988 -Defence Arms Control Unit (DACU), Ministry of Defence, London 
Colonel John Speight, Acting Head, DACU; 
Mr. Malcolm Lingwood, Head of Section; 
Mr. Ian Manson. 
24th and 25th March 1988 - Vienna 
The Rapporteur had interviews with the following representatives to the CSCE talks: 
H.E. Mr. Hans Meesman, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation; 
Mr. Como Van Hellenburg Hubar, Netherlands Delegation; 
General van der Graaf, Netherlands Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Shikalov, Ambassador, Head of the Soviet Delegation: 
H.E. Mr. B. Frowick, Ambassador, Head of the United States Delegation; 
Mr. J. Felix-Paganon, French Delegation; 
Colonel Christian Meric, French Delegation; 
and the MBFR talks: 
H.E. Mr. T. Strulak, Ambassador, Head of the Polish Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. L.W. Veenendaal, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Delegation; 
Colonel C. Kuypers, Netherlands Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. K. Hedemann, Ambassador, Head of the Norwegian Delegation; 
General Hammer, Norwegian Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. R.J. O'Neill, Ambassador, Head of the United Kingdom Delegation. 
5th April 1988 - Geneva 
The Rapporteur had interviews with the following representatives to the Conference on Disarm-
ament: 
H.E. Mr. R.J. van Schaik, Ambassador, Head of the Netherlands Permanent Mission to the 
United Nations; 
Mr. Robert Milders, First Secretary of the Netherlands Permanent Mission to the United Nations; 
Mr. Zharkov, Deputy Head of the Soviet Delegation; 
Mr. Richard Edis, Counsellor and Deputy Leader of the United Kingdom Delegation; 
H.E. Mr. Rolf Ekeus, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Sweden; 
H.E. Mr. Max L. Friedersdorf, Ambassador, United States Permanent Representative; 
Dr. Pierce Corden, United States Delegation. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their special thanks to all the officials and senior 
officers who met the Rapporteur or briefed the committee in reply to questions. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on disarmament - reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council 
The Assembly, 
(i) Welcoming the renewed efforts of the Council to ensure a speedy transillission of the annual 
report; 
(ii) Pleased that information called for in previous replies has been reinstated in the Council's report; 
(iii) Commending the Council's initiatives in promoting the present comprehensive five-nation mine-
sweeping operation in the Gulf, codenamed "Cleansweep ", before disengagement; 
(il~ Calling for the collective defence effort to be maintained at the level necessary to ensure the 
security of all countries of the alliance, while negotiations are actively pursued on the mutual reduction 
of forces and armaments to the lowest levels compatible with that essential security, in full accordance 
with the long-standing policy of the alliance; 
M Endorsing the approach to a bilateral agreement to reduce strategic nuclear weapons; 
(vi) Stressing the importance of respect for the existing ABM treaty and the limitations of the SALT 
accords, which can be modified only by agreement between the parties to them; 
(vii) Supporting the efforts of the nations at the Conference on Disarmament to conclude a multi-
lateral treaty to ban all chemical weapons and applauding US and French initiatives to convene an 
international conference to help further such agreement; 
(vizi) Noting with interest the Council's report on" The experience gained in verification of controls on 
forces and conventional armaments" (which reinforces the Assembly's belief that the Agency still has a 
major contribution to make in the important matter of verification), asking that such studies will be 
further developed and applied, and encouraged in this hope by the reply of the Council to Recommen-
dation 460, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Give substance to the principles enunciated in The Hague platform by defining and stating pub-
lid) a Western European Union posture on specific arms control issues, including the following criteria: 
(a) arms control priorities should now advance conventional and chemical disarmament mea-
sures in preference to the abolition of short-range nuclear weapons which for the present 
remain an essential factor for deterrence contributing significantly to the maintenance of 
peace; 
(b) arms control measures should be global and must not prevent some countries from doing 
what others are allowed to do; (the creation of denuclearised zones, for example, would be a 
factor of destabilisation for Europe); 
(c) arms control agreements should include verification measures which fully satisfy all parties 
and which do not infringe national sovereignty; 
(d) arms control should proceed by stages, allowing the security of all to remain assured 
throughout; 
2. In the name of Western European Union, reply to Mr. Gorbachev's eaU for a pan-European 
summit on conventional arms by stressing that such a forum already exists in the context of the CSCE; 
3. Urge more and wider adequate publicity by member governments for disa~mament issues aimed 
at both the press and the public, including the fact that in the initial stages arms reduction and control 
do not necessarily imply greatly-reduced defence spending, and invite the WEU Agency to prepare 
studies with a view to facilitating the task of the governments of member countries in informing public 
opinion of security and disarmament problems; 
4. Call on member governments to involve the specialist scientific and technical departments ofthe 
universities and defence institutions closely in work on arms control, and authorise the WEU Agency, in 
the framework of its own research for the Council, to consult certain specialised university departments 
and appropriate government bodies; 
5. Ensure that the "appropriate utilisation of the WEU Agency in studying in detail questions 
relating to conventional disarmament and, in particular, problems relating to the technology of verifi-
cation " (Reply of the Council to Recommendation 460) is implemented without delay. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Tummers, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1.1. Under the terms of the Charter and Rules 
of Procedure ofthe Assembly, the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments is required 
to reply to those parts of the annual report of the 
Council referred to it by the Presidential Com-
mittee. As in previous years this report will also 
examine developments in present forums for 
negotiations on the control of armaments and 
disarmament, both bilateral and multilateral, on 
nuclear weapons and on other aspects of arma-
ments control. 
1.2. The present report follows on logically 
from the committee's previous two reports on 
these subjects 1, but for the first time in recent 
years, as a direct result of the Council's efforts to 
improve the consultative process among 
member states, in addition to commenting on 
the previous year's report ( 1987), the committee 
is also able to take account of the first part of the 
Council's report for the current year ( 1988), 
received by the Assembly on 30th September 
1988. 
1.3. As previously, the Presidential Committee 
has referred to the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments the sections of the Coun-
cil's annual report concerning: 
- the Council's activities relating to 
security in the framework of the 
Atlantic Alliance, the control of arma-
ments and disarmament; 
- the application of Protocol No. 11 on 
WEU forces; 
- the activities of the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments and Agencies I 
and 11. 
1.4. The two major arms control events of the 
past year have been essentially bilateral in 
nature: 
(a) the treaty between the United States 
and the Soviet Union on intermediate-
range nuclear forces (the INF Treaty 2) 
which was signed in Washington on 
8th December 1987 and ratified by the 
Senate ofthe United States (as recom-
I. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of 
the Council, 31st March 1987, Document 1090, Rapporteur: 
Mr. -\madei; and Dtsarmament - reply to the thirty-second 
annual report of the Counctl. 2nd November 1987, 
Document 1116, Rapporteur: Mr. Scheer. 
2. See text at Appendix I. 
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mended in Resolution 77, instigated 
by the Committee on Defence Ques-
tions and Armaments and adopted by 
the Assembly in December 1987) and 
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at the 
end of May 1988. This treaty is 
examined in detail at Chapter IV: 
(b) the summit meeting in Moscow (29th 
May to 2nd June 1988) between the 
leaders of the United States and the 
Soviet Union which, as it occurred a 
matter of days before the last session of 
the Assembly was the subject of an 
urgent recommendation on disarm-
ament drafted by the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments 
and adopted unanimously by the 
Assembly on 9th June 1988 as Recom-
mendation 460. 
II. Activities of the Council 
(a) Platform on European security interests 
2.1. By far the most significant event con-
cerning the members of WEU in 1987 was the 
adoption by members on 27th October in The 
Hague of the platform on European security 
interests. The declared purpose of the platform 
was to define the conditions and criteria for 
European security and the responsibilities of the 
WEU partners in respect of western defence, 
arms control and disarmament and East-West 
dialogue and co-operation. 
2.2. The introductory section of the platform 
emphasises the twin foundations ofWEU reacti-
vation: in the process of creating a security 
dimension to European integration on the one 
hand, and in the reaffirmation and strengthening 
of alliance solidarity on the other: 
"We recall our commitment to build a 
European union in accordance with the 
single European act, which we all signed as 
members of the European Community. 
We are convinced that the construction of 
an integrated Europe will remain incom-
plete as long as it does not include security 
and defence. " (point 2) 
"We intend therefore to develop a more 
cohesive European defence identity which 
will translate more effectively into practice 
the obligations of solidarity to which we 
are committed through the modified 
Brussels and North Atlantic Treaties. " 
(point 4) 
2.3. One remarkable and immediate effect of 
the platform was on United States attitudes gen-
erally to Western European Union. In a previous 
report of the Committee on Defence Questions 
and Armaments 3 the Assembly's attention was 
drawn to the fact that certain parts ofthe United 
States administration had reportedly objected to 
the WEU Council interesting itself in arms 
control matters. Since those days, there have 
been some who obviously mistrust the idea of 
reactivating WEU, thinking perhaps that here 
was the embryo of a European Defence Com-
munity, with all the implications of a latter-day 
Pleven Plan ... 
2.4. To avoid any such inference, the theme of 
Europe and the alliance is repeated throughout 
the platform. The member states declared that it 
was " our conviction that a more united Europe 
will make a stronger contribution to the alliance, 
to the benefit of western security as a whole. This 
will enhance the European role in the alliance 
and ensure the basis for a balanced partnership 
across the alliance". The member states were 
" resolved to strengthen the European pillar of 
the alliance ". (III,a,2). 
2.5. The Worldnet speech delivered by Pres-
ident Reagan on 4th November 1987 proved that 
the attachment to this link was reciprocated 
across the Atlantic: the President welcomed the 
platform and emphasised the unshakeable nature 
of the United States' commitment to the alliance 
and to European security. The platform itself is 
unambiguous about the significance ofthe North 
American presence in Europe: " ... the security of 
the Western European countries can only be 
ensured in close association with our North 
American allies. The security of the alliance is 
indivisible". (1.4). And "The substantial 
presence of United States conventional and 
nuclear forces plays an irreplaceable part in the 
defence of Europe. They embody the American 
commitment to the defence of Europe and 
provide the indispensable linkage with the 
United States strategic deterrent". (II.3). This 
latter point further legitimises Western European 
interests and concerns where the START talks 
are concerned, for example, as well as providing 
impetus to the burden-sharing debate which is 
discussed in other recent reports of the 
Assembly 4• 
3. Disarmament - reply to the thirty-first annual report of 
the Council, 31st March 1987, Document 1090, Rapporteur: 
Mr. Amadei. 
4. Co-operation between Europe and the United States and 
Canada in security matters. 9th May 1988. Document 1137. 
Rapporteur: Mr. Pontillon. 
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(b) The Gulf situation 
2.6. If the platform is the " inward and spir-
itual grace" of Western European Union, then 
the "outward and visible sign" in 1987-88 has 
been co-operation in the Gulf, and this also has 
had a particular impact on the Atlantic Alliance 
which found itself otherwise collectively 
impotent when confronted with the problem. 
2.7. At the invitation of the Netherlands presi-
dency, senior officials from the WEU ministries 
of foreign affairs and defence met in The Hague 
on 20th August to consider the different aspects 
of the situation in the Gulf area. The meeting 
was held pursuant to Article VIII of the modified 
Brussels Treaty and was the first meeting of its 
kind held within the reactivated WEU. 
2.8. The representatives had a thorough 
exchange of views. They stressed that United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 598 should 
be fully implemented forthwith so as to bring the 
conflict between Iraq and Iran to an end and that 
the WEU member countries would continue to 
support all efforts aimed at achieving this. And 
they affirmed that Europe's vital interests 
required that the freedom of navigation in the 
Gulf be assured at all times and that member 
states strongly condemned all actions contrary to 
that principle. 
2.9. The participants also took note of the mea-
sures already undertaken or envisaged by indi-
vidual member countries; the governments of 
Italy, the Netherlands and Belgium each decided 
to send naval forces to the Gulf. France and the 
United Kingdom had already decided to 
strengthen their naval presence in the region. 
Subsequently, the two WEU member countries 
not present in the Gulf expressed their solidarity 
with their partners. Although the constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Germany precludes it 
from taking part in such operations, the German 
Government agreed to deploy replacements in 
the alliance area to cover for partners' forces sent 
to the Gulf. The Government of Luxembourg 
made a financial contribution to the mainte-
nance of the Belgian and Netherlands naval 
forces in the region. 
2.1 0. The 20th August meeting was followed by 
two others in The Hague on 15th September and 
14th October, during which participants dis-
cussed in particular ways of improving their con-
tacts in order to enhance co-ordination on the 
practical-technical level, and other meetings were 
held between senior officials from the foreign 
and defence ministries of the Seven and, on the 
basis of a British proposal, a consultation process 
initiated between the chiefs of staff in the cap-
itals. Furthermore, regular on-the-spot contacts 
and exchanges of information between the naval 
commanders of the five WEU countries present 
in the Gulf were established. 
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2.11. This process of co-operation and 
concertation has continued into 1988 when the 
situation has eased considerably with the 
welcome news of the cease-fire between the two 
belligerents. At the time of writing, the British 
presidency of WEU is reported as urging a 
coherent mine-sweeping effort to leave the Gulf 
sea lanes as clear as possible before disen-
gagement. The committee seconds the initiative 
wholeheartedly. 
2.12. This contribution of Western European 
Union to improving political and military 
co-ordination of various national activities is 
viewed positively by the member states and 
applauded by the Assembly. It is to be hoped 
that it will continue and develop further, as a 
model for future co-operation. 
(c) Arms control and disarmament questions 
2.13. Very little detail on such topical questions 
as arms control and disarmament is given in the 
Council's annual report: 
" Member states continued consultations 
covering East-West relations in general 
and arms control issues in particular in the 
regular sessions of the Permanent Council 
as well as in the meetings of the enlarged 
Council (comprising the political directors 
of foreign ministries and appropriate rep-
resentatives of defence ministries). On this 
base ministers in The Hague reviewed 
developments in East/West relations and 
arms control, particularly in relation to 
negotiations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union on the global, veri-
fiable elimination of intermediate nuclear 
forces. They recalled that the allies con-
cerned at Reykjavik in June had agreed to 
develop further a comprehensive concept 
of arms control and disarmament and to 
work within the framework of this concept 
as envisaged in paragraphs 7 and 8 of the 
NAC communique of 12th June 1987. ", 
although the platform on security interests was 
reasonably clear on WEU intentions: 
" 1. We shall pursue an active arms control 
and disarmament policy aimed at influ-
encing future developments in such a way 
as to enhance security and to foster sta-
bility and co-operation in the whole of 
Europe. The steadfastness and cohesion of 
the alliance and close consultations among 
all the allies remain essential if concrete 
results are to be brought about. 
3. In pursuing such an approach we shall 
exploit all opportunities to make further 
progress towards arms reductions, com-
patible with our security and with our pri-
orities, taking into account the fact that 
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work in this area raises complex and inter-
related issues. We shall evaluate them 
together, bearing in mind the political and 
military requirements of our security and 
progress in the different negotiations. " 
2.14. The Assembly has urged the Council to 
prepare a specifically European initiative. espe-
cially in the context of the proposed Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe, cur-
rently being discussed in Vienna, but there is a 
striking lack of evidence of concertation or 
attempt at consensus in this important domain. 
The only glimmer of hope that something pos-
itive may emerge in the future comes in the 
Council's reply to Recommendation 460: 
" 1. The Council recalls that its approach 
to disarmament will continue to be deter-
mined and upheld by the principles in The 
Hague platform. 
2. The Council supports the objective of 
balanced and verifiable arms control 
agreements and agrees with the Assembly 
that further progress towards arms reduc-
tions must be compatible with our 
security. 
3. A major priority in this field would be 
the achievement of a START agreement 
cutting United States and Soviet strategic 
arsenals by approximately 50%. The 
Council supports the efforts of the United 
States and the Soviet Union to reach such 
an agreement as soon as possible as it 
could enhance strategic stability. 
4. The launching of negotiations on con-
ventional stability remains a major pri-
ority in the arms control field. The estab-
lishment of a stable and secure balance of 
conventional forces remains the objective 
of these negotiations. The Council hopes 
that the negotiations can begin in 1988, 
following the satisfactory conclusion of the 
discussions on a mandate for them. The 
negotiations should take place in the 
context of a balanced outcome to the 
Vienna follow-up meeting, which will also 
cover the question of human rights. 
5. As part of their work programme. the 
WEU agencies have studied in detail ques-
tions relating to conventional disarm-
ament and, in particular, problems relating 
to the technology of verification. As the 
recommendation suggests, the agencies' 
skills in this area will continue to be 
appropriately utilised. 
6. The Council strongly advocates the 
establishment of a global and effectively 
verifiable ban on chemical weapons as 
soon as possible. " 
This, coupled with one of the reports prepared by 
the agencies and transmitted to the Assembly: 
" The experience gained in verification of con-
trois on forces and conventional armaments " 
indicates that some worthwhile if largely unsung 
work is indeed being conducted. The committee 
feels that this aspect of the WEU Council's work 
should be reported more fully in the future and 
extensively publicised to help strengthen not 
only the " European pillar" but the "transat-
lantic bridge" and thereby ultimately to help 
demolish walls between East and West. 
(d) Agencies for security questions 
2.15. The Council reports that in 1987 " the 
agencies for security questions continued to carry 
out the tasks assigned to them by the Council ". 
The only elaboration of this laconic statement 
reached the Assembly via the letter in which the 
Secretary-General gave the revised terms of ref-
erence of the Paris-based agencies for security 
questions. Agency I for the study of arms control 
and disarmament questions was to work on two 
studies: 
" the first relating to verification pro-
posals in the context of current negoti-
ations on arms control; 
- the second relating to Soviet tactics 
vis-a-vis western European countries 
in regard to arms control and disarm-
ament matters. " 
The agency was also to " follow changes in Soviet 
positions in regard to disarmament and arma-
ments control". 
2.16. Agency II for the study of security and 
defence questions was " to continue its consider-
ation of resource management - on the basis of 
an analysis of national defence budgets - and of 
the non-military aspects of the threat, and to 
study how the public in WEU member states 
views the strategic balance ". In connection with 
resource management, " the agency is to study 
means of achieving true comparability of criteria 
in western countries and rationalisation of 
defence budget management". 
2.1 7. Sadly this potentially valuable research 
has obviously suffered from the failure of the 
Council to solve the related issues of merging the 
agencies and eventual collocation of the minis-
terial organs. Meanwhile, however, Western 
Europe is in danger of losing a vital asset in the 
realm of arms control, with considerable 
expertise and experience, at the very moment 
that considerations such as verification are 
assuming an extremely high profile (see also the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments report on " Verification: a future 
European satellite agency", Rapporteur: Mr. 
Fourre). 
2.18. The committee ventures to suggest that 
squabbling over institutional issues should 
occupy far less of the Council's time: the" status 
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quo " on location is obviously the only alter-
native for the present, with secondment from 
national ministries being the best solution for 
staffing the agencies and achieving results (as is 
being proved already in the working of the rein-
forced Council and the Special Working 
Group). 
(e) Institutional defence tasks of the Council 
(i) Levels of forces of member states 
2.19. The committee notes that the Council has 
continued with its customary tasks of forces 
control in implementation of Protocol No. II. As 
indicated in the 32nd report, and in accordance 
with the Rome declaration of 27th October 1984, 
the control of conventional weapons listed in 
Annex IV to Protocol No. Ill of the modified 
Brussels Treaty has been abolished as from 1st 
January 1986. 
(a) Forces under NATO command 
2.20. The maximum levels of ground, air and 
naval forces which member states of WEU place 
under NATO command are fixed in Articles I 
and II ofProtocol No. II to the modified Brussels 
Treaty. So that it may satisfy itself that the limits 
laid down in Articles I and II of Protocol No. II 
are not exceeded, the Council receives infor-
mation every year concerning the levels in 
question, in accordance with Article IV of that 
Protocol. This information is obtained in the 
course of inspections carried out by the Supreme 
Allied Commander, Europe, and is transmitted 
to the Council by a high-ranking officer desig-
nated by him to that end. The information, as at 
the end of 1986, was conveyed at the appropriate 
time. The same procedure is reported as under 
way for the information as at the end of 1987. 
2.21. The Council also takes the necessary steps 
to implement the procedure laid down in its res-
olution of 15th September 1956, whereby the 
levels of forces of WEU member states under 
NATO command are examined in the light of 
the annual review. 
2.22. For the year 1986, the permanent repre-
sentatives to the North Atlantic Council of 
Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom examined the levels offorces of 
WEU member states and reported to the 
Council. 
2.23. The Council noted that the level of forces 
of the member states of WEU, as set out in the 
NATO force plan, fell within the limits specified 
in Articles I and II of Protocol No. IL as at 
present in force. It also took note of a declaration 
on French forces made by the representative of 
France. 
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2.24. The Council reports that the same pro-
cedure is under way for the year 1987. 
(b) Forces under national command 
2.25. As stated above, the Council is continuing 
with its control offorces of member states main-
tained on the mainland of Europe, and 
remaining under national command - internal 
defence and police forces, forces for the defence 
of overseas territories, and common defence 
forces - specified in the agreement of 14th 
December 1957. 
(ii) United Kingdom forces stationed 
on the mainland of Europe 
2.26. Under the terms of Article VI of Protocol 
No. 11 to the modified Brussels Treaty, the 
United Kingdom undertook to maintain on the 
mainland of Europe the effective strength of: 
" four divisions and the second tactical air force, 
or such other forces as the Supreme Allied Com-
mander, Europe, regards as having equivalent 
fighting capacity". The United Kingdom 
undertook: " not to withdraw these forces against 
the wishes ofthe majority ofthe high contracting 
parties ... this undertaking shall not, however, 
bind her in the event of an acute overseas emer-
gency ... ". In accordance with the procedure pro-
vided for in that article, the Council subse-
quently acquiesced in the United Kingdom's 
request to reduce the levels of forces it maintains 
on the mainland of Europe, and the level now 
agreed by the Council is 55 000 men plus a tac-
tical air force. At the insistence of the Assembly, 
acting on reports from the committee, the 
United Kingdom agreed to include a statement 
in the Council's annual report setting forth the 
precise levels of the forces affected by this under-
taking. 
2.27. The Council's annual report states that the 
"average" number of British land forces sta-
tioned on the mainland of Europe in 1987 in 
accordance with this commitment was 54 334 
but " .. .in 1987 there were an average 949 men 
redeployed ... to Northern Ireland". This means 
that the underlying average number of men on 
the mainland of Europe was 53 385 - a shortfall 
of 1 615 below the current level of the United 
Kingdom's obligation. As the figure quoted is an 
average level, it must be concluded that there 
were periods in 1987 when the actual level was 
lower still. 
2.28. The committee regrets that the United 
Kingdom fell short of its WEU commitment by 
an average of nearly 3% in 1987, continuing the 
previous year's trend, and would welcome an 
explanation of the underlying reasons, especially 
if the same situation is to be continued or exacer-
bated in the future (which, given present demo-
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graphic profiles, may well be the case). The com-
mittee accepts the Council's assurance that 
BAOR units redeployed to Northern Ireland 
would be speedily returned to their duty station 
in an emergency affecting NATO. 
2.29. With regard to the United Kingdom's con-
tribution to the second allied tactical air force in 
1987, the Council's report provides the following 
information: 
United Kingdom contribution to NATO second 
tactical air force 
Role Aircraft eqmpment Squadrons 
Strike/ Attack Tornado 7 
Offens1ve support Harrier 2 
Reconnaissance Jaguar I 
A1r defence Phantom 2 
Rapier surface-to-air 
missiles 4 
Air transport Puma I 
Chinook I 
Ground defence RAF regiment I 
2.30. The committee notes with satisfaction that 
compared with 1986, there has been an increase 
of one in the number of Tornado squadrons in 
Germany. 
2.31. Where levels offorces present in Germany 
are concerned, the committee would like to 
underline the importance of maintaining agreed 
numbers and not making unilateral reductions, 
unless and until agreed and verifiable multi-
lateral arms control measures are negotiated. 
This is particularly vital in the context of visible 
burden-sharing and the setting of examples 
which might create unfortunate precedents. 
Transatlantic alliance solidarity is more 
important than short-term national considera-
tions now and in the foreseeable future. 
(f) Agency for the Control of Armaments 
2.32. In accordance with the Council's decision 
to abolish controls on conventional weapons in 
WEU countries - a decision which the 
Assembly, on the recommendation of the com-
mittee, had been calling for repeatedly for a 
number of years, no such controls were carried 
out in 1987. The Agency for the Control of 
Armaments has itself been largely disbanded and 
comprises today a single staff member who is an 
expert on chemical weapons. According to the 
Council's Rome declaration of 26th October 
1984, which announced the reactivation of 
WEU, while the conventional arms controls were 
to be abolished from 1st January 1986, " the 
commitments and controls concerning ABC 
weapons would be maintained at the existing 
level and in accordance with the procedures 
agreed up to the present time". The second part 
of the annual report for 1987 records that: " The 
Agency did not exercise any control in the field 
of atomic weapons". While the list of biological 
weapons subject to control, as accepted by the 
Council in 1981, was renewed for 1987, " ... the 
agency did not exercise any control in the field of 
biological weapons". The committee notes that 
the situation concerning nuclear and biological 
weapons remains unchanged - the controls on 
these weapons provided for in the modified 
Brussels Treaty have never been applied. 
2.33. The situation concerning chemical 
weapons is quite different, as the Agency for the 
Control of Armaments has duly applied the con-
trols provided for in Protocol No. Ill of the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty. The Agency for the Control 
of Armaments circulates a questionnaire to all 
member countries which have not renounced the 
right to produce chemical weapons; two specific 
questions are asked: whether production of 
chemical weapons has passed the experimental 
stage and entered the effective production stage; 
and the levels of stocks of any chemical weapons 
that the member country might hold. The annual 
report states, as in the past, that all member 
states replied in the negative to both questions, 
and that accordingly, the agency carried out no 
quantitative controls of chemical weapons in 
1987. 
2.34. Since the committee's last report on the 
subject 5, France has considerably modified its 
original stance on chemical weapons and as 
recently as 29th September 1988, President 
Mitterrand stated that France would itself 
renounce the future making and stocking of 
chemical weapons as soon as a global convention 
was signed. The committee welcomes this con-
structive development which considerably mod-
ifies the briefing it received on 26th July 1988 at 
the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva. 
2.35. As far as Germany is concerned, it has of 
course renounced the right to produce chemical 
weapons on its territory under the terms of a uni-
lateral declaration annexed to the modified 
Brussels Treaty, and the Agency for the Control 
of Armaments applies an agreed procedure to 
verify the non-production of chemical weapons 
in that country. At the present time, visits 
carried out under the agreed procedure remain 
the only inspections carried out by the Agency 
for the Control of Armaments which previously 
numbered some 70 each year when controls were 
applied also to conventional weapons. The 
annual report of the Council up to 1965 gave 
details of all inspections carried out by the 
5. Disarmament- reply to the thirty-second annual report of 
the Council, Document 1116, 2nd November 1987, 
Rapporteur: Mr. Scheer. 
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agency, including the numbers of non-control 
measures applying to the non-production of 
chemical weapons. From 1966 onwards, annual 
reports of the Council provided data only for 
total numbers of control measures carried out by 
the agency, but under a subsequent agreement 
with the Council, the committee was informed 
each year on a confidential basis of the 
breakdown of this number of inspections by 
quantitative controls and non-production con-
trols, etc. 
2.36. The Council's report for 1987 reinstates 
the information relating to the numbers of 
inspections carried out under the residual func-
tions of the Agency for the Control of Arma-
ments, as called for by the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments which is 
pleased to see that this capacity, although ves-
tigial, is being maintained. 
Ill. Western European Union attitudes 
on arms control and disarmament 
3.1. The governments of WEU have always 
recognised that military strength. while being 
essential to security, is not the complete answer. 
Progress has to be maintained in the search for a 
more peaceful world and our nations are 
therefore committed to the negotiation of real-
istic and verifiable arms control agreements in 
respect of nuclear and other forces. The western 
alliance as a whole has long recognised that 
strong defences to deter aggression, and the 
pursuit of detente through arms control and 
other measures, are complementary aspects of 
security policy. A need for international, as 
opposed to unilateral, arms control is recognised, 
with the INF deal seen as a vindication of the 
West's policy of maintaining strong defences 
while seeking international arms control agree-
ments. One-sided disarmament would remove 
the alliance's ability to deter aggression and 
would thus undermine security, increasing, 
rather than reducing, the dangers of war. It 
would not result in other nuclear states following 
a western example and would remove the 
incentive for the Soviet Union to negotiate 
proper balanced measures of disarmament. The 
only safe route to disarmament is seen as one in 
which countries act in agreement and in parallel. 
There would be no way that the Soviet Union 
could be persuaded to disarm if the West threw 
in its hand before the bidding started. If. while 
maintaining western defences, multilateral dis-
armament is pursued with determination and 
vigour, we stand the best chance of persuading 
the Soviet Union to reduce their nuclear and 
conventional arsenals in return for reducing 
ours, and the INF deal supports that particular 
view. 
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(a) Arms control priorities 
3.2. The Assembly of WEU fully supports the 
United States-Soviet Union INF agreement 
signed in Washington last December. The 
agreement had been a NATO priority since 1979 
and is a tribute to the alliance's decision to 
follow the twin track of modernising its own 
aging forces in the face of the Soviet build-up, 
while seeking an arms control accord. If NATO 
had abandoned its own forces unilaterally, there 
would have been no incentive for the Soviet 
Union to negotiate and the INF deal might never 
have been achieved. 
3.3. The western allies have a comprehensive 
set of further arms control priorities which were 
affirmed in Reykjavik in June last year, and 
these are a 50% reduction in United States and 
Soviet strategic nuclear arsenals, a global ban on 
chemical weapons, and an agreement to redress 
the imbalance in conventional forces in 
Europe. 
3.4. The priority in the strategic arms talks has 
to be reductions in the massive arsenals of the 
United States and the Soviet Union, as these are 
seen as vastly greater than the strategic forces of 
the other nuclear weapon states and that has 
been fully recognised by both General Secretary 
Gorbachev and President Reagan, who agree 
that forces from other countries should be 
excluded from the current negotiations. A 50% 
cut in the superpowers' arsenals would signifi-
cantly improve international security without 
undermining defence strategy. The Warsaw Pact 
has a definite numerical advantage in conven-
tional forces in Europe, and in chemical 
weapons. Agreements in these two areas would 
likewise be necessary steps towards greater 
security. 
(b) NATO forces post-/NE 
3.5. The INF agreement is seen as a good one, 
but limited. It will change neither the essential 
basis of the Soviet threat, nor the nature of the 
necessary western response to it. The Soviet 
Union will still retain large numbers of nuclear 
weapons, including strategic systems capable of 
attacking intermediate targets. Its conventional 
and chemical superiorities remain. The alliance, 
therefore, has to maintain the ingredients of a 
flexible response strategy - that means the 
recognisable military capabilities - conventional 
and nuclear - to respond effectively at all levels 
of aggression. That in turn requires continued 
possession of adequate conventional forces, 
maintenance of nuclear forces in the European 
area and maintenance of a strategic nuclear 
arsenal. 
3.6. There are concerns that the INF 
agreement damages one crucial element of the 
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triad by diminishing NATO's ability to deploy 
longer-range nuclear systems in Europe. The Per-
shing 2 and ground-launched cruise missile 
systems are reliable and effective. They provide 
increased flexibility and survivability. It would 
be wrong to pretend that the alliance is not 
giving up weapons of considerable military 
value, although the Soviet Union no doubt feels 
the same about the SS-20. 
3. 7. Alliance nuclear planning over the last five 
years and more has assumed the deployment in 
Europe of Pershing and cruise, and, with their 
elimination, it will be necessary to reassess and 
to adjust what is left. That in no sense involves a 
contravention of the INF agreement. The aim is 
to ensure that the remaining forces, which will 
include over 4 000 nuclear warheads assigned to 
SACEUR, are effective, with the necessary 
launchers. This process is not new, nor is it in 
any way inconsistent with reducing the number 
of nuclear weapons. 
3.8. At Montebello in 1983, for example, the 
West agreed 6 to reduce its European stockpile 
unilaterally by 1 400 warheads and also to 
improve the remaining systems to ensure their 
effectiveness. We now have to consider what 
further adjustments are needed following the 
INF agreement, although the emphasis must 
surely be on the conventional and chemical. 
IV. The INF Treaty 
4.1. Many members of the Assembly have 
asked for a breakdown of the details concerning 
the INF Treaty, which has far-reaching implica-
tions as a precedent for future arms control 
regimes, and particularly for verification. The 
following section is an attempt to give the detail 
required. 
4.2. During the second part of the thirty-third 
ordinary session, the Assembly voted to adopt 
Resolution 77 on the INF Treaty on 2nd 
December 1987. Resolution 77 reads: 
" The Assembly, 
Endorsing the view of its Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments 
expressed in Document 1116 that the INF 
agreement now to be signed by the United 
States and the Soviet Union should be in 
the long-term security interests of coun-
tries both of the alliance and the Warsaw 
Pact, 
URGES THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 
To give its advice and consent to the treaty 
on intermediate-range nuclear forces as 
expeditiously as possible; 
6. See text at Appendix II. 
INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENT 
To transmit the text of the present reso-
lution and the corresponding report of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments to the President ofthe United 
States Senate for the information of all its 
members." 
The INF Treaty was duly signed on 8th 
December and the text of Resolution 77 and the 
corresponding report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments duly trans-
mitted to the President of the United States 
Senate. The full text of the INF Treaty is shown 
at appendix. 
(a) The INF Treaty at a glance 
4.3. The treaty is made up of 17 articles. All 
ground-launched missiles of the two sides with a 
range between 500 and 5 500 km are to be 
destroyed including those with non-nuclear war-
heads. For the future, further production, flight-
testing or deployment will be banned. 
4.4. The total number of missiles involved is 
2 611. On the United States side there are 859 
missiles made up of 247 Pershing lis. 442 
ground-launched cruise missiles, 1 70 Pershing 
IAs with a total of 283 launchers. For the Soviet 
Union, 1 752 missiles are involved: 170 SS-4s, 
six SS-Ss, 650 SS-20s, 726 SS-12s and 200 SS-23s 
on a total of 845 launchers. Also banned are all 
conventional ground-launched cruise missiles. 
(i) Time-scale 
4.5. Both countries began destruction of mis-
siles at the same time and the process is to be 
completed within three years. All warheads are 
to be removed from missiles, but the fissile 
material may be kept on each side together with 
the most sensitive parts of the guidance systems. 
The remainder of the warhead and the whole of 
the re-entry vehicle are to be destroyed. 
(ii) Inspection 
4.6. Thirty days after the treaty came into 
force, each side was allowed a base-line 
inspection to check the number of missiles and 
launchers in notified locations and these inspec-
tions duly began on 1st July 1988. A total of 20 
short-notice on-site inspections per year will be 
allowed each side during the first three years. 
These may be carried out in third countries, but 
the third country inspections will be covered by a 
formal agreement with each host country. Once 
the dismantling is complete, each side will make 
a formal inspection of the bases and other sites to 
ensure that all missiles have been destroyed. In 
addition, each side is allowed 15 challenge 
inspections per year after dismantling for the 
first five years and then 10 a year for the next 
five years after that. 
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(iii) Other documents 
4. 7. Other documents concerning the treaty 
include a memorandum of understanding cov-
ering weapons and site data including types of 
missile. technical characteristics of missiles. 
numbers deployed and location, numbers pro-
duced but not deployed with location at pro-
duction sites, test sites, etc. 
4.8. A protocol on elimination procedures 
describes the means to be used to destroy mis-
siles, warheads and launching equipment. The 
protocol describes what materials may be 
re-used. Missile destruction in the first six 
months may be done by test-firing or by using 
the vehicles for target practice. 
4.9. Thirdly, there is a protocol for on-site 
inspections. Inspectors making short-notice 
inspections of suspect activity would be confined 
to certain areas which would include the declared 
sites. The inspections during the last 10 years 
will be permitted in the home countries only and 
will include the ground-launched cruise missile 
launcher plants in each country. 
4.10. Lastly, basing country agreements have 
been concluded to give legal status to visits by 
inspectors to third countries. It is this point 
which has given rise on occasion to charges that 
such inspections are possible infringements of 
national sovereignty. 
(b) Technical aspects of the INF Treaty 
4.11. The INF agreement contains more clauses 
of a technical nature than most of its fore-
runners. The following paragraphs seek to 
explain some of the complicated ramifications. 
4.12. The treaty provides for the total elimi-
nation of intermediate nuclear forces (INF) 
which include both longer-range intermediate 
nuclear forces (LRINF) and shorter-range inter-
mediate nuclear forces (SRINF). 
4.13. Attached to the treaty is the protocol on 
verification which is the key to the success not 
only of this particular agreement, but also for all 
other future agreements. Obviously the two 
parties involved must be satisfied that all provi-
sions of the treaty are met fully: hence the 
intricate system of verification procedures. 
4.14. These procedures call for the destruction 
of both sides' ground-launched cruise missiles 
(GLCM) and ground-launched ballistic missiles 
(GLBM), which have ranges from 1 000 to 
5 500 km (LRINF) and from 500 to 1 000 km 
(SRINF). For the United States, this encom-
passes the Pershing 11 and the BGM-109G cruise 
systems (LRINF) and the Pershing lA (SRINF); 
for the Soviet Union, the SS-20. SS-5. SS-4 
(LRINF) and the SS-23 and the SS-12 (SRINF). 
All missiles are to be destroyed within three 
years of the implementation of the treaty. 
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4.15. During the period leading up to ratifi-
cation. both sides drew up lists of inspectors. 
Three initial lists were prepared by each side. 
One included the aircrew in charge of trans-
porting national inspection teams. Another list 
(Group A) included those who would carry out 
the initial missile counts and spot checks. 
Thirdly, there is the team (Group B) of those 
inspectors who will monitor compliance for a 
period of up to 13 years. As many as 200 
members were included on a list. Other states 
besides the United States and the Soviet Union 
are also affected, because of the siting of the two 
countries' systems. For inspection purposes, 
there are two kinds of parties: the " inspected 
party" (Party 1) which can be only the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and the "basing 
country " (Party 2). 
4.16. Points of entry into each country are 
strictly specified: 
- United States: Washington DC or San 
Francisco; 
Belgium: Brussels National Airport; 
FRG: Frankfurt (Main Airbase); 
Italy: Ciampino, Rome; 
Netherlands: Schiphol, Amsterdam; 
United Kingdom: RAF Greenham 
Common; 
Soviet Union: Moscow or Irkutsk; 
GDR: Schkeuditz; 
Czechoslovakia: Ruzyne International 
Airport. 
4.17. Advance notice of inspectors, point of 
entry, date and hour, will be given at least 16 
hours previously. The same team, tasked also 
with supervising the destruction process, will, 
when performing that task, give no less than 72 
hours advance warning of its arrival at a 
destruction site. 
4.18. The reception accorded to any inspection 
team will be dictated by the country they visit. 
Should they arrive in the United States and the 
Soviet Union, only an escort from Party 1 will be 
present. Should an inspection team arrive in one 
of the countries belonging to Party 2, in addition 
to a team from Party 1, an escort from Party 2 
may also be provided. (A provision inserted in 
order to preserve the sovereignty of each basing 
country.) 
4.19. On Tuesday 27th September 1988 ten 
Soviet inspectors arrived in the Federal Republic 
of Germany to make the first such " short notice 
inspection " of an American INF missile base -
exercising the right to do so for the first time. 
The USSR has the right to make ten short notice 
inspections in the FRG each year. 
4.20. While performing their duty, inspectors 
may use all equipment allowed, apart from 
" photographic appliances ". Should any con-
tention arise, inspectors could ask Party 1 (but 
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not Party 2), to photograph the object of dispute 
for them. The only cameras permitted are those 
which produce instantaneous pictures, identical 
copies of which will be retained by the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The task of the 
inspectors is to compile a report and it is their 
duty to try and resolve disputes on the spot. In 
the event of substantial disagreements, however. 
they are not empowered to propose solutions. 
Their inspection must be visual, aided by scien-
tific equipment such as radiation detection 
devices. Should members of Group A come 
across objects contained within enclosed spaces. 
they are allowed to measure them and compare 
their size with the information provided by Party 
1. If the information coincides with their meas-
urements, they will not be allowed to inspect 
further. However, should the claims of Partv 1 
seem to contradict the size and shape o( an 
obscured object, this finding will be added to the 
inspectors' report. During their visit, inspectors 
are allowed to place guards around an instal-
lation and challenge any vehicles or movements 
which may take place. 
4.21. Production facilities on the territory of 
Party 1 are subject to continuous monitoring for 
a period of 13 years. Party 1 is obliged to 
maintain a perimeter around such sites with one 
main gate, containing at most one road and rail 
link and two other exits. Any vehicle which 
could contain a missile should pass only through 
the main gate. Inspectors from Group B will live 
next to the facilities for the entire period, if they 
wish. Living accommodation will initially be 
provided by the host nation; construction 
material could also be provided for the erection 
of three buildings, with floor space not greater 
then 150 square metres. These could house a 
data centre and the team's headquarters. And 
although teams would be allowed communi-
cation with their data centre outside a facility's 
perimeter while inspecting such sites, this will be 
restricted to particular radio frequencies. 
Inspectors are also allowed to place sensors 
around the main gate to monitor movements. 
4.22. From the amount of detail included in the 
protocol to the treaty, it is obvious that verifi-
cation will not be cheap. But verification proce-
dures must be rigorous if the treaty is to be a 
success. In addition, however, the procedures 
must be enhanced by good will on both sides and 
a genuine commitment to adhere to the 
agreement (which entails the destruction of some 
4% of world stocks of nuclear weapons). The 
stakes are high, but if successful, the agreement 
will augur well for further arms limitation pro-
posals, and especially for the reductions cur-
rently being discussed at the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Talks (START). Should the verifi-
cation procedures outlined above prove impos-
sible to apply practically (and equitably), the 
eventual success of all future negotiations could 
well be in jeopardy. 
V. Major conventional arms control talks 
(a) Negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces 
and armaments and associated measures 
in central Europe (MBFR talks) - Vienna 
5.1. Talks began on 30th October 1973 
between two groups of countries from NATO 
and the Warsaw Pact. The participants are: 
(i) West: Belgium, Canada, FRG, Luxem-
bourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
United States; 
(ii) East: Czechoslovakia, GDR, Poland, 
USSR. 
(It has also been suggested that Denmark and 
Hungary should join; France does not participate 
in the talks. although she is kept informed, e.g. in 
the NATO Council.) 
5.2. The area covered includes the territory of 
seven countries only: Belgium, FRG, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, GDR 
and Poland. 
5.3. Both sides agree reductions in the area 
concerned to 900 000 ground and air troops, with 
an initial reduction of 1 500 Soviet and 5-6 500 
United States troops. But major issues still to be 
resolved include adequate verification measures 
and whether or not to include armaments in the 
initial reduction (at various times proposals on 
armaments have included nuclear missiles, 
nuclear-capable aircraft, tactical nuclear war-
heads and tanks). 
5.3. The 45th round of talks finished on 30th 
June, but it appears likely that when a mandate 
is agreed for the wider CSCE talks (see below), 
the MBFR negotiations will probably be sub-
sumed. Even though nothing tangible seems to 
have resulted from nearly fifteen years of talks in 
this forum, the " lessons learned " by all con-
cerned have been considerable and have had tre-
mendous influence both on attitudes bi- and 
multilaterally and in helping to generate a greater 
understanding of the issues involved in arms 
control. (In addition, the talks have also spawned 
a whole new specialist vocabulary ... ) 
(b) Conference on Confidence- and Security-building and 
Disarmament in Europe (CDE and CSCE) - Vienna 
5.5. The CDE (Conference on Disarmament in 
Europe) is part of the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). 
5.6. Previous talks took place in Stockholm 
from January 1984 to September 1986 when the 
thirty-four states involved agreed various confi-
dence-building measures which developed those 
agreed in Helsinki in 1975. This third conference 
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began in Vienna on 4th November 1986, having 
decided a mandate to begin the talks on actual 
disarmament measures. 
5. 7. The participants now are as follows 
(grouped normally as NATO, Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation (WTO), and neutral and non-
aligned (NNA)): 
Austria (NNA) 
Belgium (NATO) 
Bulgaria (WTO) 
Canada (NATO) 
Cyprus (NNA) 
Czechoslovakia 
(WTO) 
Denmark (NATO) 
Finland (NNA) 
France (NATO) 
FRG (NATO) 
GDR (WTO) 
Greece (NATO) 
Holy See (NNA) 
Hungary (WTO) 
Iceland (NATO) 
Ireland (NNA) 
Italy (NATO) 
Liechtenstein (NNA) 
Luxembourg 
(NATO) 
Malta (NNA) 
Monaco (NNA) 
Netherlands 
(NATO) 
Norway (NATO) 
Poland (WTO) 
Portugal (NATO) 
Romania (WTO) 
San Marino (NNA) 
Spain (NATO) 
Sweden (NNA) 
Switzerland (NNA) 
Turkey (NATO) 
United Kingdom 
(NATO) 
United States 
(NATO) 
USSR (WTO) 
Yugoslavia (NNA) 
5.8. While all states appear to be satisfied with 
how the provisions of the Stockholm conference 
were being implemented (successful inspections. 
for example, on both sides), ideas are divided on 
how to reach agreement on the subjects for dis-
cussion. The Warsaw Pact wants CDE to begin 
negotiations on large-scale conventional reduc-
tions, while NATO wants such discussions to be 
held outside the CDE. Hence the sixteen NATO 
nations and the seven WTO nations are sepa-
rately discussing what mandate to give European 
conventional arms talks and what link to have 
with the CSCE. This "Group of twenty-three" 
also has its own problems - the WTO wanting to 
include discussion of tactical nuclear weapons, 
which is strongly resisted by NATO. 
5.9. Many NATO nations do not want the 
neutral and non-aligned states to discuss western 
arms reductions, so the present proposal is to 
discuss military reductions and stability among 
the twenty-three (concentrating to begin with on 
reductions to lessen the capability for offensive 
action and surprise attack) and link such talks 
with the thirty-five-state forum which would 
discuss further confidence-building measures. 
5.1 0. France has traditionally opposed bloc-
to-bloc talks on conventional arms reductions, in 
this and other settings, and has insisted that ref-
erence be made, in the preamble to the proposed 
mandate, to the Brussels Treaty, thus providing a 
potential direct link with Western European 
Union. 
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5.11. At the time of writing, provided agreement 
can be reached to make progress on human 
rights issues (and progress here should be pos-
sible if the same attitudes prevail as in virtually 
all other areas), it would appear that a mandate 
for conventional arms control talks in this 
context is highly likely in the near future. 
5.12. Outside the talks, the Warsaw Pact con-
tinued its multitude of proposals. At the Moscow 
summit Mr. Gorbachev presented a three-stage 
proposal for reductions. It would begin with a 
data exchange and verification of the data, fol-
lowed by correction of the asymmetries 
uncovered, through reductions. In stage two each 
side would reduce by 500 000 troops. In the third 
stage further reductions would take place and the 
remaining forces would be given a defensive 
character. 
5.13. Poland on 15th June 1988 tabled details of 
a plan for a broader reduction, as well as a zone 
of dispersed armaments between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact. 
5.14. On 11th July 1988, Mr. Gorbachev sug-
gested a pan-European summit meeting to move 
ahead on conventional arms, and a European 
risk-reduction centre. In the same speech he said 
the USSR would withdraw forward-deployed 
nuclear-capable aircraft if the United States 
would withdraw the 72 F-16s which at Spanish 
insistence, were to be moved from their current 
home in Spain to Italy. 
(c) Conference on Disarmament (CD) - Geneva 
5.15. The Conference on Disarmament was 
created by the United Nations as a result of the 
1978 Special Session on Disarmament. 
5.16. Participants are as follows: 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Australia 
Belgium 
Brazil 
Bulgaria 
Burma 
Canada 
China 
Cuba 
Czechoslovakia 
Egypt 
Ethiopia 
France 
FRG 
GDR 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Italy 
Japan 
Kenya 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Morocco 
Nether lands 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Peru 
Poland 
Romania 
Sri Lanka 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
United States 
USSR 
Venezuela 
Yugoslavia 
Zaire 
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5.17. The permanent agenda of the conference 
deals with " the cessation of the arms race and 
disarmament and other relevant measures in the 
following areas: 
(i) nuclear weapons in all aspects: 
(zi) chemical weapons; 
(iii) other weapons of mass destruction; 
(n) conventional weapons; 
M reduction of military budgets; 
(vi) reduction of armed forces: 
(vii) disarmament and development; 
(viii) disarmament and international 
security; 
(ix) collateral measures; confidence-
building measures; effective verifi-
cation methods in relation to appro-
priate disarmament measures, 
acceptable to all parties concerned; 
(x) comprehensive programme of dis-
armament leading to general and 
complete disarmament under 
effective international control". 
5.18. Most items on the CD agenda are dis-
cussed in ad hoc committees and of these 
perhaps the committee on chemical weapons is 
the one which has made the most progress. 
Established in March 1980, with all forty coun-
tries of the conference participating, it is 
attempting to draft a treaty which would produce 
a global ban on the possession, production, and 
use of chemical weapons. 
5.19. Chemical weapons are those weapons 
which include a chemical agent: chemicals which 
kill after touching the skin or inhalation. They 
are usually delivered by shells; the term " muni-
tions " refers to both the agent and the shell 
(hence the confusion caused when the Soviet 
Union stated that no more than 50 000 tons of 
chemical weapons were held: 50 000 tons of 
agent? Or 50 000 tons of agent and shell?). 
5.20. The obvious complications which bedevil 
negotiations are: 
(i) the problem of proliferation 
chemical agents are easy to produce 
and comparatively cheap; 
(ii) the problem therefore of agreeing a 
truly global ban; 
(izi) the reported current use of such 
agents in present conflicts (not all 
alleged users take part in the talks); 
(iv) the major problem of adequate verifi-
cation, including, of course, fear of 
industrial espionage. 
5.21. Where verification is concerned, your 
Rapporteur cannot help wondering what advice 
and consultation has been offered by the Council 
of Western European Union whose agencies 
haYc thirty years' worth of experience and 
expertise to contribute? 
5.22. The United Nations third special session 
on disarmament met in New York from 31st 
Mav to 26th June, but ended without a final doc-
um~nt. Subjects discussed included: prevention 
of an arms race in outer space; the relationship 
between disarmament and development; 
nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace. 
Although a consensus was not possible, most 
present agreed that "progress was made". 
VI. Aspects of deterrence: 
the different Europes and public perceptions 
6.1. Development of deterrence now seems to 
depend on developments in high technology. But 
here there is a great danger of arousing special 
susceptibilities: advanced technology is closely 
linked to individual, industrial and national 
prestige and has particular overtones for eco-
nomic stimulus. 
6.2. In both eastern and western bloc coun-
tries, the birth rate is either generally static, or in 
some instances actually declining in real terms 
and such demographic developments (in par-
ticular producing insufficient manpower for 
present force levels to be maintained) will cer-
tainly increase the demand for sophisticated 
technology, leading eventually to an alienation 
between civilisation (technological progress) and 
culture (social advancement and everyday use). 
6.3. For example, the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions' report 
on European space policy until 2000 7 concludes 
that space should be seen as a collective cultural 
heritage. But one must always look forward. 
Even in days gone by it was only by looking 
forward that space became any sort of" cultural 
heritage" (from Daedalus and his ill-fated son, 
Icarus, through Jules Verne to our modern com-
munication satellites). And such was the theme 
which contributed to the success of the 
Assembly's colloquy in Munich in September 
1985 (The space challenge for Europe). 
6.4. The most recent colloquy, (held by the 
Assembly in London at the beginning of March 
1988 on European co-operation in armaments 
research and development) pointed to various 
other problems which also have repercussions on 
disarmament. European unity is still vitally 
7. European space policy until 2000, 29th April 1987. 
Document 1098, Rapporteur: Mr. Valleix. 
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dependent on a series of situations which prog-
nosticate conflict rather than unison. For 
example: the current incompatibility between the 
Europes of seven, twelve or twenty-one 
members; the single European act. and the 1992 
market: the possible enlargement of WEU as a 
means to reinforcing the European pillar of the 
North Atlantic Alliance, with attendant 
problems; the whole incongruence between the 
various organisations set up to ensure European 
co-operation in different fields; all leading to 
very different attitudes, influenced also by such 
basic elements as individual geography and 
therefore threat perception ... 
6.5. Our ideal aim would surely be to achieve 
mutual security for the whole of Western Europe: 
co-operation between the . various European 
organisations is therefore a move in the right 
direction (as is the step towards enlargement of 
Western European Union taken by the Council 
at The Hague on 18th/ 19th April 1988). But 
many problems remain to be solved before our 
present grouping (the only European organi-
sation with a mandate to deliberate on defence 
issues) becomes involved with other forums, 
some of which are already extending their 
interests into the field of security. 
6.6. Some of these conceptions may appear 
particularly nebulous, but they have to be con-
sidered if real progress is to be made in disarm-
ament. WEU could have a real contribution to 
make in this domain, especially where verifi-
cation is concerned, and a positive suggestion is 
developed in a parallel report to the Assembly by 
the Committee on Defence Questions and Arma-
ments, "Verification: a future European satellite 
agency " (Rapporteur: Mr. Fourre ). 
6. 7. Originally conceived to guard against a 
renewal of the militarism which had plunged 
Europe into conflict, the Brussels Treaty clearly 
shows that it is the task of the alliance to protect 
our everyday life from the risks of future warfare. 
On the wider scale, the aim is to unite Europe so 
that together we may prevent conflict. On a 
smaller scale it really is necessary to give the 
population of our countries a genuine perception 
of peace instead of always searching for a 
potential enemy. So links between Western 
European Union and other organisations based 
on co-operation, such as the Council of Europe, 
must be assessed according to their peace- and 
security-promoting effects. All members of the 
Assembly nominated from national parliaments 
to the Council of Europe and also to the 
Assembly, must make this sort of assessment for 
themselves and they should then pass on their 
assessment to all parliamentary bodies of which 
they are a member. 
6.8. 
and 
Public opinion on the promotion of peace 
security through arms control, arms 
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reduction and disarmament is not always based 
on the necessary understanding of the procedures 
involved and of course the exact or precise bud-
getary consequences. Arms control does not 
necessarily lead to mitigation or reduction of the 
burden or indeed to the burden remaining 
unchanged. The gap between the public and the 
factors affecting a whole weapons cult is still far 
too large. A particular phenomenon of late has 
been the creation of special arms control depart-
ments in ministries for foreign affairs or the 
various ministries of defence of the member 
states. The creation of such departments is to be 
highly recommended. Links, where they exist 
between these departments and the academics in 
the universities, are a means whereby" civilian" 
participation in arms control procedures may be 
possible, given the growing importance of verifi-
cation procedures, as will be examined later in 
this report. A number of universities and other 
institutions has already begun setting up verifi-
cation departments in order to examine the tech-
nical aspects of verification in particular; for 
example, the Free University in Amsterdam now 
has such a department and in London the Verifi-
cation Technology Information Centre already 
has a great deal of experience in this field. 
6.9. One factor affecting "disarmament 
culture" is very much subject to change because 
of the gradual fading-away of " enemy per-
ception" built up during the era of the cold war. 
Care must be taken that strategists, whether mil-
itary or academic, do not create new subjects for 
study which might lead to the reconstruction of 
that old "enemy perception". There are two 
aspects to this change. One consistently shows 
the road from arms reduction to disarmament, 
and the other seeks to conjure up a picture of 
rearmament to compensate for reductions. The 
first aspect must obviously be made credible 
through agreements on the control of arma-
ments, through verification and inspection. The 
second must be prevented by improving inter-
national relations and encouraging democracy. 
In the latter context, the threatening concept of 
dictatorship usurping democracy seems to be 
fading, leading to an easing of tension between 
nations, something which is very much in line 
with the intentions of the treaties on which 
Western European Union is based. This change 
in "enemy perception" might imply a conse-
quential change in the operation of deter-
rence. 
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VII. Conclusion 
7.1. The whole arms control and disarmament 
scene is subject to change, so it is still difficult to 
draw any punctual conclusion at this stage. It is 
obvious that with such a state of flux and given 
the" unknown" (for example, the United States 
presidential elections take place the day after this 
report is to be presented to the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments!) follow-up 
reports are bound to be necessary. What is 
important at this stage is that we seek to control 
the changes currently taking place and that we 
should build on what has been agreed in the 
various forums: " we should reflect upon the 
style in which we negotiate. Would not it be wise 
to take stock and conclude ... that at least there are 
elements ... on which we do agree " (Ambassador 
van Schaik of the Netherlands in his address to 
the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on 8th 
March 1988). 
7.2. We should also try to ensure that our con-
cerns as Europeans are taken into account par-
ticularly where superpower arms control negotia-
tions affecting Europeans are concerned, and 
that Europe is not left on the sideline when the 
important decisions are taken. The Council of 
WEU has shown some sign of such a 
co-ordinating role in the reports prepared by the 
Paris agencies: " The recent evolution of the 
Soviet attitude with regard to Western Europe 
and the impact of this evolution on security 
policy" (prepared in September 1987 and trans-
mitted to the Assembly on 25th February 1988) 
and " The experience gained in verification of 
controls on forces and conventional arma-
ments " (prepared in March 1988 and trans-
mitted to the Assembly on 17th June), although, 
sadly, the disclaimer on the title page that the 
reports " reflect only the opinion of the authors 
and neither the member states nor the Per-
manent Council ofWestern European Union can 
accept responsibility for the contents " tends to 
detract considerably from the overall impact! 
The Council informs the Assembly that a 
number of reports prepared by the agencies has 
been " passed to expert working groups for more 
detailed consideration ". The Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments trusts that 
the above-cited report, and others. on verifi-
cation issues, especially, will help define a 
Western European identity and bring agreement 
closer on these vital issues of arms control and 
disarmament. 
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Treaty between the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the elimination of 
their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles 1 
The United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter 
referred to as the parties, 
Conscious that nuclear war would have 
devastating consequences for all mankind, 
Guided by the objective of strengthening 
strategic stability, 
Convinced that the measures set forth in 
this treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak 
of war and strengthen international peace and 
security, and 
Mindful of their obligations under Article 
VI of the treaty on the non-proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
In accordance with the provisions of this 
treaty which includes the memorandum of 
understanding and protocols which form an 
integral part thereof, each party shall eliminate 
its intermediate-range and shorter-range mis-
siles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry 
out the other obligations set forth in this 
treaty. 
Article// 
For the purposes of this treaty: 
1. The term " ballistic missile " means a 
missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of 
its flight path. The term "ground-launched 
ballistic missile (GLBM)" means a ground-
launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-
delivery vehicle. 
2. The term " cruise missile " means an 
unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains 
flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over 
most of its flight path. The term " ground-
launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a 
ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon 
delivery vehicle. 
3. The term "GLBM launcher" means a 
fixed launcher of a mobile land-based 
transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for 
launching a GLBM. 
1. Official English text. 
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4. The term "GLCM launcher" means a 
fixed launcher or a mobile land-based 
transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for 
launching a GLCM. 
5. The term "intermediate-range missile" 
means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capa-
bility in excess of 1 000 km but not in excess of 
5 500 km. 
6. The term " shorter-range missile " means a 
GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability 
equal to or in excess of 500 km but not in excess 
of 1 000 km. 
7. The term "deployment area" means a 
designated area within which intermediate-range 
missiles and launchers of such missiles may 
operate and within which one or more missile 
operating bases are located. 
8. The term " missile operating base " 
means: 
(a) in the case of intermediate-range mis-
siles, a complex of facilities, located 
within a deployment area, at which 
intermediate-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles normally 
operate, in which support structures 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers are also located and in 
which support equipment associated 
with such missiles and launchers is 
normally located; and 
(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a 
complex of facilities, located any place, 
at which shorter-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles normally 
operate and in which support 
equipment associated with such mis-
siles and launchers is normally 
located. 
9. The term "missile support facility". as 
regards intermediate-range or shorter-range mis-
siles and launchers of such missiles, means a 
missile production facility or a launcher pro-
duction facility, a missile repair facility or a 
launcher repair facility, a training facility, a 
missile storage facility or a launcher storage 
facility, a test range, or an elimination facility as 
those terms are defined in the memorandum of 
understanding. 
10. The term " transit " means movement, 
notified in accordance with paragraph 5(0 of 
Article IX of this treaty, of an intermediate-range 
missile or a launcher of such a missile between 
missile support facilities, between such a facility 
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and a deployment area or between deployment 
areas, or of a shorter-range missile or a launcher 
of such a missile from a missile support facility 
or a missile operating base to an elimination 
facility. 
11. The term " deployed missile " means an 
intermediate-range missile located within a 
deployment area or a shorter-range missile 
located at a missile operating base. 
12. The term "non-deployed missile" means 
an intermediate-range missile located outside a 
deployment area or a shorter-range missile 
located outside a missile operating base. 
13. The term " deployed launcher " means a 
launcher of an intermediate-range missile located 
within a deployment area or a launcher of a 
shorter-range missile located at a missile oper-
ating base. 
14. The term " non-deployed launcher " 
means a launcher of an intermediate-range 
missile located outside a deployment area or a 
launcher of a shorter-range missile located 
outside a missile operating base. 
15. The term " basing country " means a 
country other than the United States of America 
or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
whose territory intermediate-range or shorter-
range missiles of the parties, launchers of such 
missiles or support structures associated with 
such missiles and launchers were located at any 
time after 1st November 1987. Missiles or 
launchers in transit are not considered to be 
" located". 
Article Ill 
1. For the purposes of this treaty, ex1stmg 
types of intermediate-range missiles are: 
(a) for the United States of America, mis-
siles of the types designated by the 
United States of America as the Per-
shing II and the BGM-109G, which are 
known to the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics by the same designations; 
and 
(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, missiles of the types desig-
nated by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 
and the R-14, which are known to the 
United States of America as the SS-20, 
the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively. 
2. For the purposes of this treaty, existing 
types of shorter-range missiles are: 
(a) for the United States of America, mis-
siles of the type designated by the 
United States of America as the Per-
shing lA, which is known to the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics by the 
same designation; and 
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(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, missiles of the types desig-
nated by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics as the OTR-22 and the 
OTR-23, which are known to the 
United States of America as the SS-12 
and the SS-23, respectively. 
Article IV 
1. Each party shall eliminate all its 
intermediate-range missiles and launchers of 
such missiles, and all support structures and 
support equipment of the categories listed in the 
memorandum of understanding associated with 
such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 
three years after entry into force of this treaty 
and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, 
support structures or support equipment shall be 
possessed by either party. 
2. To implement paragraph 1 of this article, 
upon entry into force of this treaty, both parties 
shall begin and continue throughout the duration 
of each phase, the reduction of all types of their 
deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range 
missiles and deployed and non-deployed 
launchers of such missiles and support structures 
and support equipment associated with such 
missiles and launchers in accordance with the 
provisions of this treaty. These reductions shall 
be implemented in two phases so that: 
(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no 
later than 29 months after entry into 
force of this treaty: 
(i) the number of deployed launchers 
of intermediate-range missiles for 
each party shall not exceed the 
number of launchers that are 
capable of carrying or containing 
at one time missiles considered by 
the parties to carry 1 71 war-
heads; 
(ii) the number of deployed 
intermediate-range missiles for 
each party shall not exceed the 
number of such missiles con-
sidered by the parties to carry 180 
warheads; 
(iii) the aggregate number of deployed 
and non-deployed launchers of 
intermediate-range missiles for 
each party shall not exceed the 
number of launchers that are 
capable of carrying or containing 
at one time missiles considered by 
the parties to carry 200 war-
heads; 
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(iv) the aggregate number of deployed 
and non-deployed intermediate-
range missiles for each party shall 
not exceed the number of such 
missiles considered by the parties 
to carry 200 warheads; and 
M the ratio of the aggregate number 
of deployed and non-deployed 
intermediate-range GLBMs of 
existing types for each party to the 
aggregate number of deployed and 
non-deployed intermediate-range 
missiles of existing types pos-
sessed by that party shall not 
exceed the ratio of such 
intermediate-range GLBMs to 
such intermediate-range missiles 
for that party as of 1st November 
1987, as set forth in the memo-
randum of understanding; and 
(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, 
no later than three years after entry 
into force of this treaty, all 
intermediate-range missiles of each 
party, launchers of such missiles and 
all support structures and support 
equipment of the categories listed in 
the memorandum of understanding 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers, shall be eliminated. 
Article V 
1. Each party shall eliminate all its shorter-
range missiles and launchers of such missiles, 
and all support equipment of the categories listed 
in the memorandum of understanding associated 
with such missiles and launchers, so that no later 
than 18 months after entry into force of this 
treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers 
or support equipment shall be possessed by 
either party. 
2. No later than 90 days after entry into force 
of this treaty, each party shall complete the 
removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles 
and deployed and non-deployed launchers of 
such missiles to elimination facilities and shall 
retain them at those locations until they are elim-
inated in accordance with the procedures set 
forth in the protocol on elimination. No later 
than 12 months after entry into force of this 
treaty, each party shall complete the removal of 
all its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to 
elimination facilities and shall retain them at 
those locations until they are eliminated in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in the 
protocol on elimination. 
3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of 
such missiles shall not be located at the same 
elimination facility. Such facilities shall be sepa-
rated by no less than 1 000 km. 
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Article VI 
1. Upon entry into force of this treaty and 
thereafter, neither party shall: 
(a) produce or flight-test any inter-
mediate-range missiles or produce any 
stages of such missiles or any 
launchers of such missiles; or 
(b) produce, flight-test or launch any 
shorter-range missiles or produce any 
stages of such missiles or any 
launchers of such missiles. 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this 
article, each party shall have the right to produce 
a type of GLBM not limited by this treaty which 
uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but 
not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing 
type of intermediate-range GLBM having more 
than one stage, providing that that party does not 
produce any other stage which is outwardly 
similar to, but not interchangeable with, any 
other stage of an existing type of intermediate-
range GLBM. 
Article VII 
For the purposes of this treaty: 
1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has 
been flight-tested or deployed for weapon 
delivery, all missiles of that type shall be con-
sidered to be weapon-delivery vehicles. 
2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-
range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type 
shall be considered to be intermediate-range mis-
siles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range 
missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall 
be considered to be shorter~range missiles. 
3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and 
tested solely to intercept and counter objects not 
located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be 
considered to be a missile to which the limita-
tions of this treaty apply. 
4. The range capability of a GLBM not listed 
in Article III of this treaty shall be considered to 
be the maximum range to which it has been 
tested. The range capability of a GLCM not 
listed in Article Ill of this treaty shall be con-
sidered to be the maximum distance which can 
be covered by the missile in its standard design 
mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by 
projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere 
from the point of launch to the point of impact. 
GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability 
equal to or in excess of 500 km but not in excess 
of 1 000 km shall be considered to be shorter-
range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a 
range capability in excess of 1 000 km but not in 
excess of 5 500 km shall be considered to be 
intermediate-range missiles. 
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5. The maximum number of warheads an 
existing type of intermediate-range missile or 
shorter-range missile carries shall be considered 
to be the number listed for missiles of that type 
in the memorandum of understanding. 
6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be considered 
to carry the maximum number of warheads 
listed for a GLBM or GLCM of that type in the 
memorandum of understanding. 
7. If a launcher has been tested for launching 
a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type 
shall be considered to have been tested for 
launching GLBMs or GLCMs. 
8. If a launcher has contained or launched a 
particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all 
launchers of that type shall be considered to be 
launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM. 
9. The number of missiles each launcher of 
an existing type of intermediate-range missile or 
shorter-range missile shall be considered to be 
capable of carrying or containing at one time is 
the number listed for launchers of missiles of 
that type in the memorandum of under-
standing. 
10. Except in the case of elimination in 
accordance with the procedures set forth in the 
protocol on elimination, the following shall 
apply: 
(a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved 
in separate stages, the longest stage of 
an intermediate-range or shorter-range 
GLBM shall be counted as a complete 
missile; 
(b) for GLBMs which are not stored or 
moved in separate stages, a canister of 
the type used in the launch of an 
intermediate-range GLBM, unless a 
party proves to the satisfaction of the 
other party that it does not contain 
such a missile, or an assembled 
intermediate-range or shorter-range 
GLBM, shall be counted as a complete 
missile; and 
(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an 
intermediate-range or shorter-range 
GLCM shall be counted as a complete 
missile. 
11. A ballistic missile which is not a missile to 
be used in a ground-based mode shall not be con-
sidered to be a GLBM if it is test-launched at a 
test site from a fixed land-based launcher which 
is used solely for test purposes and which is dis-
tinguishable from GLBM launchers. A cruise 
missile which is not a missile to be used in a 
ground-based mode shall not be considered to be 
a GLCM if it is test-launched at a test site from a 
fixed land-based launcher which is used solely 
for test purposes and which is distinguishable 
from GLCM launchers. 
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12. Each party shall have the right to produce 
and use for booster systems, which might oth-
erwise be considered to be intermediate-range or 
shorter-range missiles, only existing types of 
booster stages for such booster systems. 
Launches of such booster systems shall not be 
considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-
range or shorter-range missiles provided that: 
(a) stages used in such booster systems are 
different from stages used in those 
missiles listed as existing types of 
intermediate-range or shorter-range 
missiles in Article Ill of this treaty; 
(b) such booster systems are used only for 
research and development purposes to 
test objects other than the booster 
systems themselves; 
(c) the aggregate number of launchers for 
such booster systems shall not exceed 
35 for each party at any one time; and 
(d) the launchers for such booster systems 
are fixed, emplaced above ground and 
located only at research and devel-
opment launch sites which are spec-
ified in the memorandum of under-
standing. 
Research and development launch sites shall not 
be subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of 
this treaty. 
Article VIII 
1. All intermediate-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles shall be located in 
deployment areas, at missile support facilities or 
shall be in transit. Intermediate-range missiles or 
launchers of such missiles shall not be located 
elsewhere. 
2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall 
be located in deployment areas, at missile 
support facilities or moving between deployment 
areas, between missile support facilities or 
between missile support facilities and deploy-
ment areas. 
3. Until their removal to elimination facil-
ities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of 
this treaty, all shorter-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles shall be located at 
missile operating bases, at missile support facil-
ities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles 
or launchers of such missiles shall not be located 
elsewhere. 
4. Transit of a missile or launcher subject to 
the provisions of this treaty shall be completed 
within 25 days. 
5. All deployment areas, missile operating 
bases and missile support facilities are specified 
in the memorandum of understanding or in sub-
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sequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 
3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX ofthis treaty. Neither 
party shall increase the number of, or change the 
location or boundaries of, deployment areas, 
missile operating bases or missile support facil-
ities, except for elimination facilities, from those 
set forth in the memorandum of understanding. 
A missile support facility shall not be considered 
to be part of a deployment area even though it 
may be located within the geographic boundaries 
of a deployment area. 
6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of 
this treaty, neither party shall locate inter-
mediate-range or shorter-range missiles, 
including stages of such missiles, of launchers of 
such missiles at missile production facilities, 
launcher production facilities or test ranges listed 
in the memorandum of understanding. 
7. Neither party shall locate any inter-
mediate-range or shorter-range missiles at 
training facilities. 
8. A non-deployed intermediate-range or 
shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or 
contained within a launcher of such a type of 
missile, except as required for maintenance con-
ducted at repair facilities or for elimination by 
means of launching conducted at elimination 
facilities. 
9. Training missiles and training launchers 
for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles 
shall be subject to the same locational restric-
tions as are set forth for intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles and launchers of such mis-
siles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this article. 
Article IX 
1. The memorandum of understanding con-
tains categories of data relevant to obligations 
undertaken with regard to this treaty and lists all 
intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, 
launchers of such missiles, and support struc-
tures and support equipment associated with 
such missiles and launchers, possessed by the 
parties as of 1st November 1987. Updates ofthat 
data and notifications required by this article 
shall be provided according to the categories of 
data contained in the memorandum of under-
standing. 
2. The parties shall update that data and 
provide the notifications required by this treaty 
through the nuclear risk reduction centres, estab-
lished pursuant to the agreement between the 
United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the establishment 
of nuclear risk reduction centres of 15th Sep-
tember 1987. 
3. No later than 30 days after entry into force 
of this treaty, each party shall provide the other 
party with updated data, as of the date of entry 
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into force of this treaty, for all categories of data 
contained in the memorandum of under-
standing. 
4. No later than 30 days after the end of each 
six-month interval followiqg the entry into force 
of this treaty, each party shall provide updated 
data for all categories of data contained in the 
memorandum of understanding by informing 
the other party of all changes, completed and in 
process, in that data, which have occurred during 
the six-month interval since the preceding data 
exchange, and the net effect of those changes. 
5. Upon entry into force of this treaty and 
thereafter, each party shall provide the following 
notifications to the other party: 
(a) notification, no less than 30 days in 
advance, of the scheduled date of the 
elimination of a specific deployment 
area, missile operating base or missile 
support facility; 
(b) notification, no less than 30 days in 
advance, of changes in the number or 
location of elimination facilities, 
including the location and scheduled 
date of each change; 
(c) notification, except with respect to 
launches of intermediate-range mis-
siles for the purpose of their elimi-
nation, no less than 30 days in 
advance, of the scheduled date of the 
initiation of the elimination of inter-
mediate-range and shorter-range mis-
siles, and stages of such missiles, and 
launchers of such missiles and support 
structures and support equipment 
associated with such missiles and 
launchers, including: 
(i) the number and type of items of 
missile systems to be eliminated; 
(ii) the elimination site; 
(iii) for intermediate-range missiles, 
the location from which such mis-
siles, launchers of such missiles 
and support equipment associated 
with such missiles and launchers 
are moved to the elimination 
facility; and 
(iv) except in the case of support 
structures, the point of entry to be 
used by an inspection team con-
ducting an inspection pursuant to 
paragraph 7 of Article XI of this 
treaty and the estimated time of 
departure of an inspection team 
from the point of entry to the 
elimination facility; 
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(d) notification, no less than ten days in 
advance, of the scheduled date of the 
launch, or the scheduled date of the 
initiation of a series of launches, of 
intermediate-range missiles for the 
purpose of their elimination, 
including: 
(i) the type of missiles to be elimi-
nated; 
(ii) the location of the launch, or, if 
elimination is by a series of 
launches, the location of such 
launches and the number of 
launches in the series; 
(iii) the point of entry to be used by an 
inspection team conducting an 
inspection pursuant to paragraph 
7 of Article XI of this treaty; and 
(iv) the estimated time of departure of 
an inspection team from the point 
of entry to the elimination 
facility; 
(e) notification, no later than 48 hours 
after they occur, of changes in the 
number of intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles, launchers of 
such missiles and support structures 
and support equipment associated 
with such missiles and launchers 
resulting from elimination as 
described in the protocol on elimi-
nation, including: 
(i) the number and type of items of a 
missile system which were elimi-
nated; and 
(ii) the date and location of such elim-
ination; and 
(f) notification of transit of intermediate-
range or shorter-range missiles or 
launchers of such missiles, or the 
movement of training missiles or 
training launchers for such 
intermediate-range and shorter-range 
missiles, no later than 48 hours after it 
has been completed, including: 
(i) the number of missiles or 
launchers; 
(ii) the points, dates and times of 
departure and arrival; 
(iii) the mode of transport; and 
(iv) the location and time at that 
location at least once every four 
days during the period of transit. 
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6. Upon entry into force of this treaty and 
thereafter, each party shall notify the other party, 
no less than ten days in advance, of the 
scheduled date and location of the launch of a 
research and development booster system as 
described in paragraph 12 of Article VII of this 
treaty. 
Article X 
1. Each party shall eliminate its inter-
mediate-range and shorter-range missiles and 
launchers of such missiles and support structures 
and support equipment associated with such 
missiles and launchers in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in the protocol on elimi-
nation. 
2. Verification by on-site inspection of the 
elimination of items of missile systems specified 
in the protocol on elimination shall be carried 
out in accordance with Article XI of this treaty, 
the protocol on elimination and the protocol on 
inspection. 
3. When a party removes its intermediate-
range missiles, launchers of such missiles and 
support equipment associated with such missiles 
and launchers from deployment areas to elimi-
nation facilities for the purpose of their elimi-
nation, it shall do so in complete deployed 
organisational units. For the United States of 
America, these units shall be Pershing 11 bat-
teries and BGM-109G flights. For the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, these units shall be 
SS-20 regiments composed of two or three bat-
talions. 
4. Elimination of intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles and launchers of such mis-
siles and support equipment associated with 
such missiles and launchers shall be carried out 
at the facilities that are specified in the memo-
randum of understanding or notified in 
accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of 
this treaty, unless eliminated in accordance with 
Sections IV or V of the protocol on elimination. 
Support structures, associated with the missiles 
and launchers subject to this treaty, that are 
subject to elimination shall be eliminated in situ. 
5. Each party shall have the right, during the 
first six months after entry into force of this 
treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no 
more than 100 of its intermediate-range mis-
siles. 
6. Intermediate-range and shorter-range mis-
siles which have been tested prior to entry into 
force of this treaty, but never deployed, and 
which are not existing types of intermediate-
range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article 
Ill of this treaty, and launchers of such missiles, 
shall be eliminated within six months after entry 
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into force of this treaty in accordance with the 
procedures set forth in the protocol on elimi-
nation. Such missiles are: 
(a) for the United States of America, mis-
siles of the type designated by the 
United States of America as the Per-
shing IB, which is known to the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics by the 
same designation; and 
(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, missiles of the type desig-
nated by the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics as the RK-55, which is 
known to the United States of America 
as the SSC-X-4. 
7. Intermediate-range and shorter-range mis-
siles and launchers of such missiles and support 
structures and support equipment associated 
with such missiles and launchers shall be con-
sidered to be eliminated after completion of the 
procedures set forth in the protocol on elimi-
nation and upon the notification provided for in 
paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this treaty. 
8. Each party shall eliminate its deployment 
areas, missile operating bases and missile 
support facilities. A party shall notify the other 
party pursuant to paragraph 5( a) of Article IX of 
this treaty once the conditions set forth below are 
fulfilled: 
(a) all intermediate-range and shorter-
range missiles, launchers of such mis-
siles and support equipment associated 
with such missiles and launchers 
located there have been removed; 
(b) all support structures associated with 
such missiles and launchers located 
there have been eliminated; and 
(c) all activity related to production, 
flight-testing, training, repair, storage 
or deployment of such missiles and 
launchers has ceased there. 
Such deployment areas, missile operating bases 
and missile support facilities shall be considered 
to be eliminated either when they have been 
inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI 
of this treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since 
the date of the scheduled elimination which was 
notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX 
of this treaty. A deployment area, missile oper-
ating base or missile support facility listed in the 
memorandum of understanding that met the 
above conditions prior to entry into force of this 
treaty, and is not included in the initial data 
exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX 
of this treaty, shall be considered to be elimi-
nated. 
9. If a party intends to convert a missile 
operating base listed in the memorandum of 
understanding for use as a base associated with 
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GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this 
treaty, then that party shall notify the other 
party, no less than 30 days in advance of the 
scheduled date of the initiation of the con-
version, of the scheduled date and the purpose 
for which the base will be converted. 
Article XI 
1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of 
compliance with the provisions of this treaty, 
each party shall have the right to conduct on-site 
inspections. The parties shall implement on-site 
inspections in accordance with this article, the 
protocol on inspection and the protocol on elimi-
nation. 
2. Each party shall have the right to conduct 
inspections provided for by this article both 
within the territory of the other party and within 
the territories of basing countries. 
3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of 
this treaty, each party shall have the right to 
conduct inspections at all missile operating bases 
and missile support facilities specified in the 
memorandum of understanding other than 
missile production facilities, and at all elimi-
nation facilities included in the initial data 
update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of 
this treaty. These inspections shall be completed 
no later than 90 days after entry into force of this 
treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be 
to verify the number of missiles, launchers, 
support structures and support equipment and 
other data, as of the date of entry into force of 
this treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of 
Article IX of this treaty. 
4. Each party shall have the right to conduct 
inspections to verify the elimination, notified 
pursuant to paragraph 5( a) of Article IX of this 
treaty, of missile operating bases and missile 
support facilities other than missile production 
facilities, which are thus nQ longer subject to 
inspections pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of this 
article. Such an inspection shall be carried out 
within 60 days after the scheduled date of the 
elimination of that facility. If a party conducts an 
inspection at a particular facility pursuant to 
paragraph 3 of this article after the scheduled 
date of the elimination of that facility, then no 
additional inspection of that facility pursuant to 
this paragraph shall be permitted. 
5. Each party shall have the right to conduct 
inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 
years after entry into force <J>f this treaty. Each 
party shall have the right to conduct 20 such 
inspections per calendar year during the first 
three years after entry into force of this treaty, 15 
such inspections per calendar year during the 
subsequent five years, and ten such inspections 
per calendar year during the last five years. 
Neither party shall use more than half of its total 
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number of these inspections per calendar year 
within the territory of any one basing country. 
Each party shall have the right to conduct: 
(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after 
entry into force of this treaty, of 
missile operating bases and missile 
support facilities other than elimina-
tion facilities and missile production 
facilities, to ascertain, according to the 
categories of data specified in the 
memorandum of understanding, the 
numbers of missiles, launchers, sup-
port structures and support equipment 
located at each missile operating base 
or missile support facility at the time 
of the inspection; and 
(b) inspections of former missile operating 
bases and former missile support facil-
ities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 
8 of Article X of this treaty other than 
former missile production facilities. 
6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of 
this treaty, each party shall have the right, for 13 
years after entry into force of this treaty, to 
inspect by means of continuous monitoring: 
(a) the portals of any facility of the other 
party at which the final assembly of a 
GLBM using stages, any of which is 
outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-
propellant GLBM listed in Article Ill 
of this treaty, is accomplished; or 
(b) if a party has no such facility, the 
portals of an agreed former missile 
production facility at which existing 
types of intermediate-range or shorter-
range GLBMs were produced. 
The party whose facility is to be inspected pur-
suant to this paragraph shall ensure that the 
other party is able to establish a permanent con-
tinuous monitoring system at that facility within 
six months after entry into force of this treaty or 
within six months of initiation of the process of 
final assembly described in sub-paragraph (a). If, 
after the end of the second year after entry into 
force of this treaty, neither party conducts the 
process of final assembly described in sub-
paragraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive 
months, then neither party shall have the right to 
inspect by means of continuous monitoring any 
missile production facility of the other party 
unless the process of final assembly as described 
in sub-paragraph (a) is initiated again. Upon 
entry into force of this treaty, the facilities to be 
inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in 
accordance with sub-paragraph (b), for the 
United States of America, Hercules Plant 
Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance with 
sub-paragraph (a), for the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine 
Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative 
Socialist Republic. 
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7. Each party shall conduct inspections of the 
process of elimination, including elimination of 
intermediate-range missiles by means of 
launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-
range missiles and launchers of such missiles and 
support equipment associated with such missiles 
and launchers carried out at elimination facilities 
in accordance with Article X of this treaty and 
the protocol on elimination. Inspectors con-
ducting inspections provided for in this para-
graph shall determine that the processes specified 
for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and 
support equipment have been completed. 
8. Each party shall have the right to conduct 
inspections to confirm the completion of the 
process of elimination of intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles and launchers of such mis-
siles and support equipment associated with 
such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant 
to Section V of the protocol on elimination, and 
of training missiles, training missile stages, 
training launch canisters and training launchers 
eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV and V of 
the protocol on elimination. 
Article XII 
1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of 
compliance with the provisions of this treaty, 
each party shall use national technical means of 
verification at its disposal in a manner consistent 
with generally recognised principles of interna-
tional law. 
2. Neither party shall: 
(a) interfere with national technical means 
of verification of the other party oper-
ating in accordance with paragraph 1 
of this article; or 
(b) use concealment measures which 
impede verification of compliance 
with the provisions of this treaty by 
national technical means of verifi-
cation carried out in accordance with 
paragraph 1 of this article. This obli-
gation does not apply to cover or con-
cealment practices, within a 
deployment area, associated with 
normal training, maintenance and 
operations, including the use of envi-
ronmental shelters to protect missiles 
and launchers. 
3. To enhance observation by national tech-
nical means of verification, each party shall have 
the right until a treaty between the parties 
reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms 
enters into force, but in any event for no more 
than three years after entry into force of this 
treaty, to request the implementation of 
co-operative measures at deployment bases for 
road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in 
excess of 5 500 km, which are not former missile 
operating bases eliminated pursuant to para-
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graph 8 of Article X of this treaty. The party 
making such a request shall inform the other 
party of the deployment base at which 
co-operative measures shall be implemented. 
The party whose base is to be observed shall 
carry out the following co-operative measures: 
(a) no later than six hours after such a 
request, the party shall have opened 
the roofs of all fixed structures for 
launchers located at the base, removed 
completely all missiles on launchers 
from such fixed structures for 
launchers and displayed such missiles 
on launchers in the open without using 
concealment measures; and 
(b) the party shall leave the roofs open 
and the missiles on launchers in place 
until twelve hours have elapsed from 
the time of the receipt of a request for 
such an observation. 
Each party shall have the right to make six such 
requests per calendar year. Only one deployment 
base shall be subject to these co-operative mea-
sures at any one time. 
Article XIII 
11. To promote the objectives and implemen-
tation of the provisions of this treaty, the parties 
hereby establish the Special Verification Com-
mission. The parties agree that, if either party so 
requests, they shall meet within the framework 
of the Special Verification Commission to: 
(a) resolve questions relating to com-
pliance with the obligations assumed; 
and 
(b) agree upon such measures as may be 
necessary to improve the viability and 
effectiveness of this treaty. 
2. The parties shall use the nuclear risk 
reduction centres, which provide for continuous 
communication between the parties, to: 
(a) exchange data and provide notifica-
tions as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 
and 6 of Article IX of this treaty and 
the protocol on elimination; 
(b) provide and receive the information 
required by paragraph 9 of Article X of 
this treaty; 
(c) provide and receive notifications of 
inspections as required by Article XI 
of this treaty and the protocol on 
inspection; and 
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA: 
President of the United States 
of America 
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(d) provide and receive requests for co-
operative measures as provided for in 
paragraph 3 of Article XII of this 
treaty. 
Article XIV 
The parties shall comply with this treaty 
and shall not assume any international obliga-
tions or undertakings which would conflict with 
its provisions. 
Article XV 
1. This treaty shall be of unlimited 
duration. 
2. Each party shall, in exercising its national 
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this 
treaty if it decides that extraordinary events 
related to the subject matter of this treaty have 
jeopardised its supreme interests. It shall give 
notice of its decision to withdraw to the other 
party six months prior to withdrawal from this 
treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of 
the extraordinary events the notifying party 
regards as having jeopardised its supreme 
interests. 
Article XVI 
Each party may propose amendments to 
this treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into 
force in accordance with the procedures set forth 
in Article XVII governing the entry into force of 
this treaty. 
Article XVII 
1. This treaty, including the memorandum of 
understanding and protocols, which form an 
integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratifi-
cation in accordance with the constitutional pro-
cedures of each party. This treaty shall enter into 
force on the date of the exchange of instruments 
of ratification. 
2. This treaty shall be registered pursuant to 
Article 102 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
DONE at Washington on 8th December 
1987, in two copies, each in the English and 
Russian languages, both texts being equally 
authentic. 
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET 
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS: 
General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the CPSU 
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APPENDIX II 
The Montebel/o decision, Annex to the final communique of the 
autumn ministerial meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) 
Montebello, Canada (27th October 1983) 
At Montebello, Nuclear Planning Group 
(NPG) ministers declared that the policy of the 
alliance is to preserve the peace through the 
maintenance of forces at the lowest level capable 
of deterring the Warsaw Pact threat. 
Consistent with this policy the alliance 
since 1977 has been conducting analyses aimed 
at assuring that nuclear weapons in NA TO's 
armoury are held to the minimum number nec-
essary for deterrence, taking account of develop-
ments in conventional as well as nuclear 
forces. 
On the basis of the initial results of these 
analyses, the alliance decided in December 1979 
that, unless obviated by successful negotiation 
with the Soviet Union, the deployment oflonger-
range weapons (Pershing II and cruise missiles) 
was essential to restoring the balance and main-
taining the integrity of NA TO's deterrent 
posture. The alliance remains committed to the 
dual-track decision and its implementation. 1 At 
the same time ministers decided to reduce the 
NATO stockpile by 1 000 warheads. This with-
drawal has been completed. Moreover, ministers 
mandated further analysis to determine whether 
the withdrawal of weapons beyond the 1 000 
then decided could be accomplished safely, in a 
manner consistent with the maintenance of 
deterrence at the lowest possible level of 
weapons. 
With the alliance analysis now complete, 
the Nuclear Planning Group has decided on 27th 
October 1983 to withdraw 1 400 warheads 
during the next several years. This ministerial 
decision, taken together with the already accom-
I. Greece has expressed its views in the minutes of the NPG 
at Montebello. 
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plished withdrawal of 1 000 warheads will bring 
to 2 400 the total number of warheads to be 
removed from Europe since 1979. Moreover, 
this reduction will not be affected by any 
deployment of longer-range INF (LRINF) since 
one warhead will be removed for each Pershing 
11 or ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) 
warhead deployed. 
The detailed implementation of this 
decision as to the precise composition of the 
stockpile is a matter for the responsible military 
authorities to determine and a programme to 
effect this will be worked out and implemented 
over the next five to six years. In this context, 
appropriate consideration will be given to short-
range systems. NA TO's military authorities 
should report their findings at a future NPG 
meeting. 
Recognising that for this minimum level 
stockpile to make the most effective contribution 
to deterrence, both the delivery systems and the 
warheads must be survivable, responsive and 
effective, ministers accordingly identified a range 
of possible improvements. Ministers established 
broad criteria which will remain valid for the 
next decade, including the continuing impor-
tance of strengthening conventional forces. The 
alliance must, however, take account at all times 
of changes to Soviet capabilities during this 
period. 
Contrary to the impression that NATO 
has been fuelling an arms build-up by adding to 
its nuclear armoury, this sustained programme 
of reductions will have reduced NA TO's nuclear 
stockpile to the lowest level in over twenty years. 
Ministers urged the Soviet Union to follow the 
example set by the alliance, to halt and reverse 
its build-up of nuclear forces, and to join NATO 
in the search for a safer future. 
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Amendments 1, 2, 3 and 4 
Sth December 1988 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 1, 2, 3 and 4 1 
tabled by Mrs. Francese and others 
1. In paragraph 1 (a) of the draft recommendation proper, leave out from" in preference" to the end 
of the paragraph and insert: 
" by tackling the question of short-range nuclear weapons in parallel with progress in the 
reduction of conventional weapons; " 
2. Leave out paragraph 1 (b) of the draft recommendation proper. 
3. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, after" reply" add "favourably". 
4. In paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper, leave out " by stressing that such a forum 
already exists in the context of the CSCE " and insert: 
"in order to promote a positive atmosphere for the negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw 
Pact in accordance with the mandate they will receive from the CSCE; " 
1. See 11th sitting, 7th December 1988 (amendments withdrawn). 
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Signed: Francese, Pieral/i, Greco 
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Amendment 5 
5th December 1988 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 5 I 
tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman 
5. Leave out paragraph (iii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
Signed: Baarveld-Schlaman 
1. See 11th sitting, 7th December 1988 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendment 6 
5th December 1988 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 6 1 
tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and others 
6. Redraft paragraph 1 of the draft recommendation proper as follows: 
" 1. Give substance to the principles enunciated in The Hague platform by defining and stating 
publicly a Western European Union posture on specific arms control issues, including the fol-
lowing criteria: 
(a) arms control priorities should now advance conventional and chemical disarmament mea-
sures; 
(b) in consonance with a comprehensive concept which encompasses the interrelation between 
the conventional and nuclear components in our force planning and negotiating strategy, 
negotiations should take place on tactical nuclear weapons with a range below 500 kilometres 
as well as conventional forces in a way which at any time contributes to stability in Europe; 
(c) in order to enhance stability and to complement and reinforce a conventional stability 
agreement primary attention should be devoted to reduction and withdrawal of battlefield 
nuclear weapons: their short range, the limited number of ammunition depots, and war-
fighting rationale contribute to dangerous instability in the event of a crisis; 
(d) the idea of corridors with no nuclear weapons and particularly offensive conventional arma-
ments should be supported as a confidence-building measure and an integral element in a 
regime for stability in Europe; 
(e) sub-regional nuclear weapon-free zones as part of an overall arrangement for reducing nuclear 
weapons in Europe could similarly contribute to stability and security in Europe at large; 
(f) arms control agreements should include verification measures which fully satisfy all parties; 
(g) arms control should proceed by stages, allowing the security of all to remain assured 
throughout; " 
Signed: Baarveld-Schlaman, Stoffelen, Hardy, Ahrens, Coleman, Soell, Klejdzinski, Luuk 
1. See 11th sitting, 7th December 1988 (amendment negatived) 
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Amendments 7 and 8 
5th December 1988 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 7 and 8 1 
tabled by Mrs. Baarveld-Schlaman and others 
7. In paragraph (vii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, leave out "to help further such 
agreement " and insert " to reconfirm the Geneva Convention of 1925 and to take international political 
measures against any violation". 
8. Redraft paragraph 2 of the draft recommendation proper as follows: 
" 2. To speed up the negotiation process, take the initiative to mount a conference of the Foreign 
and Defence Ministers of the twenty-three states within CSCE, who carry responsibility for the 
European disarmament process as members of WEU, NATO and the Warsaw Pact." 
Signed: Baarveld-Schlaman, Stoffelen, Hardy, Klejdzinski 
l. See llth sitting, 7th December 1988 (amendment 7 agreed to; amendment 8 negatived). 
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Amendment 9 
6th December 1988 
Disarmament - reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Coun'cil 
AMENDMENT 9 1 
tabled by Mr. Reddemann 
9. In the draft recommendation proper, leave out sub-paragraph (a) of paragraph 1 and insert: 
" Priority should now be given in the field of arms control to those objectives set out in the alli-
ance's declaration of 12th July 1987; 
Particular importance is attributed to the elimination of the conventional imbalances which are at 
present favouring the Warsaw Pact and which are the key security problem in Europe; 
In conjunction herewith and with the global elimination of chemical weapons, the imbalances in 
the field of short-range nuclear weapons have to be abolished by reductions to common ceilings. " 
1. See llth sitting, 7th December 1988 (amendment withdrawn). 
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Verification: a future European satellite agency 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the 
Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments 2 
by Mr. Fourre, Rapporteur 
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Rapporteur's Preface 
This report was suggested for inclusion in the agenda of the Committee on Defence Questions by 
its Vice-Chairman and Rapporteur with the aim of proposing a specifically Western European Union 
initiative to contribute positively and succinctly to the elan characteristic of the present arms control 
scene. The Rapporteur is also an alternate member of the Committee on Scientific, Technological and 
Aerospace Questions which is producing a complementary report (" Scientific and technical aspects of 
arms control verification by satellite ", Rapporteur: Mr. Malfatti) stressing the technology required for a 
future Western European satellite agency. It is recommended that the two reports be read in conjunction 
with each other: their conclusions and recommendations are very similar. 
In preparing this report the Rapporteur had interviews as follows: 
DACU (Defence and Arms Control Unit), Ministry of Defence, London, 7th September 1988 
Ministry of Defence: 
Mr. Malcolm Lingwood; 
Captain Chris Sloane, RN; 
Commander Trevor Dale, RN; 
Lt. Col. Terry Taylor; 
Mr. Richard Hoskins. 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: 
Mr. Simon Gass, Security Policy Department. 
Delegation Generale pour l'Armement, Paris, 16th September 1988 
Mr. Jacques Bousquet, Ingenieur General de l'Armement, Directeur des Engins; 
Mr. Daniel Pichoud, Ingenieur en Chef de 1' Armement, Chef du Groupe Espace Satellites. 
Paris, 30th September 1988 
Mr. A1ain Simon, Conseiller pour les Affaires Militaires, CNES (Centre national d'etudes 
spatiales). 
The Rapporteur arranged for the following interview to be conducted on his behalf: 
SEP (Societe Europeenne de Propulsion), Paris, 30th September 1988 
Mr. Rene Morin, Vice President and General Manager, Sepimage. 
The committee and the Rapporteur express their special thanks to all the officials and senior 
officers who met the Rapporteur or briefed the committee in reply to questions. 
In addition, the Rapporteur would like to acknowledge the information kindly made available by 
H.E. Mr. de Montigny de Marchand, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of Canada to the Con-
ference on Disarmament, Geneva. 
For further reading, the Rapporteur would recommend the recent (1988) Chatham House Special 
Paper, " Europe's future in space ", published as the result of consultation between the five institutions 
of international affairs based in Bonn, The Hague, London, Paris and Rome, which argues the impor-
tance of establishing European autonomy in space and of ensuring that Europeans have the means of 
safeguarding their own security interests. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, ISSN 0143-5795.) 
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Draft Recommendation 
on verification: a future European satellite agency 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recalling that in The Hague platform the governments of the member states of Western European 
Union stressed " arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security " as well as 
"arms control agreements have to be effectively verifiable"; 
(ii) Convinced that high levels of arms expenditure are caused by uncertainty in the international 
environment and the magnitude of the perceived threat affecting in particular relations between neigh-
bouring countries; 
(iii) Believing that this uncertainty could be reduced by the operations of a European agency for obser-
vation satellites, the data and information from which might possibly be made freely available; 
(iv) Sharing the Council's support for negotiations towards arms control and disarmament; 
(v) Considering that new negotiations on conventional stability in Europe are to be welcomed and are 
likely to begin in the near future; 
(vi) Noting that effective verification will be an essential feature of any negotiated agreement and that 
the signatory countries must be able to commit themselves fully and also actively participate in such 
verification; 
(vii) Emphasising the generally-accepted principle of sharing risks, roles and responsibilities in 
ensuring European security which should also apply to the verification aspects of future agreements on 
the control of conventional armaments; 
(viii) Aware that the Council has commissioned the Agency for the study of arms control and disarm-
ament questions to prepare an assessment of verification measures and has already expressed the 
opinion that " satellites ... may offer possible means of verification which merit careful exami-
nation"; 
(ix) Certain that the verification regime of any future conventional arms control agreement in Europe 
should include national technical means of verification, such as monitoring by satellite, as well as other 
co-operative, systems; 
(x) In the knowledge that various member states of Western European Union have developed suffi-
cient technological expertise to begin working on the deployment of a satellite system capable of car-
rying out essential verification tasks; 
(xi) Believing that the time is now ripe for the member states ofWEU to take a credible political initi-
ative towards the setting up of a European satellite agency for the verification of conventional arms 
control and disarmament agreements and, in a second stage, crisis situations, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
Define the conditions for setting up a European satellite agency in WEU on the basis of the guide-
lines in the present report with the initial task of verifYing a future conventional arms control 
agreement, 
and in particular, in accordance with suggestions made in paragraph 8.3 of the explanatory mem-
orandum, 
Identify and assess systems existing or under study in Western Europe, methods of foreseeable 
European co-operation - political, operational, industrial, technological and financial - and the advan-
tages of co-operation or a merger with existing machinery in the alliance, together with the resulting 
institutional and legal aspects, 
and present its conclusions to the Assembly. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Fourre, Rapporteur) 
/. Introduction 
1.1. What are the reasons which lead your 
Rapporteur to the conclusion that Western 
European Union should be present as an 
observer in space, when at this very moment, 
scores of other artificial " eyes " are peacefully 
surveying our planet? Circling the Earth at dif-
ferent altitudes, these man-made sensors, both 
commercial and military, belong to several coun-
tries and watch over us for a multitude of dif-
ferent reasons: some passively collect data for 
intelligence purposes, some monitor the growth 
of crops, some watch the weather, some are used 
for mapping land masses, others for oceano-
graphic research. Among the array of applica-
tions for which satellites are employed, one has 
acquired increasingly critical importance where 
arms control and disarmament agreements are 
concerned: the use of space-based remote sensing 
for the purpose of verification. 
/I. What is verification? 
2.1. The dictionary defines " verify " as a tran-
sitive verb meaning " establish the truth or cor-
rectness of, by examination or demonstration". 
And verification is now accepted as one of the 
most important aspects of the growing number 
of arms control agreements extant or postu-
lated. 
2.2. An arms control agreement is in fact a 
compromise in which each side bases at least 
some of its national security on the promises of 
the other signatory or signatories rather than on 
the strength of its own weapons. As a direct 
result, reciprocal confidence that each party will 
live up to its obligations is vital, particularly in 
conditions of suspicion and uncertainty. The 
benefit to each participant results from the com-
pliance of the other signatories in the agreement 
so there is an obvious necessity for some type of 
external assurance that all participants are ful-
filling their obligations. Verification is the ideal 
way in which to achieve such assurance. The reli-
ability and adequacy ofthe verification measures 
associated with an arms control agreement are 
therefore of paramount importance, both to the 
successful negotiation of an agreement and to its 
successful implementation once ratified. 
2.3. The methods used to verify an arms 
control agreement may vary widely, depending 
on the type of agreement. Everything is possible, 
ranging from on-site inspection where inspectors 
physically visit a facility to the use of remote 
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sensors located well away from the area to be 
examined. The latter systems have proved of 
particular importance for verifying bilateral arms 
control agreements between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. Such systems, called 
'' national technical means " (NTM), are not spe-
cifically identified in the texts of the bilateral 
agreements. However, the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency has provided 
a very useful definition of " national technical 
means": 
" Assets which are under national control 
for monitoring compliance with the provi-
sions of an agreement NTM include 
photographic reconnaissance satellites, 
aircraft-based systems (such as radars and 
optical systems), as well as sea- and 
ground-based systems (e.g. radars and 
antennas for collecting telemetry)". 
2.4. It is obvious that many technical systems 
thus come within the scope of NTM, but there is 
general agreement amongst the various experts 
(both governmental and academic) that satellite 
systems, because of their relative unobtru-
siveness, are among the most important. 
2.5. It has been particularly the United States 
and the Soviet Union which have adapted their 
space-based surveillance capabilities to arms 
control verification, especially with respect to 
their bilateral agreements. Now it is becoming 
more and more apparent that other nations, 
some already with more than an interest in 
space, recognise a responsibility to become more 
closely involved in certain aspects of space sur-
veillance. 
2.6. Indeed, five member states of Western 
European Union (Belgium, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom) are already implicated intimately in 
the recently-implemented bilateral United 
States-Soviet Union treaty banning intermediate 
nuclear forces (the INF Treaty). They recognise 
the advantages of this treaty banning a whole 
range of weapons. The same Europeans, and 
others too, are determined to play a part in 
future multilateral arms control agreements con-
cerning conventional weaponry, contributing not 
only to the formulation of s4ch agreements, but 
also to their verification once implemented. 
2.7. One possible way to achieve such 
European participation in a verification system 
(while already recognising that all verification 
should be treaty-specific) would be by contrib-
uting Western Europe's expertise in launching 
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and using remote sensors. Hence the present 
report, prepared for the Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments which aims in con-
junction with the Committee on Scientific, Tech-
nological and Aerospace Questions' report on 
"Scientific and technical aspects of arms control 
verification by satellite "1, to examine the pos-
sible role for a Western European agency in con-
tributing to a verification system by satellite. 
Ill. Remote sensing 
3.1. Remote sensing means being able to 
monitor objects or events from a distance. In 
technical terms, remote sensing is defined as the 
use of electromagnetic radiation to record, from 
a distance, data on the environment (often in the 
form of images), which may be interpreted to 
yield useful information. The design of remote 
sensing systems involves consideration of a 
number of factors such as: 
(a) the source of the electromagnetic radi-
ation to be recorded: this source may 
be natural in origin, like the light of the 
sun and the heat emitted by the earth, 
or it may be man-made like radar; 
(b) target interaction: the parameters of 
the target will affect the amount and 
characteristics of the energy emitted or 
reflected from it; 
(c) atmospheric interaction: the atmo-
sphere may distort or scatter electro-
magnetic radiation passing through it; 
(d) the sensor: the device which records 
the energy reaching it from the target is 
a key element; 
(e) data transmission: once sensed, the 
data has to be transmitted from the 
sensor platform to the ground, where it 
is received and stored; 
{f) analysis and interpretation: before the 
data may be used it must be processed 
and analysed (usually by a combi-
nation of skilled human interpreters 
and powerful computery). This aspect 
is significant and is often overlooked. 
3.2. Remote sensors may be used on satellites 
to detect electromagnetic energy. Examples of 
such sensors include photographic cameras, 
return-beam vidicon cameras, infra-red detectors 
and various types of scanner. 
3.3. Radars and passive microwave sensors 
can also be used from space. In addition, elec-
tronic listening devices mounted on spacecraft 
might be used to detect communications trans-
missions and radar emissions. 
I. " Scientific and technical aspects of arms control verifi-
cation by satellite", 7th November 1988. Document 1160. 
Rapporteur: Mr. Malfatti. 
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(i) Civilian and military applications 
3.4. Space-based remote sensors have become 
a favourite tool of the modern world for both 
civilian and military purposes. Many of the same 
types of equipment are used for both. The main 
difference, however, is that military remote 
sensors are designed for much higher resolution 
than their civilian counterparts. Resolution is 
related to the size of the smallest object a sensor 
is able to distinguish and is determined by the 
focal length of the sensor, its distance from the 
object being examined and the size of the 
" picture element " (pixel) of the sensor's 
recording medium. 
3.5. Some reports have claimed that the most 
advanced military space surveillance systems 
have a resolution ofthe order often centimetres. 
In contrast, the best resolution of current com-
mercial satellites is about ten metres. For some 
arms control verification tasks, it may be suffi-
cient only to detect an object or activity, while 
other tasks may require actual identification, 
which is more demanding in terms of resolution. 
To illustrate the difference regarding the reso-
lution required for the purpose of verification, 
studies have indicated that a resolution of 4.5 m 
is necessary to detect an aircraft by means of 
optical sensors, while 0.9 m would be needed for 
identification. (See illustrations of different 
imagery at Appendices Ill and IV.) 
(ii) Military sensors in space 
3.6. Military surveillance from space has 
proved beneficial in the context of arms control 
verification. Even when used exclusively for mil-
itary purposes these systems contribute directly 
to international peace and security through the 
maintenance of effective deterrence. Without 
them, the fear of military escalation, even sur-
prise attack, especially during periods of 
increased political tension, would have implied 
defence postures and deployments which them-
selves might have proved catalysts for confron-
tation. It is perhaps reasonable to conclude that 
military space-based surveillance systems have 
contributed positively to the maintenance of 
peace in recent times. Interfering with these func-
tions would be counter-productive in terms of 
global security and military space-based surveil-
lance systems will probably continue to be 
essential to the verification of significant arms 
control and disarmament agreements. 
(iii) " Civilian " sensors in space 
3.7. The rapid development of civilian remote 
sensing satellites over the past two decades has 
been remarkable. Among those designed to view 
the Earth's land surface in some detail are those 
which provide data to be sold commercially. Of 
these, the two most important operating 
examples are LANDSAT and SPOT. LANDSAT 
is the name given to a series of remote sensing 
satellites launched by the United States; the pro-
gramme was privatised in 1985 and continues 
under a consortium called EOSAT. There have 
been regular launchings of this series of satellites 
and more are planned. SPOT is the satellite 
developed by France and the first one of the 
series was launched in January 1986. SPOT also 
operates on a commercial basis. 
3.8. Images produced from both these satellite 
systems which have appeared in the press and on 
television have suggested the possibility of using 
such data for arms control verification. The pub-
lished photos include the following: 
(a) SPOT images ofthe Chernobyl nuclear 
reactor site in the Soviet Union which 
suffered a catastrophic fire in April 
1986; 
(b) LANDSAT images of the Iran-Iraq 
war; 
(c) LANDSAT images interpreted as 
showing construction of surface-to-air 
missile (SAMSA-5) sites in Libya; 
(d) LANDSAT image interpreted as 
showing through-ice launch tests of 
Soviet submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles (SLBMs) in the Arctic Ocean, 
near Wrangel Island, USSR; 
(e) LANDSAT image of the Kola Penin-
sular in the northern Soviet Union 
interpreted as showing newly con-
structed air and naval bases, including 
berths for some of the latest subma-
rines; 
(f) LANDSA T image interpreted as 
showing a mobile intermediate-range 
ballistic missile (SS-20) base near 
Kirov, USSR; 
(g) SPOT images of Soviet space shuttle 
facilities at Tyuratam, USSR. 
3.9. In January 1986, it was also reported that 
LANDSAT imagery was being used to monitor 
Soviet military activities in the Far East, and 
another interesting press report in August 1986 
suggested that SPOT images taken on behalf of a 
Swedish firm indicated apparent preparations in 
the Soviet Union for a resumption of under-
ground nuclear testing. 
3.1 0. Existing civilian earth observation satel-
lites could obviously be used to provide infor-
mation of some relevance to arms control verifi-
cation, but are not yet a universal panacea. The 
resolution and the design of sensors on-board 
current civilian satellites are unlikely to be 
totally adequate for verification purposes, 
although, in some cases such satellite data might 
perhaps serve as "trigger" to initiate other veri-
fication procedures, including possibly on-site 
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inspections to obtain more detailed information. 
In fact, as the resolution and coverage of com-
mercial satellites improve, they will become 
increasingly effective for arms control verifi-
cation. Already the equivalent Soviet system to 
SPOT is reputed to have doubled the resolution 
available. 
(iv) Limitations of space-based sensors 
3.11. It is important to note at this stage that 
there are various limitations to space-based 
sensors. Alone, they are unlikely to constitute a 
complete solution to all the difficulties of veri-
fying compliance with arms control agreements. 
Included in the significant limiting factors which 
must be considered when assessing the use-
fulness of space-based sensors are: 
(a) constraints on resolution capabilities; 
(b) obvious sensor limitations, such as an 
inability to see inside buildings, under-
ground, or deep underwater; 
(c) environmental and climatic considera-
tions, such as the amount of available 
light and, especially, the extent of 
cloud cover; 
(d) satellite orbital and coverage con-
straints; 
(e) launch vehicle payload constraints; 
(f) limits to a spacecraft's fuel and 
inherent endurance; 
(g) data-processing constraints, caused by 
collection of massive amounts of sat-
ellite data; 
(h) cost and availability of relevant tech-
nical expertise; 
(i) the possiblity of interference with the 
sensors or the use of deception 
methods such as camouflage. 
3.12. The use of other verification methods 
means that many of these limitations could pos-
sibly be overcome, but to begin with the main 
constraint concerns the political willingness of 
the countries concerned 1<1> co-operate in this 
field. 
IV. Verificlltion 
of multilateral conventional arms 
control agreements 
4.1. As already mentioned, and partly as a 
result of a series of significant bilateral arms 
control agreements, it is the United States and 
the Soviet Union which possess the majority of 
the global capabilities concerning verification 
from outer space. If one excludes the 1986 non-
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proliferation treaty, it may be argued that no 
multilateral treaty of sufficient significance yet 
exists which might warrant the high level of tech-
nical development and finance required to invest 
in space-based remote sensing to verify its provi-
sions. But as the arms control process continues 
to evolve, it does seem increasingly likely that 
significant multilateral treaties will be signed. 
The immediate possibilities which spring to 
mind are treaties relating to outer space itself, to 
chemical weapons and, most specifically, to the 
control of conventional armaments in definite 
regions, notably Europe. In all these examples, 
space-based remote sensing is likely to play a sig-
nificant and maybe an essential role in the verifi-
cation process. 
Conference on Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (CSCE) 
4.2. The agreement reached in Stockholm m 
September 1986 is perhaps the best place to 
begin. Referred to as the " Stockholm Doc-
ument", this agreement was signed by the 35 
member countries of the Conference on Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). It involves 
a complex arrangement of confidence- and 
security-building measures (CSBMs), intended to 
reduce the likelihood of surprise attack and 
improve trust regarding military stances in 
Europe. The verification methods specified 
include the use of ground and air inspection 
methods. 
4.3. Obviously the development of advanced 
space-based remote sensors for the sole purpose 
of verifying the Stockholm document alone may 
not be justified; the CSBMs specified in the doc-
ument may not deserve the same degree of 
concern about verification as would an 
agreement which substantially reduces or limits 
armaments. However, the political significance 
of the agreement must not be underestimated: it 
was signed by all European countries (Albania 
excepted), as well as Canada and the United 
States, and it is one of the comparatively few 
multilateral agreements concerning security 
matters to be adopted in ten years or more. So, as 
a successful test of the multilateral approach to 
East-West arms control negotiations, the signing 
of the Stockholm document may well fore-
shadow future successes in the process of multi-
lateral arms control and disarmament. Indeed, 
current negotiations in Vienna on the follow-up 
to Stockholm may well prove the ideal forum in 
which to launch the idea of Europe sharing in the 
process of space-based verification. For it is 
increasingly likely that verification will involve 
more and more countries as additional multi-
lateral agreements are concluded. Nations, and 
especially European nations, have an obvious 
interest in participating in particular in systems 
designed to monitor compliance with agreements 
to which they are party. 
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4.4. This trend toward multilateral agreements 
is occurring at the same time as more countries 
become capable of developing and employing 
space-based sensors to verify arms control agree-
ments. These are two mutually reinforcing 
trends: more multilateral agreements and more 
countries with space-based sensors. A stage is 
approaching where the need for "multi-
lateralisation " of arms control verification is no 
longer just a possibility; it is on the verge of 
becoming a definite reality. The next step 
required is the political will to devise such a 
"third system" of verification and to guide its 
implementation. (The term " third system " 
applies to verification capabilities which are not 
owned and operated exclusively by the super-
powers. A " third system " would not act as an 
umpire or arbitrator in matters relating uniquely 
to the superpowers, but rather would be 
developed as a result of obligations assumed in 
the multilateral context, beginning with a specific 
arms control agreement.) 
V. Previous proposals -
an International Satellite Monitoring Agency 
(ISMA) 
5.1. At the first United Nations Special Session 
on Disarmament (UNSSOD I) in 1978, France 
proposed that the United Nations establish an 
International Satellite Monitoring Agency 
(ISMA) to assist in the verification of existing 
and new arms control treaties as well as other 
crisis management functions. ISMA was to be 
developed on a global basis under United 
Nations auspices in a proposed three-stage 
plan. It constituted an innovative approach to 
the multilateralisation of verification tech-
niques. 
5.2. From the outset a number of major 
problems were evident. Although most of these 
were identified within the 1982 United Nations 
experts' study concerning ISMA, they did not 
necessarily figure in the conclusions drawn from 
that report. First and most notable was a marked 
lack of enthusiasm on the part of the super-
powers. They probably felt, with considerable 
justification, that participation in such a scheme 
might have revealed too much about their own 
"national technical means". 
5.3. Other countries have shown considerable 
sensitivity to the use of Earth sensing technology 
in other contexts. Such sensitivities would pre-
dictably be heightened if national security 
became more directly involved. Verification is 
not simply a straightforward question of gath-
ering technical data. Interpretation of satellite 
imaging and judgment on compliance are more 
than mere technical issues; they are part of a 
political process. 
5.4. The United Nations group of experts in 
1982 replied to the French proposal, stressing: 
(a) The advantages and usefulness of sat-
ellite monitoring and of the creation of 
such an agency 
Satellite monitoring could be a decisive 
factor in monitoring certain arms limi-
tation agreements and also in prevention 
and control of international crises. From 
the legal point of view, the role of satellites 
is already recognised by the SALT agree-
ments, which prohibit interference with 
the other party's " national technical 
means". The problem is thus the extent to 
which the other countries of the interna-
tional community could have access to 
these monitoring methods, which the two 
most heavily armed nations consider 
essential today. 
The creation of an international agency 
within the general framework of the 
United Nations would be all the more jus-
tified as: 
- technological development in the field 
of remote sensing is such, today, that an 
increasing number of countries are now 
acquiring, or will soon acquire, the tech-
nology enabling them to obtain pictures 
which, while not of" military quality ", 
will, nevertheless, in the long term -
taking into account the foreseeable 
progress of technology - raise the 
problem of regulating the dissemination 
of data useful for monitoring crises and 
disarmament agreements and their use 
in monitoring procedures; 
- from the political point of view, the 
increasingly multilateral nature of dis-
armament agreements necessarily could 
bring with it a greater role for the 
United Nations in assisting states and 
implementing international monitoring 
methods. 
(b) The feasibility of a satellite monitoring 
agency 
The technical and financial difficulties 
involved in realising such a project are 
considerable but solution of them does not 
seem to be beyond the powers of the 
United Nations: the technology is (or will 
soon be) available and the costs, though 
high, are still within the bounds of possi-
bility. 
(i) The technology 
The types of satellites that could be used 
to carry out the functions which would 
be entrusted to an ISMA already exist. 
The United Nations group of experts 
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ascertained the technical resources, 
especially satellites, required for car-
rying out the agency's functions. Those 
resources could be acquired in stages. In 
the initial phase, the agency would have 
only a data-processing and interpre-
tation centre, its task being to analyse 
data supplied by the countries operating 
monitoring satellite systems. In the 
second phase, the agency would 
establish data-receiving stations directly 
linked to various states' observation sat-
ellites. Finally, in the third phase, it 
might have a segment of space, with a 
number of satellites suited to its func-
tions, at its own disposal. 
(ii) The cost 
The various technical options all affect 
the cost, and the estimates given in the 
experts' report vary considerably. The 
capital outlay required for the first 
phase of the ISMA would be approxi-
mately 8 million dollars (excluding land 
and buildings) and the annual opera-
tional budget would be 25 to 30 million 
dollars. For the second phase, a ground 
receiving station owned by the ISMA 
would require a capital outlay of 6 to 
8 million dollars, with annual operating 
costs of 2 million dollars. The number 
of stations needed to establish the ISMA 
network would depend on the functions 
assigned to the agency, but would not be 
more than about ten. Lastly, for the 
third phase, the significant cost factors 
were seen as: 
- a system of three area-monitoring sat-
ellites: capital outlay of about 1 
thousand million dollars and annual 
renewal and operational costs of 50 to 
200 million dollars; 
- a single close-inspection satellite: 
capital outlay of 1.5 thousand million 
dollars and annual renewal and oper-
ational costs of 120 million dollars. 
The costs are high, but the experts 
pointed out in their conclusions that 
even in the third phase, when the 
structure would be most complete and 
the costs highest, an ISMA would cost 
the international community consid-
erably less than 1% of the amount spent 
on armaments each year. 
5.5. In May 1986 the periodical " Space 
Policy " published a succinct and useful article 
entitled " The ISMA proposal - time for a reap-
praisal " which suggested a reassessment of the 
context in which space-based remote sensing 
technology might be applied for arms control 
verification purposes. In addition, as recently as 
DOCUMENT 1159 
June 1988, during the third United Nations 
special session on disarmament, the French 
Foreign Minister again stressed the valuable 
potential of such an agency. 
5.6. In the absence, for the present, of a def-
inite consensus at the United Nations in support 
of an international satellite monitoring agency, it 
falls to those most implicated in the possibility of 
an arms control agreement on conventional 
weapons to take the action necessary: i.e. the 
Europeans. 
VI. European capabilities 
6.1. Over the past ten years, by means of a 
series of important Earth observation pro-
grammes, Western Europe has become a major 
developer of technology for remote sensing. Of 
these, the French SPOT I, launched in 1986, is 
the first European satellite designed for opera-
tional remote sensing. This is not, however, the 
first demonstration of Europe's technical capa-
bilities in the area. As early as 1977, Meteosat I, 
the first European meteorological satellite, 
started routine observations of the Earth's atmo-
sphere and surface, so inaugurating a service 
which has become essential to European weather 
stations (to the delight of a new generation of tel-
evision " weathermen " }, as well as to various 
agencies involved in oceanographic activities or 
global climatic research studies. 
6.2. In addition, experiments aboard the 
United States Space Shuttle such as the German 
MOMS (Modulator Opto-electronic Multi-
spectral System) or the metric camera tested by 
Spacelab I in 1983, have confirmed European 
technical expertise in high-resolution remote 
sensing. European ambitions in this area are 
further illustrated by the exciting development 
by the European Space Agency of the Earth 
Resources Satellite (ERS). ERS-1 is designed for 
ocean surveillance as a forerunner for opera-
tional remote-sensing spacecraft in the next 
decade, using synthetic aperture radar. 
6.3. The European Space Agency, based in 
Paris, has 13 European member states, with 
Canada and Finland as associates. It was formed 
in 197 5 as the successor to the European Space 
Research Organisation (ESRO) and the 
European Launcher Development Organisation 
(ELDO, 1962) " to provide for and promote, for 
exclusively peaceful purposes, co-operation 
between European states in space research and 
technology and their space applications ". 
6.4. The key phrase is " for exclusively 
peaceful purposes ", and it would be perfectly 
possible to assert that a verification regime is put 
in place to help " keep the peace ". Why should 
the capabilities and successes of the European 
Space Agency, through its WEU members, not 
be used towards such a laudable aim as arms 
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control? Another " plus " factor here is the asso-
ciate status of Canada which has made consid-
erable progress in the evaluation of satellites for 
verification purposes (see Appendix I on 
"PAXSAT" ). 
VII. A European satellite agency? 
7.1. A joint European satellite verification 
system could have great political significance. It 
would enable Europe to monitor treaty com-
pliance and crisis behaviour, and it would give 
Europe a voice in appropriate discussions on the 
legal aspects. European nations cannot expect to 
be involved in East-West discussions or be signa-
tories of multilateral treaties without an inde-
pendent capability for monitoring treaty com-
pliance. And maybe such a system would allow 
eventual monitoring of crises, without having to 
rely on evidence received indirectly. For both 
uses (treaty compliance and crisis monitoring) 
each member government could keep its inde-
pendence of decision while benefiting from a 
shared source of information (even to the extent, 
if required, of totally independent interpretation 
of imagery). Independent European analysis 
could well help, rather than hinder, transatlantic 
co-operation. 
7 .2. In essence, a satellite verification capa-
bility is distinguished as vital for the future inter-
national and diplomatic role of Western Europe. 
Arms control is the catalyst for the creation of 
such a capability and if the CSCE talks in Vienna 
prove fruitful, greatly-increased attention will be 
paid to the balance of conventional forces. 
7.3. By taking the initiative of setting up such a 
European satellite monitoring agency, WEU 
would be offering all its partners a coherent 
system of monitoring from space. It would thus 
help to ensure recognition of its own specific role 
at the side of Europe's strategic ally, the United 
States. Above all, it would affirm its will to use 
its influence and technological capability to offer 
a service worthy of its vocation, defence, 
synonym of peace and independence. 
VIII. Practical considerations and conclusions 
8.1. The Committee on Scientific, Techno-
logical and Aerospace Questions' report " Scien-
tific and technical aspects of arms control verifi-
cation by satellites" (Rapporteur: Mr. Malfatti) 
includes the following detailed chapters and 
appendices which should be read in conjunction 
with the present report of the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments: 
** Verification of arms control agreements, a 
comprehensive glossary 
(i) Verification and monitoring 
(ii) Resolution 
(iii) Satellite orbits 
, 
** Basic technology 
(i) Visible light photography 
(a) Photographic cameras 
(b) Multispectral scanners (MSS) 
(c) Returned-beam vidicon (RBV) 
camera 
(ii) Infra-red detection 
(a) Photographic infra-red 
(b) Thermal infra-red 
(iii) Radar and synthetic aperture 
radar 
(iv) Image processing 
(v) Electronic reconnaissance 
** Present state of remote-sensing tech-
nology in Western Europe 
(i) European Space Agency 
(a) Meteosat 
(b) ERS-1 
(c) Earthnet 
(d) Columbus development pro-
gramme 
(e) Ariane launcher programme 
(ii) National programmes 
(a) France 
(b) Italy 
(c) United Kingdom 
(d) Federal Republic of Germany 
** Tasks and technologies of a European 
satellite monitoring agency 
(i) Monitoring military manreuvres 
(il) Monitoring crises and prepara-
tions for a surprise attack 
(iii) Verification of future conven-
tional arms control treaties 
APPENDIX I Resolution (in metres) 
required for interpretation 
tasks 
APPENDIX 11 Specifications of existing 
and near future civilian 
remote-sensing satellites 
APPENDIX Ill Characteristics of some past, 
current and future sensors 
on military reconnaissance 
and civil earth resources sat-
ellites 
8.2. Given the political will of the member 
states of WEU to take an initiative in creating a 
satellite agency for the verification of conven-
tional arms control agreements, it is obvious that 
progress would be possible only in phases. A 
logical scheme would perhaps include the fol-
lowing: 
(a) 1990 (?): the establishment of an 
agency to monitor "confidence-
building measures" (which would 
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comprise verification for example of 
fixed installations - possibly already 
using SPOT imagery). A modest 
"SPOT buying centre" comprising 
some 100 personnel maximum would 
cost in the region of 1 00 million francs 
(£10 million) but in terms of political 
investment would prove invaluable as 
a demonstration of European will. 
France and Belgium are already 
" shareholders " in SPOT so using/ 
interpreting imagery should not prove 
a problem. At this stage processing 
equipment might be envisaged; 
(b) 1995 (?): the buyil!lg/launching of a sat-
ellite. France, Italy and Spain (the 
latter well on the way to joining 
Western European Union) are 
members of the Helios consortium, 
aiming to be operational in 1993. 
Helios 2 should be available two years 
later in 1995 and already other WEU 
countries such as the Netherlands (see 
the letter addressed by the Dutch Min-
isters for Foreign Affairs and Defence 
to members of the Netherlands Par-
liament at Appendix V) and maybe the 
Federal Republic are reported as 
showing interest. How much more 
practical to make Helios 2 a WEU 
project and enhance our capabilities 
considerably by investing something of 
the order of 1000 million francs (£100 
million) to participate in a programme 
which is already well established and 
also, possibly, in an autonomous, 
ground-based reception system; 
(c) 2005 (?): complement the optical capa-
bilities by investing, for instance, in a 
radar satellite to the tune of 15-20 mil-
liard francs (£1.5-2 milliard) or in other 
satellites? (In the Committee on 
Defence Questions and Armaments' 
report " Disarmament - reply to the 
thirty-third annual report of the 
Council ", Rapporteur: Mr. Tummers, 
it was pointed out that verification 
would not necessarily be cheap, but 
how much more worthwhile to invest 
in the control of armaments rather 
than in the armaments themselves!) 
8.3. The step-by-step approach outlined above, 
together with the possible cost, is only an approx-
imation of one particular scenario. What is 
required now, practically, is that the Council of 
Western European Union should undertake (in 
either the agency which already has conducted 
considerable research in this area, or through the 
constitution of a special " ad hoc " working 
group (or by a combination of the two)) the nec-
essary evaluation of the various parameters 
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involved. This evaluation, including the points 
listed below, will then be submitted to the 
Assembly: 
(a) technologies available and envisaged: 
- launchers; 
- satellites; 
- sensors; 
- reception stations; 
- processing equipment; 
(together with likely access for a WEU 
satellite agency); 
(b) a definition of the possible sources: 
- information gained from national 
satellites, obtained via national 
authorities? 
- information gained by direct 
reception from national satellites? 
- information gained from the 
agency's own satellites? 
(c) way in which information received is 
handled: 
- interpretation by member states? 
- interpretation by the agency itself? 
(d) capital costs - investment - running 
costs; 
(e) participation: 
- all members states of WEU? 
- participation by committed WEU 
states only? 
- inclusion of " associate " states? 
(European members of NATO? 
Canada? neutral countries?) 
(f) access to information received: 
- members only? 
- European states only? 
- all signatories to a CSCE 
agreement? 
- etc, etc; 
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(g) who should be allowed to exploit the 
information obtained? 
- political authorities checking only 
on " verification " aspects? 
- military headquarters interested in 
the " intelligence " aspects? 
(h) in what form should the information 
obtained be released? 
- "raw" imagery? 
- pre-treated? 
- pre-interpreted? 
(i) if" pre-interpreted ", by whom? 
- national interpreters? 
- agency interpreters? 
- a combination? 
(would a " verification school " for 
interpreters be required?). 
8.4. One of the major considerations must be 
the question " when?" for the creation of a WEU 
satellite agency. Should we act as soon as pos-
sible in order to be prepared to make the offer of 
such an agency during the course of negotiations 
in general, or should a satellite agency wait for a 
particular agreement? Given the speed with 
which the arms control scene is currently 
evolving, the two hypotheses are in the process 
of merging and it would appear to your 
Rapporteur that the Council of the WEU must 
now act forthwith if a definite Western European 
contribution is to be made to a specific verifi-
cation regime: namely the conventional arms 
control negotiations in Vienna which are likely 
to be in full swing by the time the present report 
is scheduled for adoption by the Assembly in 
December 1988. 
8.5. If WEU undertakes to play its full role at 
the side of our strategic allies, we must play our 
full part in the verification of the agreement con-
cerned " par exellence " with our own security: 
we must act decisively and we must act now. 
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APPENDIX I 
PAXSAT 1: A Canadian approach to multilateral verification 
Canada is committed to promoting 
progress in arms control and disarmament nego-
tiations. The Canadian emphasis is on the prac-
tical and has identified research into the verifi-
cation of arms control agreements as an area to 
make a useful contribution. Speaking in the 
House of Commons on 23rd January 1986, the 
Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State 
for External Affairs, said: 
" Effective verification provisions can help 
ensure compliance with arms control 
treaties as well as facilitate their negoti-
ation. Verification is an area where 
Canadian expertise and diplomacy come 
together ... We are second to none in our 
activity to develop verification procedures 
and technology that meet the practical 
requirements of arms control agreements 
actually under negotiation or 
envisaged. " 
Certain themes form core elements of the 
P AXSA T concept and add to the chances of 
actually realising such a multilateral verification 
system. These include the following: 
- There must be the prospect of a signif-
icant multilateral agreement to warrant 
the level of sophistication of technology 
and the expenditure of funds required 
for the actual development of such 
an advanced technical verification 
system. 
- Parties to such an agreement should 
have the option, at least, to participate 
in its verification procedures. 
- The PAXSAT system would be treaty-
specific: it would be used only with 
respect to the agreements to which it 
expressly applied, as part of an overall 
verification process for those agree-
ments alone. 
The treaty being verified would 
establish the requisite political authority 
for the verification mechanism and its 
operation. 
- Technology requirements would be met 
by the collectivity of participants and 
1. PAX - from the Latm "peace". 
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would not depend upon or call for 
superpower participation, although the 
treaty would, of course. be open to all 
states. 
- PAXSAT should be based, to the extent 
possible, on existing openly available 
technology, without requiring major 
costly improvements. The technology 
possessed by the Ca:nadian commercial 
sector provided a base for the PAX SAT 
studies. 
PAXSAT 'B': space-to-groufl{i remote sensing 
The aim of the PAXSA T 'B' feasibility 
study was to examine the application of space-
based remote sensing for verifying controls on 
conventional weapons in a regional context. To 
help focus the research effort, a specific well-
defined geographic area was chosen: Europe. 
Among its preliminary observations were the fol-
lowing: 
- The arms control agreements likely to 
be concluded in Europe will require 
various forms of verification measures 
and space-based verification may fulfil 
some of these requirements. 
- Current or planned civilian remote 
sensing satellites have insufficient reso-
lution performance and coverage fre-
quencies to meet full PAXSA T 'B' 
requirements. 
- Civilian satellites such as Canada's pro-
posed RADARSA T do, however, have 
the potential to provide useful 
" detection •· level information for use 
in a confidence-building context. 
- Dedicated PAXSAT 'B' sensors and 
platforms are required to meet the full 
verification requirements of the 
expected agreements. 
- The technology base exists in non-
superpower nations from which the full 
PAXSA T 'B' system could be developed 
for the mid-to-late 1990s. 
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APPENDIX 11 
The PAXSAT Concept 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Example of imagery possible with SPOT-type satellites 
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APPENDIX IV 
Example of imagery from reconnaissance satellites 
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Letter addressed by the Dutch Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence 
to members of the Netherlands Parliament 
The President of the 
Second Chamber of the States-General 
BP 20018 
2500 The Hague 
Subject: European observation satellite 
Department: Direction of the Atlantic co-operation and security affairs 
19th September 1988 
Further to the publication in 1987 by the Council for Peace and Security of the report on the use 
of space for the purposes of security policy: a challenge for Europe, and the recommendations it con-
tains, the undersigned decided in December 1987 to instruct an official working group to review the 
advantages and drawbacks of the various possibilities of a joint observation and identification capability 
for Western Europe by the use of satellites. 
Enclosed is the report communicated to us in the meantime by the official working group. It deals 
with certain aspects of observation by satellite which warrant further examination. 
Thus, the report reaches the conclusion that at the present time and before assessing the ratio of 
forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and before monitoring respect for disarmament agreements 
there is an urgent requirement for an observation capability for Europe itself. The government shares 
the opinion that because of present requirements for satellite data for information-gathering and verifi-
cation, the creation of such a European system - with all the resulting consequences such as the joint 
building of satellites, launchers and ground stations, and the organisation of a joint capability for imple-
mentation - cannot be accorded the highest priority. Moreover, we believe that the creation and oper-
ation of such a system would involve extremely high costs. 
The report gives a positive answer to the question of whether in the future the requirements of 
such a European observation capability will increase. Satellites will continue to play a role in gathering 
information on the ratio of forces which may increase even further with the influence of steady technical 
improvements. It must nevertheless be noted that observation by satellite is no longer the only means of 
verification. In verifying agreements on armaments control, greater reliance is placed on the exchange of 
data relating to respective forces and inspections on the spot. The government shares the overall 
assessment of the working group. Undoubtedly, satellites can provide relatively quickly an overall 
impression of the area of operations; inspections, however, give a far more detailed picture of the unit or 
barracks visited than could be obtained by satellite. Nor must it be forgotten that inspectors (and also 
observers) on the spot are better placed than a satellite to form an opinion on what is inside buildings; 
satellites can observe depots but not take stock of the equipment inside. Obviously this in no way 
detracts from the fact that satellites will continue to play an important role in verifying agreements on 
the control of armaments. 
For the above reasons, the government has therefore taken note with interest df the plea for pos-
sible future association with existing (or future) co-operation groups in the area of satellite technology. 
The undersigned believe that closer consideration should also be given to this problem since an obser-
vation satellite capability for Europe itself might be stimulating from the technological and industrial 
point of view. Furthermore, it might lead to more and better co-operation between federated infor-
mation services. Closer co-operation in observation satellites with, consequently, progressively tighter 
economic, technological and also political links is of great importance for the countries of Western 
Europe. 
In agreement with the suggestion of the working group, the ministry of defence will take part in 
technological space research, including remote sensing. Furthermore, in accordance with the proposal by 
the working group, the director of scientific research and development and the general directorate of 
defence equipment of the ministry of defence will be responsible for co-ordination in defining technical 
specifications for future observation satellite systems, each in close contact with serving experts. This 
also includes pooling knowledge linked with assessing data gathered by satellites. Questions regarding 
the organisation and financing of possible future co-operative projects will be examined in due course. 
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In addition to the answers to the above questions it will also be necessary to examine how to 
implement such projects with particular regard to their specifically West European character. The only 
programme being developed in Europe at the present time, Helios, is a French programme in which 
Italy and Spain have a minority share, but it is no longer open for new participants. For the successor, 
Helios-2, France is therefore apparently seeking the participation of other countries, but this obviously 
does not yet make it a European programme. 
It is important to include the programme in an efficient European framework. To this end we 
believe it will be necessary to try to develop further an exchange ofviews in Western European Union too 
on the various aspects of a joint observation capability. 
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The Minister for Foreign Affairs 
The Minister for Defence 
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Rapporteur's Preface 
This report is complementary to a report submitted by the Committee on Defence Questions and 
Armaments, entitled "Verification: A future European Satellite Agency" (Rapporteur: Mr. Fourre), 
dealing with general aspects of the establishment of a Western European Satellite Agency. It is recom-
mended that the two reports be read in conjunction with each other; their conclusions and recommen-
dations are very similar. 
In preparing this report, the Rapporteur arranged for the following interviews to be conducted on 
his behalf: 
DACU (Defence and Arms Control Unit), Ministry of Defence, London, 7th September 1988 
Mr. Malcolm Lingwood; 
Captain Chris Sloane, RN; 
Commander Trevor Dale, RN; 
Lt. Col. Terry Taylor; 
Mr. Richard Hoskins. 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: 
Mr. Simon Gass, Security Policy Department. 
Paris, 30th September 1988 
Mr. Rene Morin, Vice President and General Manager, Sepimage. 
Mr. Alain Simon, Conseiller pour les Affaires Militaires, CNES (Centre national d'etudes 
spatiales). 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on scientific and technical aspects of arms control 
verification by satellite -
reply to the thirty-third annual report of the Council 
(i) Recalling that in the platform adopted in The Hague the member countries ofWEU affirmed that 
"arms control and disarmament are an integral part of western security policy and not an alternative to 
it " and that " arms control agreements have to be effectively verifiable and stand the test of time ,.,; 
(ii) Recalling WEU Recommendations 369, 410, 430 and 448 and noting with interest the resolution 
on European space policy adopted by the European Parliament in 1987 and the communication of 26th 
July 1988 from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council on "The Community 
and space - a coherent approach "; 
(iii) Sharing the Council's commitment to negotiations on the control of armaments and disarm-
ament; 
(iv) Considering that it is both probable and desirable for new negotiations on conventional stability 
in Europe to be opened in a very near future; 
(v) Noting that the existence of a verification system on which all the signatory countries of an 
agreement could rely and in which they would participate actively has to be an essential part of any 
agreement; 
(vi) Considering that the generally-accepted principle of sharing risks, roles and responsibilities in 
regard to the security of Europe should also be applied to systems for verifying future agreements on the 
control of conventional armaments; 
(vii) Recalling that the Council has instructed the Agency for the study of the control of armaments 
and disarmament to prepare a study of verification measures; 
(viii) Considering that the system for verifying a future agreement on conventional stability in Europe 
should include national technical means of verification such as monitoring by satellite and other 
co-operative systems including on-site inspection; 
(ix) Taking account of the fact that the member states of WEU have developed adequate technical 
knowledge to begin working on the deployment of a satellite system capable of carrying out essential 
verification tasks; 
(x) Stressing the importance ofEuropean co-operation in space matters in the framework ofESA and 
noting with satisfaction the development of the latter's programmes, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE CouNCIL 
1. Define all the conditions necessary for creating, in the framework of WEU, a European satellite 
monitoring agency whose main task would be to help to verify future agreements on the control of con-
ventional armaments, 
and, in particular, 
Identify and assess present or planned systems, foreseeable measures of co-operation in Western 
Europe in industrial and technological, political and operational areas, the problems of co-operation or 
integration with existing machinery in the Atlantic Alliance and the ensuing juridical and institutional 
aspects and present its conclusions to the Assembly; 
2. Urge member governments to co-ordinate all technological research work in the member coun-
tries of WEU, the importance of which is essential for verification by satellite. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Malfatti, Rapporteur) 
\ 
PART ONE 
I. The INF agreement and prospects 
for subsequent arms reduction agreements 
' 
V. New, more favourable prospects of dis-
at1mament, political dialogue and East-West 
ca.-operation have emerged recently following 
the agreement on the total elimination of land-
based intermediate nuclear forces in Europe. The 
zero option that therefore now applies to an 
entire class of nuclear weapons is the result of a 
joint approach and firmness by the western 
alliance in the negotiations and it may be said 
that the European allies made a decisive contri-
bution. 
2. Following the 1979 declarations by the 
Federal German and Italian Governments on the 
dissolution clause, in 1981 the allies presented 
the platform based on the zero option. The 
Washington agreement of December 1987 wel-
coming the western position was therefore an 
undeniable political success. This agreement 
made a remarkable contribution to opening the 
way for a substantial improvement in East-West 
relations. It is to be hoped that this will lead to 
speedier progress towards subsequent arms 
reduction agreements and greater mutual confi-
dence, a 50% reduction in strategic nuclear 
weapons, the total elimination of chemical 
weapons and a balanced reduction of conven-
tional forces to the lowest level. 
3. The Washington agreement confirms the 
Atlantic political line laid down in the Harmel 
report following the twofold track of determi-
nation to negotiate and maintenance of condi-
tions essential for security and stability on the 
continent - conditions which are also applicable 
in the wider all-European framework of the 
CSCE. 
4. The importance of the agreement does not 
derive only from its quantitative aspect (the 
number of nuclear warheads involved is indeed 
few compared with the total number) but from 
the fact that it confirms two principles that are of 
extraordinary importance for the future of dis-
armament negotiations: acceptability of non-
linear reductions based on a comparison of 
asymmetrical values and recourse to on-site veri-
fication that even the Soviet Union now accepts 
as an essential component of any future 
agreement. 
5. On such bases, the Western European 
allies are facing prospects of subsequent East-
West negotiations with confidence and determi-
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nation. Paragraph 1.5 of the platform adopted by 
WEU in The Hague last year, which relates to 
joint policy, notes that " political solidarity and 
adequate military strength within the Atlantic 
Alliance, arms control, disarmament and the 
search for genuine detente continue to be integral 
parts of this policy" and paragraph II.5 adds that 
"arms control and disarmament are an integral 
part of western security policy ... Arms control 
agreements have to be effectively verifiable and 
stand the test of time ". 
II. Control ~easures 
6. The problem of verification and control 
measures is therefore of qrucial importance in 
the context of subsequent arms reduction agree-
ments. 
7. For Western Europe in the Atlantic 
fram~w~rk, the availabilit;y o~ ~m independent 
momtonng and control capability will provide 
an additional source of information that will be 
useful in ensuring the credibility of the assertion 
of a European identity that everyone wants in 
the field of security, too, particularly in the 
prospect or Europe becoming ever more directly 
mvolved m subsequent stages of the disarm-
ament process. 
8. In the case of agreements on conventional 
weapons, co-operative verification to ensure 
respect of the agreements signed will be essential 
because of the political atmosphere, i.e. the need 
for greater mutual confidence, and for clear, 
unrenounceable security reasons. The control 
and verification system is ihdeed singularly pen-
etrating and there are no &lternatives. As Euro-
peans, verification obvipusly concerns us 
directly. In turn, national or multinational 
control systems, which may be operated from 
aircraft, from the ground or sea, or from satel-
lites, retain their political, technical and juridical 
validity. 
9. In making a more detailed assessment of 
ground still to be covered, it must be borne in 
mind that verification of any future agreement 
particularly in regard to conventional weapons: 
should include on-site inspections and improved 
means of verification at national level, i.e. inde-
pendently of the co-operation of the other side. 
In the last resort, this raises the problem of the 
availability in the European countries of national 
verification and control systems and an 
optimum degree of integration of these systems 
with systems used in the framework of the 
alliance is necessary. 
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10. For this purpose, the seven WEU coun-
tries should give thought to the extent of their 
direct participation in the verification of future 
agreements to which they would be signatories as 
well as participants, especially any agreements 
relating to conventional deployment. With the 
aim of reducing any potential for offensive and 
surprise attack in troop deployments or move-
ments, thus ensuring stabilisation, in addition to 
respect for future agreements, verification capa-
bilities should be developed and harmonised. In 
this connection, closer attention should be paid 
to both the technological and political implica-
tions. 
Ill. Satellites and Europe 
11. An independent European contribution, 
combined with the United States contribution, 
would moreover be a useful means of ensuring 
the more balanced sharing of political tasks and 
responsibilities in the alliance that is referred to 
in Washington with increasing frequency. 
12. Consequently, a question arises con-
cerning the air and space observation points for 
monitoring the territory and corresponding spe-
cifically Western European data-processing capa-
bilities, ranging up to a possible eo-produced and 
eo-managed satellite system for collecting data 
and analysing them in the framework of the veri-
fication process worked out at the negotiating 
table. Such means may prove essential even for 
defining the most suitable framework of ref-
erence for the on-site inspections necessary 
under the agreements concluded. 
13. A technical, financial and organisational 
commitment is moreover now being considered 
even by several neutral countries participating in 
the CSCE process and already associated with 
space research in ESA. Sweden has announced 
publicly that it has technical know-how and 
industrial capability to contribute to verification 
by satellite of respect for disarmament treaties 
and is seeking wider international co-operation 
in this area. 
14. The use of satellites to control effective 
respect of conditions laid down in an agreement 
must be considered acceptable in accordance 
with the many international agreements and res-
olutions on the peaceful use of space. The legit-
imacy of their use as national or multinational 
means of observation, verification and control 
derives from the SALT agreements. Your 
Rapporteur does not understand why this prin-
ciple would have to be called in question in the 
event of future agreements on the control of 
armaments, even conventional, or in the event 
of European countries as well as the two super-
powers having the relevant type of satellite. 
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15. Mention should be made of WEU 
Assembly Recommendation 369, adopted in 
1981, which invites the governments of member 
states "to promote, in a North Atlantic Alliance 
context, the exploitation of European military 
communication and observation satellites", 
Recommendation 410 which refers to " a 
European surveillance and reconnaissance sat-
ellite programme ", Recommendation 430 which / 
urges member governments " to accept non-
aggressive applications of military space tech-/ 
nology such as communications, surveillance, 
navigation and the use of satellites for crisis 
management and treaty verification :to 
strengthen strategic stability " and, finally, Rec-
ommendation 448, adopted in 1987, " stressing 
the urgency of establishing space co-operation for 
the security of the Western European countries, 
particularly in activities recognised to be 
stabilising, such as monitoring and communica-
tions " and recommending that the Council 
"with the assistance of the WEU agencies for 
security questions, examine the repercussions of 
establishing a European military programme for 
communications, navigation, observation and 
reconnaissance satellites". 
16. The European Parliament itself, in a reso-
lution on European space policy adopted on 17th 
June 1987, "notes with interest proposals which 
have been made in various quarters for an inter-
national satellite monitoring agency which, with 
the objectives of protecting peace and of 
releasing resources at presented devoted to the 
needs of defence for civilian applications, would 
help to monitor developments in areas where 
there is a risk of conflict ". 
17. The EEC Commission in turn pointed out 
in a communication dated 26th July 1988 that 
space research in Western Europe, particularly in 
the sector of launching devices and communica-
tions, has now reached the commercial exploi-
tation stage, while the single act confers wide-
ranging, explicit responsibilities in technological 
research and development, and concludes that a 
corresponding effort still has to be made to stim-
ulate the use of the potential of such technology. 
Moreover, Europe still has no coherent overall 
policy in this area which integrates the techno-
logical, industrial, commercial, social and even 
defence aspects. 
18. However, this Community document 
notes that, contrary to what has happened in 
civil applications, European space defence activ-
ities are still conducted mainly on a national 
basis and that Europe has no real framework in 
which it can discuss problems related to the nec-
essary co-ordination of European civil space 
co-operation with possible future defence 
co-operation. 
19. A recent report on Europe's future in 
space, prepared jointly by several of the principal 
European strategic study institutes 1, made a detail-
ed analysis of the various technological solutions 
and international formulae, concluding that: 
" Arms control may now stand a better 
chance than it has for some while, and as a 
result increased attention will be paid to 
the balance of conventional forces. The 
Atlantic Alliance will need enhanced capa-
bilities for observation from space, both to 
verify arms control agreements and to 
ascertain whether the military situation is 
stable. The European members of NATO 
could contribute to an equitable sharing of 
burdens within the alliance by creating an 
observation capability of their own. A 
West European system, adapted to the 
special circumstances of the European 
continent, would guarantee a desirable 
degree of redundancy within the alliance 
and could also strengthen the strategic 
consensus between the United States and 
its European allies. Both domestic public 
opinion and other interested parties could 
be reassured that such a West European 
observation system would serve no other 
purpose than to ensure compliance with 
agreed understandings and to give support 
for world stability. " 
20. While respecting in full the treaty on the 
exploration and use of outer space and the con-
vention establishing the European Space Agency, 
Western Europe considers there should be no 
offensive or defensive weapons systems in space 
but rather its own means of rapidly monitoring 
military activities, integrating those already 
available to the Atlantic Alliance into the frame-
work of the development of security and confi-
dence building measures provided for by the 
CSCE. 
21. In order to set up a WEU agency in 
accordance with Assembly recommendations, 
existing European systems must be identified 
and assessed and a study made of practical ways 
of ensuring Western European co-operation from 
the technico-industrial, political and operational 
points of view, possible forms of co-operation or 
integration with the allies' present procedure and 
the ensuing juridical and institutional aspects. 
This will also allow in-depth thinking on the 
aims to be pursued and the corresponding 
sharing of tasks, responsibilities and benefits. 
Joint exploitation and management methods for 
the means envisaged must take account of the 
need to pursue a European foreign and defence 
policy with the highest level of integration to 
allow some forms of co-ordination at the 
decision-taking level. 
1. Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft fiir Aus-
wartige Politik (Bonn), Institut Francais des Relations Inter-
nationales (Paris), Istituto Affari Internazionali (Rome), 
Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen 
'Clingendael' (The Hague) and Royal Institute of Interna-
tional Affairs (London). 
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22. The firm results that will be progressively 
attained will ensure a harmonious evolution 
towards better articulated forms of intra-
European and transatlantic co-ordination which 
will strengthen the cohesiqm of the alliance. 
PART TWO 
IV. Verification of arms control 
agreements, a comprehensive glossary 
23. Before paying closer attention to the 
question of a European satellite monitoring 
agency to verify arms control agreements, it may 
be useful to define some of the terms used. 
(i) Verification anti monitoring 
24. Intelligence is a general term for the full 
spectrum of methods by which one state acquires 
information about another. 
25. Verification, when applied to the par-
ticular field of arms control and disarmament, 
covers all legal and intelligence activities proper 
carried out for the explicit purpose of demon-
strating compliance with treaty obligations by 
means of evidence or information gathered by a 
variety of technical and institutional means. 
26. Espionage implies intelligence activities 
which are illegal or improper under generally-
accepted rules of international conduct. 
27. It should be borne in mind that the clear 
distinction made here between different activ-
ities is valid in the applic~tion of international 
law. In practice it will be less easy to make the 
same distinction. A satellite gathering data to 
demonstrate compliance with specific treaty 
obligations will obviously also absorb other 
data. 
28. In general, data-gathering by satellite is 
now considered a legitimate activity. Even the 
dispute between the United States and the Soviet 
Union regarding the monitoring of missile 
telemetry (see V (v)) seems' to have come to an 
end. After the last negotiations on 23rd and 24th 
September 1988 between Mr. Shultz and 
Mr. Shevardnadze it was said that the Soviet 
Union appeared to have agreed to stop encoding 
their ballistic-missile data. 
29. If it comes to the activity of verification 
itself, one can speak of monitoring, surveillance 
or reconnaissance. 
30. Monitoring is the activity of gathering data 
in general, which can be divided into the two 
more specific activities of surveillance and 
reconnaissance. 
31. Surveillance is the systematic observation 
of some place or activity on a continuous or per-
iodic basis. 
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32. Reconnaissance is conducted through ad 
hoc activities, generally aimed at a specific 
objective which for some reason has attracted 
attention. 
33. In many arms control agreements signed 
since the ABM treaty, reference is made to 
" national technical means " (NTM), although 
not one treaty nor any accompanying protocol 
gives a clear definition of this frequently used 
phrase. It is however understood that both the 
United States and the Soviet Union recognise 
satellites used for verification purposes as 
national technical means. 
(ii) Resolution 
34. A key indicator for the capability of a sat-
ellite producing visual images of the earth's 
surface is the resolution or resolving power of its 
equipment. 
35. For a photographic film camera system, 
the resolving power may be defined as the 
minimum distance between two identical small 
objects when they can still be distinguished as 
two separate objects. 
36. In the case of electronic scanning devices 
one speaks rather of the instantaneous field of 
view (IFOV), which is the size of the spot on the 
ground seen by one picture element (or pixel) in 
the image or seen by a scanning sensor at the 
instant of observation. 
(iii) Satellite orbits 
37. Most monitoring satellites are in a low 
earth orbit which means all orbits below an 
altitude of about 5 000 km. 
38. These low earth orbits may be equatorial, 
polar or inclined, depending on the orientation 
of the orbital plane with respect to the plane of 
the earth's equator. Making use of the movement 
of the earth below its orbit, a satellite is able to 
monitor the earth's surface. Only a satellite in 
polar orbit can cover the entire surface of the 
earth. 
39. A satellite in a 90-minute orbit will make 
16 revolutions each day, following an identical 
ground track pattern every 24 hours. Under these 
conditions, due to the restricted width of the 
ground track that can be monitored effectively, a 
considerable part of the surface will not be moni-
tored at all. By changing its orbital period into 
slightly more or slightly less than 90 minutes, 
one can cause a satellite to have a ground track 
pattern which is shifted slightly sideways every 
day, thus making sure that eventually it will 
monitor the entire earth surface in a given period 
of time. 
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40. A geostationary orbit is a circular orbit at 
an altitude of 35 700 km with a revolution period 
of 24 hours. If set in an eastward equatorial orbit, 
a satellite remains over the same point of the 
equator all the time. This orbit is used for com-
munications satellites and for the United States 
early warning satellite system. 
V. Basic technology 
(i) Visible light photography 
(a) Photographic cameras 
41. Photographic cameras have been used 
aerial reconnaissance of enemy territory from 
earliest days of aviation. Technical capabiliti' 
photographic cameras have since improved 
stantially. Used in satellites, cameras are 
considered to be among the best sensors 
reconnaissance purposes. However, the qu 
of the images depends on several impor 
factors such as the satellite's orbit, camera opt. ·-· 
vibration, instability and atmospheric turbu-
lence. To reduce the risk of energy loss caused by 
atmospheric drag which ultimately will ter-
minate the life cycle of the satellite, most photo-
reconnaissance satellites are being put in more or 
less elliptic orbit. In earlier days, a typical orbit 
used to have a perigee, or closest approach to the 
earth's surface, of 130-140 km and an apogee, or 
greatest distance from the earth's surface, of 
300-400 km. With improved optical properties of 
the cameras used, there seems to be a general 
tendency towards higher orbit, thus permitting 
the extension of orbital lifetimes. The satellite 
will take pictures only at the perigee of its orbit. 
Although the strip of earth within the line of 
sight of the satellite at that height may be more 
than 2 000 km, the actual strip photographed will 
only have a width varying from a few hundred 
kilometres to a few hundred metres, depending 
on the resolution desired. 
42. Normally, photo-reconnaissance satellites 
rotate in a sun-synchronous polar orbit, thus 
always passing over the light side of the earth at a 
given time. With the earth rotating from west to 
east, the ground track of the satellite's orbit will 
move westwards. If the satellite's orbit and the 
width of the strip of earth actually photographed 
are well calculated, such a satellite would be able 
to cover any desired area of the earth's surface. It 
should nevertheless be noted here that visible 
light photographic cameras cannot penetrate 
clouds. It took Landsat satellites about ten years 
to carry out cloud-free mapping of the whole 
world. Many areas in Europe - the region of 
prime importance for any arms control 
agreement - allow only a few cloud-free scenes to 
be collected per year. 
43. In camera optics, remarkable achieve-
ments have been made by using mirrors of dif-
ferent shape in order to fold a long focal length 
into a much shorter distance. A long focal length 
is essential, given the proportional relationship 
connecting the sizes and positions of the object 
and image, which is as follows: 
image length _ focal length 
obJect length - distance of object from mirror 
4. Moving parts in the satellite itself and 
nevitable fluctuations in its temperature 
t'?duce vibrations and distortions which have 
to\lJe established to a very high degree in order to 
hol'r the optical axis steady. 
45. j It is thought that the best American and 
Sov;iet photographic military reconnaissance sat-
ellites are able to achieve a ground resolution of 
10-1'5 cm under favourable atmospheric condi-
tions. 
(b) Multispectral scanners (MSS) 
46. A multispectral scanner is a device which 
can locate objects, searching them out by looking 
for their overall characteristic spectral response, 
making use of the fact that every object on earth 
emits, absorbs or reflects radiation which is 
unique to that object. 
47. In some scanners the sensor scans the 
earth's surface using a combination of a telescope 
and a rotating mirror. In others - among them 
the French Spot 1 - linear arrays of detectors, 
such as charge coupled devices (CCD), take the 
place of the rotating mirrors. The United States 
Landsat 4 and 5 have a sensor called thematic 
mapper, a second generation MSS with several 
spectral bands in different visible and infra-red 
wavelengths which enable them to produce 
theme maps emphasising specific objects on the 
earth's surface. 
(c) Returned-beam vidicon (REV) camera 
48. A returned-beam vidicon camera, used in 
the American Landsat 1, 2 and 3 and in the 
Soviet Salyut 6, is a specific television camera 
where the images are stored on the photosen-
sitive surface which then enables an electronic 
scanner to produce video images. RBV cameras 
are sensitive to the visible and near infra-red part 
of the spectrum. 
(ii) Infra-red detection 
49. While visible light photographic cameras 
make use of reflected light with wavelengths in 
the interval between 0.4 and 0. 7 micro metres, 
objects can also be detected by making use of the 
radiation emitted by them in the infra-red 
portion of the spectrum (greater than 0. 7 
micrometre). Every object emits radiation with a 
spectrum of wavelength characteristic of its tem-
perature. 
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50. As some components of the atmosphere, 
in particular water vapour and carbon dioxide, 
absorb certain ranges of infra-red light wave-
lengths, only a restricted number of these wave-
lengths can be used for reconnaissance purposes 
of which the most important are those from 0. 7 
to 1.0, from 3 to 5 and from 8 to 14 
micro metres. 
(a) Photographic infra-red 
51. Cameras equipped with specific photo-
graphic films which are sensitive to reflected 
infra-red light with wavelengths between 0. 7 and 
1.0 micrometre can make pictures in the same 
way as cameras with visible light films. Infra-red 
photography has several advantages over visible 
light photography, because clarity and contrast is 
not affected by haze, vegetation clearly stands 
out, which helps to detect camouflage, and there 
is much better contrast between land and water. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the use of 
photographic infra-red light encounters problems 
similar to visible light photography. The 
equipment is useless during night-time and fog 
and when clouds obstruct vision. 
(b) Thermal infra-red 
52. The abovementioned longer wavelengths 
from 3 to 5 and from 8 to 14 micrometres, the 
thermal infra-red region, make it possible to 
observe infra-red light emitted from hot or warm 
objects. 
53. In order to be able to detect thermal 
infra-red, a technique has been developed with 
semiconductor compounds absorbing infra-red 
light and converting the energy into electric 
current. The equipment used can be made both 
highly sensitive and of very small size. 
54. A good example of this equipment's sensi-
tivity is that early-warning satellites stationed in 
a geosynchronous orbit 36 000 km above the 
earth's surface use thermal infra-red detectors 
and imaging systems enabling them to detect and 
track ICBMs during the powered segment of 
their flight. 
55. Due to natural and technical limitations, 
even the best possible thermal infra-red imagery 
still has resolutions a hundred times poorer than 
the best results achieved with visible light 
photography. It should be borne in mind that 
this resolution is quite enough to detect heat-
generating industrial facilities, large underground 
objects or underground nuclear tests. 
(iii) Radar and synthetic aperture radar 
56. Radar systems make use of electromag-
netic radiation of much longer wavelengths than 
light. In any radar equipment an electro-
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magnetic radiation pulse is produced by a signal 
generator. The pulse is then emitted by an 
antenna, subsequently detecting the echo from 
objects reflecting the radiation. This echo or 
return signal is processed by electronic devices to 
make visible the detected objects. 
57. Synthetic aperture radar (SAR) is a spe-
cific radar system mounted on reconnaissance 
satellites. Here a relatively small antenna uses 
the forward motion of its satellite platform to 
simulate a very large antenna. The maximum 
length of the synthetic aperture is the length of 
the satellite path along which the moving 
antenna receives the reflected signals from a 
given target. It is assumed that a SAR satellite 
can achieve resolutions of 1.5 metres in the 
cross-track dimension and of 2.5 metres parallel 
to the ground track, while a 1 metre resolution by 
the year 2000 has been predicted. 
58. An additional advantage is that the ground 
resolution of a SAR does not depend on the dis-
tance between the antenna and the object 
observed so that SAR satellites can be placed in 
higher, longer-lasting orbits, provided that the 
power source is strong enough to bridge the addi-
tional wave-propagation distance. 
59. The characteristics of radar enable it to 
penetrate clouds and fog while it can also be used 
effectively both day and night. On the other 
hand, it is still not easy to produce radar images 
with a satisfactory resolution and a satisfactory 
ability to discriminate between different textures 
and objects on the earth's surface. The character-
istics of radar image formation do not facilitate 
image processing and interpretation. At present, 
much research is still being devoted to these par-
ticular problems. 
60. The power source of radar satellites has 
also been a problem of concern for a long time 
since they need a relatively high degree of energy 
to produce radar pulses. This has induced the 
Soviet Union to equip its radar ocean reconnais-
sance satellites (RORSATs) with a nuclear 
reactor. However, it is said that this energy 
problem has now been solved and future high-
performance radar satellites will need consid-
erably less power. Until very recently the main 
obstacle to the further development of SAR sat-
ellite capabilities has been the limited ability to 
process vast amounts of data at high speed. With 
the new developments in very high-speed inte-
grated circuits (VHSIC) and in the equally 
important microwave/millimetre-wave mono-
lithic integrated circuits (MIMIC), a solution for 
most problems in this field seems to be very 
near. Provided financial resources are available, 
it might nevertheless still take some fifteen years 
before a high-performance radar satellite capable 
of monitoring the earth's surface can be 
deployed. 
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(iv) lmllge processing 
61. The techniques described above are of pri-
mordial importance for obtaining the images 
which may provide us with the desired infor-
mation. The ensuing problem is then to 
transform these images to allow them to be 
examined and analysed. In a distant future, it is 
not inconceivable for this to be fully automate¥, 
making use of artificial intelligence. At present 
as in the foreseeable future, however, the work 
highly skilled human analysts for the interpre-
tation of the images is indispensable. I 
62. Even before the analyst starts working 1• the 
raw images received from satellites are pr~ssed 
in order to make the job of interpretation easier. 
Two important categories of image processing 
are restoration and enhancement. Image resto-
ration is applied in order to correct image defects 
such as those caused by distortions and limita-
tions of optics, relative motion of camera and 
target and incorrect exposure times. With the 
help of image enhancement the image is altered 
to clarify or accentuate objects of interest and 
suppress unwanted background or superfluous 
information. 
63. Nowadays, practically all image processing 
is carried out on digital computers, which is no 
longer a major problem since the speed and com-
pactness of these computers has increased 
rapidly in recent years. 
64. It may be more difficult to find a sufficient 
number of experienced, highly skilled and 
reliable human analysts, who, at the end of a 
chain of technological processes, are the key 
people to make the images obtained under-
standable. 
(v) Electronic reconnaissance 
65. In reconnaissance technology, mention 
should also be made of satellites using electronic 
sensors in order to perform signals intelligence 
(SIGINT), an activity subdivided into electronic 
intelligence (ELINT) and communications intel-
ligence (COMINT). 
66. ELINT equipment is applied to detect and 
monitor radio signals generated by military 
activities. Signals of this kind may originate from 
radars which are in use for early warning, air 
defence, missile defence or missile control. 
ELINT systems also play an important role in 
the monitoring of missile telemetry - the radio 
data transmissions from missiles which are being 
flight tested - thus providing extremely useful 
information on performance characteristics. 
COMINT covers the interception of communi-
cations in the wide range from telephone conver-
sations and conventional radio station transmis-
sions to the radio traffic of airport control 
towers, microwave transmissions and transmis-
sions by manoeuvring military units. 


by satellite can never be the only method used. 
Satellites can plan an important role in collecting 
data, but, especially as regards the verification of 
treaties, they will never be able to replace other 
verification methods such as the indispensable 
on-site inspection. Satellite data can draw 
attention to new developments and changing 
patterns and foster activities of a different kind 
-,~~ order to investigate more thoroughly the sus-
picions which have been raised. Under specific 
circumstances, satellite data may be clear enough 
to incite governments concerned to take mea-
sures at political level. 
(0 Monitoring military manoeuvres and movements 
94. Military manoeuvres may be monitored 
by satellite in order to verify that actual 
manoeuvres concord with details notified in 
advance. Under these circumstances, the verifi-
cation tasks would involve determination of: 
- type and number of ships, vehicles, 
tanks and aircraft used; 
- location, size and geographical range; 
- order of battle organisation of forces; 
- temporal developments of the 
manoeuvre; 
- details concerning possible back-up 
forces. 
(ii) Monitoring crises and preparations for a surprise attack 
95. Nowadays, no military crisis or surprise 
attack can take place without quite extensive 
preparations. No matter how covertly these prep-
arations are being made, they can never go unno-
ticed by satellite observation. The fact is that any 
such preparations of a sufficiently threatening 
size would involve changes in temporal and 
spatial civilian life and traffic patterns. There 
would be transportation of forces by land, air or 
sea and inevitably there would be increased elec-
tronic signals and communications traffic. 
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96. In order to collect significant data con-
cerning the activities under items (i) and (ii), a 
satellite monitoring agency should have at its 
disposal photographic sensors in visual and near 
visual wavelengths with 1 to 5 metre resolution, 
radar sensors with 5 to 20 metre resolution, 
infra-red sensors with 20 metre resolution and 
also possible hyperfrequency receivers for data 
relating to transmissions. 
(iii) Verification of future conventional 
arms control treaties 
97. While it is generally admitted that the 
monitoring tasks mentioned under (i) and (ii) 
can be performed reasonably effectively by satel-
lites with a relatively moderate capability, the 
requirements for verification of conventional 
arms control agreements are quite different. 
98. For effective monitorimg of the movement 
of troops and military units and the build-up of 
forces in preparation for an attack, the whole 
range of photographic, raoar and infra-red 
sensors and prospective microwave receivers is 
required as well. 
99. To verify compliance with conventional 
arms control agreements, satellite images should 
enable image analysts to identify different kinds 
of armaments which would be subject to limita-
tions, such as tanks, armoured personnel car-
riers, artillery, heavy mortars, missile systems, 
helicopters and combat aircraft. As can be seen 
from Appendix I for identification of vehicles, 
rockets and artillery, sensor equipment with 
ground resolutions in the order of 15 to 30 centi-
metres is required. Moreover, all this weaponry 
can easily be hidden from satellite monitoring by 
hangars and other such buildings. On-site 
inspection is indispensable for the verification of 
these arms limitations. 
100. For verification purposes, a full coverage 
of the European continent and the adjacent water 
surface on a day-to-day basis would be required. 
Only a system with several satellites would be 
able to accomplish this task. 
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APPENDIX I 
Resolution (in metres) required for interpretation tasks 
Target Detection General Precise Description Analysis identification identification 
" 
;Bridges .................... 
Communications 
6 4.6 1.5 0.9 0.3 
Radar ................... 3 0.9 0.3 0.15 0.04 
Radio ................... 3 1.5 0.3 0.15 0.15 
Supply dump .............. 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.03 0.03 
Troop units ................ 6 2 1.2 0.3 0.08 
Airfield facilities ........... 6 4.6 3 0.3 0.15 
Rockets & artillery ......... 0.9 0.6 0.15 0.05 0.01 
Aircraft ................... 4.6 1.5 0.9 0.15 0.03 
Command & control head-
quarters ................. 3 1.5 0.9 0.15 0.03 
Missile sites (SSM/SAM) .... 3 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.08 
Surface ships .............. 7.6 4.6 0.6 0.3 0.08 
Nuclear weapon components 2.4 1.5 0.3 0.03 0.01 
Vehicles ................... 1.5 0.6 0.3 0.05 0.03 
Land minefields ............ 9 6 0.9 0.03 -
Ports & harbours ........... 30.5 15 6 3 0.3 
Coasts & landing beaches ... 30.5 4.6 3 1.5 0.08 
Railway yards shops ........ 30.5 15 6 1.5 0.6 
Roads ..................... 9 6 1.8 0.6 0.15 
Urban areas ............... 61 30.5 3 3 0.3 
Terrain .................... - 91 4.6 1.5 0.15 
Surfaced submarines ........ 30.5 6 1.5 0.9 0.03 
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APPENDIX II 
Specifications of existing and near future civilian remote-sensing satellites 
Satelhte Orb1t Sensor Spectral IFOV Swath Launch parameter range width (km) 
Landsat-5 Sun-synchronous TM 0.45- 0.52 11 30 m 185 1984 , 
(United States) Altitude: 705 km 0.52- 0.60 11 j 
Inclination: 98° 0.63- 0.69 11 
Repeat cycle: 16 days 0. 76- 0.90 11 
1.55- I. 75 11 
2.08- 2.35 11 I 
10.40-12.50 11 120 m 
MSS 0.5 - 0.6 11 80 m 
0.6 - 0.7 11 
0.7 - 0.8 11 
0.8 - 1.1 11 
SPOT Sun-synchronous HRV 0.50- 0.59 11 20 m 60 (x 2) 1986 
(France) Altitude: 832 km 0.61- 0.68 11 
1986 Inclination: 99° 0.79- 0.89 J.1 
Repeat cycle: 26 days 0.51- 0.73 J.1 10m 
ERS-1 (ESA) Sun-synchronous AMI (-band active microwave instruction) 1990 
1990 
Altitude: 675 km SAR 5.3 GHz (C band) 30 m 75 
Inclination: 98° mode Incident or 
Repeat cycle: 3 days angle: 35 100 m 
HH 
Polarisation 
Wave 5 km 200 
mode 
Wind 5.5 GHz 50 km 400 
mode Incident 
angle: 25-55 
HHVV 
Polarisation 
RA 13. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Characteristics of some past, current and future sensors 
on military reconnaissance and civil earth resources satellites 
Sensor orbital Spatial Satellite and date Sensor altitude resolution Spectral region 
of launch (km) (m) 
Photographic camera 
Reconnaissance 200-500 ea. 0.30 Visible K.H-11, Big Bird 
camera & some of the 
Cosmos satellites 
Multispectral scanner 375 ea. 30 Visible Skylab (1973) 
(MSS) ea. 75 Infra-red 
Earth terrain 375 ea. 15 Visible Skylab (1973) 
camera 50 Infra-red 
Large format 268 18 Visible Space shuttle 
camera 540 ea. 20 Visible STS-41G (1984) 
Tested on board 
space shuttle STS-4 
(1982) 
MSS 920 ea. 140 Visible Landsat 1 (1972) 
920 ea. 140 Visible Landsat 2 ( 1977) 
ea. 240 Infra-red Landsat 3 (1978) 
MSS ea. 250 20 Visible Salyut 6 (1977) 
60 Infra-red Salyut 6 (1977) 
Charged couple 800 ea. 50 Visible SPOT 1 (1986) 
device (CCD) ea. 25 Visible 
panchromatic 
200 ea. 0.30 Visible KH-11 
Film camera 500 80-120 Visible Salyut 6 (1978) 
Thematic mapper 700 25 Visible, Landsat 4 (1982) 
near 
infra-red; Landsat 5 (1984) 
thermal 
infra-red 
Television camera 
Returned-beam 920 80 Visible Landsat 1 ( 1972) 
vidicon (RBV) Landsat 2 ( 1977) 
40 Visible Landsat 3 ( 1978) 
panchromatic 
500 100 Visible Salyut 6 (1978) 
Microwave 
Synthetic aperture 
(1979) 800 25 - Seasat-1 
radar (SAR) 250 38 - Space shuttle STS-2 
(1981) 
675 30 - ERS-1 (ESA) (1990) 
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Country 
USA 
USSR 
USA 
USA 
USA 
USA 
USSR 
France 
USA 
USSR 
USA 
USA 
USA 
USSR 
USA 
USA 
Europe 
DOCUMENT 1160 APPENDIX IV 
APPENDIX IV 
Typical distribution of military satellites 
deployed by the United States and the USSR at any given time 
60 
USSR 
50 
40 
30 
USA 
"' G) 
i 
i;; 
"' 0 
.8 
e 
= 10 z 
USSR 
Orbits LEO Molniya Semi·Synctaronou GEO 
Photo-reconnatssance 
Navtgatton 
Ocean survetllance 
Meteorology 
Communications 
-
. 
. 
Electrontc tntelligence 
-
Early warntng 
Source: Scientific American June 1984. 
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APPENDIX V 
The effect of resolution on the satellite image of a B-52 bomber 
(d): 
1r 
-0.6 mx0.6 m 
B- 52: 
Length=48 m 
Wingspan=56 m 
Width of fuselage=3.5 m 
(e) 
Source: B. Jasani and B. Sakata, Satellites for arms control and crisis monitoring. 
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APPENDIX VI 
The effect of resolution on the satellite image of a F-15 aircraft 
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APPENDIX VI 
Source: See Appendix V. 
F-15: 
Length=19.4 m 
Wingspan= 13.1 m 
Tailspan=8.6 m 
Wheeltrack=2.75 m 
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-0.2 mx0.2 m 
(f) 
DOCUMENT 1160 APPENDIX VII 
APPENDIX VII 
Comparison between a Soviet T-54/55 tank 
and an armoured personnel carrier ( APC) at various resolutions 
(d) 
Source: See Appendix V. 
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APPENDIX VIII 
Breakdown by programme of long-term European space plan 1988-JOOO 
(in millions of accounting units - 1986 prices) 
C/1 
ll.l 
~ ~ SPACE TRANSPORT 
.....l~ 10 362 
<..r:: 
Zp::: 
Oc:J ~0 
P..p::: 
OP.. 
.. SPACE STATION 6 972 
TOTAL 
... 31 060 
.. 
Telecommunications 
3 355 
MICROGRA VITY 
1 536 
>-C/1 .. Observation 3 119 p:::ll.l 0~ C/1~ Science & Technology .....l< .... ;:Jp::: 3 182 P..c:J ~0 8.2% , .... General Budget OP::: 
UP.. 2 535 
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D.o.C. 
219 
NASA 
6 151 
(excluding aeronautical 
R& D) 
APPENDIX IX 
World breakdown of space budgets for 1987 (ECUm) 
UNITED STATES 20 801 Canada 
196.51 
D.o.D. 
EUROPE 2 756 
(ESA + NATIONAL PROGRAMMES**) 
F.R.G. 
491 
14 337 NETHERLANDS 60 
* programme authorisations for the United States & payment credits for ESA. 
** excluding military programmes. 
BRAZIL 
E1 
INPE 
France 
858 
INDIA 
236 
~ 
ESA 
1 626 
ITALY 
473 
JAPAN 
839 
NASDA 
663 
-
-0'1 0 
> ., 
., 
~ 
S2 
>< 
->< 
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APPENDIX X 
Percentage participation of ESA member countries 
States Ariane-5 Col urn bus Hermes 
Austria 0.4 - 0.5 
Belgium 6.0 5.0 5.8 
Denmark 0.5 1.0 0.45 
France 44.7 13.8 43.5 
Germany 22.0 38.0 27.0 
Ireland 0.2 - -
Italy 15.0 25.0 12.1 
Netherlands 2.3 1.3 2.2 
Norway 0.4 0.4 0.2 
Spain 3.0 6.0 4.5 
Sweden 2.0 - 1.3 
Switzerland 2.0 - 1.5 
United Kingdom - 5.0 -
Not covered X 4.0 0.95 
Source: European Space Agency. 
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Programme of the visit 
by the Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aerospace Questions 
to Spain and Portugal 
Spain 
Monday, 12th September 1988 
Visit the SENER factory, Bilbao. 
Tuesday, 13th September 1988 
Visit the CASA factory, Seville. 
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Meeting with Mr. Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Madrid. 
Wednesday, 14th September 1988 
Meeting with the National Armaments Director, Admiral Juan F. Ruiz Montero. 
Meeting with members of the Congress of Deputies. 
Visit of INISEL. 
Portugal 
Thursday, 15th September 1988 
Visit of OGMA (Oeiras) and briefing. 
Friday, 16th September 1988 
Meeting with the Secretary of National Defence, Dr. Eugenio Ramos, and the National Arma-
ments Director, General Cravo da Silva, at the Ministry of Defence, Lisbon. 
Meeting with the Defence Committee of the Assembly of the Republic. 
In preparing this report, the Rapporteur has also made use of the following publication: Jean-
Francois DAGUZAN, L'Espagne a la croisee des chemins, Paris 1988. 
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Draft Recommendation 
on defence industry in Spain and Portugal 
The Assembly, 
(i) Recognising the benefits of a more cohesive and politically more vigorous European defence 
effort within the alliance which the accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU should bring; 
(ii) Aware that Western Europe's defence industrial base would be strengthened if the productive and 
technical potential of Spain and Portugal were stimulated by an active programme of joint research, col-
laborative development and production of defence equipment as well as by common maintenance and 
training programmes with the existing WEU member countries; 
(iii) Conscious that important recommendations in the report "Towards a stronger Europe" pre-
sented by the European Defence Industry Study Group to the ministers of the Independent European 
Programme Group which are of particular relevance to countries with a less-developed defence industry 
have not as yet been fully implemented; 
(iv) Convinced that budgetary constraints will impel all the European member countries within the 
alliance to promote enhanced co-operation by governments over the setting of common operational 
requirements through the Independent European Programme Group as well as through intensified 
industrial collaboration in the design, development and production of defence equipment; 
(v) Hopeful that better value for money in armament procurement for Western Europe as a whole 
can be obtained through the imaginative involvement of Portugal and Spain in the development, manu-
facture and support of a wide range of European defence equipments, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Urge member governments: 
1. To mark the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU with a political initiative to address the 
industrial needs of the countries with a less-developed defence industry within the alliance; 
2. To bear in mind the particular respective considerations of Portugal and Spain in implementing 
more fully the recommendations of the report" Towards a stronger Europe" presented by the European 
Defence Industry Study Group to the Independent European Programme Group; 
3. To investigate the benefits to be derived to the alliance from common dependence by other WEU 
member countries on more specialist and economic sources of supply for defence equipments, and 
thereby enhance the opportunities for defence equipment procurement from Portugal and Spain; 
4. To match Spanish and Portuguese commitment to a wide range of European collaborative air-
craft, naval and missile programmes with the establishment of joint European training facilities and 
courses as well as the secondment of Portuguese and Spanish personnel to military research establish-
ments elsewhere in Western Europe; 
5. To facilitate by granting preferential terms of access the participation of LDDI nations such as 
Portugal in common technology projects; 
6. To study the opportunities for military establishments for third line servicing within the WEU 
countries to bid commercially on the OGMA model for maintenance contracts from the armed forces of 
other western countries and from approved civilian sources. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Wilkinson, Rapporteur) 
Introduction 
1. In the framework of the committee's spe-
cific interest in the European armaments indus-
tries and in increasing co-operation in European 
defence equipment procurement, it paid a visit 
to Spain and Portugal from 12th to 16th Sep-
tember 1988. 
2. As both countries have formally applied to 
join WEU and are negotiating the terms of their 
membership with the Ministerial Council, the 
committee considered it of particular interest to 
examine the general capabilities of their 
respective defence industries and at the same 
time to study the possibility of deriving addi-
tional political impetus to European armaments 
collaboration from the enlargement of WEU by 
the accession of Portugal and Spain. 
3. In this report, a clear distinction will be 
made between the positions of Spain and Por-
tugal since their strategic and political situations 
are very different. Likewise their technical and 
industrial experience and capabilities display 
important differences. 
A. SPAIN 
I. Government and defence industry 
4. In most countries, there is a close rela-
tionship between government and the defence 
industry. An obvious reason is that an indig-
enous ability to supply the defence equipment 
needs of the armed forces plays a vital role in 
maintaining autonomy and sovereignty in 
national defence. 
5. Spain follows this general pattern. The 
Ministry of Defence is responsible for deter-
mining the national defence policy in the context 
of meeting the objectives of Spain's strategic and 
foreign policy objectives and of developing the 
ensuing equipment programmes. Within the 
Ministry of Defence, there is a Direccion General 
de Armamento y Material (DGAM), created in 
1977. The main task of the DGAM is to 
co-ordinate and execute the armaments and 
material policy of the armed services in 
accordance with their respective standards and 
specifications. 
6. Its role needs some clarification especially 
since the substantial influence of the National 
Institute for Industry (1Nl) in the armaments 
industry does not facilitate DGAM's role as a 
mediator and co-ordinator between the armed 
services and the defence industry. The 1Nl was 
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established in 1941 to reconstruct the national 
defence industry which had been distorted and 
set back by the civil war and has a most 
important role. 1Nl, after a recent restructuring, 
is still the main public holding company in the 
defence industry with an important stake in 
companies such as Bazan (shipyards, 95%), Santa 
Barbara (field armaments, 100%), CASA (aero-
space industry, 73%) and INISEL (electronics, 
100%). 
7. The main task of 1Nl is to create and 
revitalise industries according to the defence 
needs of the country. Moreover, it supervises all 
matters that it considers to be of interest for mil-
itary or state reasons and exercises its super-
vision specifically over the larger industries. 
Altogether, 1Nl controls 70% of armaments pro-
duction in Spain. 
I I. Structure of the defence industry 
(a) Public sector 
8. In the public sector, the state holding 
company, 1Nl, exercises control over 74 com-
panies with the defence-Jielated companies 
among them covering 70% of Spanish arms pro-
duction. 
9. The 1Nl defence industries are also by far 
the biggest employers: Bazan shipyards has 
12 000 employees, ENASA, a military vehicle 
manufacturer, 10 000, CASA 8 000, Santa 
Barbara 4 200 and INISEL nearly 3 000. 
10. INISEL, created in 1985 by merging six 
existing small electronics companies, may be 
considered the showpiece ofiNI, destined to lead 
Spain's battle in advanced technology in the 
future European defence market. Between 60 and 
70% of INISEL's activities are defence-related, 
primarily in co-operative. European pro-
grammes. 
(b) Private sector 
11. In the private sector of the Spanish 
defence industry, some 140 companies are 
active, including about 40 in. the production of 
armaments, electronics and military vehicles and 
the others in ancillary industries. 
12. Of these companies, mention should be 
made of Talbot (vehicles), Cecelsa (electronics, 
aircraft maintenance and overhaul, 1 100 
employees), Marconi (electronics, 400 
employees) and Sener (informatics and engi-
neering, 700 employees). The average size of 
private companies in this sector is between 200 
and 1 000 employees. 
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(c) Associations 
13. Since most companies active in the 
defence industry are of a relatively small size, the 
Ministry of Defence has stimulated the estab-
lishment of trade associations of manufacturers, 
which should act as a link between industry and 
the ministry. 
14. In 1983 this policy resulted in the estab-
lishment of the Circulo de Electronica Militar 
(CEM), uniting defence manufacturers and uni-
versity centres. The CEM especially promotes 
contacts between industry and fundamental 
research, facilitates the establishment of bilateral 
agreements and organises the exchange of infor-
mation. 
15. The Asociacion de Fabricantes de Armas y 
Material de Defensa (Afarmade), a non-profit 
organisation comprising 85% of the defence 
manufacturers, was created in 1985. Afarmade 
promotes research and development in industry 
and is trying to restructure the armaments sector. 
In international programmes, it helps small com-
panies to participate. 
(d) Size and economic output 
16. At present some 100 000 people are 
employed in the defence industry in Spain, 
including ancillary industries and support ser-
vices. 
17. For many reasons, such as the political 
isolation of Spain in the Franco era and the late 
entry of Spain into NATO, the production 
volume of the Spanish defence industry even 
after the Franco era has been very limited. Suc-
cessive democratic governments in the post-
Franco period have been convinced of the need 
to expand the defence sector of industry for the 
benefit of the overall industrial economy and the 
armed forces. This active policy soon resulted in 
considerable growth in Spanish armaments pro-
duction. Excessive reliance on imports of 
American defence equipment (a legacy of the 
United StatesjSpanish bilateral defence treaty) 
is now being overcome as these figures on 
domestic armaments production clearly demon-
strate: 
FIGURE 1 
Production volume of armament industries 
(in millions of pesetas) 
Years INI Private State Total 
1978 - - - 70 000 
1979 46000 70 000 - 116 000 
1980 65 992 - - -
1981 108 400 ± 60 000 - 170 000 
1982 100 992 
1983 -
1984 -
1985 150 000 
(Source: Daguzan, I'Espagne a la croisee des chemins.) 
Ill. Products and capabilities 
18. Without claiming to be in any way 
exhaustive, an attempt is made here to provide a 
brief survey of Spain's major capabilities in the 
defence industrial field. 
(a) Ammunitions and bombs 
19. Union Explosivos Rio Tinto S.A. (ERT), 
Spain's largest private chemical group, produces 
a full range of ammunitions, explosives and avi-
ation bombs. Part ofERT is Explosivos Alaveses 
S.A. (Expal), a small group of companies pro-
ducing mines, aviation bombs and artillery 
ammunition, which exports 75% of its pro-
duction. Material de Armamento y Suministros 
S.A. (Maarsusa) is another company, specialised 
in aviation bombs and ammunition, which 
exports to the African and Arabic world as well 
as to some European clients. 
- 2400 150 000 
- 2400 -
- - 204 000 
60000 1 200 222 000 
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20. Research is being done now in more 
advanced technologies: Sener, in co-operation 
with the DGAM, is developing a long-range 
laser-guided stand-off weapon. 
(b) Aerospace 
21. Aeronautica Industrial S.A. (AISA) is a 
small company which has been responsible for 
several liaison and training aircraft for the 
Spanish air force. It is now a subsidiary of 
Ceselsa and engaged in repair and general 
overhaul of Beechcraft aircraft for the Spanish 
air force and also of several types of Bell heli-
copter and of the Boeing Vertol CH-47 heli-
copters for the Spanish air force, army and 
civilian operators. As a subcontractor, it is 
engaged in production programmes for the 
Mirage F-1 and 2000, Falcon and Alpha-jet as 
well as for the C-212 and Airbus. 
22. Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A. (CASA) 
is the largest aerospace company of Spain. It has 
designed several aircraft under contract to the 
Spanish Air Ministry, including the successful 
C-212 aviocar transport aircraft (412 sold, 390 
delivered) and the C-101 aviojet jet trainer (151 
sold, 144 delivered), both of which are currently 
in production. Together with the Indonesian 
company IPTN, CASA developed the CN-235 
transport aircraft, of which 114 have now been 
sold and 5 delivered. 
23. Recently, CASA started work on the AX, a 
tactical aircraft for advanced training and ground 
support missions (see Chapter VI). In the 
framework of offset agreements and as a subcon-
tractor, it is involved in a number of pro-
grammes. It is participating in the production of 
the recently ordered McDonnell Douglas 
F/A-18s and is assembling MBB B0-105 and 
Aerospatiale AS-332 Super Puma helicopters for 
the Spanish armed forces. Components are being 
produced for the MD-80, Boeing 757 and 
Canadair CL-215. As a full member of Airbus 
Industrie, Casa is producing components for the 
Airbus A 300, 310 and 320 civil airliner pro-
grammes. Maintenance and overhaul is being 
carried out for the Spanish armed forces aircraft 
inventory and for some USAF aircraft in Europe, 
such as the F-15. As far as international arms 
co-operation is concerned, CASA is involved in 
the programmes for development of the EF A, 
Tonal helicopter, MSOW, FAMS and FIMA (see 
Chapter VII). 
24. Ibermisil is a new company, created in 
early 1988 under the sponsorship ofthe Ministry 
of Defence and the Ministry of Industry with 
CASA, Bazan, Santa Barbara and INISEL as par-
ticipants in order to develop and manufacture 
missiles. In 1992, Ibermisil should deliver the 
first missile designed and built in 1992. The first 
system will be an anti-tank missile in short-range 
(800-1 000 m) and long-range (up to 5 000 m) 
versions meeting the requirements of the 
Spanish army. Ibermisil will also participate in 
international missile programmes (see Chapter 
VII). 
25. As part of its determined policy to upgrade 
the national aerospace industry, the Spanish 
Ministry of Defence opened a competition in 
1986 for a contract to modernise the 23 Mirage 
IIIE aircraft of the air force. The contract 
worth nearly US $200 million will involve 
modernisation of the aicraft's avionics and radar 
and structural enhancement such as the fitting of 
canard foreplanes. Recently, the Defence Min-
istry awarded the contract to a team consisting of 
the private domestic company Ceselsa, teaming 
with the Israel aircraft industries (IAI), and 
CASA teaming with A vions Marcel Dassault-
Breguet lost. The ministry has now forced 
Ceselsa and CASA to create a consortium to 
perform the modernisation, stipulating that the 
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two companies are considered as equal level con-
tractors with Ceselsa (aviqnics and radar) to 
perform a minimum of 20% of the total work. 
Foreign involvement should be restricted to a 
minimum and only on a subcontractor level. The 
final contract has not yet been signed and CASA 
is claiming that the connection with IAI could 
undermine its own dealings with the Arab 
world. 
(c) Vehicles 
26. The largest Spanish· company in this 
sector, Empresa Nacional de Autocamiones S.A. 
(ENASA), is manufacturing a full range of special 
vehicles for defence purposes including all-
terrain trucks, light armoured vehicles, 
amphibious wheeled vehicles and armoured 
vehicles for personnel transport and reconnais-
sance. ENASA is especially successful also in 
export contracts with its BMR 6X6, a 6 wheel 
drive armoured personnel carrier, available in 
several versions. 
(d) Artillery and light weapons 
27. Recently, two field guns have been 
developed by rival Spanish companies. 
Desarrollos de Sistemas y Tecnologias S.A. 
(Sitecsa), an ERT company, has developed the 
ST 155/45 gun and is developing a 203 mm gun 
based on the same carrier. At the same time, 
Santa Barbara developed the SB 155/39 how-
itzer. Santa Barbara also offers a wide range of 
light weapons. It is now testing the very short-
range ground-to-air defence system Meroka 
which it developed for the Spanish army. A 
special version was developed for installation on 
several Spanish navy ships. Semi-automatic 
pistols and sub-machine guns are manufactured 
by Star Bonifacio Echevarria S.A. 
(e) Ships 
28. The only shipyard with a significant 
defence manufacturing activity is the state-
owned Bazan shipyard. Its main activity is to 
carry out Spanish navy programmes. All major 
naval ships recently built, however, are of foreign 
design, adapted by Bazan to the national navy's 
requirements. This happened in the case of 
the Descubierta class frigates (commissioned 
1978-82) based on a Portuguese-German design, 
the Principe de Asturias aircraft-carrier (commis-
sioned 1988), based on a United States design, 
and the Santa Maria class frigates (being com-
missioned now), based on the United States FFG 
7 Oliver Perry class. Nevertheless, it should be 
stressed that especially for the Santa Maria class 
frigates the national Spanish industry has 
developed new equipment in the field of arma-
ments and electronics, for which Spain previ-
ously called on foreign suppliers. Bazan also 
builds smaller vessels, of which some types are 
exported; six patrol vessels are now being 
delivered to Morocco. 
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(j) Electronics 
29. The principal Spanish group in the defence 
electronics sector is INISEL, created in 1985 as 
the result of a decision of the 1Nl. Apart from 
INISEL there are 7 other companies in this 
group with a total of 3 000 employees. In the 
defence field, which accounted for about US 
$100 million or 48% of the sales of the INISEL 
group in 1987, it is active in, among others, tac-
tical communications, weapons electronics, avi-
onics, optics and optoelectronics, radars, elec-
tronic warfare, artificial intelligence and software 
development. In the framework of offset con-
tracts, it produced Kaiser head-up displays and 
other cockpit displays for the F/A-18. Recently, 
many of its technicians attended training pro-
grammes in United States companies associated 
with the F/A-18 programme. 
30. Now it is involved in the development of 
the radar for the European fighter aircraft and it 
is also competing in consortia for other EF A con-
tracts concerning cockpit displays, digital engine 
control and communications. 
31. Also forward-looking is the private 
company Ceselsa, created in 1979 and now 
employing 1 100 in seven operating divisions. 
Ceselsa acquired new technology in working in 
computers and inertial navigation systems for 
the F/A-18 and AV-8B programmes for the 
Spanish armed forces. It recently won a contract 
for the modernisation of avionics and airframes 
for the Spanish Mirage HIEs and is involved in 
the EF A programme. With government-funded 
research, it is now developing a three-dimen-
sional primary radar for civilian and military 
use. 
32. Marconi Espanola is a smaller, since 1987 
wholly Spanish-owned, private company, with 
400 employees. It is specialised in tactical com-
munications, aircraft instruments and radar 
assemblies and is exporting defence equipment 
to the United States, France and Italy. 
IV. Arms sales and exports 
33. Since the beginning of democratic gov-
ernment in 1976 it has been standing gov-
ernment policy to export as many defence 
products as possible. This policy, by concen-
trating on a few not very advanced but reliable 
products, has been highly successful. 
(a) The legal framework 
34. Each contract for the export or import of 
weapons is subject to approval by a council with 
representatives from the Ministries of Trade and 
Tourism, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Industry 
and Energy. In formulating its judgment, this 
council takes into account the possible conse-
quences for the foreign policy of Spain, the 
influence on national arms production and 
defence and, in general, if it is appropriate to 
import or export the material in question, 
making sure that the needs of the armed forces 
and the national industry are met. Criteria for 
the selection of approved countries for Spanish 
defence sales or imports are established by the 
ministerial council. In certain cases an official 
guarantee of destination (end-user certificate) 
may be required and the council can demand a 
clause prohibiting re-export to third countries. 
35. Altogether, the Spanish legislation for the 
control of arms export and import is very similar 
to the rules existing in other Western European 
countries and no political controversies about it 
have occurred since it came into force. 
FIGURE 2 
EXPORTS 
Country 1987 
USSR •••••• 0 •• 0 0 0 0 12 262 
United States •••• 0. 11 547 
France ............. 3 573 
United Kingdom ... 1 792 
West Germany ..... 1 444 
China • 0 ••••••••••• 1040 
Netherlands ........ 497 
Sweden ............ 380 
Brazil 0 0 •• 0 0 ••••••• 369 
Czechoslovakia ..... 321 
Israel .............. 268 
Italy ............... 247 
Spain .............. 177 
Egypt .............. 158 
Canada ............ 139 
(Source: SIPRI). 
Arms trade ranking 
(millions of 1985 dollars) 
1986 Country 
10 908 India .............. 
9 965 Iraq ............... 
4 378 Egypt .............. 
1 693 Saudi Arabia ....... 
943 Israel .............. 
1 302 Japan •••• 0 ••••• 0. 0 
240 Syria 0 ••••• 0 0 0. 0 ••• 
322 Turkey •• 0 •• 0 0 0. 0 0. 
189 Czechoslovakia ..... 
276 Angola ............ 
179 Spain .............. 
327 Canada ............ 
210 Australia ........... 
126 Taiwan ............ 
746 South Korea ....... 
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IMPORTS 
1987 1986 
5 246 2 695 
3 541 2 100 
2 231 1 778 
1 753 2 495 
1 632 406 
1 331 1 640 
1 301 1 782 
1 212 789 
1 191 1 161 
1 126 720 
1 111 865 
677 759 
654 867 
607 664 
556 288 
(b) Volumes of exports and clients 
36. Since the early 1970s, when Spain started 
to export weaponry as part of a determined 
government policy, it climbed rapidly from a 
position of almost zero to the thirteenth place in 
the world list of weapons exporting countries. 
37. It should be noted of course that the size of 
its exports cannot be compared with that of the 
six countries ranked highest on the list, who 
shared together about 93% of the market in 
1987. 
38. Moreover in 1982, weapons exports made 
up only 4% of total Spanish exports. For the 
defence industry, however, arms exports play an 
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important role, since about 50% of the total arms 
production is exported. 
39. On the other hand, examining those coun-
tries which have received Spanish weapons, it 
appears that Spain's major weapons exports are 
directed almost exclusively to third world coun-
tries. Exports of major weapQns to industrialised 
countries are virtually non-existent. On the list 
of exporters of major weapons to the third world, 
Spain moved from eighteenth position in the 
1977-81 period to the eighth place in the 1982-86 
period (see Appendix). 
40. Figure 3 shows the main third world major 
weapons recipients from the Spanish defence 
industry, as compared with four other West 
European arms suppliers. 
FIGURE 3 
Patterns of major-weapon exports of five West European arms suppliers 
1977-81 and 1982-86 
Percentage share based on SIPRI trend indicator values as expressed in 
US $m., at constant (1985) prices 
Share in total Third world share 
arms exports to in supplier's 
third world arms exports 
Supplier 
1982-86 1977-81 1982-86 
France 0 0 ••••••••• 15.1 12.4 86 
United Kingdom .. 5.3 5.1 67 
FR Germany •• 0 0. 3.9 1.7 63 
Italy •• 0 0. 0 ••••••• 3.6 3.3 98 
Spain 0 0 0 ••••••• 0. 1.6 0.2 100 
* Share in supplier's total exports to the third world. 
(Source: SIPRI). 
41. Several factors determine the extent of 
Spanish weapons exports to third world coun-
tries. First, the technological level of the Spanish 
defence industry, as compared to other major 
arms producing nations in the world, is relatively 
low and not very sophisticated. As a conse-
quence, Spanish arms products are relatively 
cheap and reliable and fit perfectly the level of 
requirements and financial capabilities of many 
third world countries. 
42. Second, in recent years and under suc-
cessive governments, Spain has not been fairly 
catholic in selecting its clients on the arms 
market, as can be seen in Figure 4. 
1977-81 Top 5 third world Combined 
recipients, 1982-86 share* 
71 Iraq, Saudi Arabia, India, 
Argentina, Egypt ••••• 0. 0 •• 55 
85 India, Chili, Oman, Nigeria, 
Egypt ..................... 58 
42 Argentina, Colombia, Malaysia, 
Bahrain, Kuwait ........... 81 
94 Libya, Venezuela, Ecuador, 
Peru, Malaysia ............ 70 
100 Egypt, Mexico, Morocco, 
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Argentina, Iraq ............ 84 
(c) An anxious perspective 
43. If Spanish weapons exp()rts have been suc-
cessful in recent years, a decline is now visible 
(see Appendix) and the outlook is not entirely 
reassuring. 
44. One reason for the general decline in 
weapons sales of many major weapons exporters 
is the debt burden problem which has led many 
third world countries to curtail the overambi-
tious modernisation of their armed forces. 
Moreover, several new exporting countries such 
as Brazil, Egypt and Israel have recently entered 
the world arms market, especially in those 
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FIGURE 4 
Development of Spanish arms sales 
1970-1982 
Europe Middle East Africa Asia America 
Portugal Saudi Arabia Uganda Indonesia Chile 
Jordan Senegal Thailand Bolivia 
Syria Libya Peru 
United Arab Upper Volta Argentina 
Emirates Nigeria Mexico 
Iraq South Africa Ecuador 
Egypt Morocco Venezuela 
Rhodesia Uruguay 
1982-1986 
Europe Middle East Africa Asia America 
Saudi Arabia Zimbabwe Indonesia Honduras 
Egypt Sudan Thailand Chile 
Turkey Angola Mexico 
Iraq Somalia Paraguay 
Jordan South Africa Nicaragua 
Iran Morocco Colombia 
Lebanon Djibouti Panama 
(Source: Daguzan, L'Espagne a la croisee des chemins). 
market sectors for less-sophisticated weaponry 
where Spain enjoyed previously a relatively 
strong position. 
45. It is not therefore surprising that Spain is 
trying as many ways as possible to acquire more 
technological expertise in order to enhance the 
competitiveness and sophistication of its defence 
industries. In the Spanish view particularly the 
trend towards improved and expanded European 
arms co-operation is opening vast opportunities 
for technology transfer. Consequently, Spain is 
participating in most of the main European 
international arms development programmes. 
The hard question of how Spain will be able to 
Peru 
Argentina 
meet this challenge in terms of financial 
resources and qualified manpower will be dis-
cussed in Chapters V and VII. 
V. Research and development 
46. Spain has only recently started to invest 
substantially in defence research and deve-
lopment. The overall picture of the defence 
research and development programme in Spain 
is not clear since the co-ordination of the dif-
ferent branches of relevant activity seems to be 
lacking. SIPRI figures quoted here therefore 
mention 1983 as the latest year for which reliable 
Spanish data are available. 
FIGURE 5 
Military research and development in some major weapon exporting countries, 
1977-83 
(US $m at constant (1980) prices and exchange rates) 
Country 1977 1978 
United States ........... 16 363.6 16 206.8 
France .................. I 982.8 2 235.2 
United Kingdom ........ (2 936.8) (3 181.8) 
West Germany .......... 991.1 1047 
Netherlands ............. 43 46.9 
Sweden ................. - 323 
Italy .................... 68.1 59.5 
Spain ................... 6.4 7.6 
Canada ................. 86.3 84.3 
F1gures between brackets are SIPRI estimates. 
(Source: SIPRI yearbook 1987). 
1979 1980 1981 
15 850.5 15 766.5 17 125.2 
2 517.1 2 685.8 3 276.1 
(3 503.9) (3 718. 7) (3 583.3) 
1072.3 951.8 813.7 
48.7 45.8 50.4 
281 228.6 210.6 
46.4 48.7 166.6 
12.2 24.3 28.6 
80.4 83.2 85.4 
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1982 
19 386.4 
3 116.5 
3 354.0 
809.6 
55.2 
246.4 
121.4 
37.3 
93.5 
1983 
21 050.5 
3 081.3 
3 514.1 
873.1 
47.2 
311.3 
160.3 
36.3 
100.6 
47. There is still a very pronounced imbalance 
in Spain between public and private investment 
in defence research and development if it is con-
sidered that three-fifths are financed by the gov-
ernment budget, and only one-fifth by public and 
one-fifth by private companies. 
48. Even if a full survey of Spain's research 
and development spending in recent years is not 
yet available, the figures reflecting the devel-
opment of research and development in the 
budget of the Ministry of Defence are evidence 
of the government's intentions. 
49. While in 1982 only 400 million pesetas 
were spent on research and development, this 
increased to 15 000 million in 1987 and 18 000 
million in 1988. The research and development 
component is now being progressively raised to 
4% of total defence spending. 
50. In 1987, 85% of the defence budget's 
research and development funds were destined 
for aeronautical research of which almost 60% 
went to programmes related to the EF A 
(European fighter aircraft), considered as the 
pivot programme for the acquisition and devel-
opment of new technologies. 
51. The lack of highly-qualified research per-
sonnel has proved one of the legacies of the 
Franco era causing difficulty in speeding up the 
country's technological development which will 
take some time to correct. It has since been the 
clear educational policy of all governments to 
raise the national skill and qualification base so 
as to provide for more well-trained research per-
sonnel. 
52. The establishment of joint ventures is also 
consciously promoted by the Spanish Gov-
ernment as another efficient way of acquiring 
new technologies. 
VI. The AX, a major national 
development programme 
53. It is interesting to note that Spain, having 
some difficulty already in providing the funds for 
a number of ambitious multilateral European 
arms co-operation programmes, is working on 
the definition of a significant national military 
aircraft programme. 
54. The AX project is based on an outline staff 
target of the Spanish air force. The AX, meant to 
replace the aging Northrop F-5, will be a trans-
sonic, single-engine aircraft, capable of inter-
ception, ground attack and reconnaissance mis-
sions, all at very low altitudes. It is to be 
equipped with advanced systems such as radar, 
laser, fly-by-wire and a head-up display. 
Advanced materials and production methods 
would be used for manufacturing the airframe. 
55. CASA, which, together with a number of 
other Spanish defence manufacturers has already 
been studying this project, told the committee 
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that the official feasibility phase should start 
within a few months. CASA has also suggested 
that the AX could be a candidate for the joint 
NATO trainer system. First delivery of the AX 
fighter/trainer should then be at the end of the 
1990s. Spain would prefer not to be alone in this 
programme and talks have been initiated with 
other European countries to see if they are inter-
ested. 
VII. International co-operation 
56. Whilst Spain is taking the first steps to 
develop the AX aircraft alone and has in recent 
years developed a number of armaments inde-
pendently, a drive for a major role in European 
co-operation is a prime Spanish strategic 
objective, especially for the part of the defence 
industry concerned with the aerospace and elec-
tronics sectors as can be seen in the following 
table: 
International arms co-operation programmes 
with Spanish participation 
IEPG Trigat (third-generation anti-tank missile): 
United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, 
Spain. 
IEPG ASRAAM (advanced short-range air-to-
air missile): Canada, Germany, Italy, 
Norway, United Kingdom, Spain. 
IEPG FIMA (future interallied military aircraft): 
United Kingdom, Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain. 
IEPG Maverick "D" (air-to-ground missile) 
United States-European dual production; 
European participants: Denmark, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Spain. 
IEPG Mistral (short-range ground-to-air 
missile): France, Belgium, Italy, Greece, 
Spain. 
IEPG Medium surface-to-aiv missile (MSAM): 
United Kingdom, iBelgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain. 
IEPG Light support weapons: France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom 
(observer). 
IEPG Medium mortar: France, Italy, Norway, 
Spain, United Kingdom, Germany 
(observer). 
IEPG Short-range anti-armour weapon 600 m: 
France, Belgium, Germany, Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain. 
IEPG Short-range anti-armour weapon 300 m: 
Spain, France, Germany, Netherlands. 
IEPG Mortars: Spain, France, Italy, Norway, 
United Kingdom, Germany (observer). 
IEPG Microwave landing system: United 
Kingdom, France, Netherlands, Spain. 
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- European fighter aircraft: United 
Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Spain. 
- Tonal light attack helicopter: United 
Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Spain. 
- Modular stand-off weapon: United 
Kingdom, United States, Germany, Italy, 
Spain. 
- Helios (military reconnaissance satellite): 
France, Italy, Spain. 
- NFR-90, NATO frigate replacement for 
the 1990s: Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, United 
Kingdom, United States. 
- FAMS (future anti-missile system for 
navy): Italy, France, United Kingdom, 
Spain (European contender for NFR-90 
NATO frigate anti-air missile system). 
- NATO anti-air warfare system, based on 
United States Aegis architecture. United 
States, Germany, Canada, Spain, Nether-
lands and United Kingdom concluded 
MOU late 1987 for concept exploration of 
this system, lasting about eighteen months 
(allied contender for the NFR-90 NATO 
frigate anti-air missile system). 
- NATO 155 mm autonomous precision-
guided munition (APGM) Canada, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, 
Turkey, United States. MOU for expanded 
feasibility study signed April 198 7. 
Contract award expected 1988. 
57. The Spanish authorities are quite willing 
to admit that within Europe, the ultimate goal 
should be an open European armaments market. 
They believe that a transitional period of eight to 
twelve years should allow existing imbalances in 
the defence industry and technology to be cor-
rected gradually. The creation of a common 
industrial and technological base which would 
make sure that all participating countries have 
the same capabilities is, from the Spanish point 
of view, a condition for the establishment of an 
open European defence market. It is well 
understood in Spain that participation in arms 
co-operation programmes is the best and vir-
tually only way to acquire the advanced tech-
nology which is still lacking in the national 
defence industry. On the other hand, the 
government is well aware that private companies 
are not eager to transfer technology if their 
patents are concerned, these being their profit-
making assets. The problem of safeguarding 
intellectual property rights in international pro-
grammes is notoriously contentious. 
58. The idea of a common European defence 
research programme, as advocated in the EDIS 
report presented to the Ministerial Council of the 
IEPG in Seville in July 1987 and which is being 
strongly endorsed by the Assembly of WEU, is 
therefore now being promoted by the Spanish 
presidency of the IEPG. Admiral Ruiz Montero, 
the Spanish National Armaments Director, told 
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the committee that in preparatory meetings for 
the IEPG ministerial meeting in Luxembourg on 
8th and 9th November 1988 a general consensus 
seemed to have developed, recognising that a 
commonly-funded European defence research 
programme is the only way towards creating a 
strong European defence technology base whilst 
making better use of available resources. 
59. In existing arms co-operation pro-
grammes, Spain is insisting on obtaining a fair 
return for its investments. The Spanish admit 
that this concept of juste retour may cause pro-
blems in some programmes where the technical 
level of the Spanish industrial participation is 
not up to that of other participating industries. 
They visualise juste retour as a temporary indus-
trial phase whose interpretation would become 
less rigid with the passage of time. 
60. One other rather thorny problem is the 
question of the export of jointly developed arma-
ments. In the EFA programme, rules have now 
been adopted which could serve as a basis for 
other co-operative programmes. The Spanish 
have made clear their view that unduly strict 
export rules could damage the defence industry, 
which seeks not only advantageous high tech-
nology transfers from its European collaborative 
programmes but substantial volume production 
also. 
61. It should be noted here that the Spanish 
defence industry supported by the government is 
extending itself into new areas in its eagerness to 
participate in key European collaborative pro-
grammes. One example is participation in the 
development and production of the EJ 200 
powerplant by the private company Sener, the 
lead company for the Spanish with a 13% share 
in this ultra high technology engine to be pro-
duced by the Eurojet four nation consortium for 
the EF A. A new subsidiary has been created for 
this purpose, Sener Turbo Propulsion S.A., in 
which Sener, CASA and Bazan together have a 
51% share, Rolls Royce, MTU and Fiat together 
a 32% share and other investors the remaining 
17%. 
62. A recent example of the potentially 
conflicting pressures which the urge to colla-
borate may impose upon Spanish policy-makers 
is worthy of examination. A few months ago it 
became known that the United States company 
Hughes Missiles had formed a joint venture with 
a consortium of three Spanish companies led by 
Explosivos Rio Tin to (ER T) to develop a third-
generation, medium-range, man-portable missile 
called Aries. Aries should be ready for pro-
duction in 1992/1993 at the same time as the 
man-portable version of Trigat against which it 
is meant to compete. On the other hand, Spain is 
involved in negotiations to be an associate 
member of a British-French-German consortium 
which is developing Trigat. The Spanish autho-
rities were keen to join the Trigat programme as 
one of the major European arms collaboration 
programmes. Spanish industry has however 
started to complain that it will only play a small 
part in Trigat's development and production, 
while it is being said that the United States-
Spanish joint venture for Aries could offer larger 
workshares. 
63. It seems clear that the ERT consortium 
has been tempted here by Hughes with attractive 
promises which may prove more than 
worthwhile for Hughes if it manages to secure a 
strong foot-hold in the European market. The 
low cost of Spanish production must be 
attractive to Hughes also. 
64. An example where the Spanish desire for a 
fair return on its investment can lead to an appa-
rently anomalous competitive process is the pro-
gramme for an EF A radar. The Spanish state-
owned company INISEL is a member of both 
consortia now competing for this radar, one led 
by Ferranti with the proposed ECR 90 radar, the 
other by AEG-Marconi with the proposed MSD 
2000. Here INISEL, as Spain's sole represen-
tative in the radar competition, can never lose 
and will always win, but this desirable result for 
Spain does not necessarily mean that INISEL 
derives the greatest incentive for efficiency and 
competitiveness, and such each-way betting 
must be expensive. 
65. CASA, traditionally a fixed-wing aircraft 
manufacturer, has been participating in a co-ope-
rative study programme for a light attack heli-
copter, the Tonal, together with Agusta, 
Westland and Fokker. Here, CASA is expending 
energy and resources to derive expertise in rota-
ry-wing technology of which it has little expe-
rience. So too is Fokker in Holland. As a conse-
quence, the development of Tonal could be 
extended as the Westland and Agusta companies 
who have worked together on the EH 101 make 
CASA and Fokker more familiar with helicopter 
technology and the procedures of international 
co-operation. Furthermore there are impreci-
sions about the operational requirement and dif-
ferences of view within as well as between res-
pective national army staffs which make Spain's 
excursion into the anti-tank helicopter arena 
exceptionally bold as well as potentially proble-
matical. The subject of the future of the heli-
copter industry in Europe was addressed in a pre-
vious report by the committee to the Assembly 
in 1986. It has hardly clarified itself since that 
date. 
B. PORTUGAL 
I. Structure and capabilities 
of the Portuguese defence industry 
66. At present, the Portuguese defence 
industry is entirely state controlled. It has a 
capacity in conventional munitions, light hand 
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weapons and some related equipments and pro-
duces almost exclusively for national require-
ments. As far as shipyard activities are 
concerned, the Arsenal di Alfeite is doing main-
tenance work and has built some smaller vessels, 
e.g. patrol vessels for the Portuguese navy. Such 
vessels have also been built by the Estaleiros 
Navais do Mondego. All recent larger Portuguese 
naval ships, e.g. frigates and submarines, have 
been ordered and built abroad. In fact, the Ofi-
cinas Gerais de Material Aeronautico (OGMA) 
is the only Portuguese def~nce industry esta-
blishment of any size whiclJI also works for the 
international market. OGMA, founded in 1918, 
is the department of the Portuguese air force res-
ponsible for maintenance and repair, at second 
and third line level of its aircraft, avionics, 
engines, ground communications and radar 
equipment. In this capacity, it works on a 
number of different aircraft, such as the Cessna 
T-37, Northrop T-38 Talon, Fiat G-91, Vought 
A-7P Corsair, Lockheed P-3 Orion, Casa 212 
A viocar, Lockheed C-130 Hercules and the Aero-
spatiale Alouette Ill and Puma helicopters. Yet 
OGMA operates commercially also. Beginning 
in 1959, OGMA has now established mainte-
nance contracts with a large number of foreign 
customers, such as the United States air force, 
the United States navy, the air forces of West 
Germany and Angola. Recently it won a compe-
tition between eleven companies for the ove-
rhaul of Allison turboprop engines for the C-130s 
of the Kuwaiti air force. 
67. The manufacturing division has just 
started working as a subcontractor in the aero-
space industry and its management anticipates 
great opportunities in this area of activity. A 
recent example of industrial co-operation is the 
Portuguese purchase of eighteen Aerospatiale 
Epsilon training aircraft which will be assembled 
at OGMA. OGMA's total workforce now is 
about 2 600 people, of which 1 930 technical and 
production staff and 429 iitdministrative per-
sonnel. 
II. The future of Portugal's defence industry 
68. The Portuguese Government made it clear 
to the committee that at present, apart from 
OGMA which has been discussed in Chapter I, 
the situation in the national defence industry is 
not exactly a thriving one. There is an industrial 
base in conventional munitions, which needs 
reinforcement. Portugal would like to extend 
these capabilities to produce anti-tank missiles 
and guided artillery shells. As it has increasingly 
been known in recent years that the internal 
market is too small to maintain a fully inde-
pendent defence industry, Portugal is esta-
blishing contacts with companies abroad in order 
to examine opportunities for joint ventures. As 
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far as IEPG research and technology pro-
grammes are concerned, Portugal is interested in 
a programme for the production of insensitive 
secondary explosive components with the 
United Kingdom as the lead nation with Italy, 
Norway and Spain also participating. 
69. A major problem for the defence industry 
is the lack of technological know-how. Even if 
other nations were inclined to transfer tech-
nology the question is whether the Portuguese 
industry will then be in a position to absorb it. 
70. In its fight for a fair return, Portugal is 
encountering problems. Even if it is true that 
thanks to low wages its manufacturing costs are 
very competitive, the national defence industry 
in general is not as yet able to operate to the stan-
dards of technological expertise required in 
major international arms co-operation pro-
grammes. Also in off-set contracts or compen-
sation orders which are normally part of arma-
ments purchases abroad, the mutual interest is 
lacking because the Portuguese industry is not 
able to offer the capabilities which the overseas 
supplier company would expect in return. In the 
framework of some armaments programmes 
with the United States, new technology was 
transferred to Portuguese companies but only on 
the strict condition that it should not be used for 
other purposes or for the export of new 
products. 
71.. For all these reasons, in addition to acute 
budgetary constraints, Portugal is not partici-
pating in any ofthe major European co-operative 
armaments programmes, but Portugal is an 
observer in some of them, which means that it is 
attending certain meetings of the relevant pro-
gramme board to be able to see if it can partic-
ipate at a later stage. 
72. It must be understood that in Portugal 
there are still significant legal obstacles of a con-
stitutional nature which prevent private com-
panies from being active in the field of defence 
equipment manufacture. Believing that private 
initiatives could well stimulate the development 
of a sound defence industry, the Portuguese Gov-
ernment has now proposed a bill which is meant 
to enable private companies to become defence 
equipment suppliers. It is hoped by the gov-
ernment that parliament will adopt this bill 
before the end of 1988 which is an important 
part of its programme of privatisation and eco-
nomic liberalisation. 
Ill. Portugal and the IEPG action plan 
for countries with a less-developed defence 
industry 
73. When the IEPG ministers of defence met 
in Seville on 22nd June 1987, they agreed that in 
order to improve the competitiveness of 
Europe's defence industry, decisive action 
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should be taken at short notice towards the step-
by-step build-up of a European armaments 
market. As it was quite clear that specific diffi-
culties of the IEPG member countries with a 
less-developed defence industry (LDDI) -
Greece, Portugal and Turkey - should be taken 
into account, the ministers decided that LDDI 
countries should be included in armaments 
co-operation. 
74. At the same time the ministers instructed 
their national armaments directors to draw up an 
action plan for the progressive creation of a 
European armaments market. This action plan 
will be presented to the IEPG ministers at their 
meeting in Luxembourg on 8th-9th November 
1988. 
75. During discussions with the Portuguese 
Secretary of State for National Defence, Dr. 
Ramos and the National Armaments Director, 
General Cravo da Silva, it was explained to the 
committee that there was a need for a dedicated 
action plan to help LDDI countries gradually 
enter the European armaments market. 
76. Co-operative technology projects (CTPs) 
are considered a useful method for Portugal to 
acquire technology, but for the moment the 
entrance fee due for participation is prohibitive 
for Portugal. This financial inhibition which 
could well also apply to Greece and Turkey was a 
reason for this committee's clear recommen-
dation as a consequence of its seminar in 
London in March 1988 which was adopted by 
the Assembly to the WEU Council to establish a 
European defence research agency funded from a 
common budget. This would help reduce the dis-
advantages suffered by the LDDis at present in 
gaining access to key technologies in the defence 
field. This is however a medium-term 
objective. 
77. In the short term participation in CTPs by 
LDDI countries should therefore be facilitated. 
Specific rules including less prohibitive entrance 
fees and the possibility of later participation in 
CTPs should be drawn up. 
78. Moreover, it was stressed that there should 
also be a transfer of technology outside the 
framework of CTPs. OGMA is an example 
where high-standard maintenance licences and 
contracts help to improve understanding of 
many technologies. The maintenance capabilities 
of low-cost technology-hungry LDDI nations 
such as Portugal should be more fully utilised by 
the richer alliance nations who do actually face 
severe budgetary problems. 
79. It has also been suggested that after an 
initial supplementary effort by countries with a 
fully-developed defence industry to transfer 
some basic technology, a number of European 
co-operative procurement programmes could 
benefit from lower production costs in Portugal. 
This should even be possible in procurement 
programmes in which Portugal is not a full par-
ticipant as a customer, provided that customer-
participant nations will not claim a full fair 
return. 
80. As far as technology transfer is concerned, 
the opportunities of joint ventures deserve 
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special attention. The government bill to allow 
private enterprise in the defence industry may 
open up new prospects. Likewise, the man-
agement of OGMA made it clear to the com-
mittee that for the time being co-operative agree-
ments or joint ventures on a bi- or multilateral 
industry-to-industry basis are a most efficient 
way of improving its capabilities. 
N 
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APPENDIX 
Values of exports of major weapons to third world regions 
Suppher 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 
USSR A 4 317 3 787 2 164 4 121 4 967 5 874 7 025 4 732 2 874 4 875 7 233 9065 9 786 B 2 845 3 398 3 871 4 183 4 830 5 344 5 094 5 076 5 348 5 756 6 766 7 910 8 363 
United States A 1 816 2 215 3 118 3 551 3 830 5 924 6 264 4481 7 074 7 257 9 722 6 852 4 020 B 2 017 2442 2 906 3 728 4 538 4 810 5 515 6 200 6 960 7 077 6 985 6 713 6 517 
France A 274 580 274 693 677 786 1 643 1 263 I 144 I 398 2 157 2 409 3 264 B 333 433 500 602 815 I 012 I 102 1 247 I 521 I 674 2 074 2 317 2 664 
United Kingdom A 478 518 1 038 472 I 212 I 195 I 307 1 071 1 196 834 I 641 I 200 773 B 537 564 744 887 I 045 I 052 I 196 I 121 1 210 I 189 I 129 I 030 I 096 
China A 214 162 86 101 321 417 232 382 320 211 114 459 412 B 154 159 177 218 232 291 335 313 252 297 303 349 372 
FR Germany A 66 36 56 3 86 108 - 408 261 166 204 258 162 B 52 44 50 58 51 121 173 188 208 259 210 215 368 
Italy A 96 121 85 37 95 137 148 268 139 163 294 323 975 B 73 75 87 95 100 137 157 171 202 237 379 481 715 
Spain A 6 12 6 - - 10 - - 5 7 13 30 21 B 12 8 5 5 3 2 3 4 5 11 15 16 34 
A * 1 9 5 I 34 4 67 121 59 55 470 228 Israel B 2 3 3 10 10 22 45 57 61 155 187 204 248 
Brazil A - - I - - - - 11 25 154 130 120 112 B * * * * * 2 7 38 64 88 108 157 181 
Other third world A 44 13 15 26 48 134 30 184 146 157 187 95 507 B 77 81 29 47 51 84 108 130 141 154 218 225 270 
Other industrialised, A 67 105 241 68 223 327 254 83 218 514 184 464 301 
West B 117 102 141 193 223 191 221 279 251 293 336 338 292 
Other industrialised, A 4 7 6 3 232 5 10 13 24 63 71 41 445 
neutral B 12 4 50 51 51 52 57 23 36 42 129 178 230 
Other mdustrialised, A 126 163 139 143 60 72 56 19 23 63 76 144 124 
East B 107 135 126 115 94 70 46 47 48 65 86 107 141 
Total A 7 509 7 721 7 238 9223 11 752 15 023 16 974 12 982 13 571 15 921 22082 21932 21130 B 6 338 7 451 8688 10191 12042 13 191 14 060 14 894 16 306 17 297 18 927 20 240 21491 
Figures are SI PRI trend mdicator values, as expressed m US $m., at constant ( 1985) pnces. 
A "" yearly figures B - five·year movmg averages 
(Source. SIPRI Yearbook 1987). 
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 
8 590 7 141 7 112 6 904 7 521 7 948 7 681 
8 339 7 906 7 454 7 325 7 433 . . .. 
5 712 6 277 7 192 6 336 5 230 4 291 5 108 
6 011 5 907 6 150 5 865 5 631 . . .. 
2 356 3 134 2 892 2 778 3 654 3 796 3 566 
2 811 2 885 2 963 3 251 3 337 . . .. 
703 I 161 I 670 579 I 135 942 I 516 
1 102 977 1 050 I 098 I 169 . . .. 
548 328 736 877 I 146 792 I 208 
497 580 727 776 952 . . .. 
283 931 321 I 172 I 820 505 541 
391 574 905 950 872 . . .. 
653 I 332 1 346 970 811 539 324 
926 I 055 1 022 999 798 . . .. 
9 97 371 542 525 247 107 
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Draft Recommendation 
on Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq 
The Assembly, 
(i) Considering that the region of the Gulf is a particularly important area for the security ofWestern 
Europe and for international peace; 
(ii) Welcoming the cease-fire between Iraq and Iran on 20th August 1988; 
(iii) Regretting that the negotiations to implement this cease-fire have still not been effectively started; 
(iv) Considering that the situation thus created is still highly unstable; 
(v) Noting that the eight years of warfare illustrate the horrors that can stem from the conduct of 
conventional warfare; 
(vi) Believing that supplies of armaments to the belligerents have helped to prolong fighting and still 
contribute to instability in the area; 
(vii) Condemning the use of chemical weapons by Iraq during the war; 
(viii) Welcoming the forthcoming convening of a conference to strengthen the ban on chemical 
weapons; 
(ix) Considering that the Kurdish problem is also a factor of instability in the region; 
(x) Noting the many indications that Iraq also used chemical weapons against the Kurds after the 
cease-fire; 
(xi) Considering further that the brutal repression of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, the destruction of 
villages and the deportation of populations are serious infringements of human rights; 
(xii) Noting that the execution by Iran of many political prisoners and the use of procedures, contrary 
to the laws of war, directed against Iraqi prisoners-of-war are also infringements of human rights; 
(xiii) Welcoming the measures taken by the Council to contribute, with the United States, to ensuring 
freedom of navigation in the Gulf, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
1. Endorse the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to achieve true negotiations on 
the implementation of the cease-fire and the re-establishment of peace, in particular by banning any sup-
plies of arms to the belligerents; 
2. Continue to follow with vigilance the evolution of the situation in the Gulf, even after the possible 
withdrawal of the naval forces that member countries maintain there; 
3. Endorse the proposal to convene a conference to ban the production, stockpiling and use of che-
mical weapons; 
4. Ask the Agency for the Control of Armaments for a report on the means of verifying that chemical 
weapons are not produced or stockpiled and communicate this report to the Assembly; 
5. Examine carefully any sanctions that the United States might adopt against countries which have 
used chemical weapons in order to associate the WEU countries with them and call upon the Soviet 
Union and its allies to take part in these sanctions; 
6. Ask the EEC and member countries of the Council of Europe to provide meaningful assistance to 
Kurdish refugees through the appropriate international organisations; 
7. Also ask them to receive on their territory significant numbers of those who are now refugees 
because of persecution in Iraq; 
8. Pursue the efforts undertaken to ensure the mine-sweeping of the Gulf until this operation has 
been completed. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Martino, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. When your Rapporteur was asked to 
prepare the present report, Iran and Iraq had 
been at war for eight years and there was no sign 
of an early termination of hostilities. In summer 
1988, the situation changed radically with Iran's 
acceptance of Security Council Resolution 598 
which Iraq had already accepted a year before. 
On 20th Augj.lst 1988, a cease-fire came into 
force under United Nations supervision. 
2. These circumstances changed your 
Rapporteur's mandate fundamentally, as the 
Presidential Committee noted on 28th Sep-
tember 1988 when it adapted the title of his 
report to the new situation: the purpose is no 
longer to examine what Europe has done to 
protect its interests in an ongoing war or to try to 
induce the belligerents to stop their military 
operations. On the contrary, the aim is to assess 
the situation emerging from the cease-fire as a 
basis for reflection on what Europe can do to 
help to consolidate peace in the region. Your 
Rapporteur will therefore have to review a rather 
larger area than that formed by the two recent 
belligerents since the problems raised by the res-
toration of peace affect much of South-West 
Asia. 
3. The main difficulty in preparing this 
report stems not from the absence of information 
but from its unreliable, sparse and often contra-
dictory nature. None of the countries in the 
region allow journalists unlimited access to its 
territory. All try to give a picture of the facts that 
conforms to their own interests. Most have only 
mediocre statistical machinery. Nevertheless, 
although cross-checking information from 
various sources does not solve all the problems 
due to inadequate information, it does at least 
give a picture of the present situation that, it may 
be hoped, is fairly close to the truth. 
4. Contrary to what might have been thought 
in summer 1988, your Rapporteur does not feel 
that the cease-fire that came into force between 
Iran and Iraq on 20th August 1988 is a guarantee 
of lasting peace. All the problems that arose in 
1979 still exist and some of them, such as the 
Kurdish question, have worsened. The quantity 
of armaments in the possession of countries in 
the region has increased considerably. Govern-
mental authority has diminished and there are 
fewer possibilities for action by outside powers 
to promote peace, particularly since they did not 
find a way to try to restore peace and to ensure 
respect for international law while hostilities 
were in progress, whereas those of the United 
Nations have been strengthened. 
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5. The cease-fire of 20th August 1988 cannot 
therefore be considered as a restoration of peace 
but at most as a first step in that direction. This 
presumably is the context in which the present 
situation should be viewed and an attempt made 
to define a possible European policy in the 
Middle East in the next few years. 
II. The cease-fire 
1. The end of military operations 
6. On 18th July 1988, Iran's acceptance of 
Security Council Resolution 598 calling for a 
cease-fire between Iraq and Iran on the basis of 
the status quo allowed military operations to 
come to an end. This became effective on 
20th August. Since the faiLure of its offensives 
from 1980 to 1982, Iraq had been calling for a 
return to peace on such a baisis and even more so 
during the period 1982-87 when Iranian counter-
offensives had penetrated its territory, invaded 
the right bank of the Shatt al-Arab and occupied 
the AI Faw peninsula, Iraq's only outlet to the 
sea, thus also threatening its main port, the 
second city of Iraq and Basm, southern Iraq's oil 
centre. The revolt of the Kurds. which started in 
1985, increased the country's difficulties. It had 
incurred heavy debts and managed to hold on 
only thanks to the material and financial support 
of other Arab countries such as Kuwait and 
Jordan, whose port of Aqaba had become Iraq's 
main maritime outlet, the Emirates and Saudi 
Arabia, all anxious to avoid Iran obtaining 
control of the Gulf and to check the subversive 
movements inspired by the Iranian revolution. 
There was therefore no longer any question of 
Iraq winning the war but it was good policy to 
seek the backing of international society to avoid 
losing it. 
7. On 20th July 1987, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 598, which met the wishes of 
Iraq and also, to some extent, those of Iran. But 
Iran did not wish to follow it up. Ayatollah 
Khomeini refused any deals designed to put an 
end to hostilities as long as Iraq had not been 
condemned as the aggressor and President 
Saddam Hussein remained at the head of its gov-
ernment. For the Iranian Government. condem-
nation implied the payment of an indemnity to 
cover the war damage suffered by Iran. 
8. Iran's change of tack was therefore due to 
developments in 1987-88, for which many causes 
may be mentioned although it is not possible to 
say which were decisive. At 'the front, first of all, 
Iraq had had a series of miliJtary successes which 
allowed it to recover almost all the territory Iran 
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had conquered between 1982 and 1987, 
including the AI Faw peninsula in April 1988 
after the failure of Iran's offensive in Kurdistan 
in February. Furthermore, Iraqi forces had pene-
trated Iran and made it possible for the 
Mujaheddin-e-Khalq to conquer a sizeable strip 
of land and hold it for several weeks. Iran had to 
make a major military effort in July 1988 to 
overcome this operation. In themselves, these 
military setbacks were not very serious but they 
were indicative of the lassitude of the Iranian 
people and army. They had lost the revolu-
tionary elation that had allowed them, at the 
price of heavy losses, to win the battles of earlier 
years over a far better equipped Iraqi army. 
9. Second, Iraq's air and missile superiority, 
considerable at the beginning of the war, was 
becoming increasingly obvious, since Iran was 
having great difficulty in replacing lost aircraft 
and procuring modern missiles. On the other 
hand, the financial assistance of the Gulf Arab 
countries and generous credit facilities for its 
purchases allowed Iraq to renew and update its 
equipment and, at the beginning of 1988, to 
resume massive air raids on Iranian towns 
whereas Iran was unable to retaliate effectively. 
This air superiority was further enhanced by 
Iraq's use of poison gases; in spring 1988, it was 
reported to have used a new cyanuric acid gas 
against the Kurdish town of Halabja, occupied 
by the Iranian army, which was far more 
effective than any other known gas. Mortal in 
less than a minute, this gas is believed to have 
killed 97% of the people in the bombed area, i.e. 
about 5 000 victims. Iran had no means of retali-
ation or protection against this form of chemical 
war, which prevented it from regrouping forces 
for further offensives. 
10. Finally, the intervention of western naval 
forces blocked any Iranian hopes of preventing 
navigation towards the Arab shore of the Gulf. 
American retaliation against attacks on ships had 
reduced Iran's naval capability and the acci-
dental destruction of a civilian Airbus on 3rd 
July 1988, with the loss of the 290 persons on 
board, however deplorable, showed that the 
United States was determined to take action 
against the Iranian air force if it attacked 
shipping in the Gulf. The Saudi air force for its 
part had effectively defended Arabian territory 
against Iranian attacks. The permanent presence 
near the Gulf of two aircraft carriers, one 
American, the other French, showed that the 
West was capable of taking effective action 
against the very weakened Iranian air force. The 
arrival of mine-sweepers from several European 
countries and their action, co-ordinated in WEU, 
also most certainly had a deterrent effect by 
showing Iran that it could not rely on mines to 
disrupt navigation. 
11. To these reasons might be added other, 
internal, events, although currently-available 
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information does not allow their importance to 
be assessed. It is believed there was an internal 
crisis in Iran. The falling price of oil, from $34 
per barrel when the war broke out in 1980 to $18 
in August 1988, obviously reduced its income 
considerably in view of the erosion of the value 
of the dollar during those eight years. No one 
gave Iran financial assistance and it had diffi-
culties in obtaining credit and had to pay for the 
military equipment it procured. Iraq, on the con-
trary, which had a reserve of $35 000 million in 
1980, received steady financial assistance of 
between $13 and 14 000 million per year from 
the countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council 
and was able to incur debts of about $60 000 
million to support its war effort. The building of 
an oil pipeline to take Iraqi oil to Dortyol near 
Iskenderun in Turkey and the decision taken by 
the Arab countries not to impose quotas on 
Iraq's supplies to the world oil market also 
allowed it to make the most of its oil resources. 
Thus, Iran's economic situation made it increas-
ingly difficult for it to support its war effort and 
make the population accept continued hostilities 
at a time when Iraq was saying it was prepared to 
accept a break-even peace. 
12. Indeed, the social and political crisis in 
Iran at the beginning of 1988 seems to have been 
quite serious. It was becoming increasingly dif-
ficult to appeal to revolutionary enthusiasm to 
mobilise the population and galvanise energy. 
13. For all these reasons, many Iranian leaders 
believed the war should be brought to an end and 
that Resolution 598 was a means of doing so 
without losing face. Early in July, Ayatollah 
Khomeini, although not wishing to assume 
political responsibility for the decision, left the 
government free to endorse the resolution. By 
that time, Iraq would probably have preferred to 
continue operations which were turning in its 
favour. This was not possible because it had 
already, in July 1987, accepted the resolution, 
which moreover included most of what Iraq had 
been calling for since 1983. But a cease-fire at a 
time when it felt victorious made it feel it had 
been deprived of the fruits of its victory. It 
therefore tackled the negotiations on the appli-
cation of the resolution determined to obtain a 
favourable interpretation of the provisions. It 
proved so uncompromising that the negotiations 
have not yet made any progress. 
14. Although fighting has stopped along the 
frontiers between Iraq and Iran, it is for the time 
being only a cease-fire and differences have not 
been settled. The armies are still deployed and, 
on 20th August, Iraq took advantage of this lull 
to put down brutally the Kurdish rebellion which 
had troubled it in the last years of the war. 
15. Some observers, particularly in countries 
in the area, attribute a decisive role to the two 
great powers which, they say, imposed the cease-
fire. This interpretation seems highly exagge-
rated. It seems to stem from a tendency, frequent 
among the non-aligned countries, to attribute to 
others responsibilities which are first and 
foremost those of the powers which started and 
pursued the war. Conversely, it seems accurate to 
say that the attitude of the great powers helped to 
bring about a situation favourable to the cease-
fire. 
16. The attitude of the Soviet Union in par-
ticular should be stressed since, by deciding to 
withdraw its forces from Afghanistan, it stopped 
being a threat to the Gulf region. Moreover, the 
fact that it associated itself with the United 
States and the other members of the Security 
Council to adopt Resolution 598 was a great help 
in giving this resolution the authority necessary 
for it finally to be accepted by Iran. The Soviet 
Union's refusal to endorse sanctions should Iran 
not apply the resolution made it impossible for 
the latter to say that it accepted the resolution 
because of outside pressure, which obviously 
would have increased the Iranian people's 
resentment towards international society. 
1 7. Of course, this does not mean the Soviet 
Union has given up defending its interests in the 
Middle East. While granting considerable 
financial and military assistance to Iraq, 
including 80% of its arms, it managed not to 
break with Iran. It even allowed some of its 
allies, such as North Korea, Vietnam, Bulgaria, 
Poland and the GDR, to deliver military 
equipment to Iran. It developed good relations 
with Syria, an open opponent of Iraq, from 
which it obtained an agreement allowing it to 
install a naval base in the Eastern Mediterranean 
at Tartiis near Latakia. According to a report 
submitted to the United States Congress by 
Rear-Admiral William 0. Stredeman, this is 
intended to allow medium-tonnage Soviet war-
ships to be repaired without having to return to 
ports in the Black Sea or the Kola peninsula. 
This base is believed to be needed for a rede-
ployment of the Soviet navy which is now less 
well represented in other parts of the world but 
more in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf. 
The Soviet Union is also reported to have an air 
base in Syria. According to statements by an 
American expert, Mr. Norman Polmar, pub-
lished in the New York Times on 29th August 
1988, all these advantages were obtained in 
exchange for arms procured by Syria from the 
Soviet Union: aircraft, tanks, missiles, armoured 
vehicles, warships and submarines. Thus, Syria 
is believed to have been the first of the Soviet 
Union's allies to receive ultra-modern MiG-29 
aircraft, the figure quoted being about forty. 
According to statements by Israeli officials, Syria 
is also developing capsules for chemical weapons 
which could be adapted for use on missiles sup-
plied by the Soviet Union. 
18. Furthermore, for the first time in fifty-one 
years, the Soviet Union and Turkey have opened 
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a frontier post at Sarp in Armenia in order to 
increase trade and movements of persons in the 
area, thus showing a will for a rapprochement 
between the two countries. Bearing in mind also 
the opening of exploratory contacts between 
Moscow and Riyadh, the es~ablishment of diplo-
matic relations between the Soviet Union and 
Oman and between the Soviet Union and the 
United Arab Emirates, the protection of part of 
Kuwait's oil exports by Soviet warships and the 
procurement of Soviet arms by certain Gulf 
countries, it can be seen that, far from being 
inactive, the Soviet Union has taken advantage 
of the war to improve its positions in the area. 
19. Since July 1987, when the United States 
increased its naval force in the Gulf, the Soviet 
Union, hitherto favourable to Iraq, seems to 
have moved closer towards Iran, although 
without suspending its assistance to Iraq. It 
endorsed Iranian protests at the American mil-
itary presence in the Gulf and proposed replacing 
it by a fleet under United Nations command. It 
also refused to support any sanctions against Iran 
for not applying Resolution 598. However, in 
August 1988, the Soviet Union welcomed Iran's 
acceptance of the resolution and, paying tribute 
to the efforts of Mr. Perez de Cuellar to ensure its 
implementation, it offered its services to the 
international community and to the United 
Nations for the re-establishment of peace, while 
opposing the continued presence of American 
naval forces in the Gulf. 
20. It is just as if the Soviet Union, after 
renouncing an active military presence in a 
sector that it nevertheless considered important, 
apart from its relations with Syria, wished to 
bring about the withdrawal of western forces in 
the region. The destruction of an Iranian air liner 
by an American missile in July 1988 obviously 
provided it with a good supporting argument. In 
fact, the total abstention of the two great powers 
in the Middle East would probably allow the 
Soviet Union, because of its proximity, to regain 
the influence it had lost since the death of 
Nasser. However, since it is a rival of the Gulf 
countries for the sale of oil, it would probably be 
unable to substitute its influence for that of the 
western countries, the main oil customers, par-
ticularly at a time of falling prices. This concern 
to recover an influential position in Middle East 
affairs made it play a mod~rating, peaceful role 
just when the United Statts came to the con-
clusion that a break-even peace would be more 
in the West's interests than the victory of one or 
other of the two belligerents. 
21. The cease-fire must not therefore be con-
sidered as the direct result of action by the two 
great powers but of action by the international 
community and of the United Nations coupled 
with developments in the local situation that 
proved favourable for starting negotiations at a 
time when both sides wanted to revert to peace 
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in the region. The two belligerents had indeed 
suffered considerable losses, although the most 
recent information shows figures lower than pre-
viously thought. Thus, Iraq had estimated 
Iranian losses at 800 000 killed and western 
sources at between 300 000 and 600 000, whereas 
Iran has just given figures of 123 230 fighters 
killed, 60 711 missing, many of whom are 
probably prisoners, and 11 000 civilian victims 
of air raids. Iraq has not yet given any figures for 
its losses, which are certainly far lower. 
2. Negotiations 
(a) Procedure 
22. Iran's acceptance of Resolution 598 should 
allow negotiations to start immediately on its 
application. However, procedural difficulties 
quickly arose since Iraq called for direct negotia-
tions with Iran, while Iran refused any contact 
with Saddam Hussein's regime and wished to 
hold talks only with United Nations representa-
tives. It required extraordinary diplomatic imag-
ination on the part of the United Nations Secre-
tary-General, Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, to 
allow a first exchange of views to be started in 
Geneva on 25th August. However, the meetings 
came to naught and, since the Secretary-General 
was occupied by other steps to promote peace in 
Africa, it proved difficult to fix a new date. Iraq 
refused to negotiate in New York during the 
session of the United Nations General Assembly. 
Its resolve not to negotiate on United States ter-
ritory was further strengthened when the United 
States Senate passed a bill that included a con-
demnation of Iraq for using chemical weapons 
against the Kurds. The only measure effectively 
taken was to send a 350-strong international 
team drawn from twenty-four member countries 
of the United Nations, including Italy, to the 
frontier to monitor application of the cease-fire. 
However, the team was able to establish itself 
only in the southern part of the front since it is 
excluded from the north either by the Kurds or 
because of Iraqi army operations against the 
Kurds. 
23. Even the purpose ofthe negotiations is not 
considered to be the same by Iraq as by Iran. The 
former considers it to be to define the form of 
peace as soon as possible and to take immediate 
steps such as clearing the Shatt al-Arab and a 
return to freedom of navigation in the Gulf. For 
Iran, on the contrary, the question is to follow 
the order of the terms set out in Resolution 598 
and, consequently, as a first step to lay down pro-
cedure for the cease-fire before tackling matters 
relating to the organisation of peace. The negoti-
ations therefore generally consist of private, suc-
cessive talks between each of the delegations and 
the Secretary-General or his deputy, Mr. 
Eliasson, with no direct dialogue, making it par-
ticularly difficult to reach compromises. 
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24. In reality, these procedural difficulties 
conceal fundamental disagreements that make 
the cease-fire of 20th August 1988 very fragile. 
Neither side accepted Resolution 598 unre-
servedly, and Iraq's strong position at the time it 
came into force does not make it easy for it to go 
back on its proclaimed principles, nor can Iran, 
without admitting its failure, too openly 
abandon the official declarations made by Aya-
tollah Khomeini during the eight-year war. 
(b) Responsibility for the war 
25. Among the prior conditions for stopping 
hostilities insisted on by Iran were recognition of 
Iraq as the aggressor and the fall of Saddam 
Hussein's regime. The latter was in fact aban-
doned once Iran accepted the principle of a 
cease-fire since it had to be negotiated with the 
present Iraqi Government. It nevertheless 
explains Iran's opposition to direct negotiations, 
which does not make agreement between the two 
countries easy and creates a particularly tense 
atmosphere at each meeting. 
26. Moreover, Article 6 of Resolution 598 
specifies that the United Nations Secretary-
General would be asked to explore, in consul-
tation with Iran and Iraq, " the question of 
entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into 
responsibility for the conflict " and to report to 
the Security Council as soon as possible. This 
wording could not conceal from Iran that, by 
accepting the resolution, it would be renouncing 
its prior condition, since Article 6 left no doubt 
about the Security Council's concern to give Iran 
a loophole but not to take a stance on this del-
icate question. 
27. While it is clear that in September 1980 it 
was indeed Iraq that initiated open hostilites, it 
followed several months of incidents along the 
frontier between the two countries and attacks 
provoked by partisans of Khomeini in Baghdad, 
which made Iraq feel it was taking up arms to 
defend itself. Moreover, in 1975 Saddam 
Hussein's government had been induced to 
accept the Algiers Agreements by which the Shah 
imposed his views on Iraq and, thanks to the 
preponderance of his armed forces in the region, 
ensured recognition of his encroachments at the 
expense of the Gulf countries. Iraq considers the 
origins of the war go back to that date, thus 
allowing it to present its attack in August 1980 as 
a military operation in retaliation against an 
Iranian aggressor. In the circumstances, to 
attribute responsibility could only be a political 
act that would have prevented the entry into 
force of the cease-fire. For Iraq to acknowledge 
that it was the aggressor would have been a capit-
ulation entirely unwarranted by its military situ-
ation. 
28. On 1Oth August, Mr. Rafsanjani, acting 
Commander-in-Chief of the Iranian army, 
recalled that Iran's acceptance ofthe cease-fire in 
no way meant it had stopped insisting on Iraq 
being punished as the aggressor. He said that 
Iran was today accepting the resolution on the 
cease-fire in the hope that the committee respon-
sible for determining responsibility would be 
serious. If there was an impression that Iran had 
been lied to on this point, he said, this might 
have serious consequences for the region. 
According to the Iranian authorities, this implied 
that Iraq, recognised responsible for starting the 
war, would have to pay compensation. This 
requirement obviously does not make it easy to 
open negotiations. 
(c) Territorial questions 
29. Iraq had never concealed the fact that its 
first aim in the war was revision of the 197 5 
Algiers Agreements. A few days before launching 
its forces against Iran in 1980, President Saddam 
Hussein had denounced this treaty and symboli-
cally torn up the text on television. Once the war 
had started, he had rejected the mediation the 
United Nations Secretary-General had asked to 
be conducted by the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference, the non-aligned movement and the 
late Prime Minister of Sweden, Olaf Palme, who 
had proposed a return to the status quo ante 
bellum. It required Iraq's defeats between 1983 
and 1987 for its government, in July 1987, to 
accept Resolution 598 which, in Article 1, urged, 
with the cease-fire, the withdrawal of armed 
forces to internationally-recognised frontiers. 
These frontiers could only be those laid down in 
the Algiers Agreements, the last international 
text to have fixed frontiers between Iran and 
Iraq. There could be no doubt about this in the 
mind of the Iraqi Government. 
30. Compelled, after its victories in 1988, to 
maintain its acceptance of Resolution 598, Iraq 
has nevertheless done its utmost since hostilities 
ended to mark its rejection of the provisions of 
these agreements and to obtain the opening of 
negotiations on frontiers, whereas Iran could use 
firm. texts as a basis for refusing any such dis-
cussion. 
31. The disputed territories are, however, not 
very extensive and are unpopulated. But they are 
of undeniable strategic and economic impor-
tance. 
32. The most serious affair concerns the Shatt 
a1-Arab, i.e. the eastern, most important and 
only navigable branch of the delta common to 
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255 km long with an average width of 500 m, 
which marks their common frontier. For many 
centuries, this frontier has separated the Aryan 
population of Iran, of Persian culture and Shiite 
religion, from the Semitic peoples of the 
southern part of the Ottoman Empire, who have 
become Arabs and among whom the Sunni 
religion dominates, with the twofold exception of 
some two million Arabs living in Iranian 
Khuzestan and a large number of Shiites in Iraq, 
where they are in the majority. 
33. In 1847, for the first time, an agreement 
between Iran and the Ottoman Empire fixed the 
river frontier, giving all the waters of the river to 
the Ottomans. In spite of minor revisions, ships 
using the river had, until 1969, to fly the Iraqi 
flag and have Iraqi pilots. In April 1969, Shah 
Mohammed Reza Pahlavi denounced these 
agreements. A crisis ensued, relations between 
the two countries were broken off in 1971 and, 
finally, the Algiers Agreements were concluded 
in 1975, placing the frontier along the thalweg 
line on an intangible, permanent and final basis. 
The remaining 1 200 km of frontier between Iran 
and Iraq was kept on a line fixed in 1914. It was 
the danger of the Kurd rebellion, supported by 
Iran, that led Saddam Hussein to make this con-
cession. He was then able to terminate the 
uprising quickly. 
34. Control of the Shatt al-Arab is, however, 
of far greater importance to Iraq, since it is its 
only outlet to the sea, than tQ Iran, which has the 
entire northern coast of the Gulf, although its 
principal oil industries are grouped in the area 
round Abadan and Khorramshahr. It is not 
therefore surprising that, in J 980, control of the 
left bank of the river was the first target of the 
Iraqi offensive which immediately made recog-
nition of its legitimate rights over the Shatt 
al-Arab the condition for a cease-fire. On 6th 
August 1988, when accepting application of Res-
olution 598 which Iran had just endorsed, 
Saddam Hussein stressed that it was normal for 
Iraq to have navigation rights in the Gulf as soon 
as the cease-fire came into force in accordance 
with its inalienable rights and international law. 
This remark is ambiguous since a distinction can 
be drawn between Iraq's navigation rights in the 
Gulf which were not contested in the Algiers 
Agreements but which Iran had made it impos-
sible to exercise since 1980 and sovereignty over 
the watercourse which was shared between the 
two countries. 
the Tigris and the Euphrates, whose western part 35. The United Nations sent observers to 
is marshy with sinuous ox-bow lakes among monitor application of the cease-fire along the 
which fighting was particularly murderous river. But Iran is not prepared to agree to the 
during the 1983-84 Iranian offensives. Iran's question of navigation on the Shatt al-Arab being 
principal port and oil centre, Abadan, is on the a prior condition to talks. Whereas, when the 
east bank of the Shatt al-Arab while Basra, on the cease-fire came into force, Iran was immediately 
west bank, is the capital of southern Iraq, its able to reopen all its Gulf ports and those on the 
principal oil centre and its only port. This shows Indian Ocean had never been closed, it will take 
the importance for both countries of this river, years of work before the Shatt al-Arab, which is 
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silted up and strewn with wrecks and mines, can 
be reopened as a trading port for Iraq. In other 
words, since the talks between the two countries 
have not yet really started, the affair is far from 
being settled. It is expected that work will 
probably take more than two years and, under-
standably, Iraq is quite anxious for it to start. 
36. On 19th September 1988, the Iraqi agency 
INA announced that President Saddam Hussein 
had chaired a meeting of military leaders in 
order to examine the possibility of diverting the 
Shatt al-Arab waterway, which emphasised the 
importance he attaches to this question. The idea 
would be to enlarge the existing canal between 
Basra and Khawr as Sabiyah at the head of the 
Gulf and to the west of the El Faw peninsula for 
navigation by large ships. It is estimated that this 
operation would cost $14 000 million. It is clear 
that such a decision would further complicate the 
current negotiations and, by setting the problem 
in new terms, make it even more difficult to find 
a solution acceptable to both parties. To divert 
the Shatt al-Arab waterway would completely 
ruin the Iranian ports of Abadan and 
Khorramshahr and hence such a plan would be 
unacceptable to Iran. 
37. The second territorial dispute does not 
concern Iraqi sovereignty but illustrates the 
all-Arab nature of the conflict. It relates to three 
small desert islands in the Gulf waters close to 
the Strait of Hormuz whose access they 
command: Abu Musa, Bani Tanb and Tanb-e 
Borzog. They are also close to the offshore 
oilfields exploited by the United Arab Emirates. 
These islets were under the sovereignty of the 
Emir of Ra's al Khaymah when, in November 
1971, the Shah of Iran had them occupied by his 
armed forces in spite of the protests of the Arab 
states in the region, including Iraq, which then 
broke off diplomatic relations with Iran. Never-
theless, in 197 5 Iraq recognised the annexation 
of these islets but, in 1980, President Saddam 
Hussein made their return to Arab control one of 
his aims in the war. The war showed that keeping 
the islets under Iranian occupation effectively 
raised the problem of freedom of navigation in 
the Gulf since they were used for military opera-
tions designed to prevent merchant ships passing 
through the Strait of Hormuz. 
38. The question of to whom Resolution 598 
assigned these islets during the cease-fire period 
is far from clear. The Algiers Agreements do not 
concern Ra's al Khaymah and Iran's possession 
of the islets is still not official, but Iraq does not 
claim to have any right over them and its claim 
is based only on Arab solidarity. 
39. It should be added that, after 20th August, 
Iran continued to exercise control over merchant 
shipping passing through the Strait ofHormuz in 
order to prevent the delivery of war equipment 
to Iraq. This practice was confirmed the very day 
of the cease-fire by an Iraqi ship, which was 
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boarded and whose cargo was checked by the 
Iranian navy. One may wonder whether this 
practice, based only on the right to blockade, is 
still acceptable following a cease-fire. 
40. Two months after fighting stopped along 
the front, it would appear that negotiations 
intended first to allow the cease-fire to be imple-
mented and then to lay down conditions for a 
return to peace, have not really started. Neither 
of the two governments, weakened by eight years 
of war, can afford, without danger for their sur-
vival, to make the concessions necessary for a 
dialogue to be started. For them, it is mainly a 
matter of demonstrating that they did not lose 
the war, which makes them extremely uncom-
promising. On the other hand, the armed forces 
are still ready to start fighting again. In other 
words, the situation in the aftermath of the war is 
very unstable. 
Ill. The Kurdish problem 
41. There are about twenty million Kurds 
living in the mountainous region between 
Turkey and the Soviet Union in the north, Syria 
and Iraq in the west and Iran in the east. These 
countries do not keep statistics on the same 
basis, which makes an accurate estimate of the 
size of the Kurdish population difficult. It would 
appear that half the Kurds live in Turkey, about 
four million in Iran and three million in Iraq, 
with a smaller number in Syria and the Soviet 
Union. This people, of Moslem Sunni religion, is 
trying to retain its language and traditions but, at 
least in Turkey, Iraq and Iran, it has run up 
against the states' policy of centralisation. When 
the Ottoman Empire was dismantled under the 
Sevres Treaty, the victorious powers promised to 
grant independence to the Kurds, but Ataturk's 
revolution and the ensuing repression of the 
Kurds in 1923 dashed their hopes. Similarly, in 
194 7 Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, by liqui-
dating the ephemer4tl republic of Mahabad, 
under Soviet protection, triggered off Iran's first 
war against the Kurds, under the leadership of 
the Iraqi Kurd " General " Mustapha Barzani 
who came from Iraq with his guerrillas. He did 
not return there until 1958, after the indepen-
dence of Iraq. In 1961, the Kurdistan Demo-
cratic Party, led by Mustapha Barzani, con-
ducted an armed rebellion against the Iraqi 
Government and managed to control part of 
Iraqi Kurdistan for fourteen years in spite of con-
stant pressure from the Iraqi army. It received 
large-scale military assistance from the Shah and 
its fighters could take refuge on Iranian territory 
when pursued by the Iraqi army. This was the 
origin of a series of rebellions, interspersed with 
cease-fires and agreements in 1963, 1964, 1966, 
1968 and, above all, 1970, when Iraqi Kurdistan 
obtained an autonomous regime that lasted four 
years. But tension between Baghdad and the 
Kurds re-emerged in 1974 and General Barzani, 
with the assistance of Iran, Israel and the United 
States, resumed active military operations 
against the Iraqi Government. 
42. The Algiers Agreement of March 1975 
between Iraq and Iran put an end to this situ-
ation. In exchange for territorial concessions, 
Iran undertook to stop all assistance to the 
Kurdish rebellion and indeed repatriated 
without delay all weapons, equipment and even 
rations supplied to Barzani's forces. The Shah 
merely received on Iranian territory more than 
250 000 Kurdish refugees chased out by the 
offensive that Iraq immediately conducted to put 
down the rebellion, which it managed very 
quickly. Barzani died in the United States in 
1979. The Iraqi authorities deported part of the 
Kurdish population to the south, settled Arabs in 
Kurdistan and destroyed many villages along the 
frontiers in order to solve the Kurdish problem 
and, in any event, to dilute the Kurdish popu-
lation living in the oil-producing region of 
Kirkiik among an Arab-speaking population. 
43. The Iranian revolution in 1979 
encouraged the new leaders of the KDP, the two 
sons of Mustapha Barzani, to seek an alliance 
with the new republic in order to be able to 
resume their military activities on Iraqi territory. 
As from 1980, many Kurdish conscripts in the 
Iraqi army went to the rebel areas. The impact of 
their new rebellion remained limited until 
November 1986 when they concluded an alliance 
in Teheran with the Kurdistani Patriotic Union, 
led by Mr. Jalal Talabani, under the aegis oflran, 
which again started to provide supplies and 
arms. The Kurdistani Patriotic Union had tried 
to take advantage of the fact that Iraq needed to 
devote all its forces to the war against Iran to 
negotiate with the Iraqi Government an auton-
omous statute for Kurdistan. These negotiations, 
which lasted from December 1983 to January 
1985, eventually failed because the Kurds' terri-
torial claims covered areas that Iraq was particu-
larly anxious not to hana over to Kurdistan 
because, with Kirkiik and part of the Mosul 
region, they included a very large part of 
Northern Iraq's oil reserves. This setback led to a 
rapprochement between the KPU and Iran and a 
general revolt by the Kurds in 1987. The Kurds 
were then well equipped and were thus able to 
give a new dimension to military operations and 
create a " liberated " area which, they estimated, 
covered about 10 000 sq.km. along the Turkish 
and Iranian frontiers. 
44. In the midst of the war, Iraq thus had to 
divert some of its forces to put down the Kurdish 
revolt. It did not confine itself to operations 
against the rebels but undertook to settle the 
Kurdish problem by radical means: complete 
destruction of villages and, when they were not 
easily accessible to the army, the use of poison 
gas. The most spectacular operation was the 
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bombing of the town of Halabja, occupied by the 
Iranian army, on 17th MaJ1Ch 1988, when more 
than 5 000 of the civilian population are believed 
to have been killed. 
45. Furthermore, since 1984, there had been 
fairly serious disturbances among the Kurdish 
population in Turkey, with the assistance of 
Syria, which was trying to bring pressure to bear 
on Turkey to ensure a better share of the 
Euphrates. On 1st May 1988, an agreement was 
signed in Damascus between the Kurdistan 
Patriotic Union and the Kurdistan Workers 
Party directed against both Iraq and Turkey. The 
disturbances had led the Turkish Government to 
launch large-scale military operations against the 
rebellion. Turkey does not officially admit the 
existence of a Kurdish minority, called 
" mountain Turks " by the Turkish authorities. 
Teaching in the Kurdish language is forbidden 
and even the use of that language is repressed. As 
the Turkish Kurds had taken refuge on Iraqi ter-
ritory controlled by the Kurdish rebels, the 
Turkish army several times, with the agreement 
of the Iraqi Government, conducted military 
operations and air raids on this territory. 
However, the hostilities conducted by Kurdish 
forces in Turkey were limited: it is believed there 
were about 700 victims in four years and fighting 
continued until August 1988, which explains the 
ambiguous attitude adopted by the Turkish Gov-
ernment towards the arrival of Iraqi Kurdish ref-
ugees. 
46. Finally, the war between Iran and Iraq also 
provided an opportunity for a revolt of the 
Iranian Kurds, this time with the assistance of 
Iraq. In July 1988, much of Iranian Kurdistan 
along the frontier with Iraq was wholly con-
trolled by the Kurdish rebels of the Kurdistani 
Democratic Party, under Mr. Abdul Rahman 
Ghassemlou, and the Komala Marxist-inspired 
Party, which may have helped to encourage the 
Iranian Government to accept the idea of a 
cease-fire with Iraq. Unlike Iraq, the Iranian 
Governent has not yet made major military 
efforts to restore its authority in the regions that 
have fallen under the control of Kurdish 
organisations that managed not to act as auxil-
iaries of the Iraqi army. However, they have 
every reason to fear the cease-fire between Iran 
and Iraq, which should enable the Iranian army 
which, in July 1988, had already conducted 
severe attacks on the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq sup-
ported by Iran, to direct its forces against the 
Kurdish rebellion. 
47. Iraq has already done this; since 19th July, 
i.e. when the Iranian Government accepted the 
principle of a cease-fire, and above all between 
20th August and 5th September, it has inten-
sified its offensive against • the Iraqi Kurds, 
apparently helped by the use of poison gas. 
According to the Kurds, it deployed 60 000 men 
to reconquer the area under Kurdish control. 
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The first figures given by the Turkish authorities 
seem to indicate that 120 000 Kurds took refuge 
on Turkish territory at the end of August and 
the b~ginning of September 1988, including, 
accordmg to western sources, victims of injuries 
caused by chemical weapons. At the end of 
September, however, the number of refugees 
recorded was only 65 000. This unexpected flow 
raised particularly serious housing and security 
problems for the Turkish authorities because 
armed detachments of rebels belonging to the 
Turkish Kurdistani Workers Party operate in the 
frontier region and are believed to have con-
ducted propaganda action among the refugees. 
The use of gas by the Iraqis in the region, the sys-
tematic destruction of villages and the flow of 
refugees seem to have caused serious tension 
between the Turkish and Iraqi armies and led to 
Turkish protests. The Iraqi army is even 
believed to have crossed the frontier on several 
occasions and to have used their arms to prevent 
the evacuation of refugees towards Turkish ter-
ritory at the beginning of September 1988. Since 
5th September, when the Iraqi offensive ended 
relations between the two countries hav~ 
returned to normal and Kurdish refugees have 
stopped arriving. 
48. Western journalists who have been able to 
visit the region stress the remarkable efforts 
made by the Turkish authorities to receive the 
refugees, but they note that, although well treated 
and having rights that are refused to Turkish 
Kurds, the latter are kept apart from the local 
P<?Pulation. Fu~hermore, the approaching 
wmter creates senous problems that the Turkish 
authorities probably have no means of solving as 
swiftly as the situation requires. Finally, they 
report that the Turkish authorities deny having 
seen the effects of chemical weapons on these ref-
ugees and will not authorise foreign experts to 
come and examine the question. The Turkish 
Government has appealed for international 
assistance in receiving the refugees and Western 
Europe must not remain deaf to this appeal. 
49. Turkey has so far refused to grant asylum 
to the Kurdish refugees. It does not have to do so 
since, when it signed the Geneva Convention on 
refugees in 1951, it reserved its rights in the case 
of refugees from non-European countries. It is 
for humanitarian reasons that it authorised 
Kurdish refugees - women, children or injured 
persons, but not fighters - to settle provisionally 
on its territory, but on 5th September 1988 the 
Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Turgut Ozal 
stressed the precariousness of this permission: 
Some of the refugees have already chosen to 
leave Turkey for Iran in order to pursue the 
struggle against the Iraqi army. 
?O. Thus, the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq 
1s not a guarantee of peace for the Kurds since it 
is to be feared that the two countries, not to 
speak of Turkey, may take advantage of the 
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present truce to regain control, by use of force 
over the various parts of Kurdistan, as they dict 
just after the Algiers Agreements. Moreover 
Syria seems to be encouraging the Kurdish 
rebellion in Iraq. 
51. International public opinion cannot con-
tinue to ignore the systematic massacre of the 
Kurdish. people by the Iraqi army, the 
destructwn of villages and the establishment of 
refugee camps on Turkish territory. Nor is 
Turkey in a positon to cope with the flow of ref-
ugees who have no housing, blankets, food or 
medical assistance. The Turkish Government 
~lso had serious difficulty in ensuring security on 
lts own territory in face of Iraqi incursions and 
attacks organised by the Turkish Kurdistani 
Workers Party. At first, it was hesitant about 
appealing for international assistance, no doubt 
for fear that the entire Kurdish problem may be 
raised in the United Nations, but it encouraged 
the refugees to leave for Iran. In the end, it 
turned to the western countries for financial 
assistance, but not through the intermediary of 
the United Nations or other international 
organisations liable to make inquiries, in par-
ticular about Iraq's use of chemical weapons. As 
a result, very little assistance was obtained: 
Turkey estimates that $300 million in assistance 
is necessary. The European Community has 
offered $600 000 and Denmark $250 000, the 
Netherlands has proposed taking sixty refugees 
and France has sent a team of doctors. This is far 
less than what is required and is unworthy of 
Europe. 
52. International society certainly cannot 
ignore the fate of the Kurds because they are a 
permanent threat to peace between Iran and 
Iraq: each one may be tempted to use its 
influence over the Kurds in the other country in 
order to exert pressure on it. Yet so far the inter-
national community has done nothing to ensure 
that Kurds have the right to exist, like all 
peoples, and only Iraq's use of chemical weapons 
agamst them has evoked a reaction, albeit 
timid. 
53. The Iraqi Kurds have informed the United 
Nations Secretary-General that in no event 
would they accept a settlement of the conflict 
which did not take their claims into account. In 
support of this position, they have refused to 
allow the United Nations cease-fire inspectors 
access to Kurdish territory, i.e. to about half of 
the cease-fire line that the inspectors are sup-
posed to be monitoring. In other words, the 
Kurds .have ample means to block the imple-
mentatwn of a settlement which, in present cir-
cumstances, would be very unfavourable to 
them. Iraq's announcement, on 5th September 
1988, . of a general amnesty for any Kurds 
returnmg home within thirty days would 
probably not, in such conditions, do much to 
restore civil peace: it has every appearance of a 
measure to pacify international public opinion 
whereas the behaviour of the Iraqi army shows a 
desire to liquidate the Kurdish problem in Iraq. 
According to Turkish sources, 25 000 of the 
50 000 refugees wish to remain in Turkey, 18 000 
wish to go to Iran, 2 500 wish to return to Iraq, 
either to take up the fight again or to surrender, 
and 4 500 wish to go to western countries. The 
amnesty proclaimed by Iraq in September 1988 
appears to have encouraged between 1 000 and 
2 000 Kurds to return at the beginning of 
October. Iraq wished to settle the matter through 
a direct agreement with Turkey and the Interna-
tional Red Cross did not feel able to guarantee its 
application. Reports concerning the, in principle, 
voluntary displacement of Iraqi Kurds from 
Turkey to Iran give figures which range from 
6 000 to 22 000. Most probably Turkey would 
have wished to transfer more, but on 12th 
October Iran closed its frontier, stating that it 
was unable to receive more refugees. In mid-
October, 43 000 Kurdish refugees were reported 
to be still in Turkey. 
54. The term genocide has been used to define 
Iraq's policy towards the Kurds. Uncertainty 
about the number of victims of the repression 
makes one hesitate to use the word, but it is 
already clear that the aim of the Iraqi Gov-
ernment is to solve the Kurdish problem by 
deporting the Kurdish people from the regions in 
which they have settled, by the systematic 
destruction of villages and massacres or by 
forcing them to flee. Present knowledge of events 
between 20th August and 5th September is not 
sufficient to be able to interpret the repression of 
the Kurdish rebellion as being a desire to mas-
sacre a large proportion of that population, but it 
is clear that brutal means, contrary to all notions 
of human rights, were used to squash the 
rebellion and to make its resumption impos-
sible. 
55. Since the Kurdish problem is not confined 
to Iraq and the international community is ill-
equipped to ensure that the rights of the Kurds 
are respected, there is every reason to think that 
they will continue to be a factor of instability in 
the region well into the future and that any 
tension between neighbouring countries will con-
tinue to give rise to subversive operations of 
which the Kurds will again be the instruments 
and the victims. 
IV. Lessons from the war 
1. The conduct of operations 
56. The wars in Vietnam, Algeria and Afghan-
istan showed that the existence of nuclear 
weapons had little deterrent effect on peoples 
fighting for their independence. They also 
proved that technological superiority and the 
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possession of plenty of sophisticated weaponry 
were not enough to ensure victory. The war 
between Iraq and Iran has just shown that the 
most conventional of wars could still, at the end 
of the twentieth century, last for years and cause 
hundreds of thousands of victims. Hence, the 
existence of nuclear deterrents should not be 
considered as a panacea that can dispense states 
from having conventional weapons or allow 
them to avoid the efforts necessary to organise 
peace or to work out ways of allowing the 
peaceful settlement of conflicts and negotiated, 
balanced disarmament. 
57. From a truly strategic standpoint, the prin-
cipal interest of the war is that it allows an 
assessment to be made of the results achieved, 
first by Iraq, when, realising that it was not man-
aging to force a decision through the use of land 
forces, used a series of other means, one after the 
other, in order to do so. 
58. (a) The bombing of rear positions and 
towns led to retaliatory measures against Iraqi 
towns and provided Iranian propaganda with a 
greater echo among international public 
opinion. 
59. (b) The attack on economic targets and, in 
particular, as from January 1982, on the oil ter-
minal on the island of Kharg extended the war to 
the Gulf waters. Iraq was at first the hardest hit 
by this because Iran, with outlets on the Red Sea 
and the Gulf out of range of Iraqi aircraft, could 
also block navigation in the Shatt al-Arab, and 
hence most of Iraq's sea traffic. It was also able 
to threaten navigation in the Strait of Hormuz 
and along the southern shore of the Gulf, which 
allowed it to exert pressure on the Emirates, 
Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, Qatar and Kuwait. In 
August, Iran having strengthened defences on the 
island of Kharg, Iraq blockaded it and attacked 
oil tankers between Kharg and the Strait of 
Hormuz. Iran retaliated by acting against navi-
gation using the ports of the non-belligerent Gulf 
countries. Thus, in spite of Iraq's superiority in 
the air, it was then Iran that, in 1984, became a 
threat to navigation in the Gulf and hence the 
diplomatic situation turned in favour of Iraq 
which also obtained considerable financial 
assistance from the Gulf Arab countries. The 
United States, the Soviet Union and then WEU 
countries intervened to protect their flags and, at 
the same time, Kuwaiti shipping against attacks 
coming mainly from Iran. The Soviet Union was 
first to allow three oil tankers to fly its flag, fol-
lowed by the United States (eleven tankers) and 
the United Kingdom (one tanker) in the first half 
of 1987. These countries, which were joined by 
France and Italy, protected their flags by 
escorting their merchant ships. Finally, the possi-
bility of using the port of Aqaba for its general 
trade and imports of weapons and the port of 
Dortyol for its oil allowed Iraq to side-step the 
effects of the Iranian attacks. 
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60. (c) In 1986, Iraq was able to extend its 
area of attack to the ports of Sirri and Larak, 
although ineffectively, and, in April 1987, Iran's 
oil output passed the threshold of two million 
barrels a day essential for it to be able to pursue 
the war. 
61. (d) It was then the turn of Iran, whose 
land offensive capability was running down, to 
extend its field of operations by employing new 
means. 
(i) Terrorist operations increased in 
summer 1986, especially in France in 
September, resulting in a Franco-
Iranian crisis and a break in relations 
between the two countries. 
(ii) Operations by fast, light motor boats 
against merchant shipping led to a 
strengthening of the United States 
navy and that of other countries 
which, by organising convoys, 
inflicted heavy losses on the assai-
lants, not well-enough armed to be 
really effective. 
(iii) Iran, which had started to lay mines 
in the Shatt al-Arab in 1980, extended 
operations to the coasts of Kuwait in 
January 1987, where they destroyed 
three ships, including a Soviet oil 
tanker. In July, the sea-lanes in the 
southern Gulf were mined, too, 
leading to the loss of an American 
ship and another chartered by Iran. 
(iv) The threat, never carried out, of 
suicide operations and of using 
Chinese Silkworm missiles against 
shipping in the strait helped to keep 
crews in a permanent state of alert. 
This was probably not unconnected 
with the shooting down of the Iranian 
Airbus by the Vincennes in July 
1988. 
(v) Subversive operations against Arab 
states assisting Iraq provoked the 
reaction, on 31st July 1987, of the 
Saudi guards at the holy sites at 
Mecca and the death of four hundred 
Iranian pilgrims. 
62. The effect of this Iranian escalation was to 
bring more than eighty warships to the Gulf, sent 
by powers outside the region. Their presence 
made Iranian operations completely ineffective 
and oil traffic in the Gulf returned to normal just 
when Iraqi oil was starting to reach the Mediter-
ranean at Dortyol and Iranian gas reached the 
Soviet distribution network. Iranian oil output 
then attained 2.8 million barrels a day, but the 
price of oil immediately started to drop, falling 
to $17 per barrel at the end of August 1988. The 
price continued to fall and, after the cease-fire, 
was less than $1 0 per barrel. 
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63. (e) In August 1987, Iraq, with an 
enhanced air capability, resumed attacks on 
Iranian ports and ships approaching them. For 
the first time, major economic results were 
obtained. Ninety ships attacked in 1987 com-
pared with thirty-seven in 1986, eleven in 1985 
and seventeen in 1984, reduced Iranian exports 
to less than two million barrels a day, while the 
United States navy inflicted heavy losses on 
Iranian mine-layers and vedettes. Fleets of 
western mine-sweepers cleaned up the Gulf 
waters and the use of the first Silkworm missiles 
led to American reprisals against oil installations 
on the Iranian coast. 
64. (f) In April 1988, the Iranians, whose 
offensive in Kurdistan, after initial successes, 
had finally failed, while Iraq was strengthening 
its air raids on Iranian towns and shipping in the 
Gulf, extended their operations to the Strait of 
Hormuz, more suitable for the use of fast motor 
boats and the effective use of mines. On 14th 
April, an American frigate was seriously 
damaged by a mine, causing the United States to 
bomb Iranian platforms, followed by an Iranian 
response and finally the destruction of much of 
what remained of the Iranian navy by the United 
States air force. 
65. It therefore seems that the failure first of 
Iraqi offensives and then of Iranian offensives 
led the two countries to resort to an escalation of 
means and an extension of the battlefield in an 
attempt to sway the outcome. This remark is not 
without significance for Europe where, in the 
event of war, there is every chance that the belli-
gerents would also be tempted to resort to esca-
lation in order to force a decision. But in that 
event escalation would quickly reach the nuclear 
threshold. 
66. It is also clear that neither Iraq nor Iran 
was able to obtain decisive advantages from air 
raids on towns or attacks on shipping. Such ope-
rations merely resulted in intervention from 
powers outside the region and largely helped to 
prevent the belligerents gaining any advantage 
from the extension of the war. Finally, it was 
Iraq's modest land victories in spring 1988 and 
Iran's internal difficulties that led the latter to 
accept a cease-fire. Hence the limited inter-
vention of the western countries and the Soviet 
Union played a major role in preventing the war 
spreading to the entire region and safeguarding, 
with freedom of navigation in the Gulf, the oil 
trade on which the stability of the world 
economy depends. 
67. In the early stages of the war, the Iraqi 
forces' intensive use of precision-guided anti-
tank weapons considerably weakened Iran's 
armoured material that it could not replace 
because of its poor relations with potential sup-
pliers. Subsequently, the very conduct of opera-
tions, by both sides, was far more reminiscent of 
the first world war than of operations that tri-
umphed in the second. It is typical that mass 
offensives managed to take only small areas of 
territory and achieve almost negligible strategic 
results. This means that strategists are now 
having serious second thoughts about the role 
once played by tanks and aircraft. Apart from 
exceptional cases, the tank no longer seems likely 
to play the decisive role it had in the middle of 
this century. This is certainly not so for aircraft, 
but their cost and the time it takes to build them 
have already reduced their ground support role 
which has been taken over by helicopters and 
present discussions about the air equipment of 
countries of the Atlantic Alliance show that is 
necessary to reconsider air strategy and tactics in 
terms of these new facts. 
68. The lack of western supplies for the 
Iranian air force very soon gave Iraq air superi-
ority on the battlefield. For a very long time, this 
superiority does not seem to have allowed Iraq 
to make a breakthrough in its offensives. Apart 
from its concern not to risk having too many 
very expensive aircraft shot down and not to lose 
too many pilots, it may be wondered whether the 
training given in the Soviet Union for Iraqi air 
force officers did not hinder exploitation of this 
superiority in the air. For many years, Soviet 
doctrine for war in the air was based on very 
concentrated centralisation of military head-
quarters, leaving little room for individual initi-
ative and for fighter pilots to adapt themselves to 
the current situation on the battlefield. However, 
experience acquired during air operations in 
Afghanistan will probably lead to significant 
changes in Soviet concepts of air support for land 
operations. 
69. Conversely, in the second half of the war, 
the use of anti-ship missiles and laser-guided 
weapons by a new generation of pilots trained in 
the West undeniably allowed Iraq to raise serious 
obstacles to the exportation of Iran's oil pro-
duction by sea. 
70. Furthermore, the massive use of relatively 
poorly-equipped infantry in Iran's offensives 
against buried tanks which were used solely as 
artillery led to massacres without strategic 
results. It helped to discourage the Iranian army, 
which was evident as from the end of 1987. 
Again, Iraq's superiority in the air allowed it to 
conduct operations against Iranian towns and oil 
installations, which also explains Iran's weak-
ening in the last months of the war while Iranian 
medium-range missiles failed to obtain compa-
rable results. Finally, Iraq's use of lethal gas, 
which Iran was able to use only to a very limited 
extent, seems to have had only slight tactical 
effects but constituted a further demoralising 
factor for its enemy. Increasingly clearly as the 
war progressed, Iraq's superiority in sophisti-
cated weaponry therefore offset the numerical 
inferiority of its army by allowing it first to resist, 
then to extend the theatre of operations when 
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this was to its advantage and finally to 
undermine the morale of its enemy which, in a 
war of attrition, was not without importance. 
71. Furthermore, mine-laying in the Gulf led 
several European countries, at the beginning of 
summer 1987, to send m~ne-sweepers to the 
region. Three of them - Ftance, Italy and the 
United Kingdom - protected their mine-
sweepers with frigates and corvettes together 
with supporting craft and - in the case of France 
- an aircraft-carrier in the Indian Ocean. A 
special agreement between Belgium on the one 
hand and the Netherlands on the other and the 
United Kingdom ensured protection and support 
for Belgian and Netherlands mine-sweepers by 
the British fleet. On 1st July 1988, the three 
countries formed a single operational command 
under British leadership. Finally, in August 
1987, WEU decided to co-ordinate member 
countries' action in the Gulf and organised con-
sultations between the capitals for this purpose 
and local consultations to ensure that the 
European presence in the Gulf was as effective as 
possible. The Federal Republic, whose basic law 
does not authorise it to depLoy warships outside 
European waters, took over from Italian and 
French mine-sweepers in the Mediterranean and 
Luxembourg contributed financially to the cost 
of operations. 
72. It is difficult to assess the efficiency of this 
European action in the Gulf. Counting only the 
number of mines destroyed, it was limited but 
nevertheless a great help in reducing the danger 
for merchant shipping. Its deterrent effect should 
not be overlooked, however, because since 
summer 1987 only one further Iranian mine-
laying operation was detected: the certainty that 
the mined areas would be swept soon afterwards 
was enough to discourage Iran. Finally, its 
political effect, although difficult to assess, was 
certainly not zero: not only were the Western 
European countries' warships not attacked but 
their merchant ships were also spared. Above all, 
Iran had to abandon all hope of acting against its 
opponents by attacking shipping in the Gulf and 
the number of attacks fell sharply in 1988. 
73. The question now is whether these 
co-ordinated national forces should remain in 
the Gulf. On 6th September: 1988, experts from 
the WEU countries met in London to consult 
each other on the matter. It was decided to con-
tinue mine-sweeping operations, several mines 
having been destroyed since the cease-fire. 
However, Italy and France have reduced their 
presence. Italy has withdrawn its three frigates, 
leaving only two mine-sweepers and an oil 
tender. France has repatriated its aircraft-carrier, 
an escort vessel, a mine-sweeper and an oil 
tender, keeping only seven warships in the Gulf. 
But the French communique specified that 
France was prepared to bring its presence up to 
strength again if warranted by the situation in the 
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region. The planned end of mine-sweeping oper-
ations by the WEU countries will probably be 
towards the end of the year. The task of pro-
tecting and providing convoys for merchant 
shipping came to an end in October. 
2. The use of chemical weapons 
74. Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran 
several times during the war. This was officially 
established by teams from the International Red 
Cross and the United Nations and is now 
recognised by international society. The WEU 
Assembly called attention to this grave situation 
in Recommendation 435. Iraq itself hardly 
denies it. There have been various reports about 
the type of products used which were sometimes 
said to be yperite, or mustard gas, ~ell known 
since the first world war, sometimes more 
sophisticated products such as tabun, devel?ped 
during the second world war, and sometimes 
more recent products such as phosgene which 
also affects the nervous system. Finally, since 
April 1988, Iraq has been using cyanide-ba~ed 
products which kill instantaneously. The actiOn 
of these products is prolonged since they con-
taminate water and food and, even when they do 
not kill immediately, they cause incurable 
injuries. They are believed to have been used 
first against the Iranian army but to have been 
gradually extended to operatio~s inv:olving 
civilians. The growth of the Kurdish resistance 
movement finally led Iraq, in 1987 and 1988, to 
use chemical weapons against resistants in Iraq 
itself, which meant they were used against 
Kurdish civilians as well as active insurgents. 
Many observers considered that such use was 
continued and intensified after the cease-fire on 
20th August 1988. It appears to have stopped on 
5th September but was resumed in mid-October 
to eliminate pockets of Kurdish resistance. 
75. According to Amnesty International, 
which testified on 23rd August 1988 before the 
United Nations Human Rights Subcommittee in 
Geneva on two occasions in April 1988 hun-
dreds of civilians, injured in chemical air raids, 
were rounded up by the Iraqi army in the regions 
of Sulaymaniyah and Ardil for mass executions 
obviously intended to wipe out all traces of the 
use of poison gas. Amnesty International said it 
has lists of some of the victims. Again, on 2nd 
September, Amnesty International announced 
the massacre of several hundred Iraqi Kurds by 
poison gas in North-West Kurdistan. A report by 
the United Nations Secretary-General, published 
on 23rd August, quoted the conclusions of a 
group of experts sent to Iran fro!? 12th to l~th 
August referring to the launchmg of ypente 
bombs on Iranian territory on 2nd August 
leading to the hospitalisation of 2 680 civilians 
although there were no deaths. This was the 
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fourth team of experts since the beginning of 
1988 to conclude that Iraq was using chemical 
weapons. A number of similar cases had alre~dy 
been detected during the eight-year war, affectmg 
both the Iranian armed forces and civilians. The 
Iraqi Government has not denied these cases but 
claimed that they were in retaliation to the use of 
poison gas by Iran. Operations conducted along 
the Turkish-Iraqi frontier at the end of August 
and beginning of September are reported in the 
press to have caused a still higher number of 
deaths, although no figures can be quo~ed. 
According to the Kurdish resistance, chemical 
weapons were also used on 30th August for the 
mass execution of 2 400 Kurdish civilians, pris-
oners of the Iraqi army. 
76. So far, the Iraqi Government has denied 
using chemical weapons against the Kurds and 
the Turkish authorities continue to affirm that 
Turkish doctors have found no injuries among 
the refugees that could be attributed medically to 
chemical weapons. A team of French doctors, 
sent by the association " Medecins du monde " 
to see the refugees in Turkey, made similar state-
ments. Many of the injuries actually observed 
can apparently also be attributed to other causes. 
Furthermore, the conclusions of the doctors sent 
by that organisation tally with those of the Inter-
national Red Cross, i.e. that chemical weapons 
had been used in the campaigns against the 
Kurds although it was not evident that they had 
been lethal, particularly in the case of tear gas. In 
October however, a British medical team and an Americ~n team attending Kurdish refugees in 
Turkey confirmed having had to treat patie~ts 
with lesions due to war gases. The Turkish 
authorities have not authorised teams of interna-
tional experts to inquire into the matter on their 
territory and the Iraqi Government for its p~rt 
has refused a United Nations team access to Its 
territory. In these conditions it is difficult to c~m­
clude with certainty that lethal chemical 
weapons were used in operations after 28th 
August. 
77. Baghdad also points out that anti-Kurd 
campaigns are internal police operations in 
which the international community has no right 
to interfere and which are not covered by the 
rules of war. However, on 17th September the 
Iraqi army conveyed journalists to areas where 
repression had been very severe. They saw that 
villages and crops had been totally and systemat-
ically destroyed and that men and cattle had 
totally disappeared from vast areas, but they saw 
no proof of the use of gas. They noted never-
theless that Iraqi soldiers wore gas masks in 
certain sectors and that their written reports and 
films had been censured by the Iraqi authorities. 
Neither of these facts proves that lethal gas was 
used. 
78. Conversely, journalists from many 
western countries who have been in contact with 
the refugees have obtained testimonies which 
leave little doubt that chemical weapons were 
used by the Iraqi air force, that this caused many 
deaths and was the origin of the refugees' 
injuries. On 9th September, the United States 
Secretary of State, Mr. George Shultz, told the 
Senate that the American authorities had proof 
that chemical weapons had been used against the 
Kurds. This proof apparently came from inter-
cepted radio messages from the Iraqi air force 
but the United States has never revealed the 
exact nature of this "proof". In point of fact, 
there is now no doubt that chemical weapons 
were used after 20th August but the use of lethal 
gas, on the contrary, has not been proved. 
However, delay in conducting medical controls 
will make it increasingly difficult to obtain 
medical proof of the origin of the injuries 
observed: after a few days, or sometimes a few 
hours, traces of the chemical products disappear. 
But the injuries remain. 
79. Apart from the particularly inhumane 
nature of chemical weapons against which 
civilians, and especially children, are entirely 
unprotected, this matter is extremely serious. It 
is a violation of international agreements on the 
law of war, in particular the 1925 Geneva Pro-
tocol banning the use of chemical weapons to 
which Iraq is a party and it taints with suspicion 
all that country's international undertakings. It 
also involves other violations of the law of war 
such as limits on visits by the International Red 
Cross to prisoners of war, particularly those in 
hospital, in order to conceal the use of chemical 
weapons from the international community. 
Finally, it jeopardises something that mankind 
might have taken for granted because, since the 
first world war, war gas had almost never been 
used by belligerents. 
80. The State Department spokesman, Mr. 
Redman, announced on 14th September that 
Libya is believed to have already built a factory 
to produce chemical weapons, which is particu-
larly disturbing since, through deliveries of 
weapons or direct intervention, that country sup-
ports several armed conflicts in Africa, inter alia 
in the Western Sahara and Chad where, 
according to Mr. Redman, it already used 
chemical weapons in 1987. It has missiles of suf-
ficient range to reach European territories and it 
has been noted that it does not have too many 
scruples about violating international law. 
According to other sources, Syria and Egypt 
already have stocks of chemical weapons, while 
Israel is reported to be building a plant in the 
Negev to produce nerve gas that it has just 
developed. Thus, now that East and West are 
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thwart the success of the current negotiations. It 
now seems certain that twenty-four countries in 
the world have chemical w~apons and there are 
probably about ten others. There is a still larger 
number of countries which could produce them 
at short notice. Iraq's massive use of chemical 
weapons therefore brings the world to grips with 
a choice that is crucial for its future: either it 
must react vigorously to Iraq's action or it will 
enter a new age in which chemical weapons 
become a normal means of fighting. 
81. There can be no justification for this 
return to a barbarian, unlawful practice, and the 
argument that chemical weapons are the poor 
man's nuclear weapons is irrelevant since 
nuclear weapons are intended to be purely 
deterrent, i.e. not to be usedin practice, whereas 
chemical weapons have no deterrent effect and 
have a purely exterminatory role for the benefit 
of an army in battle. 
82. It would therefore have been desirable for 
the international community to react strongly as 
soon as it was informed that Iraq was using 
chemical weapons. This was particularly nec-
essary since the aircraft, helicopters and missiles 
used to deliver chemical weapons were procured 
abroad, as were the raw materials used to 
produce the poison gases. The aim should have 
been to signify that it could not accept such vio-
lations of the law of war and to threaten the 
offender with sanctions, on the understanding 
that significant sanctions would be applied in the 
event of any repetition. Too much time was 
spent doing nothing, mainly in order to spare 
Iraq which it considered to be both an ally of the 
Soviet Union and the last rampart of the more 
conservative Arab states against an expansion of 
the Islamic revolution backed by Iran. In par-
ticular, no one wished to take sanctions against 
Iraq which could only have been trade sanctions 
relating to arms sales or oil imports and would 
have weakened it vis-a-vis Iran. 
83. Other reasons for caution emerged after 
the cease-fire: the, after all, quite legitimate 
reason which seems to be paralysing the United 
Nations and its Secretary-General, i.e. not to 
harm the already difficult progress of the negotia-
tions to restore peace between Iraq and Iran, and 
the less openly admitted wish not to lose the 
prospects of a market in a country which will 
have to import a great deal for reconstruction 
purposes. The absence of rel~able informtion on 
the use of chemical weapons is probably a 
pretext, frequently invoked, rather than a real 
reason for the apathy of intetnational society in 
this matter. 
negotiating an agreement in Geneva to eliminate 84. Only on 26th August 1988, i.e. after the 
stocks of chemical weapons and ban their pro- cease-fire between Iran and Iraq had come into 
duction in Europe, an effective proliferation of force, did the Security Council adopt Resolution 
such weapons is developing on the southern 620, tabled by Italy, Japan, the Federal Republic 
shore of the Mediterranean, which might well and the United Kingdom, threatening with sanc-
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tions any governments using chemical weapons 
in future armed conflicts. The Council, deter-
mined to intensify efforts to ensure that all use of 
chemical weapons in violation of international 
commitments is ended once and for all, con-
demned their use and encouraged the Secretary-
General to conduct inquiries in view of the fact 
that the use of chemical weapons against the 
Iranians had become more intensive and more 
frequent. Its adoption by the Security Council 
was not obtained unreservedly although Iraq, 
clearly named in reports in the possession of the 
Council as being responsible for the use of 
chemical weapons, was not named in the text 
adopted. 
85. Mr. Shultz's statement that the United 
States had proof that Iraq was using chemical 
weapons in its repressive operations against the 
Kurds nevertheless led, on 9th September, to the 
United States Senate passing a bill tabled by 
Senator Claiborne Pell, Democrat Chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Committee, which, if 
carried into effect, would mark a turning point in 
American policy towards the Middle East. This 
text indeed names Iraq, denounces the use of 
poison gas and organises a boycott of Iraq by the 
United States, which would stop buying Iraqi oil 
and stop delivering arms to Iraq. Furthermore, 
United States representatives in international 
financial organisations would oppose the 
granting of any credit to Iraq and the United 
States itself would refuse any credit or guarantee 
of trade credit to Iraq and any technology 
transfers. The bill bases these measures on the 
twofold accusation of using chemical weapons 
and genocide of the Kurds. 
86. The vote in the United States Senate 
caused violent anti-American demonstrations in 
Baghdad where a number of people - estimated 
by the Iraqi press agency at 250 000 and by other 
witnesses at 150 000 - marched in front of the 
United States Embassy on 11th September in 
protest. Without having any illusions about the 
spontaneity of this demonstration, observers 
were impressed by the violence of the slogans 
denouncing the Senate's decision as the result of 
an Israeli-inspired plot and as an attack on Iraq's 
sovereignty. On 25th September, the House of 
Representatives nevertheless passed a bill similar 
to the one passed by the Senate. The difference 
between the two texts means there must be nego-
tiations between the two houses, and the United 
States administration seems to be trying to seize 
this opportunity to have the scale of the sanc-
tions reduced. 
87. On 15th September, the European Par-
liament adopted by a very large majority a reso-
lution calling on the Twelve to suspend immedi-
ately all deliveries of arms to Iraq and all exports 
of chemical substances and equipment that could 
be used to produce chemical weapons. 
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88. Yet so far the entire international com-
munity has been weak in this matter and in a 
way has become an accomplice of Iraq by 
avoiding, for political reasons, the assumption of 
its responsibilities in face of this regression in the 
application of international law. There is no 
point in underlining all the dangers of this 
weakness for future conflicts. It has allowed Iraq 
to pursue its policy of repressing the Kurdish 
rebellion by massacring the population or forcing 
them to abandon Iraqi Kurdistan. The some 
600 000 Kurds who have now taken refuge in the 
West are liable to become desperate and resort to 
terrorism as the only means of making their pro-
tests heard. 
89. The international community would cer-
tainly be better armed if countries participating 
in the Geneva negotiations on chemical disarm-
ament were more zealous about achieving satis-
factory results within a reasonable lapse of time. 
The fact that they have been unable to reach 
agreement on a text allowing possessors of 
chemical weapons in Europe and elsewhere ten 
years in which to destroy their stocks can but 
encourage non-aligned countries to consider 
chemical weapons as a normal means of fighting. 
This also disqualifies the countries of the two 
blocs when it is a matter of showing their disap-
proval of the use of such weapons. Since certain 
southern Mediterranean countries now have 
means of delivery that can attain Western 
European countries and also transport chemical 
weapons, it seems essential and urgent, for the 
very security of Europe, for chemical weapons to 
be really and truly outlawed. 
90. In this connection, the proposal tabled by 
President Reagan in the United Nations General 
Assembly on 26th September 1988 to hold an 
international conference to reaffirm the ban on 
the use of chemical weapons is an important 
event. The purpose of this conference would be 
to draw the attention of the international com-
munity to the urgency of envisaging the total 
elimination of chemical weapons. This is the aim 
of current negotiations in the conference on dis-
armament. One way or another, application of 
any agreement in this field will require very firm 
political will. First, there must be the will to 
impose effective, binding sanctions on any 
power violating the new convention. Then there 
must be the will to enforce effective controls on 
all, which should concern all chemical industries. 
This will take a long time to achieve, but Europe 
certainly has an important role to play in 
bringing this initiative to fruition. The speech by 
Mr. Mitterrand, President of the French 
Republic, to the United Nations General 
Assembly took up the threads of President 
Reagan's proposal that the conference on a total 
ban on chemical weapons hold its first session in 
Paris at ministerial level before the end of the 
year, and the French Government has accepted 
this proposal. 
3. Law of war and human rights 
91. While the use of chemical weapons by Iraq 
is a particularly intolerable violation of the law 
of war, based on international agreements to 
which the belligerents subscribed, the war 
between Iran and Iraq led to other striking viola-
tions of human rights, as defined in the Uni-
versal Declaration, and of the law of war, as 
defined most positively in the conventions in 
force. 
92. This is illustrated in a report to the United 
Nations published on 1st September 1988. 
Drafted by a group of three after a fortnight's 
visit to prisons and camps, this report was 
intended to give Mr. Perez de Cuellar infor-
mation to allow him to prepare a plan for an 
exchange of prisoners of war between the two 
countries in accordance with Article 118 of the 
Third (1949) Geneva Convention stipulating 
that prisoners must be returned immediately 
hostilities end. It confirmed Iraqi statements that 
Iraqi prisoners in Iran had been subjected to 
mental pressure and brain-washing by followers 
of Khomeini to try to induce them to rebel in 
favour of the Islamic revolution when repa-
triated. Iranian propaganda films shown in the 
West of Iraqi prisoners hailing the Iranian 
regime moreover left little doubt about such 
practices. According to the experts, this spiritual 
guidance of Iraqi prisoners could not be distin-
guished from mental pressure. 
93. The United Nations experts said that in 
each of the camps they had visited there were 
fanatical, hysterical and sometimes violent dem-
onstrations by the prisoners. They chanted 
slogans hostile to Saddam Hussein and the great 
powers and in praise of Islam and Ayatollah 
Khomeini. United States and Israeli flags were 
burnt. Many prisoners refused to be repatriated 
and said they would fight against returning to 
their country. 
94. The International Red Cross, which 
recorded 50 182 prisoners in Iran and 19 284 in 
Iraq, said it was convinced that many prisoners 
on both sides had not been declared in Geneva. 
A large proportion of prisoners and even camps 
and hospitals had escaped its visits, which were 
moreover suspended in Iran from 1Oth October 
1984 to 4th January 1986 following a riot which 
had killed and wounded Iraqi prisoners in the 
Gorgan camp. In both countries, International 
Red Cross delegates saw serious, repeated viola-
tions of international human rights. Former pris-
oners who had been freed confirmed at a press 
conference in Baghdad on 28th September that 
they had been ill-treated in several Iranian 
camps. 
95. Conversely, while Iranian offensives in the 
Shatt al-Arab sector had used tightly-packed 
masses of adolescents, often fourteen years old, 
fanaticised by propaganda and among whom 
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losses were high, this practice seems to have been 
abandoned in the last two years of the war. 
96. Repression of political opposition and 
national rebellions deriving from it is not a direct 
consequence of the war, although the offensive 
by the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq at Kermanshah in 
July 1988, with Iraqi assistance, led, after initial 
successes, to whole-scale massacre. In Sep-
tember, several humanitarian organisations 
denounced a wave of executions of members of 
the opposition in Iran in the days following the 
entry into force of the cease-fire. According to a 
statement made in Paris on 28th September by 
the committee for solidarity with political pris-
oners in Iran, hundreds of political prisoners are 
believed to have been executed in this way. The 
Times of 3rd October 1988 refers to waves of 
arrests and summary executions of political pris-
oners since the cease-fire. Information from 
various sources that are difficult to check men-
tions about a thousand executions in Teheran 
and dozens of others in many large towns. These 
were mainly members of the Mujaheddin-e-
Khalq but also of the Tudeh Party, the Iranian 
Fedayeen-e-Khalq organisation and Iranian 
Kurds. Conversely, religious persecution, partic-
ularly of the Bahai, seems to have diminished at 
the same time. 
97. The Iraqi Government moreover has 
proved to be at least as repressive of less 
extensive political rebellions in Iraq. More 
clearly contrary to any definition of human 
rights was the persecution and massacre of the 
Bahai religious community in Iran. It was con-
tinued until recently, although these martyrs 
have in no way compromised themselves with 
Iraq. Finally, some commentators do not hes-
itate to speak of genocide in regard to the mas-
sacre of the Iraqi Kurds. The number of victims, 
as announced by Kurdish resistance movements 
themselves, is between 5 000 and 25 000, which 
does not justify the word genocide, although the 
massacres were collective, often carried out by 
means of chemical weapons and mass deporta-
tions implying many serious infringements ofthe 
most elementary human rights. These too are 
areas in which international society must react 
firmly. It must first indicate clearly each 
infraction and name the guilty party and then act 
by adopting and effectively applying sanctions 
commensurate with the nature and magnitude of 
the violation of texts defining the law of war. 
This is the only way to terminate practices 
which, it was hoped, had disa~;>peared. 
V. Consequences of the war 
1. Local conseq•ences 
98. Assuming that the armed struggle between 
Iran and Iraq has really come to an end, which is 
not yet obvious, it already appears that the gov-
ernments on both sides will have been weakened 
by it. 
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99. In Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini's charismatic 
authority was certainly safeguarded in the main 
by his remaining above the conduct of military 
operations and attempts to achieve peace in 
1988. Conversely, the authority of his colleagues 
at the head of the Shiite clergy and the state has 
now been considerably diminished due to divi-
sions now emerging between them and the set-
backs they have suffered requiring the personal 
intervention of Khomeini. For the first time in 
1988 it was possible to voice certain forms of 
political opposition in Iran. Although one should 
be highly sceptical about rumours concerning the 
Ayatollah's health, because of his age the 
question of his succession inevitably exists, 
although no one has yet been able to impose 
himself as an unchallenged candidate for this 
role. 
100. It would be pointless, on the basis of infor-
mation in the press, to speculate about the 
chances and tendencies of anyone. But it seems 
impossible that the inevitable future withdrawal 
of the Ayatollah from political life will not be fol-
lowed by major changes in Iranian politics. 
Internal developments in recent months indicate 
that the trend will be towards a more open 
attitude to the outside world and Iran will 
resume a place in international trade: the need to 
rebuild, the legitimate wish to resume the place 
in the Middle East that it occupied in the Shah's 
day and the population's apparent lassitude over 
the Islamic rigour imposed by the present regime 
can but strengthen this trend. Iran has already 
re-established, or is in the process of re-estab-
lishing, relations with the Western European 
countries with which it had broken its ties and is 
developing its trade with others. For this 
purpose, it has managed to make Lebanese 
organisations which held or still hold western 
hostages release some of them and the position 
for others is encouraging, although American 
and British hostages have not benefited from 
these steps. The United States, for its part, seems 
prepared to re-establish the relations broken off 
after the siege of the United States Embassy in 
Tehran. However, on 3rd October, Ayatollah 
Khomeini insisted that Iran be rebuilt and its 
army reconstituted without the assistance of the 
United States and the Soviet Union and he pro-
claimed that his country did not wish to resume 
diplomatic relations with Washington. At the 
same time, he made current negotiations for the 
resumption of relations with the United 
Kingdom more difficult by insisting that the 
latter be seen as the one making the request. 
However, Iran's losses due to the war, its present 
economic and financial difficulties and uncer-
tainty as to whether the present regime will 
remain in office will not necessarily remove Iran 
from the international scene but may, on the 
contrary, be the first steps towards a return to a 
very important if not dominating position in the 
Gulf region. 
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101. From the moment Iran accepted the cease-
fire, stopped threatening freedom of navigation 
in the Gulf and used whatever influence it may 
have over associations practising terrorism or 
hostage-taking to ensure that terrorist attacks 
stop and hostages are released, there was no 
longer any reason not to have a normal rela-
tionship with it, no judgment being passed on 
the country's internal regime. Development of 
such relations can but encourage Iran to act in 
accordance with the requirements of interna-
tional order. 
102. Iraq for its part is emerging from the war 
in an advantageous, if not victorious, military 
position, and President Saddam Hussein has 
been able to present the end of hostilities to his 
nation as a victory. Thanks to the weapons it 
procured during the war, his army is now the 
strongest in the region and the crushing of the 
Kurdish rebellion seems to have further 
enhanced the authority of the regime. Fur-
thermore, the credits he has just obtained from 
the United Kingdom ($300 million) and the 
Federal Republic ($165 million) and the fact that 
the United States does not seem prepared to 
apply the embargo which both houses imposed 
on non-military products mean that Iraq is able 
to tackle its reconstruction in relatively 
favourable conditions. 
103. In this position, Iraq is no longer the 
defender of the Arab world against Iranian 
imperialism, now much calmer, but on the con-
trary it is more dangerous for its neighbours: 
during the summer, its relations with Syria and 
Turkey deteriorated sharply. On the other hand, 
the countries on the southern shore of the Gulf 
now have the military means necessary for 
ensuring their own security if they pull 
together. 
104. In such circumstances, the West has clear 
means of exerting pressure on Iraq to ensure that 
it accepts the implications of Security Council 
Resolution 598, renounces the use of chemical 
weapons, destroys stocks and shows moderation 
and respect for human rights in repressing the 
Kurdish rebellion. The abundance of oil on the 
world market and the credit needed for recon-
struction can but leave it open to the threat of 
economic sanctions if it continues its earlier 
excesses. The immediate interest of the Iraqi 
market for western exporters is no reason for the 
West to relinquish the means at its disposal for 
making Iraq behave more humanely in these 
matters. 
2. Regional consequences 
105. The war did not concern only Iran and 
Iraq. All countries in the region were affected 
and, to varying degrees, felt threatened on the 
one hand due to direct attacks by the Iranian air 
force, in particular on ships from all countries 
trading along the southern shore of the Gulf, and 
on the other hand due to the unrest caused by 
partisans of the Islamic revolution and certain 
Shiite communities in many of these countries, 
especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, where there 
were many acts of terrorism and sabotage, and 
Lebanon. The other countries of the Gulf 
Co-operation Council were less affected by the 
war. However, both Sunnites and Shiites seem to 
be well aware of the threat of rising Islamic fun-
damentalism in all Moslem countries. Dan-
gerous for all existing regimes, it is more so on 
the shores of the Gulf where states have a large 
migrant population and national cohesion is 
very weak. For this reason they have leaned cau-
tiously towards Iraq. Apart from Bahrein, they 
maintained diplomatic relations with Iran. It 
should be noted that Resolution 598 urged them 
to take part in the peace talks. The resulting con-
sequences are threefold. 
106. Inside states, the governments have 
strengthened their authority: promises to set up 
consultative parliamentary assemblies in Saudi 
Arabia and the Emirates have not been 
respected. In Kuwait, parliamentary activity was 
suspended in 1986. In Saudi Arabia, the author-
ities' control over the pilgrimage to Mecca was 
strengthened after rioting which on several occa-
sions, particularly in July 1987 when there were 
about 400 victims, brought Iranian pilgrims into 
conflict with the forces of law and order. 
107. Diplomatically, the Gulf countries have 
strengthened their links in the framework of the 
Gulf Co-operation Council, dominated by Saudi 
Arabia, which ensured considerable influence for 
itself in the region. During the war, these coun-
tries gave generous assistance to Iraq in the name 
of Arab solidarity and above all in order to check 
an Iranian threat which was already being felt 
before the 1979 revolution due to the Shah's 
activities and to which the Ayatollah's revolu-
tionary propaganda gave a new dimension. Only 
Syria, Iraq's avowed opponent and beneficiary of 
generous oil supplies from Iran, kept its distance 
from the Islamic conference in Koweit in 1987 
and the Arab summit in Amman which affirmed 
support for Iraq. The cease-fire has not brought 
this inter-Arab co-operation to an end but the 
fact that Iraq has emerged stronger from the war 
might redirect co-operation between the Gulf 
countries, which have everything to fear from a 
resumption of Iraqi claims, in particular to the 
neutral zone of Kuwait: the war has brought Iraq 
face to face with all the disadvantages of its 
narrow outlet to the Gulf. 
108. The Arab League has benefited from the 
need for greater solidarity shown by Iraq. The 
latter, which obtained the expulsion of Egypt in 
1979 after the Camp David agreements, was, 
together with Jordan, the main supporter of 
Egypt's return to the league in exchange for 
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which Egypt backed Iraqi views on the appli-
cation ofthe cease-fire, although its reintegration 
in the league was delayed because of Syrian 
opposition. For the time being, this concern for 
Arab solidarity has led Iraq to adopt more mod-
erate positions towards the Palestinian conflict 
since it has declared that it would no longer 
oppose an agreement accepted by the Pales-
tinians. However, the consolidation of under-
standing between Arab countries seems to be dis-
turbing for the Israelis. 
109. The strengthening of co-operation between 
the Arab countries did not prevent a very swift 
resumption of trade, which had moreover never 
stopped completely, between the two shores of 
the Gulf as soon as the cease-fire became 
effective. The Emirates and the small countries 
of the Gulf which had backed Iraq resumed trade 
and two of them which, like Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia, had broken off diplomatic relations with 
Iran are now in the process of resuming them. 
110. Finally, militarily the war made all the 
states in the region increase their arsenals consid-
erably by procuring the most sophisticated 
weapons. This was particularly so for the coun-
tries with very high oil revenues. 
3. The accumulation of armaments 
111. According to information given by Mr. 
Aaron Karp, Director of the SIPRI arms trade 
research programme, between 1980 and 1987, 
fifty-three countries sold arms worth $27 000 
million to Iran or Irak, i.e. 20% of the arms sold 
in the third world, a large Pf.lrt of the remainder 
having been delivered to olher countries in the 
region. All attempts by the United States, 
Western European countries and even the Soviet 
Union to limit the arms race in the Middle East 
have come up against tough competition from 
other selling countries which seized every oppor-
tunity to extend their markets. Countries them-
selves subject to embargoes, such as North Korea 
and South Africa, were first in line to increase 
their sales, but industries in countries intending 
to respect the embargo quite often sold arms 
under the counter, with the complicity of certain 
government authorities. The United States was 
not alone with its Irangate. For instance, Iran 
procured clandestinely Haubitzers from Austria, 
Swedish missiles, French munitions and arms 
from many other countries. 
112. The cease-fire provides arms-exporting 
industrialists with new argl)lments for bringing 
pressure to bear on governments to abolish all 
restrictions. Nor did Iran and Iraq wait for the 
end of the war before starting to arm their sup-
porters, especially in Lebanon, where Iran sup-
plied arms to the Shiites, while since the 
cease-fire Iraq has started to supply arms to the 
Christian militia in order to thwart Syria which 
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itself supported Iran during the war. All these 
facts indicate, in spite of the cease-fire, that the 
armed struggle between Iran and Iraq is 
spreading to other parts of the region and that, in 
particular, the threat of a crisis between Syria 
and Iraq is looming up. 
113. Among the most recent and most signif-
icant arms contracts, mention should be made of 
the one between the United Kingdom and 
Jordan, worth $4 000 million, and another con-
cluded between the United Kingdom and Saudi 
Arabia since the cease-fire, worth $20 000 
million in addition to a $9 000 million contract 
concluded in 1986. Both relate mainly to deliv-
eries of Tornado combat aircraft. In Saudi 
Arabia, 122 aircraft of this type are now on 
order. Qatar has procured Stinger missiles from 
the United States. Kuwait, which had hitherto 
procured arms only in the West, wished to 
procure Maverick D and G missiles whose devel-
opment was completed only in November 1987 
and which are not yet issued to American forces, 
but permission was refused by the United States 
Senate. It then diversified its sources by ordering 
from the Soviet Union, too, while ordering forty 
fighter aircraft from the United States, from 
which Bahrein has ordered sixteen, while the 
Emirates have ordered Mirage 2000s from 
France. North Korea has joined with Egypt for 
the production of missiles and Brazil is reported 
to have supplied Libya with long-range missiles, 
while China has delivered various types of mis-
siles to Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. It 
denies having sold Silkworm anti-ship missiles 
to Iran, which means Iran must have procured 
its stocks and those it used in the Gulf through 
the intermediary of third powers. 
114. Where Iraq is concerned, on 1Oth October, 
a French weekly, " Le Point" published the fol-
lowing information: 
"The government of Saddam Hussein 
(Iraq) has presented French arms mer-
chants with an enormous order. It is for 
equipment - such as the Mirage 2000 - far 
more sophisticated than any the Iraqis 
now have. Paris is studying the order and, 
in particular, the traditional payment facil-
ities requested by Iraq." 
115. The Gulf war thus led to a sharp quanti-
tative and qualitative rise in weapons deployed 
in the region. Their wealth allowed oil-producing 
countries to bring sellers from very many coun-
tries into competition and thus procure the best 
equipment at the lowest prices, which is quite 
normal. They were thus able, however, to evade 
all controls and quantitative or qualitative limi-
tations of their armaments by third countries. In 
this way, countries as dependent on the West for 
their security as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have 
diversified the sources of their arms in recent 
years, not only among the member countries of 
the Atlantic Alliance but also in China and the 
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Soviet Union. For instance, it was from China 
that Saudi Arabia procured 3-A missiles with a 
range of more than 2 500 km, while Iran, Syria, 
Libya and Pakistan are in the market for Chinese 
shorter-range M-9 missiles. 
116. Furthermore, it is disturbing that Saudi 
Arabia now has Chinese East Wind 3-A missiles 
because this missile brings Israeli and Iranian 
territory within range and it has a nuclear 
warhead capability. However, China denies that 
it has supplied Saudi Arabia with the means to 
produce nuclear warheads. Furthermore, Saudi 
Arabia acceded to the non-proliferation treaty in 
October 1988. Chinese sales worried the United 
States Government which has approached the 
Chinese Government twice to try to stop the 
contract. In July 1988, Mr. Shultz failed to reach 
agreement while, in September, the Secretary of 
Defence, Mr. Carlucci, said: " I am satisfied with 
my discussions and believe the Chinese will 
handle this issue responsibly in the future. " The 
Chinese Minister of Defence, Qin Jiwei, said 
China had to continue its arms sales because it 
was a poor country and that in 1987 China had 
fallen into fourth place for world sales behind the 
United States, the Soviet Union and France but 
that: " In the future, China will not be able to sell 
its weapons on a big scale. But we will continue 
to do so because we are still poor. " 
11 7. Procurement of sophisticated weapons by 
many Arab countries could not fail to worry 
Israel which for its part is at present making great 
efforts to develop its defence means. The 
launching of a first Israeli satellite, said to be for 
purely civil purposes, left little doubt about the 
determination of the Israeli Government to 
acquire means of observing the entire region, and 
modern launchers, possibly capable of carrying 
nuclear weapons, Israel's possession of which is 
hardly in doubt. Thus, one of the consequences 
of the war between Iraq and Iran has been a 
marked rise in the level of confrontation between 
Israel and its Arab neighbours at a time when 
unrest in the occupied territories is assuming 
proportions that are a threat to peace. 
4. International consequences 
118. Although the local and regional implica-
tions of the war do not seem very reassuring, the 
same is not so for its repercussions on interna-
tional relations. The scale of the conflict seems, 
indeed, to have worried the two great powers and 
to have induced them to take the necessary steps 
to avoid any extension of the crisis. The situ-
ation in the Middle East has been one of the 
main themes of international policy concerning 
which the great powers have, since 1985, 
exchanged views at the highest level. The United 
States authorities have declared several times 
that they have found reasonable persons of good 
will to talk to in Moscow, inter alia refusing to 
deliver the most sophisticated weapons to the 
belligerents, which probably explains the share of 
the Middle East arms market taken by others. 
This understanding was certainly one of the 
factors that finally helped to make the bellig-
erents accept the Security Council resolution 
leading up to the cease-fire. 
119. This does not mean there is real agreement 
between the two powers, and the Soviet Union 
has not failed to protest at the large American 
naval presence in the Gulf. The United States 
now has twenty-six warships in the region, of 
which seventeen in the Gulf and an aircraft-
carrier with escort vessels near the Strait of 
Hormuz. In one year, these vessels escorted 
eighty-seven convoys through the Gulf. The 
American presence in the Gulf dates back to 
1949 but has increased considerably since 1980. 
The United States seems to have decided to wind 
down its operations only gradually, pending 
more definite progress towards peace, and to 
improve its weaponry, in parti~ular for threat 
detection and reconnaissance purposes. This 
improvement became essential when Iran 
deployed Silkworm anti-ship missiles, and the 
destruction of the Iranian Airbus in July 1988 
showed the inadequacy of the equipment on 
American ships. Conversely, the United States 
has decided to stop escorting convoys, deploying 
air force patrols and monitoring the Gulf with 
AWACS aircraft stationed in Saudi Arabia. 
120. The WEU countries' ships in the Gulf had 
a different role, being mainly concerned with 
destroying mines laid by Iran on either side of 
the Strait of Hormuz. Only France sent and 
maintained an aircraft-carrier in the region, 
which it has now withdrawn. However, it is esti-
mated that there are still about 200 mines in the 
Gulf and the search for them is continuing. The 
United Kingdom is reported to have proposed to 
its WEU partners that the operation be con-
tinued, not concealing from its allies that its 
main intention was to demonstrate to the United 
States that Europeans are serious about shoul-
dering more of the financial burden of their own 
defence now that the United States Congress is 
strongly urging a greater European contribution 
to the expenditure necessary for joint security. 
The WEU countries will probably keep their 
mine-sweepers in the Gulf for some time to 
come, but they have already reduced the number 
of vessels that accompanied them for pro-
tection. 
121. Thus, anxiety caused by the Gulf war 
seems to have helped to develop exchanges 
between the United States and the Soviet Union 
on matters relating to international peace and the 
rapprochement between the United States and 
its European allies on an essential factor in trans-
atlantic understanding which escapes the 
alliance, i.e. co-operation outside the NATO 
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area. Such a trend was particularly essential 
because the build-up of armaments in the Middle 
East means it is the region where world peace 
will be the most threatened if one or other 
country allows itself to become involved in the 
conflicts which have surely not stopped tearing it 
apart. 
VI. Conclusions 
122. Among the many works of fiction pub-
lished in the last twenty years describing what a 
third world war might be, most have made the 
war that was to encompass the earth start in the 
Middle East. The war between Iran and Iraq 
fitted well into such a plot and yet it proved nov-
elists writing about the future war to be wrong 
because, far from calling in question the process 
of East-West detente, it made a major contri-
bution to speeding it up and enhancing it. This is 
a reason for being at one and the same time pes-
simistic about developments in the region and 
optimistic about the future of international 
peace. 
123. From a truly European standpoint, it may 
in the same way be deplored that Europe has lost 
much of the influence it exercised in the region 
after the dismantling of the Ottoman Empire but 
the fact is to be welcomed that, in spite of the oil 
aspect of the war, it did not jeopardise Europe's 
economic activity as was the case in 1956 and 
even more so in 1983. For the first time since the 
second world war, neither the spread of ter-
rorism, fanned by the Iranian revolution, nor the 
taking of hostages in Lebanon, nor the European 
states' different assessments of the local situation 
prevented consultation between European 
countries leading to the implementation of 
co-ordinated, if not joint, action in the 
framework of WEU to help to ensure freedom of 
navigation in the Gulf. The political results of 
this operation are not easy to assess, but they cer-
tainly helped to prevent the belligerents from 
entertaining any hope of extending the conflict in 
order to solve it to their own advantage and, con-
sequently, it paved the way for the acceptance of 
a cease-fire under the aegis of the United 
Nations. It also helped to improve the United 
States and Soviet perception of Europe's political 
effort, showing it to be an entity worthy of con-
sideration in international life. Consequently, it 
allayed the United States' fear of being isolated 
in its peace-keeping actions in the world and con-
vinced the Soviet Union that the realities of 
Europe should have a place in their concept of 
detente. 
124. It must now be ensured that the cease-fire 
is a first step towards a return to true peace, 
which is not obvious from a study of the local 
situation, and that Europe, with the return to 
peace, does not lose the advantages it derived 
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from its firmness and moderation during the 
war. Your Rapporteur considers these should be 
the underlying themes of the recommendation 
that the Assembly has to submit to the WEU 
Council. 
125. Even if the present negotiations concern 
only Iran, Iraq and, to a certain extent, the coun-
tries on the southern shore of the Gulf however, 
it is evident that the effects of the war in the Gulf 
have been far more widespread in that new 
factors of imbalance have surfaced in an area 
extending from the Mediterranean to the Indian 
Ocean. Although Iran's declared aim was the 
deliverance of Jerusalem, the fact that Israel 
afforded it its support, particularly by acting as a 
discreet intermediary for the delivery of arma-
ments from third countries, showed that the 
Israelis believed that there was a close link 
between the situation in Palestine and the war in 
the Gulf. Iraq has one of the strongest armies in 
the region and took part in several of the 
Israeli-Arab wars. It is therefore not surprising 
that Israel wished to weaken it whereas Iran, 
further away and not on good terms with most 
Arab countries, except for Syria and Libya, pre-
sents no immediate danger. Any victory by Iran 
however would probably have released a series of 
fundamentalist-inspired revolutions which 
would hardly have been advantageous to Israel's 
security. 
126. Furthermore, the rivalry between India 
and Pakistan is not unknown in the countries of 
the Gulf where there are Indian and Pakistani 
immigrant minorities. India has built up a signif-
icant military capability in recent years. It has 
nuclear weapons and two nuclear submarines. 
The armaments of its ground and air forces are 
being modernised. At regional level at least, it is 
therefore becoming a major power at a time 
when the death of General Zia-ul-Hak raises 
serious uncertainty about the future of Pakistani 
policy. General Zia's close relations with Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrein had previously limited 
India's influence in the Gulf region but it is to be 
wondered whether the barriers thus raised 
against the hegemonic views these governments 
attributed to India will survive the Pakistani dic-
tator for very long. 
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127. Finally, the fact that Iraq, with its 15 
million inhabitants and a military capability that 
is strong only at regional level, has been able to 
extend the effects ofthe war over a vast maritime 
region where it has seriously perturbed navi-
gation and forced a number of powers to deploy 
strong naval and air forces is worth underlining. 
It demonstrates the responsibility assumed by 
countries that supply modern weapons to coun-
tries in highly volatile regions: to some extent it 
was to offset the effects of arms sold by the West 
that the countries of the West had to send a 
strong armada ofwarships to the Gulf area where 
they had to stay for more than a year. Several of 
them were badly damaged and human lives were 
lost. It is doubtful whether the benefits of these 
arms sales were greater than the cost of this mil-
itary operation. 
128. Arms procurement by countries in the 
area did not slow down with the cease-fire. Your 
Rapporteur has mentioned recent orders which 
Saudi Arabia has placed in the United Kingdom 
and those of several emirates. Apparently both 
Iran and Iraq are endeavouring to procure new 
armaments, not only from their usual suppliers 
but also from countries which, for the duration 
of military operations, had in principle 
refused. 
129. Your Rapporteur believes that humani-
tarian reasons unite with the interests of peace 
and Europe's own interest for everything to be 
done to avoid all-out competition for the sale of 
arms. The United States seems to have per-
suaded the Soviet Union and China to exercise 
some restraint in this field. It would be regret-
table if it were Europe that broke ranks in the 
sale of armaments. Furthermore, the political 
impact of such sales makes them an act of tre-
mendous consequence and any consultation 
between countries that claim to examine together 
questions of their joint security must include the 
question of arms sales to the Middle East. If the 
question of mine-sweeping in the Gulf is soon to 
be removed from the Council's agenda, that of 
the evolution of the political and military situ-
ation in the Middle East should remain and con-
sultations on arms sales in this region must be 
given a prominent place. 
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Amendment 1 
Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Pieralli and others 
1. Leave out paragraph (xiii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation. 
5th December 1988 
Signed: Pieralli, Pecchioli, Francese 
l. See 7th sitting, 5th December 1988 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendment 2 
Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq 
AMENDMENT 2 1 
tabled by Mr. Speed 
5th December 1988 
2. After paragraph (xiii) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph: 
"(xiv) Noting that over the last eight years the United Kingdom and France have maintained 
naval units in the Gulf whose prime task has been to assist and protect merchant shipping and 
these forces were supplemented last year by the WEU mine counter-measures force whose task 
was to detect and clear mines laid by Iran or others on either side of the Strait of Hormuz, " 
Signed: Speed 
l. See 7th sitting, 5th December 1988 (amendment negatived). 
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Amendment 3 
Europe and the aftermath of the war between Iran and Iraq 
AMENDMENT 3 1 
tabled by Mr. Ahrens and others 
3. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph: 
5th December 1988 
"9. Request the member countries of Western European Union to support Turkey in providing 
humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish refugees and urge the Iraqi Government to take measures 
in order to ensure, in future, a voluntary return of these refugees without repression. " 
Signed: Ahrens, Luuk, Baarveld-Schlaman, Lambie, Lalumiere, Bassinet, Holtz, Pistre, Lagorce, 
Blunck, Antretter, Tummers 
1. See 7th sitting, 5th December 1988 (amendment agreed to). 
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The reactivation and enlargement of WEU -
reply to the annual report of the Council 
REPORT 1 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur 
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2. Intergovernmental activities 
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I. Adopted in committee by 16 votes to 0 with I abstention. 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); MM. Burger (Alternate: Hengel), Ma~·tino (Vice-Chairmen): MM. Aarts 
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N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed in italics. 
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The Assembly, 
Draft Recommendation 
on the reactivation and enlargement of WEU -
reply to the annual report of the Council 
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(i) Considering that developments in the international situation require Western Europe to assume 
without delay greater responsibilities to ensure its security, promote disarmament and contribute to 
international peace; 
(ii) Noting that the Council considers the reactivation of WEU to have been completed but that the 
highest authorities of certain member countries do not appear to endorse this view; 
(iii) Noting that the role of the WEU Agency has still not been satisfactorily defined; 
(iv) Welcoming the very definite improvement in the information the Council has communicated to 
the Assembly in 1988; 
(v) Noting, however, that: 
(a) the Council has not answered all the points raised in Recommendation 457; 
(b) the Council's communications to the Assembly contain much ambiguity about the way the 
Council intends to interpret and implement the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(c) the Council's promise to communicate the agencies' reports to the Assembly has been kept 
only in part; 
(vi) Welcoming the progress made towards the forthcoming accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU; 
(vii) Recalling that it is incumbent upon the Council to give the Assembly detailed and accurate infor-
mation about everything relating to the application of the modified Brussels Treaty; 
(viii) Trusting that the colloquy on the future of European security to be held in Aorence in March 
1989 will allow a successful definition to be made of the tasks to be accomplished so that WEU may 
make a meaningful contribution to building a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
I. Answer the paragraphs of Recommendation 457 asking the Council: 
(a) How it intends to implement the political impetus that it said it wisped to give to co-operation 
in armaments matters; 
(b) When it intends to transmit to the Assembly the text of the agencies' studies that have not yet 
been communicated to it; 
(c) What progress has been made with its studies of burden- and responsibility-sharing in the 
Atlantic Alliance; 
2. Inform the Assembly of the decisions taken by the IEPG at its meeting in Luxembourg on 9th 
November 1988; 
3. Ensure that its annual report covers all its activities and the implementation of commitments 
incumbent upon the WEU organs under the Paris Agreements and the Council's decision of 7th May 
1955, as long as these texts remain in force; 
4. Inform the Assembly of the conclusions of the seminar on defence resources that it organised in 
The Hague on 14th and 15th March 1988; 
5. In view of the nature of the subject to be tackled and the Assembly's responsibility for informing 
public opinion, invite the Assembly to play a full part in the seminar on informing public opinion it is 
planning to convene in 1989; 
6. Specify whether the WEU " intergovernmental organs " referred to in the Secretary-General's 
letters to the President of the Assembly were effectively set up in application of Articles VIII and IX of 
the modified Brussels Treaty; 
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7. Not wait for agreement on a single seat for the WEU ministerial organs before defining the tasks 
of the new agency and specifying what henceforth it expects of the ACA and the SAC, as the Assembly 
asked it to do in Recommendations 428, 429, 432, 438, 442, 451 and 454; 
8. Explain how the WEU ministerial organs will follow up the organisation of a European seminar 
by the French Ministry of Defence in November 1988 to make European security requirements better 
known to public opinion; 
9. Invite member governments to be represented and play a full part in discussions at the colloquy 
on the future of European security that the General Affairs Committee is organising in Florence from 
21st to 23rd March 1989. 
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Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur) 
I. Introduction 
1. The time-table of the Assembly's work 
obliges the General Affairs Committee to adopt, 
on lOth November, the reports to be presented at 
the second part of the thirty-fourth session. 
However, as the Council is not holding its minis-
terial meeting until 14th and 15th November, it 
is impossible for your Rapporteur to refer to the 
decisions the Council should take on that 
occasion. In these circumstances, the General 
Affairs Committee decided to discuss the text 
submitted to it by its Rapporteur on lOth 
November and to ask him to prepare, for the 
meeting on 7th December, another document 
updating and correcting the present report in the 
light of information received on 15th November. 
The final report will have to be distributed to the 
Assembly in the morning of 7th December so 
that any changes made by the committee to the 
draft recommendation may be voted upon by the 
Assembly in the afternoon of the same day. 
There is every reason to think that most of these 
changes will relate to the enlargement of WEU, 
but it is not out of the question that the Council 
will also manage to take decisions on restruc-
turing. 
II. General 
2. Since the ministerial meeting in The 
Hague in April 1988, it is agreed that the reacti-
vation of WEU has now been completed, thus 
allowing thought to be given to enlargement. 
Some governments which hold that reactivation 
has now been completed seem to hesitate to spell 
out its impact and it is just as if they now find 
what they jointly agreed to assert in the platform 
adopted in The Hague in October 1987 to be 
extremely audacious and that they should take a 
step back from it. 
3. This is apparently what the President of 
the French Republic, Mr. Mitterrand, deplored 
in his address to the Institut des hautes etudes de 
defense nationale in Paris on 12th October, when 
he said he thought " the only point on which 
there has been progress is in relations between 
France and the Federal Republic". He added:" I 
wish Europe's defence to be united but I do not 
have to conceal the difficulties that will be 
encountered and it troubles me to note that 
words are pronounced time and again to the 
effect that if reality was not what it is ... we shall 
do our utmost to consolidate a European pillar of 
the alliance. This will continue to be our aim. If, 
in 1992-93, we have been successful, we shall be 
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in a position to take a decisive step towards 
giving real, and not only imaginary, substance to 
the defence of Europe... WEU needs to be 
reformed if it wishes to meet what many expect 
of it. " Can it be said more c~early that the reacti-
vation of WEU is not a reality? Moreover, as far 
as your Rapporteur knows, the deadline of 
1992-93 has no special significance in regard to 
security. In any event, the difference between the 
utterances of the WEU Council on behalf of the 
Seven and those of the President of the French 
Republic is striking. 
4. Chancellor Kohl has referred to the 
position of WEU twice: in Berlin on 13th 
October 1988 in an address on the future of 
Europe and Franco-German relations at the 
opening of the Aspen Institute and in Brussels on 
19th October. In Berlin, i.e. just before his 
meeting with the President of the French 
Republic in Vezelay on 14th October, he said: 
" The definition of a European security 
policy concept with the aim of achieving 
joint European defence in close liaison 
with the United States of America is a task 
to which we shall give priority in the 
future. The WEU platform and the 
inclusion of security policy in European 
political co-operation are the first and 
important steps in this direction. " 
Speaking in Brussels, he underlined the progress 
to be made towards closer European union. He 
added: "We cannot speak indefinitely of a 
'European identity' or of a 'European pillar of 
the alliance' without following up such state-
ments with firm progress", which means that 
such progress has not been made, which is very 
close to President Mitterrand's words. It is 
impossible not to bear these statements in mind 
when examining the content of the Council's 
communications to the Assembly in 1988, which 
constitute undeniable progress. In particular, the 
Council should lose no time in saying what it has 
done to follow up the platform adopted in The 
Hague. 
5. Referring to the deadline of 1992-93 so 
that Europeans at last give serious consideration 
to matters relating to their joint security is also in 
many respects a way of evading specific, urgent 
problems. The General Affairs Committee has 
made a major effort to circumscribe the new 
facts of European security in tecent years, thanks 
inter alia to the report on recent developments in 
Soviet external policy, submitted by Mr. 
Pecriaux in December 1987, and the report on 
co-operation between the United States and 
Canada in security matters, submitted by Mr. 
Pontillon in June 1988. 
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6. The internal evolution in the Soviet 
Union, which accelerated during the year, as did 
its external policy, offers hope of the early suc-
cessful conclusion of the Vienna conference on 
security and co-operation in Europe and the 
opening, before the end of 1988, of the 
specialised conferences that are to follow it up, 
inter alia, where European security is concerned, 
the one in Vienna on conventional disarmament. 
Mr. Gorbachev has just proposed an all-
European summit meeting to give the necessary 
impetus to these two conferences and President 
Mitterrand has proposed an East-West summit 
meeting in about three years' time if sufficient 
results have been obtained in disarmament. 
These facts, added to the trend of Soviet-
American strategic arms limitation talks and the 
expected opening in January 1989 of a con-
ference on banning chemical weapons, indicate 
that henceforth reflection on European security 
should assume a new dimension and that 
co-ordination of the WEU countries' positions 
on disarmament should become an essential part 
of it, otherwise progress in disarmament may 
lead to dislocation of the western security system 
just when " The military balance " has 
announced new and dangerous deployments of 
conventional means by the Soviet Union. 
7. One of WEU's principal roles is to ensure 
that Western Europe retains the cohesion nec-
essary in security matters to be able to tackle 
questions relating to detente and disarmament 
without jeopardising the union it is achieving in 
other areas - such as that of the economy - and 
wi~hout calling in question the bases of its 
security, particularly the Atlantic Alliance. It is 
not, therefore, enough for the Assembly to know 
that a Council working group is studying 
problems relating to disarmament; it has to 
know how far and on what points the seven gov-
ernments are able to define the requirements of a 
European disarmament policy and to tackle the 
negotiations that are about to be started from a 
common standpoint. 
8. Secondly, the result of the American elec-
tions implies that in the next few years the gov-
ernment will reconsider the way United States 
armed forces are deployed in the world. Mr. 
Pontillon's report referred to present discussions 
in American circles concerned with defence 
questions. It stressed the development of a 
" global " way of thinking in this area and the 
will of the United States authorities to ensure 
that the European members of the alliance 
assume a larger proportion of the expenditure 
required for joint security and perhaps also more 
responsibilities in the defence of the European 
continent and in the efforts that need to be made 
to keep peace in the rest of the world. 
9. If a global United States defence policy is 
confirmed after the elections, which seems 
probable, this will mean some weakening in the 
American military presence in Europe. The call 
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for a better division of the burden of joint 
defence will certainly not be abandoned by the 
new administration. Furthermore, the favour-
able attitude of the Americans to Europe's 
request that better burden-sharing should be 
accompanied by better responsibility-sharing in 
the alliance allows it to be thought that, as the 
General Affairs Committee was told clearly 
when it visited the United States in April 1988, 
the Americans welcome the fact that the reacti-
vation ofWEU gives Western Europe a means of 
exercising these responsibilities and promoting a 
financial effort for joint defence. The WEU 
countries' co-ordinated mine-sweeping operation 
in the Gulf was a great help in making the 
United States accept the idea of a reactivated 
WEU which meant that it was no longer alone in 
taking action outside the NATO area. United 
States decisions obviously depend on purely 
American considerations. However, if Europe 
does not express its views on the question in the 
next few months, as the General Affairs Com-
mittee intends to do in Florence next spring, it 
might bring grist to the mill of those who 
advocate redeploying the United States army, 
which would weaken its security, and hasten 
redeployment. In any event, it will not be able to 
avoid examining the new situation but it has 
every interest in doing so before it is faced with a 
fait accompli. 
10. In view of these requirements incurred by 
international developments, the Council's 
various communications to the Assembly give 
the impression that the Seven have effectively 
assumed their responsibilities and, whenever 
necessary, set up working groups on topical 
matters. Chancellor Kohl and President 
Mitterrand, on the contrary, say how disap-
pointed they are at the non-existence of Europe 
in matters that are the responsibility of WEU. 
Since it must be accepted that neither of them 
deliberately deceives his audience and that they 
are both well-informed, it must be concluded 
that while the WEU working groups exist and are 
active they have not achieved significant results 
for lack of agreement between governments, in 
particular on everything relating to the appli-
cation of the platform adopted in The Hague. In 
this case, the situation would be far more serious 
than the Council's commul)ications to the 
Assembly suggest because it would mean that as 
well as disagreement over the restructuring and 
collocation of the ministerial organs there are far 
more deep-rooted differences concerning which 
it would be very much harder to find compro-
mises because they are based on the countries' 
views on the possibility of the very existence of a 
European pillar of the alliance. The Assembly 
has done much to promote this formula. If, as 
Chancellor Kohl holds, it is an empty one, it is 
because the Council has been able to follow up 
neither the Rome declaration nor the platform 
adopted in The Hague. 
11. Your Rapporteur believes this question 
should be raised before tackling the purpose of 
the report. The Assembly has every reason to 
welcome the attitude adopted by the Council 
towards it and the prospects of WEU being 
enlarged in the very near future to include Spain 
and Portugal. But it has to note that these 
sources of satisfaction will have only a limited 
impact if the Council does not give positive 
content to its work. Texts emanating from it so 
far make no mention of this content and it will 
probably be necessary to await the ministerial 
meeting on 14th and 15th November before 
being able to express an opinion. 
Ill. Relations between the Council 
and the Assembly 
12. Examination of previous annual reports of 
the Council had led the Assembly to understand 
that consultations were being held between 
member governments in WEU on security, that 
the restructuring of the organisation had not 
been completed for lack of agreement on the 
location of the single seat that the Council 
believed all the WEU ministerial organs should 
have and, finally, that the informal nature of 
intergovernmental activities and the decline in 
statutory activities were preventing the Council 
from providing the Assembly with the infor-
mation it needed to carry out its task of super-
vising the work assigned to the Council under 
the modified Brussels Treaty, which is the basis 
of its existence. 
(a) Reply to Recommendation 457 
13. The thirty-third annual report, the first 
part of the thirty-fourth annual report, the reply 
to Recommendation 457 and the information 
letters from the Secretary-General of WEU on 
the activities of the intergovernmental organs in 
June and July 1988 and August and September 
1988, communicated to the President of the 
Assembly on 26th July and 12th October, 
confirm those views but also reveal the Council's 
sincere wish to alleviate the difficulties that were 
stressed, inter alia, in Recommendation 457. For 
reasons that are probably not solely due to the 
Council's activities, it may be said that there has 
been a positive response to most of the points in 
this recommendation and a start has at last been 
made with implementing them. It is rare for the 
Assembly to be able to record such action and it 
takes due note of this as well as of the fact that 
the Council's reply to this recommendation 
reached the Office of the Clerk on 11th August 
and not on the eve of the session following the 
recommendation's adoption, as had long been 
the practice. This, too, is a pleasant change 
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because it allows the General Affairs Committee 
to take account, in preparing the present report, 
of the Council's reply to the previous report and 
thus inaugurate a true dialogue between the two 
institutions. The swiftness of this reply and of 
several others was probably facilitated by the 
WEU-Com network for relations between the 
capitals, but it also benefited from the fact that 
the Council's reply to the Assembly's recommen-
dations was, as is increasingly the case, vague 
and evasive. 
14. It was through other channels, in par-
ticular the press but also, it should be underlined, 
the letter from the Secretary-General dated 26th 
July, that the Assembly was informed of action 
taken on its recommendation. This applies espe-
cially to the implications of the platform adopted 
in The Hague, the progress of negotiations on 
enlargement, the limitation of armaments, all of 
which were amply covered in the letter, and the 
naval presence in the Gulf, referred to again in 
the letter of 12th October. The latter had already 
been the subject of press reports. The question of 
restructuring the Office of the Clerk was settled 
satisfactorily in June. 
15. The Council has still not answered three 
questions raised in Recommendation 457: 
- It has not said how it intends to 
implement the political impetus it 
decided to give to co-operation in arma-
ments matters and, to date, there have 
been few signs of such impetus. Gen-
erally speaking, there is little mention of 
co-operation in armaments matters in 
documents emanating from the Council 
now that it is assuming new dimen-
sions, as was emphasised at the colloquy 
which the Committee on Scientific, 
Technological and Aerospace Questions 
organised in London in March 1988, 
and the IEPG is reviewing its methods 
of work. 
- It says it is prepared to give the Agency 
a role without waiting for a decision on 
its possible move, but it has not yet 
done so, and it has transmitted the text 
of only four of the Agency's forty-four 
studies in implementation of the 
promises it made to the Assembly at the 
ministerial meeting in Bonn in April 
1985. 
- It has not answered the recommen-
dation relating to the study of burden-
sharing in the alliance and possible 
changes in the deployment of NATO 
forces. 
Your Rapporteur will therefore propose that the 
Assembly insist that it be given a satisfactory 
answer on these three points. 
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(b) Second part of the thirty-third annual report 
of the Council 
16. Since the second part of the annual report 
of the Council reached the Assembly too late to 
be examined at the first part of the thirty-fourth 
session, most of the facts it mentions concern too 
remote a past to be suitable for a political dia-
logue between the two WEU organs. However, 
the text calls for a few remarks. 
17. First, about the very presentation of the 
report: for the first time, matters concerning the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments, the activ-
ities of the Standing Armaments Committee and 
application of Protocol No. II to the modified 
Brussels Treaty on WEU forces are no longer 
given in the body of the report but at appendix. 
This is of some importance if one looks into the 
reasons why the Council decided to make this 
change in what had been its unswerving practice 
for thirty-two years. The Assembly has always 
insisted that the modified Brussels Treaty and 
the Council's 1955 decision setting up the 
Standing Armaments Committee should be 
applied in full or amended. This is not a conser-
vative attitude on its part since it welcomed the 
deletion, in 1985, of the lists of conventional 
armaments subject to control, but has never 
agreed to the Council flaunting the provisions of 
the basic WEU texts in practice that has not been 
embodied in an official act by the governments. 
This is how it has always interpreted the super-
visory powers assigned to it in Article IX of the 
treaty. As matters now stand, it is not logical to 
relegate to an appendix to the annual report 
matters that are a statutory part of the Council's 
reponsibilities, and this innovation makes one 
fear that the Council has started to shift some of 
its commitments to one side in order gradually 
to shelve them, which would foster doubts about 
its will to apply the 1954 agreements. 
to strip down the structure of the organisation to 
leave it as a mere forum for exchanges of views 
between government representatives. The result 
is to deprive Europe of the power the SAC had to 
work out draft agreements - that it could even 
promote in non-member countries - and also the 
obligation of openness inherent in the SAC's 
summary records and half-yearly reports, not to 
speak of the exchanges of views between the SAC 
and the Assembly's Committee on Defence 
Questions and Armaments. The aim of the 
IEPG, on the contrary, is not to reach agree-
ments and this means governments no longer 
have to commit themselves firmly to 
co-operative programmes. The SAC's openness 
allowed WEU to apply the provisions of the 
modified Brussels Treaty on relations between 
WEU and NATO, since it allowed NATO to 
keep an eye on all WEU's activities in regard to 
co-operation. Finally, the direct link between the 
SAC and the Assembly, plus its indirect link 
through the intermediary of the Council, allowed 
the Assembly to exercise its right to supervise 
European co-operation in armaments matters. 
The presence ofthe Spanish Minister of Defence, 
Mr. Narcisse Serra, in the Assembly in June 1988 
and his address as Chairman of the IEPG cer-
tainly open the door to exchanges between the 
IEPG and the WEU Assembly. But these 
exchanges will remain precarious as long as they 
are not based on a text. In short, SAC not 
meeting helps to destroy the structures of WEU 
and to weaken its Assembly's means of super-
vising defence Europe, whatever results the 
IEPG may achieve, although these are for the 
time being very limited. 
20. Your Rapporteur is also aware that the 
accession of Spain and Portugal to WEU raises 
the problem of the application of Protocols Nos. 
II and Ill by those countries. In neither case, in 
fact, can they be applied in their existing form to 
new members since Protocol No. II fixes 
18. Your Rapporteur is well aware that the maximum force levels on the basis of the treaty 
governments wish to develop European eo- instituting a European Defence Community. 
operation in armaments matters in the IEPG and This obviously sets no maximum for these two 
that they have not convened the Standing Arma- countries as they were not parties to the EDC 
ments Committee for more than two years. treaty. Once the list of conventional armaments 
Nevertheless, the annual report notes that the is deleted from Protocol No. Ill, it no longer con-
SAC subgroups are still meeting. Furthermore, cerns them, since they possess none of the 
the fact that the IEPG still has no international weapons that are still subject to control. The 
secretariat and that the governments were unable question will at least have to be raised and a 
to reach agreement on this question at the Seville solution found. There is no need to act as if it 
meeting continues to make the future of that were already solved by making the application of 
institution uncertain, not to speak of the absurd these protocols appendices to the annual report, 
situation in which the SAC has a secretariat but although this might be perfectly justified after the 
does not meet while the IEPG meets but has no accession of Spain and Portugal if it becomes 
secretariat. It is not by concealing this fact that it necessary to distinguish between the report on 
will be remedied, unless a decision is taken on the activities of the Council of nine WEU 
this matter at the IEPG ministerial meeting in member countries and a residual seven-power 
Luxembourg in November. activity, just as the North Atlantic Council gives 
. . . . . . a .special place to decisions taken only by coun-
19. T~1s attitude m reahty falls m With many tnes whose forces are under integrated NATO 
others smce WEU was reactivated and the aim is command. 
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21. Regarding the descript10n of the Council's 
political activities, the thirty-~hird annual report 
is extremely parsimonious and disappointing 
and the Assembly can but wonder why the 
Council took five months to adopt such a doc-
ument. It has every reason to welcome its subse-
quent recovery with the rapid publication of the 
first part of the thirty-fourth annual report and 
the Secretary-General's two letters on the Coun-
cil's activities from June to September. 
(c) First part of the thirty-fourth annual report of the Council 
22. The first part of the thirty-fourth annual 
report of the Council makes no mention of 
matters relating to the application of the pro-
tocols. This is normal since the Council has to 
report to the Assembly on their application only 
once a year. Nor is it surprising that the Council 
has presented its political activities in an 
inhabitual manner in a document which is, after 
all, only the first outline of its annual report, the 
only one provided for in the treaty. But, in view 
of the difficulty for an observer to ascertain what 
is actually being done in intergovernmental rela-
tions in WEU, the Council might usefully, in 
each report, list the meetings held at each level so 
that the reader may know how much importance 
the governments attach to each aspect of consul-
tations in WEU. 
23. Conversely, in a remarkably short time the 
Council has given the Assembly a summary of 
matters tackled at meetings at all levels, which is 
more specific and interesting than heretofore. 
This is most gratifying. 
24. However, this satisfactory aspect of the 
report leads to a few points on which it does not 
give the Assembly the information it is entitled 
to receive. 
25. (i) The promise made in 1985 and recalled 
on 25th February 1988 to communicate agency 
reports to the Assembly as soon as they had been 
declassified has been kept only for the report on 
" The experience gained in verification of con-
trols on forces and conventional armaments", 
transmitted on 17th June. The Council does not 
refer to other agency reports. 
26. (ii) The Council does not give the pro-
gramme of work adopted in London on 21st 
June 1988 for the negotiations on the 
enlargement of WEU to include Spain and Por-
tugal. This might have helped the Assembly to 
obtain a better idea of the questions raised by 
enlargement and to work more effectively on 
these matters. Thus, your Rapporteur has noted 
that the accession of those countries to Protocols 
Nos. II and Ill and to the May 1955 decision 
setting up the SAC raised a number of very dif-
ferent problems, but it knows nothing at all of 
how the Council is considering solving them. 
27. (iii) When it visited the United States in 
April 1988, the General Affairs Committee was 
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able to assess the importance the United States 
Government attached to reactivated WEU as a 
partner with which it could examine burden-
sharing in the alliance. It is therefore surprised 
and disappointed that, although announcing the 
visit by Mr. Taft, United States Deputy Secretary 
of Defence, to the European capitals, the report 
makes no mention of his contacts with WEU as 
such. Were there none? In his address to the 
Assembly on 6th June, tHe Secretary-General 
nevertheless indicated that there had been con-
tacts. Why therefore does the Council hide them? 
Why too does it not say from what standpoint it 
decided to tackle this question, which Europe 
can obviously not agree to see limited to a matter 
of expenditure on NATO, but which must cover 
true responsibility- and burden-sharing inside 
and outside the NATO area? 
28. (iv) The report refers to a seminar on 
defence resources organise<! in The Hague on 
14th and 15th March. As far as your Rapporteur 
knows, this was a complete innovation since the 
Council had never organised colloquies, 
although the Assembly has done so on several 
occasions and has invited the members of the 
Council. The agenda may have made it necessary 
to limit participation for security reasons and the 
Assembly cannot insist on attending every 
meeting organised by the Council. However, in 
view of its interest in the questions discussed, it 
can but ask to be informed of the conclusions of 
this seminar in whatever form the Council 
deems appropriate. 
29. Your Rapporteur has also heard that the 
Council is organising another seminar at the 
beginning of 1989 on informing public opinion 
about defence questions. It would be rather sur-
prising and inappropriate if the Assembly, which 
has so far, because ofthe Council's default in this 
area, had almost a monopoly in keeping the 
public informed of the activities of WEU, were 
to be kept out of such a colloquy altogether. Not 
only does the General Affairs Committee wish to 
be given more details of the Council's intentions 
on the matter rather than to learn, six months 
later, that the colloquy has been held without 
even being notified of the results, it considers 
that on such a matter the Council should asso-
ciate the Assembly with this colloquy on an 
equal footing. 
30. In other words, the Assembly's approval of 
the first part of the thirty-fourth annual report of 
the Council is far from unreserved, in spite of all 
the improvements it has noted in the presen-
tation of many of the Council's political activ-
ities. 
(d) The information letters from the Secretary-General 
of WEU on the activities of the intergovernmental organs 
31. Sending such letters is an innovation 
which corresponds very well to the Assembly's 
wish to receive regular information on the 
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Council's activities. To date, the Assembly has 
received two letters of this type, but it unders-
tands perfectly the Secretary-General's remark 
that the frequency of such letters " will be related 
to the pace and substance of the activities of the 
intergovernmental organs". 
32. Such as it is, however, the letter of 26th 
July raises two questions. The first relates to its 
title, in which the word " Council " does not 
appear and is replaced by " intergovernmental 
organs". At first sight, the two terms may seem 
interchangeable, but it is the word " Council " 
that is used in Articles VIII and IX of the 
modified Brussels Treaty and one might right-
fully wonder how far it was to avoid the obliga-
tions of these two articles that a term less fraught 
with obligations was preferred. The second 
question relates to the second paragraph, indi-
cating that " this letter has been drafted and 
issued by the Secretary-General under his own 
responsibility", which would be clear without 
the further words " but with the approval of the 
Chairman-in-Office ". The Assembly has often 
stressed the ambiguity surrounding the res-
pective responsibilities of the Secretary-General, 
the Chairmanship-in-Office and the Council as a 
whole since the reactivation of WEU started. In 
spite of what is said in the reply to Recommen-
dation 457, which maintains that the Secretariat-
General is exercising its role in all the Council's 
activities, the Assembly is constantly faced with 
wording that leaves it in doubt on this point. The 
ambiguity increased with the letter of 12th 
October, which states that: " Like the previous one, 
this letter has been drafted and issued by me under 
my own responsibility " but makes no reference to 
the Chairman-in-Office. Is it to be concluded that, 
unlike the July letter, it did not have " the approval 
of the Chairman-in-Office " or that such approval 
was given without wishing to tell the Assembly, as 
may be understood from the words " like the pre-
vious one "? Your Rapporteur feels that the seven 
governments are in fact committed by all Council 
communications, even if they are issued under the 
sole authority of the Chairman of the Permanent 
Council, except in cases where one or other 
government makes explicit reservations on a point 
raised in such communications. 
33. However, the Assembly is very satisfied 
with the contents of these letters and first of all 
with the fact that, for the first time, the Secreta-
ry-General links the Council's activities so 
closely with current international political events 
and presents the aspects which secured the 
attention of both the Permanent Council and the 
Special Working Group. The description of the 
political work accomplished by the Permanent 
Council is enough to rectify many of the opi-
nions so far expressed about this body, of which 
only the administrative activities were known to 
the Assembly. Furthermore, the information 
given in the letter of 12th July on WED's action 
in the Gulf is of some importance. 
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34. Generally speaking, these letters allow the 
Assembly to have a better grasp of how the 
Council works and which matters attract its 
attention. If future missives confirm the pro-
mises of the first one, there is no doubt that it 
will considerably facilitate exchanges between 
the two WEU organs. 
(e) The Assembly's budget 
35. The Assembly appreciates the Council's 
gesture in releasing the sums needed for restruc-
turing the Office of the Clerk before completing 
the restructuring of the ministerial organs. It the-
refore records its satisfaction, while recalling 
that, although the staff problems of which it had 
informed the Council have now been solved, the 
problems of premises available to the Office of 
the Clerk and the Assembly have, as a result, 
become even more urgent than before. The 
reduction in the number of agency staff since 
1985 should allow these problems to be solved 
provisionally simply by transferring offices from 
one organ to another, without prejudice to any 
decision the Council may take on the seat of the 
new agency. Conversely, the forthcoming 
appointment of Spanish and Portuguese Delega-
tions to the Assembly will inevitably raise in new 
terms the question of staff and premises for both 
the Office of the Clerk and the Assembly iself. It 
is not for the General Affairs Committee to study 
this matter and your Rapporteur merely wishes 
to say how urgent it will be once Spain and Por-
tugal are members of WEU. 
36. Your Rapporteur regrets, however, the 
delay in implementing measures agreed by the 
Council relating to the use of WEU's Paris pre-
mises. The Assembly has always held the govern-
ments alone responsible for never entrusting any 
serious task to the agencies or, henceforth, the 
single agency. On the contrary, it is uncertainty 
about the existence of such tasks that led it to ask 
the Council to assign to the agency specific tasks 
likely to contribute to WEU's overall role in 
European security, but separate from the Secreta-
riat-General's permanent role vis-a-vis the 
Council. The Assembly bears no responsibility 
for the fact that the Council has been incapable 
of defining such tasks and has left vacant a 
number of posts earmarked for the agencies. In 
the circumstances, it is entitled to ask the 
Council for permission to use the premises 
which are not fully occupied at a time when it is 
sadly short of space on a permanent basis and 
even more so in view of the new requirements 
that will shortly arise with the arrival of the 
Spanish and Portuguese Delegations to the 
Assembly. 
37. Your Rapporteur considers that, for these 
reasons, the Assembly should grant that the 
Council has made major improvements in its 
relations with the Assembly. If he has pointed to 
a number of shortcomings, it is in the hope that 
the Council will continue what it has started and 
complete the adaptation of its relations with the 
Assembly to the new facts of WEU's activities. 
IV. The reactivation of WEU 
38. Publication by the Council of the booklet 
entitled" The reactivation ofWEU- statements 
and communiques - 1984 to 1987 " obviously 
has a specific meaning: it is presented on the 
lines of the booklet containing the Brussels 
Treaty, which has been WEU's charter from the 
very start, thus showing that it is an official doc-
ument designed to be placed alongside the treaty 
and to complete it. 
39. In fact, the texts the Council has trans-
mitted to the Assembly show that its newly-
oriented work has adopted a satisfactory rhythm 
and meets better than before the requirements of 
Article VIII of the treaty and the intentions 
expressed in the Rome declaration and the 
platform adopted in The Hague. The opening of 
negotiations on the enlargement of WEU to 
include Spain and Portugal also confirms that 
the Council considers reactivation to be com-
plete, since it had postponed starting negotia-
tions until reactivation was complete. However, 
it would appear that certain aspects of reacti-
vation have still not reached fruition. Fur-
thermore, the recent speeches by President 
Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl indicate that 
France and the Federal Republic of Germany do 
not believe reactivation has been completed. 
(a) Restructuring 
40. Everyone knows that the dispute about 
applying the Council's decision to reduce the 
number of agencies to one and to collocate it 
with the Secretariat-General is paralysing the 
restructuring of WEU. It is common knowledge 
that six countries wanted or accepted collocation 
in Brussels, while France insists on Paris. Your 
Rapporteur can but hope that this dispute, minor 
if one considers the number of persons con-
cerned and whose symbolic importance has 
probably been exaggerated, will be solved in the 
near future. But he believes it has allowed the 
Council to gloss over more serious matters on 
which it has still not taken a decision. 
41. (i) The notion of" agency" is very vague 
in the various texts emanating from the Council 
and no one knows exactly what the role of the 
single agency should be. The Secretary-General's 
letter contains this phrase: "It (the Council) has 
decided to increase the degree of participation by 
staff from the Paris ministerial organs in the 
activities of the London-based working groups." 
It should first be noted that the word " agency " 
was not used. Second, no details are given of how 
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these staff are to participate. Are they intended to 
help the Secretariat-General to ensure the 
smooth running of meetings? This would herald 
the disappearance of the agency in favour of the 
Secretariat-General. Are they, on the contrary, 
intended to make their own contribution to tasks 
assigned to working groups by preparing, inde-
pendently, documents for study at meetings 
which would justify use of the word " agency " as 
distinct from the Secretariat-General? Are they 
to be experts seconded by the agencies to the 
working groups for specific tasks? The Assembly 
has never managed to make the Council say 
clearly what role it intended to give the agency 
and quarrels about the seat of the ministerial 
organs have enabled the Council to evade the 
question for four years. The question might settle 
itself with the extinction of the agency in the very 
near future. Is this what the Council wanted? 
Why did it not say so? This ,would in any event 
have allowed the inevitable staff problems to be 
solved far more satisfactorily. 
42. (ii) The question of the subsistence of the 
Agency for the Control of Armaments also arises. 
As long as the Paris Agreements remain fully in 
force it cannot be abolished and must retain its 
independent status vis-a-vis the governments. 
However, this status is in doubt because the 
Council has not appointed a director of the ACA, 
although the post of Director is essential for the 
application of Protocol No. IV which is, in fact, 
violated by the non-replacement of the last 
director. At the present juncture, with chemical 
disarmament high among European preoccupa-
tions, it is hard to imagine the abolition of the 
only body in the world that controls the non-
production of chemical weapons. Yet this role is 
the only one for which the ACA is still effectively 
responsible. What will become of the ACA if the 
agency is merged with the Secretariat-General? 
43. (iii) Similarly, one of the duties of the 
present Agency Ill is to ensure the secretariat of 
the Standing Armaments Committee. The latter 
has not met for almost three years, but it has not 
been abolished and some of its subgroups con-
tinue to function. The Council will have to take a 
decision in this connection. 
44. (iv) Finally, there is work relating to 
European security that must or should be carried 
out. In the event, for instance, of the European 
session in November 1988 organised by the 
French Institut des hautes etudes de defense 
nationale having a sequel, WEU alone will be 
able to follow up the various European sessions, 
since the one in Paris is to be followed by others, 
organised by the corresponding national insti-
tutes, in each country. What body other than a 
WEU agency could be made responsible for this 
task? 
45. It should be noted that, by calling on the 
President of the Assembly, certain members of 
the Assembly and the Secretary-General of the 
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WEU Council, by inviting all the WEU member 
countries to send trainees to the session and by 
having the Secretariat-General take part in the 
preparatory work, the French institute set its ini-
tiative firmly in the framework of WEU. This is 
perfectly in line with the application of para-
graph 12 of the Venice communique. The 
question is therefore how WEU will respond to 
expectations. 
46. (v) Your Rapporteur has pointed out 
above the ambiguities that he considers still exist 
about the respective roles of the Chairmanship-
in-Office and the Secretariat-General. The fact 
that the Council denies this aspect of the matter 
does little to convince him. 
4 7. Your Rapporteur is therefore still con-
vinced that the quarrel over the seat has given 
the Council an excellent pretext for not dealing 
with certain nevertheless important aspects of 
restructuring and has allowed it to shirk its 
responsibilities. To say the least, there is 
therefore some exaggeration in its claim to have 
completed the reactivation of WEU. 
(b) Enlargement 
countries to the treaty means taking up all these 
problems again since, on the one hand, the Paris 
Agreements must be interpreted to allow 
accession and, on the other hand, new members 
cannot be asked to subscribe to obligations that 
the old members do not apply. 
50. The central question is whether the mod-
ified Brussels Treaty, as it has existed since 1954, 
should be revised. So far, the governments have 
wished to avoid starting a discussion on this 
point, considering that Article V of the treaty was 
a vital contribution to Europe's security and that 
Article VIII provided a satisfactory basis for 
WEU when it had few political activities as well 
as since reactivation. Although some of the other 
articles of the treaty do not seem fully satis-
factory, they are not so important as to justify 
calling the whole treaty in question in order to 
improve them. The platform adopted in The 
Hague is an interpretation of the treaty in its 
present form and the two candidate countries 
have been asked to subscribe to both the treaty 
and the platform. They have affirmed their 
intention to do so. Your Rapporteur does not 
know whether their acceptance was accompanied 
by reservations but he considers that: 
51. (i) The accession of Spain and Portugal to 
48. The various texts that the Council sent to the treaty itself, as stipulated in Protocol No. I, is 
the Assembly since June record how the negotia- essential to their membership of WEU. Well 
tions on the enlargement of WEU to include aware that application of Article IX presents 
Spain and Portugal have been tackled by the certain difficulties for the Portuguese and 
Council, and the Secretary-General's letter of Spanish Parliaments, he recalls that similar ques-
26th July sets out the questions that it wished to tions arose for the parliaments of all member 
put to the candidate countries. It is natural that countries and that, subject to a less strict inter-
more cannot be said while negotiations are in pretation of the provisions of this article which 
progress. As your Rapporteur knows nothing would then apply for all member countries, it is 
about how these negotiations are being con- unacceptable for special conditions to be made 
ducted, he feels free to raise here some of the for one country about the way it is represented in 
questions which he thinks should be put, particu- the WEU Assembly. Your Rapporteur refers 
larly as the Secretary-General's letter of 12th here to the idea once put forward that the word 
October suggests that the negotiations are near to "representatives" as used in Article IX should 
completion. be interpreted in accordance with the meaning 
49. Throughout the history of WEU, before given to it in the Assembly's Rules of Procedure, 
and during the reactivation period, a number of which might allow there to be " substitutes " in 
problems relating to the application of the Paris the WEU Assembly who were not necessarily 
Agreements have arisen, in particular when those who are substitutes in the Parliamentary 
French nuclear weapons became operational, Assembly of the Council of Europe. This idea 
when France withdrew from the integrated had been contested by certain legal experts 
NATO military commands and when the lists of although it was not rejected in an absolute and 
conventional weapons subject to control were final manner. 
deleted. Your Rapporteur referred to some of 52. Another possibility would be to accept that 
these in the previous chapter, in connection with the word "representatives" in Article IX could 
Protocol No. 11 and the control of armaments. apply both to representatives and substitutes 
Since the development of the IEPG, other ques- within the meaning given to these two words in 
tions have arisen about the Council's May 1955 the Assembly's Rules of Procedure. In this case, 
decision creating the SAC. Others have been it should be easy to reach agreement among the 
raised by the European Parliament in regard to delegations that representatives to the Parlia-
the application of Article IX of the treaty, or mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
even by the President of the EEC Commission in would be substitutes in the WEU Assembly and 
regard to armaments industries. Some have vice versa, thus allowing members of the double 
eventually been solved de facto without the law, delegation from each country's parliament to be 
i.e. the text of the Paris Agreements, being specialised. Your Rapporteur cannot see how 
amended. Others still exist. The accession of new both these solutions could be rejected. 
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53. Conversely, it seems dangerous to agree to 
each country interpreting Article IX in its own 
manner at a time when the substance of this 
article is the subject of various criticisms and 
suggestions from the European Parliament, from 
private bodies and, finally, from certain govern-
ments. 
54. (ii) For the reasons given above, Protocol 
No. 11 cannot be applied in its present form to 
Spain or to Portugal. The purpose of this pro-
tocol was to limit the force levels of member 
countries' armed forces, which is obviously now 
no longer the aim of any country. In order to 
achieve this controlled limit, the treaty insisted 
on complete openness. Openness is still 
desirable, on the one hand to encourage each 
country to make the effort necessary for joint 
defence and, on the other, to be better informed 
of the true facts in Western Europe in the 
prospect of controlled conventional disarm-
ament. However, the criteria adopted in Protocol 
No. 11, which covers only forces assigned to 
NATO and " internal defence and police forces " 
(Article V), are now an absurd remnant of the 
past. For instance, all French forces, including 
those stationed in Germany or assigned to the 
Franco-German brigade, are labelled " internal 
defence and police forces". The special legal 
position of Spain's forces in NATO will raise the 
problem again in new terms when Spain joins 
WEU. Your Rapporteur feels that neither Spain 
nor Portugal can be expected to define in 
accordance with this text as it now stands the 
nature of their commitment to joint security, but 
they should be asked to give details of their mil-
itary participation in the defence of Europe, 
which, according to the Secretary-General's 
letter, is precisely what the Council is doing. 
55. (iii) Nor is Protocol No. Ill applicable to 
the two candidate countries. The control pro-
cedure that it introduced cannot concern them 
because neither has ABC weapons which are now 
the only weapons subject to control. It seems 
hardly possible, therefore, to have them take part 
in a control system concerning other members 
or, consequently, to allow their accession to Pro-
tocols Nos. Ill and IV, which implies that Spain 
and Portugal renounce participating in the work 
of the Council defined in Article VIII, para-
graph 4. 
56. From the above, your Rapporteur draws 
the conclusion that the opening of negotiations 
on enlargement points to a need to update the 
treaty but that revision is not essential in order 
to achieve enlargement. Moreover, it might be a 
long and delicate process. Finally, there is no 
reason why Spain and Portugal should not be 
asked to join WEU on the basis of Protocol No. I 
of the Paris Agreements, it being understood that 
all the protocols should subsequently be 
reviewed and that both old and new members of 
WEU would obviously be required to partic-
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ipate. One of the aims of the colloquy the 
General Affairs Committee is organising in 
Florence in March 1989 should be to ascertain 
the purpose of such a step. 
57. On the other hand, the fact that Spain and 
Portugal have said they subscribe to the platform 
adopted in The Hague is, finally, the real reason 
why Article XI of the treaty can apply to them. 
The platform expresses the way the seven 
member governments view the application of the 
modified Brussels Treaty in present circum-
stances. However, its wording is sometimes 
ambiguous, due to the fact that the Seven do not 
seem to have exactly the same view of what 
should be the European part of a defence policy 
which is also Atlantic. 
58. Today, the main questions arising relate to 
the deployment of forces, the role of nuclear 
weapons, disarmament and the three aspects of 
arms limitation - nuclear, conventional and 
chemical, the possibility of military action 
outside the NATO area and burden-sharing in 
the alliance. All these matters are being 
examined in one way or another by the WEU 
Council, as can be seen from the Council's com-
munications to the Assembly. One way or 
another, they are part of · the questions the 
Council is putting to the candidate countries. 
The decision to accept the principle of enlarging 
WEU to include Spain and Portugal means that 
the Council considers it useful for these countries 
to participate in its exchanges of views which, it 
should be noted, lead only rarely to joint deci-
sions. The decisions taken by Portugal and Spain 
to negotiate their accession to WEU on the basis 
of the platform mean that they are prepared to 
take part in these exchanges of view, i.e. to take 
account of the views of their new partners in 
their own defence policies. So far, the Seven 
themselves have not gone much further, except 
perhaps in the Gulf. 
59. Finally, it is legitimate for the Council to 
ensure that the accessions of Spain and Portugal 
to WEU are not seen as steps towards the disin-
tegration ofNATO. This was indeed a possibility 
as long as Spain was conducting negotiations 
with the United States to obtain the partial with-
drawal of American forces stationed in Spain. 
Settlement of this matter and of Spain's effective 
participation in responsibilities and risks within 
the Atlantic Alliance, as included among the 
questions put to Spain by the Council, is 
essential. The question of the extent to which a 
national command can be integrated in NATO 
military structures also raises a different problem 
from that of France, whose national command is 
outside NATO. 
60. These, therefore, are the points, together 
with any that Spain and Portugal may wish to 
raise, that should be covered by the negotiations 
which, in these conditions, could be short. It is 
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possible that the accessions of Spain and Por-
tugal will come into effect quickly. If it is 
accepted that an agreement on the principles not 
involving revision of the treaty and which would 
authorise Spain and Portugal to take part in the 
work of WEU was enough and that any member 
countries having to submit this agreement to 
their parliaments would do so reasonably 
quickly, it may be considered that their effective 
accession could be in 1989. Spain and Portugal 
may even take part in the work of the Council -
as Portugal already does in the work of the 
Assembly - as observers before the act of 
accession is ratified, i.e. perhaps as from 
November 1988. 
61. Strictly from the point of view of the 
Assembly, the arrival of two new delegations 
using two languages not now among the 
Assembly's official languages will raise problems 
of premises and staff of some magnitude, in view 
of the Assembly's cramped premises and the 
small number of staff in the Office of the Clerk. 
It is not for the General Affairs Committee to 
study this question but it must point out that, 
while the enlargement of the Council and the 
arrival of a few Spainish and Portuguese officials 
in the Secretariat-General should not necessitate 
any major administrative changes, this is not so 
for the 1\ssembly. 
62. However this may be, while the arrival of 
Spain and Portugal is a consequence of the reac-
tivation of WEU, it might also stimulate it, 
because it means raising questions on which the 
Council has taken no decision in the past 
thirty-four years. Hence, it should be followed by 
an updating of many fundamental texts and the 
Assembly will have to continue to try to ensure 
that these matters are effectively raised and 
solved within the meaning ofWEU's objective as 
described in the preamble to the treaty, the 
platform adopted in The Hague and the 
communique announcing the opening of negoti-
ations with the two countries, i.e. building a 
united Europe, responsible for its own security. 
This is one of the main reasons why the General 
Affairs Committee is organising a colloquy on 
the future of European security. 
V. WEU and the European Community 
63. The prospect of the reactivation of WEU, 
although not all member countries seem con-
vinced that it has been achieved, again raised a 
question which has in fact existed ever since 
there has been a European Economic Com-
munity and above all since political consulta-
tions have been held in a twelve-power 
framework, i.e. WEU's place in a future 
European union. The seven governments have 
now adopted a relatively clear attitude towards 
the WEU Council. The main factors are as 
follows: 
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64. (i) Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the preamble to 
the platform adopted in The Hague, taking up 
the intentions expressed by the Seven in the pre-
amble to the modified Brussels Treaty, indicate 
that: 
"2. We recall our commitment to build a 
European union in accordance with the 
single European act, which we all signed as 
members of the European Community. 
We are convinced that the construction of 
an integrated Europe will remain incom-
plete as long as it does not include security 
and defence. 
3. An important means to this end is the 
modified Brussels Treaty. This treaty, with 
its far-reaching obligations to collective 
defence, marked one of the early steps on 
the road to European unification. It also 
envisages the progressive association of 
other states inspired by the same ideals 
and animated by the like determination. 
We see the revitalisation of WEU as an 
important contribution to the broader 
process of European unification. " 
65. (ii) It should indeed be noted that the 
work of the reactivated WEU Council is shaped 
on the same lines as twelve-power political con-
sultations. The weakening of the role of the 
WEU Secretariat-General and the enhancement 
of that of the presidency brings the two bodies 
closer together, the fundamental difference being 
the number of member countries. Several of the 
Twelve, such as Greece, Ireland and Denmark, 
are not members of WEU nor are they candi-
dates for accession. This precludes any early 
merger between WEU and the Twelve. 
66. (iii) Logically, the development of the 
European Community nevertheless implies 
bringing the armaments industries into the 
purview of Community responsibilities, whereas 
they are excluded under Article 223 of the Rome 
Treaty. 
67. Thus, it would appear that Europe will 
have to juxtapose two systems for some time. 
One, with a limited number of countries and 
respecting state sovereignty in full, would con-
tinue to operate for security matters on the basis 
of the modified Brussels Treaty and the platform 
adopted in The Hague. The other, of a com-
munity nature, would derive its responsibilities 
from the Rome and related Treaties. 
68. For several years, the European Par-
liament has made many proposals for estab-
lishing permanent links with the WEU 
Assembly. Special mention may be made of the 
proposals made by Mr. Hansch and Mr. Tzounis 
on behalf of the Security and Disarmament Sub-
committee of the Political Committee of the 
European Parliament on 28th June 1988, the 
main points being: 
(i) that the European Parliament instruct 
two persons responsible for relations 
with WEU and any rapporteurs 
feeling the need to participate regu-
larly in our Assembly's sessions and 
certain committee meetings; 
(ii) that in the same way members of the 
WEU Assembly be invited to follow 
the work of the European Parlia-
ment's subcommittee and Political 
Committee; 
(iii) that provision be made for subse-
quent meetings between the bureaux 
of the two assemblies' committees; 
(iv) that the exchange of documentation 
between the two assemblies be 
improved; 
(v) that periodic meetings be held 
between delegations from the bureaux 
of the two assemblies. 
69. The WEU Assembly has always been in 
favour of such exchanges, which would show 
mutual interest without in any way affecting the 
exercise of the two assemblies' responsibilities. 
The difficulties that your Rapporteur can see 
relate to WEU's budgetary ability to meet this 
extra activity, which means the Council's 
agreement would have to be sought before imple-
menting decisions such as those suggested by the 
subcommittee of the European Parliament. Our 
Assembly for its part has often noted the heavy 
commitments dual membership imposed on par-
liamentarians whose national activities neces-
sarily remain foremost. 
70. A quite different proposal is the one made 
by Chancellor Kohl in his Brussels speech that 
Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty be 
amended so that the WEU Assembly would be 
composed of member countries' delegations to 
the European Parliament instead of the Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. 
This is not a new proposal but it is the first time 
it has been officially endorsed by a member state. 
It perhaps also meets a wish expressed by Spain 
and Portugal that they should not have to send 
their Council of Europe delegations to the WEU 
Assembly. 
71. This is an important question that your 
Rapporteur does not intend to deal with in depth 
here. He believes it should be tackled at the 
Florence colloquy. However, he wishes to 
mention a point he considers important: in view 
of the nature of the Council and the role of the 
Secretariat-General, the WEU Assembly can 
only address itself to the governments of 
member countries. It has only strictly limited 
supervisory powers and the ability to give 
impetus, without limit in scope, certainly, but 
very limited in its impact. It is its link with the 
parliaments of member countries that allows it, 
in the long run, to exercise some influence on 
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their European policy in areas within the 
purview of the modified Brussels Treaty. A 
European Parliament elected by direct universal 
suffrage has no such link and it can never 
address the ministers of defence. It may therefore 
be wondered whether Chancellor Kohl's sug-
gestion would not in fact eventually weaken the 
role of parliamentarians in the definition of a 
European security policy. This is a wish that 
certain governments perhaps feel without 
expressing it openly. The cause of democratic 
Europe would not necessarily benefit. 
72. It seems more reasonable to consider, for 
the near future, a Europe in which a Community 
part, supervised by a parliament elected by direct 
universal suffrage, would coexist with an inter-
governmental part, supervised by an assembly 
formed of members of national parliaments. Any 
federal or confederal system requires a two-
chamber system in which the weight of universal 
suffrage is moderated by that of the federated ele-
ments in a proportion varying according to the 
nature of the federation or confederation. 
However Europe develops in the coming years, it 
will find it hard to escape this requirement. 
VI. Conclusions 
73. The Assembly cannot fail to be perplexed 
at the triumphant reports circulated by the 
Council about the reactivation of WEU and the 
admissions of failure of that same reactivation 
expressed in barely veiled terms by President 
Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl. The conclusion 
expressed by the two heads of state or of gov-
ernment is that Franco-German co-operation is 
the only true European foundation in security 
matters. Your Rapporteur is not absolutely con-
vinced that their optimism on this point is not 
somewhat exaggerated. Otherwise, the situation 
in WEU would be even more serious because it 
would have failed in one of its essential voca-
tions: to give a truly European dimension to 
co-operation between member countries. The 
establishment of a Franco-German military and 
political nucleus, instead of being an encour-
agement to Europe, would then become an 
obstacle to any progress towards greater 
European unity. 
74. For these reasons, while welcoming inter-
governmental activity in WEU and especially the 
improvement in the information the Council has 
given the Assembly in 1988, your Rapporteur 
wishes to insist that the modified Brussels Treaty 
be amended to allow the strict application of all 
the provisions that the Seven do not decide by 
common, public agreement to repeal. Likewise, 
the Assembly and the public must be kept 
informed of the Council's conclusions in all the 
areas, very wisely chosen, moreover, in which it 
has decided to increase consultations between 
member countries. This is the sense of the rec-
ommendation that he proposes. 
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Amendment 1 
The reactivation and enlargement of WEU 
- reply to the annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENT 1 1 
tabled by Mr. Pieralli and others 
7th December 1988 
1. Redraft paragraph (i) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows: 
" Considering that the positive trend in the international situation and the forthcoming stages of 
East-West relations imply that Western Europe will have to assume special responsibilities in the 
negotiations on the reduction of conventional weapons to ensure its security, promote disarm-
ament and contribute to international peace; " 
Signed: Pieral/i, Greco, Francese 
l. See 11th sitting, 7th December 1988 (amendment agreed to). 
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Amendments 2, 3, 4 and 5 
The reactivation and enlargement of WEU 
- reply to the annual report of the Council 
AMENDMENTS 2, 3, 4 and 5 1 
tabled by Mr. van der Sanden 
. 7th December 1988 
2. Redraft paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation as follows: 
"(vi) Welcoming the accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU;" 
3. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as 
follows: 
"Noting that the nine signatory countries of the modified Brussels Treaty agree that a revision of 
the treaty is necessary; " 
4. After paragraph (vi) of the preamble to the draft recommendation, insert a new paragraph as 
follows: 
" Considering that satisfactory application of Articles V, VIII and IX of the treaty means effec-
tively deleting or updating the protocols to the Paris Agreements that no longer meet European 
security requirements;" 
5. At the end of the draft recommendation proper, add a new paragraph as follows: 
" 10. Undertake without delay an examination of those provisions of the modified Brussels 
Treaty whose deletion or revision it considers necessary and inform the Assembly of the results of 
that examination. " 
Signed: van der Sanden 
l. See 11th sitting, 7th December 1988 (amendments agreed to). 
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The reactivation and enlargement of WEU 
- reply to the annual report of the Council 
ADDENDUM 1 TO THE REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the General Affairs Committee 2 
by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. van der Sanden, Rapporteur) 
1. As the General Affairs Committee had to 
adopt the report it is to present at the second part 
of the thirty-fourth session at its meeting on lOth 
November 1988, it was not able to take into 
account the decisions reached by the Council at 
its ministerial meeting on 14th November. It 
therefore asked your Rapporteur to update his 
report for the meeting on 7th December. 
2. On 15th November, the Assembly re-
ceived three documents signed the previous day 
by the ministers for foreign affairs of member 
countries and of Portugal and Spain relating to 
the accession of those two countries to WEU. 
Conversely, it has received no documents 
relating to other items on the agenda of the 
Council which, contrary to its oft-expressed 
intention of keeping public opinion better 
informed of WEU and its work, seems to have 
stopped issuing press communiques, even at the 
close of ministerial meetings. It is under-
standable that the ministers do not wish to spend 
too much of their time at meetings discussing a 
communique, but it should not be impossible to 
have a satisfactory text drawn up by officials 
without the ministers having to devote a great 
deal of time to it. It is perhaps the mediocre 
results obtained that induce the Council not to 
adopt a text which would call too much attention 
to its failings. 
3. The Assembly has therefore received no 
information other than that gathered during the 
talks between Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr. 
Younger, United Kingdom Secretaries of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and 
Defence respectively, and the Presidential Com-
mittee on 15th November. Already, on a pre-
vious occasion, your Rapporteur said that, 
however useful these talks may be, because of 
cicumstances beyond the control of all concerned 
only very few members of the Assembly can take 
I. Adopted unanimously by the committee. 
part and, since no minutes are taken, they are not 
sufficient to ensure that the Assembly is properly 
informed about the Council's activities. 
4. Furthermore, the European session of the 
French Institut des hautes etudes de defense 
nationale held in Paris from 15th to 25th 
November 1988 provided an opportunity for 
official representatives of most member coun-
tries, not to speak of the President of the 
Assembly and the Secretary-General ofWEU, to 
address a selected public. Some of them have 
provided the texts of their addresses which 
contain useful information in them to which 
your Rapporteur will refer in the present doc-
ument. 
I. The enlargement of WEU 
5. The accession of Portugal and Spain to 
WEU was achieved on 14th November 1988. It 
is the subject of three public texts: a protocol of 
accession to the modified Brussels Treaty, a dec-
laration and an exchange of letters on Spain's 
application of Article X of the modified Brussels 
Treaty. 
6. (a) The protocol concerns accession to the 
Brussels Treaty "as amended by the 'Protocol 
modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty', 
signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954 ". To this is 
added accession to the agreement on the status of 
WEU of 11th May 1955 and the "Agreement 
drawn up in implementation of Article V of Pro-
tocol No. 11 to the Treaty, signed at Paris on 14th 
December 1957 ".This being said, one might ask 
to what have Portugal and Spain acceded. 
Without doubt, to the Brussels Treaty as mod-
ified by Protocol No. I. However, the first para-
graph of the preamble specifies that it is all the 
1954 protocols that are referred to hereinafter as 
2. Members of the committee: Mr. Ahrens (Chairman); MM. Burger, Martino (Vice-Chairmen); MM. Aarts, Bassinet (Alternate: 
Form), Baumel, van der Biest, Chenard (Alternate: Pontillon), Coleman (Alternate: Ewing), Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, MM. Foschi, 
Hill, Hitschler, Koehl, Lord Mackie of Benshie, MM. Mechtersheimer, Miiller, Natali, Pecriaux (Alternate: Eicher), Pieralli, 
Reddemann, Ruet, van der Sanden, Sarti, She/ton, Mrs. Staels-Dompas, Mr. Stoffelen (Alternate: van der Werjj). 
N.B. The names of those taking part in the vote are printed m italics. 
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"the Treaty", which implies that they have 
acceded to Protocols Nos. 11, Ill and IV. 
Moreover, Article II of the protocol of accession 
specifies that Portugal and Spain "become 
parties to the agreements concluded between the 
member states in fulfilment of the Treaty, listed 
by way of annex to the present Protocol", which 
include the Convention of 14th December 1957 
concerning member countries' obligations in 
regard to internal defence and police forces. It 
must therefore be concluded that Portugal and 
Spain have acceded to all the protocols forming 
the 1954 Paris Agreements. This view seems the 
only one for which there are legal grounds, par-
ticularly as Article I of Protocol No. I specifies 
that the high contracting parties consider Pro-
tocols Nos. II, Ill and IV" to be an integral part 
of the present Protocol". 
7. Furthermore, the protocol of accession 
does not say whether the two countries have 
acceded to WEU's decisions that are not a formal 
part of international agreements such as the 
Council's decision of 7th May 1955 setting up 
the Standing Armaments Committee. The pre-
amble contains the following paragraph, 
however: 
"Noting that the Portuguese Republic and 
the Kingdom of Spain have acknowledged 
the agreements, resolutions, decisions and 
rules of whatever nature adopted in the 
framework of Western European Union in 
conformity with the provisions of the 
Treaty." 
" Acknowledged " obviously does not mean 
"acceded" but since they are WEU texts it must 
be accepted that, if considered as such by a state 
acceding to WEU, that state accedes to them at 
the same time. 
8. (b) The political declaration indicates that 
the nine signatories intend to re-examine " as 
appropriate, having regard to the practice and 
achievements of, and the prospects for, their 
co-operation in security matters" the provisions 
of the modified Brussels Treaty and its corre-
sponding protocols. In his main report, your 
Rapporteur had occasion to stress that many 
aspects of WEU's status were out of date. He 
therefore shares the governments' views on the 
need for revision in order to strengthen the 
essential articles, in particular Articles V and 
VIII, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3, and the principle set 
out in Article IX on an assembly emanating from 
the parliaments of member countries to 
supervise the Council's activities. He is also grat-
ified that the new members ofWEU will be par-
ticipating in this revision. However, having 
noted that some of the provisions of these texts 
are not applicable to Portugal and Spain, he 
wonders about the true substance of the commit-
ments to which these two countries have sub-
scribed pending a revision of the treaty which 
might not be effected immediately. 
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9. In this connection, it is not a matter of 
indulging in juridical speculation but of the strict 
application of Article IX: since the Assembly has 
to supervise the Council's iq:tplementation ofthe 
treaty, its duty is to ensure tlltat it is implemented 
strictly. It is encouraged in this task by a political 
consideration: it has always objected to any mea-
sures taken by member states that infringed the 
treaty because it feared that any such measure 
might be seen as a weakening of the will to apply 
a treaty which is an essential part of the deterrent 
value of the alliance. The Assembly can but 
regret that the lack of rigour shown by the signa-
tories of the protocol of accession in this con-
nection, perhaps in order to avoid the talks on 
ratification leading to pointless discussion of 
certain aspects of the text to which Portugal and 
Spain have in principle acceded without any-
thing being said about the effective implemen-
tation of these principles in regard to all aspects 
ofProtocols Nos. II, Ill and IV. It is just as ifthe 
Council had considered the application of these 
protocols could be ignored in texts in which it 
states, on the other hand, that they can be assimi-
lated to the treaty itself. Is it not in order to 
conceal shortcomings in its own behaviour that 
the Council is taking refuge in this juridical 
vagueness? It is particularly regrettable since 
nothing indicates that the C~uncil is prepared to 
reach speedy agreement on revising the treaty. 
10. (c) Your Rapporteur is unable to com-
ment on the exchange of letters on the appli-
cation of Article X to Spain. He notes that 
similar procedure was used in 1954 to cover the 
reservations expressed by the Federal Republic 
and Italy in regard to the same Article X. He 
does not know whether Spain made its reser-
vation in virtue of a general principle or, as has 
been reported in certain newspapers, for very 
specific local interests. 
11. Accession will take effect when the pro-
tocol has been accepted, approved or ratified by 
all the member states. While hoping that 
accession will take effect as soon as possible, 
your Rapporteur believes it useful for the gov-
ernments of countries whene approval is sub-
jected to parliamentary procedure to be ques-
tioned on their interpretation of the ambiguities 
to which he has drawn atterition here. 
12. The question of wider enlargement, to 
include Turkey for instance, seems to have been 
raised at the ministerial meeting in London as a 
result of an application from Turkey in April 
1987. The Council has given no actual details in 
this connection but, according to the Turkish 
newspaper Cumhuriyet dated 9th November 
1988, Turkey sent the members of the Council a 
declaration of intention including its acceptance 
of the platform adopted in The Hague and every-
thing already done in WEU. Greece is also 
believed to have shown interest. This matter 
seems to have led member countries to raise the 
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question of a link between membership of WEU 
and of the European Community without having 
reached agreement on the matter. They do not 
seem to have followed up Turkey's application, 
but there may be other reasons for this. 
13. According to a press report from Brussels 
on 11th November, the Turkish Minister of 
Defence, Mr. Encan Vuralhan, said at the close 
of the IEPG meeting in Luxembourg: 
" There is automatism in WEU. There are 
factors that Turkey should assess carefully. 
If you say yes to a decision you are totally 
bound and have to act in conformity with 
WEU, whereas in NATO resolutions have 
to be adopted by the parliaments ... 
Turkey's position is different from that of 
the other WEU member countries. It has 
long land and maritime frontiers with the 
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. It is 
part of Europe and also an eastern 
country." 
He added that accession to the Community was 
what interested Turkey most. In other words, 
Turkey does not consider its membership of 
NATO commits it beyond Article 5 ofthe North 
Atlantic Treaty and it is no more prepared to 
subscribe to Article V of the modified Brussels 
Treaty than the WEU countries are to undertake 
to defend Turkey in the event of a conflict 
between it and other non-member countries of 
the Warsaw pact. 
14. Turkey's accession to the modified 
Brussels Treaty therefore seems out of the 
question, although this does not preclude looking 
for an adequate means of associating it with 
some of WEU's activities on a basis to be 
defined. 
2. Intergovernmental activities 
15. Information received after the London 
meeting on 14th November leaves little doubt 
about the lack of serious progress made there in 
all other areas, be it the application of the 
platform adopted in The Hague, disarmament, 
responsibility- and burden-sharing in the alliance 
or the restructuring of WEU, not to men-
tion the collocation of the ministerial organs. 
This observation comes at a time when WEU's 
main, defence-related activity in 1988, 
mine-sweeping in the Gulf, is drawing to a close. 
This means that if the Council continues to mark 
time in everything relating to action to be taken 
on The Hague platform, WEU will very soon 
again start to seem like a dormant organisation 
and not fulfil the role the governments attributed 
to it when it was reactivated, i.e. to make Euro-
peans aware of their security requirements. 
16. This concern brings your Rapporteur to 
draw attention to the European session organised 
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by the French Institut des hautes etudes de 
defense nationale from 15th to 25th November. 
In itself, this initiative, taken in the framework 
of WEU, is interesting and it meets a wish 
expressed by the Assembly on several occasions. 
All the member governments showed their 
interest by ensuring participation in response to 
the invitations received and most of them by 
having one of their members explain their 
position towards WEU. Your Rapporteur cannot 
analyse this session here, since the only infor-
mation published is the text of addresses com-
municated by their authors. However, he wishes 
to underline two points that he considers 
important: 
(a) If such sessions are to play the role 
assigned to them, i.e. of making European 
public opinion aware of Europe's defence 
requirements, they must include, in 
addition to officials and military staff 
directly concerned with WEU's work, 
persons of various professions capable of 
propagating the conclusions they draw 
from these sessions. 
(b) For the same reason, tnis first session 
must be followed up and the WEU minis-
terial organs alone can do this, be it by 
co-ordinating subsequent sessions or by 
maintaining the relations thus created 
between participants. This corresponds to 
the proposal made by Mr. Rocard, French 
Prime Minister, when he said at the 
opening of the session on 15th November: 
" I wish a European institute for security 
studies to be set up, attached to WEU, by 
means that have to be worked out. This 
would allow WEU, which is still hesi-
tating, to find its way more easily. So let us 
start by allowing it to develop joint 
thinking. " 
17. In the same address, Mr. Rocard made a 
proposal concerning the creation of a European 
" openness " centre to help with disarmament 
negotiations by gathering, circulating and 
explaining information. This proposal is too 
vague to be able to adopt an immediate position 
on it. However, it relates to an area in which 
WEU's Agency for the Control of Armaments, in 
thirty-five years' work, has acquired some expe-
rience that should not be lost if such a centre is 
one day to be set up. 
18. Note may also be taken of the proposal 
by the French Prime Minister to set up, in the 
framework of the IEPG, a flexible body for 
co-ordination to promote the implementation of 
specific co-operative programmes between a few 
countries only and to follow them up. This pro-
posal is remarkably similar to the decision taken 
in May 1955 to set up the SAC in the framework 
of WEU. It should logically lead, following the 
decision to establish a secretariat taken by the 
IEPG in Luxembourg on 9th November, to a 
restructuring of organisations whose vocation is 
to promote armaments co-operation. Since the 
SAC no longer meets, there would be every 
advantage in the officials responsible for its sec-
retariat being placed at the disposal of all the 
existing bodies dealing with the various aspects 
of co-operation: assessment of requirements, 
time schedules, research and development, joint 
programmes, etc. 
19. Mr. Rocard's proposal to revive plans for 
European co-operation on an observation sat-
ellite is close enough to an item on the agenda of 
the Assembly's session being reported on by the 
Committee on Scientific, Technological and Aer-
ospace Questions for your Rapporteur to do no 
more than point out this convergence. 
3. The Council and the Assembly 
20. The Assembly can but welcome the mea-
sures the Council has taken to allow the 
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Assembly to meet its new requirements: the 
immediate assignment of offices in the WEU 
Paris premises in order inter alia to accom-
modate the Portugese and 'Spanish Delegations 
and the officials who have recently joined the 
Office of the Clerk and the granting of credits to 
allow a study to be made of short-term require-
ments in respect of changes to be made to the 
building to adapt it to the Assembly's new needs 
augur well for co-operation between the Council 
and the Assembly. 
21. For these reasons, your Rapporteur trusts 
that with the increased membership ofWEU the 
two new members will accelerate solutions that 
the Seven have been unable to find in recent 
years and give the Council's activities the 
stimulus they need. He does not believe that 
events since lOth November call in question 
what the committee decided on that date, 
although some changes will be necessary in the 
draft recommendation adopted at that meeting. 
Document 1164 14th November 1988 
Accession of the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain 
to Western European Union 
14th November 1988 
(Documents transmitted by the Council) 
Protocol 
for the accession of the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain 
to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration 
and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on 17th March 1948, 
as amended by the 'Protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty', 
signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954 
The parties to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-
Defence signed at Brussels on 17th March 1948, as modified and completed by the Protocol signed at 
Paris on 23rd October 1954 and the other protocols and annexes which form an integral part thereof, 
hereinafter referred to as 'the Treaty', on the one hand, 
and the Portuguese Republic and Kingdom of Spain, on the other, 
Reaffirming the common destiny which binds their countries and recalling their commitment to 
build a European union in accordance with the Single European Act; 
Convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does 
not include security and defence; 
Determined to develop a more cohesive European defence identity which will translate more 
effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity contained in the Treaty and in the North Atlantic 
Treaty; 
Noting that the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain, which are fully committed to the 
process of European construction and are members of the Atlantic Alliance, have formally stated that 
they are prepared to accede to the Treaty; 
Noting that these two states accept unreservedly and in their entirety the Rome declaration of 
27th October 1984 and the platform on European security interests adopted in The Hague on 
27th October 1987 and that they are prepared to participate fully in their implementation; 
Recalling the invitation issued on 19th April 1988 by the Council of Ministers of Western 
European Union to the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain to open discussions with a view 
to their possible accession to the Treaty; 
Noting the satisfactory conclusion of the discussions which followed this invitation; 
Noting that the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain have acknowledged the agree-
ments, resolutions, decisions and rules of whatever nature adopted in the framework of Western 
European Union in conformity with the provisions of the Treaty; 
Noting the invitation to accede to the Treaty issued to the Portuguese Republic and to the 
Kingdom of Spain on 14th November 1988; 
Noting the political declaration adopted on 14th November 1988; 
Considering that the enlargement of Western European Union to include the Portuguese Republic 
and the Kingdom of Spain represents a significant step in the development of European solidarity in the 
field of security and defence; 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
By the present Protocol, the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain accede to the Treaty. 
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Article 11 
By their accession to the Treaty, the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain become 
parties to the agreements concluded between the member states in fulfilment of the Treaty, listed by way 
of annex to the present Protocol. 
Article Ill 
Each of the signatory states shall notify the Belgian Government of the acceptance, approval or 
ratification of the present Protocol, which shall enter into force on the day of the receipt of the last of 
these notifications. The Belgian Government shall inform the signatory states of each such notification 
and of the entry into force of the Protocol. 
In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto, have signed the present Pro-
tocol. 
Done at London this fourteenth day of November, 1988, in two texts, in the English and French 
languages, each text being equally authoritative, in a single copy which shall remain deposited in the 
archives of the Belgian Government and certified copies of which shall be transmitted by that gov-
ernment to each of the other signatories. 
For the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium: 
For the Government of the French Republic: 
For the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany: 
For the Government of the Italian Republic: 
For the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg: 
For the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands: 
For the Government of the Portuguese Republic: 
For the Government of the Kingdom of Spain: 
For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: 
ANNEX 
Agreements concluded between the member states in fulfilment of the Treaty: 
1. Agreement on the status of Western European Union, national representatives and international 
staff, signed at Paris on 11th May 1955. 
2. Agreement drawn up in implementation of Article V of Protocol No. 11 to the Treaty, signed at 
Paris on 14th December 1957. 
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Political declaration relating to the enlargement of 
Western European Union to include Portugal and Spain 
During the consultations which were held with a view to the enlargement ofWEU to include Por-
tugal and Spain, the member states ofWEU with Portugal and Spain, taking into consideration the spirit 
in which their security co-operation has recently developed, found that a number of the provisions of 
the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, did not correspond to the way in which they intend to pursue 
and strengthen that co-operation, on the basis of the Rome declaration on 27th October 1984 and of the 
platform on European security interests, adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987. 
Consequently, the member states ofWEU with Portugal and Spain consider that the relevant pro-
visions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, and its corresponding protocols will be re-examined, 
as appropriate, having regard for the practice and achievements of, and the prospects for, their 
co-operation in security matters. 
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Texts for exchange of letters on Article X of the modified Brussels Treaty 
English version 
A. Draft letter from Spanish Minister to each member state and Portugal 
"Your Excellency, 
I have the honour to refer to the Protocol signed this day for the accession of the Portuguese 
Republic and the Kingdom of Spain to the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and 
Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on 17th March 1948, as amended by the protocol modifying 
and completing the Brussels Treaty, signed at Paris on 23rd October 1954, and to communicate the fol-
lowing in connection with Article X of the said Treaty, hereinafter referred to as 'the Treaty'. 
The Government ofthe Kingdom of Spain proposes in this connection that the Kingdom of Spain 
shall not, as a consequence of its accession to the Treaty, be obliged to submit to the International Court 
of Justice, without its consent, any dispute between Spain and another party to the Treaty existing prior 
to the entry into force of the Treaty for Spain or relating to facts or situations existing before that date. 
I should be grateful if Your Excellency would confirm that your Government is in agreement with 
the above and that the exchange of letters thus effected will be considered as an annex to the protocol of 
accession, which will enter into force simultaneously therewith. 
(formal close)" 
B. Draft reply from each member state and Portugal to the Spanish Minister 
" Your Excellency, 
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your communication of today's date referring to the 
Protocol for the accession of the Portuguese Republic and the Kingdom of Spain to the Treaty of Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed at Brussels on 17th March 
1948, as amended by the protocol modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty, signed at Paris on 
23rd October 1954 and in particular to Article X of the said Treaty, hereinafter referred to as 'the 
Treaty'. 
I have the honour in reply to confirm that, in the view of my Government, the Kingdom of Spain 
shall not, as a consequence of its accession to the Treaty, be obliged to submit to the International Court 
of Justice, without its consent, any dispute between Spain and another party to the Treaty existing prior 
to the entry into force of the Treaty for Spain or relating to facts or situations existing before that date, 
and that the present exchange of letters will be considered as an annex to the protocol of accession, 
which will enter into force simultaneously therewith. 
(formal close)" 
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Action by the Presidential Committee 
REPORT 
submitted on behalf of the Presidential Committee 
by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Vice-President of the Assembly 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Adoption of the agenda and draft order of business of the second 1988 
part-session and preparation of the two 1989 part-sessions 
II. Dialogue with the Council and adoption of measures to allow the Portu-
guese and Spanish Delegations to the WEU Assembly to be accommo-
dated next year 
Ill. Adoption of a report on the application of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Assembly 
IV. Approval of amendments to the Financial Regulations tabled by the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
V. Adoption of guidelines on the work of representatives of the media in the 
chamber 
VI. Adoption of a supplementary budget 
VII. Adoption of the special rules on honorary association 
APPENDICES 
I. Letter from Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, to Sir Geoffrey 
Howe, Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
II. Application of the Rules of Procedure - Report to the Presidential Com-
mittee submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur 
Ill. Proposed amendments to the Financial Regulations of the Assembly sub-
mitted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
IV. Guidelines on the work of representatives of the media in the chamber 
V. Special rules on honorary association with the WEU Assembly adopted by 
the Presidential Committee on 28th September 1988 
I. Adoption of the agenda and draft order of 
business of the second 1988 part-session and 
preparation of the two 1989 part-sessions 
1. Some aspects of the Presidential Commit-
tee's action are quite clear, i.e. preparing the 
Assembly's agenda giving the subjects of reports 
and the draft order of business of sessions pro-
posing the order in which debates should be held. 
2. Thus, the Assembly's work is prepared for 
it, but it still has the last word. It may withdraw a 
report from the agenda, add another subject by 
adopting a motion with a request for urgent pro-
cedure or amend the draft order of business. 
3. Together with the Committee for Parlia-
mentary and Public Relations, the Presidential 
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Committee has been gtvmg thought to infor-
mation policy and the Assembly will of course be 
kept informed of the result. Its thoughts have 
already found expression since the draft budget 
for the financial year 1989, which is submitted to 
the Assembly for approval, includes an increase 
ofF 90 000 in estimates for expenditure on infor-
mation. 
4. Much of the Presidential Committee's 
action is described in its progress report so as to 
bring it to the attention of the Assembly and this 
includes forward planning for future sessions. 
5. Thus, the future of European security is to 
be the subject of a report by the General Affairs 
Committee which will be prepared following the 
colloquy the committee is organising in Florence 
with the generous assistance of the Italian 
authorities. 
6. Furthermore, the Presidential Committee 
decided to respond to the invitation it received 
from the Supreme Soviet by, in turn, inviting a 
delegation from the Supreme Soviet to meet a 
delegation from the Assembly next May in Paris. 
This will ensure the exchange of views on 
problems which concern us. The lessons learned 
from these talks cannot fail to enrich any future 
report by the General Affairs Committee on 
developments in East-West relations . 
• 
7. The Defence Committee for its part will be 
giving thought to China's role in the new interna-
tional context and it is in this context that it has 
been authorised to organise a visit to Beijing next 
May. 
11. Dialogue with the Council and adoption 
of measures to allow the Portuguese 
and Spanish Delegations to 
the WEU Assembly to be accommodated next year 
8. While preparing the future work of the 
Assembly, the Presidential Committee pursues a 
continuing dialogue with the Council. 
9. The Presidential Committee first acted on 
behalf of the Assembly by drawing the Council's 
attention to the importance we all attach to the 
accession of Portugal and Spain to WEU. Talks 
with the presidency showed that the Assembly's 
views were in fact shared by the Council. At the 
recent meeting held in London on 15th 
November 1988 to inform the Presidential Com-
mittee of the results of the previous day's minis-
terial meeting, the Presidential Committee was 
therefore able to congratulate Sir Geoffrey Howe 
and Mr. Younger on having obtained, only six 
months after the talks started, the signing of the 
protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain to 
the modified Brussels Treaty. The Presidential 
Committee, which hopes that ratification pro-
cedure will be swift, has expressed the wish that a 
demonstration of European unity be organised 
on that occasion. In this spirit, it has asked the 
Council to agree to transmit to the governments 
a joint explanatory memorandum designed to 
present the protocol of accession to national par-
liaments. 
10. The problem now facing the Assembly is 
how to accommodate the parliamentary delega-
tions from the new member countries ofWEU in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure. 
11. First, the Presidential Committee has 
decided to invite the parliamentary delegations 
of both countries to appoint a representative to 
take part in the work of the Presidential Com-
mittee even before completion of the ratification 
procedure and the introduction of new Rules of 
Procedure allowing two new vice-presidents to 
be elected. 
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12. From a linguistic standpoint, the Presi-
dential Committee has decided not to amend the 
Rules of Procedure so as to apply the provisions 
concerning the Assembly's working languages to 
Portuguese and Spanish immediately the pro-
tocol of accession comes into force. In order to 
take part without difficulty in the work of com-
mittees, therefore, each parliamentarian must be 
able to speak in his own language and, for the 
same reason, it has been decided that, however 
difficult it may be to find interpreters in Paris 
who can interpret from Dutch into English, the 
necessary effort must be made to ensure that 
each parliamentarian can enjoy his full rights 
under the Assembly's Rules of Procedure. 
13. The budgetary implications of increasing 
the number of official languages must not be 
concealed. More interpreters will be required and 
specialised staff will have to be recruited to take 
down speeches in Portuguese and Spanish. More 
and larger interpretation booths will be required 
for plenary sessions to allow interpretation of 
speeches to and from the seven languages. 
14. While it is certainly possible during ses-
sions to install interpretation booths on a tem-
porary basis, the same is not true for committee 
meetings. The enlargement ofWEU means larger 
rooms must be provided to accommodate the 
representatives of nine delegations and to ensure 
that some of these delega~ions will be able to 
arrange for interpretation into their own lan-
guages, and at their own expense, of speeches 
made in other languages. A feasibility study has 
been commissioned to determine how the 
Assembly's new working requirements due to the 
enlargement of WEU can be ensured. 
15. While the necessary work is being carried 
out, over a period of about ten months, the 
Assembly and its committees will have to meet 
away from its seat. The programme of work of 
the committees will have tq take due account of 
this. The Presidential Committee will obviously 
try to organise the Assembly's work so that par-
liamentary activities do not suffer from the tran-
sitional period that is about to start. 
16. The financial implications of all these 
measures will be the subject of a supplementary 
budget that the Presidential Committee, in 
accordance with the Rules of Procedure, as 
amended last June, is now empowered to draw 
up. It must be made plain that this budget will 
be a large one because of the cost of work 
to be carried out and also because of the increase 
in annual expenditure resulting from the 
enlargement of the Assembly. 
Ill. Adoption of a report on the application of 
the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly 
17. At the last session, a motion for an order 
was tabled by Mr. Soell and others instructing 
the President of the Assembly to seek an 
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agreement with the Council to limit the number 
of ministerial speeches at any one part-session of 
the Assembly. 
18. This motion was referred to the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure which reported to 
the Presidential Committee. The Committee on 
Rules of Procedure agreed unanimously to the 
comments in part I of the report on the appli-
cation of the Rules of Procedure (see Appendix 
II). The committee first considered that it was 
for the Presidential Committee to determine 
which ministers it is desirable to invite within the 
political context of each session. By taking this 
decision, the Presidential Committee would, it 
believed, take account of the Assembly's wish to 
limit the number of ministerial speeches. It was 
therefore agreed to propose to the Presidential 
Committee that, apart from representatives of 
the presidency of the Council, representatives of 
only two other governments should be invited to 
address the Assembly . .It would also be preferable 
for the ministers concerned to have different 
portfolios. 
19. Although under the Charter the Presi-
dential Committee cannot refuse members of 
governments access to the chamber and the right 
to speak, it might ask them to deliver their 
speeches on the last day of the session. 
20. The Presidential Committee agreed unani-
mously to the proposals of the Committee on 
Rules of Procedure and Privileges. 
21. It also endorsed the committee's proposals 
by deciding that senior officials members of the 
Assembly might wish to hear should, as far as 
possible, address committees since this would 
facilitate the preparation of committee reports. 
* 
* * 
22. At the last session, there were complaints 
about what was considered to be the inordinate 
lapse of time between the debate on a report and 
the resulting vote. 
23. After examining the advantages and disad-
vantages of grouping votes on draft recommen-
dations or ensuring the continuity of debates, the 
Presidential Committee first noted that the 
Assembly was master of its order ofbusiness and 
could therefore adapt it to circumstances. It 
believed, however, that when drawing up the 
draft order of business for submission to the 
Assembly the President should first endeavour to 
ensure that votes were taken immediately after 
the relevant debates. 
* 
* * 
24. Finally, the Presidential Committee 
examined the conclusions drawn by the Com-
mittee on Rules of Procedure and Privileges after 
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discussing Mr. Malfatti's proposal on voting on 
separate parts. The committee noted that there 
were serious practical and procedural objections 
to this proposal. 
25. From a practical standpoint, it would 
lengthen debates and make the Assembly vote 
twice on almost identical subjects. 
26. From a procedural standpoint, the 
adoption of this proposal would allow the time-
limits imposed in the Rules of Procedure for 
tabling amendments to be circumvented and it 
might lead to contradictions in a text and delay 
work by forcing the Assembly to make the nec-
essary adjustments to the texts being voted. The 
proposal to include voting on separate parts in 
the Assembly's Rules of Procedure was therefore 
negatived unanimously by the committee and, 
for the same reasons, the Presidential Committee 
endorsed this view. 
27. The whole of the report by the Committee 
on Rules of Procedure and Privileges was 
therefore agreed to by the Presidential Com-
mittee (see Appendix II). 
IV. Approval of amendments 
to the Financial Regulations tabled 
by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration 
28. The amendments made by the Assembly 
to its Rules of Procedure last June led the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
in turn to amend the Financial Regulations to 
take account of the new budgetary provisions in 
the Rules of Procedure. The main purpose of the 
changes is to spell out the framework in which 
the Assembly can exercise its budgetary 
autonomy as recognised by the Council in July 
1987. The President of the Assembly is now 
empowered to authorise transfers between Heads 
II to V of the Assembly's operating budget, i.e. 
between all heads except Head I relating to the 
salaries of permanent staff. 
29. Furthermore, procedure for approving 
amendments to the Financial Regulations by a 
majority of representatives to the Assembly, i.e. 
an absolute majority, seems unnecessarily 
stringent. This procedure is in fact applicable 
only to amendments to the Charter. Amend-
ments to the Assembly's Rules of Procedure are 
approved by a majority of the votes cast. 
30. Since the Financial Regulations constitute 
the application of the budgetary provisions ofthe 
Rules of Procedure, it is proposed to lighten the 
procedure by providing for the Financial Regula-
tions to be drawn up by the Committee on Budg-
etary Affairs and Administration and adopted by 
the Presidential Committee. 
31. This procedure seems to be in conformity 
with the powers of the Committee on Budgetary 
Affairs and Administration and of the Presi-
dential Committee respectively under Rule 48 of 
the Rules of Procedure. 
32. The amended text of the Financial Regula-
tions (see Appendix Ill) was adopted unani-
mously by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration and agreed to by the Presi-
dential Committee at its meeting on 28th Sep-
tember 1988. 
33. The Assembly is asked to ratify this 
decision. 
V. Adoption of guidelines on the work 
of representatives of the media in the chamber 
34. The Assembly's public sittings are open to 
representatives of all branches of the media 
wishing to report them. However, their activities 
might sometimes be intrusive to members and 
disturb the debates. 
35. Practice hitherto followed for solving this 
problem required amplification and clarifi-
cation. 
36. A compromise was sought between the 
desire to allow representatives of the media to 
exercise their activities with enough freedom to 
inform the public properly of the Assembly's 
debates and the need to allow the Assembly to 
debate in an orderly, calm manner. The Presi-
dential Committee hopes this compromise will 
prove effective. The guidelines at Appendix IV 
to the present report set out the conditions in 
which representatives of the media are 
authorised to work and provide for warnings or 
penalties in the event of these guidelines not 
being respected. 
3 7. It is hoped that the work of members of 
the Assembly and representatives of the media 
will be facilitated by these guidelines. 
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VI. Adoption of a supplementary budget 
38. Further to the decision of the WEU 
Council of Ministers to authorise the creation of 
four new posts in the Office of the Clerk of the 
Assembly, a supplementary budget has been pre-
pared asking for the corresponding credits. This 
supplementary budget also takes into account 
two new pensions which, since they relate to 
early retirements, had not been included when 
the ordinary 1988 budget was prepared. 
39. This draft budget (Document 1153), which 
amounts to F 833 000 (F 567 000 for the oper-
ating budget and F 266 000 for the pensions 
budget), was agreed to unanimously by the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
and subsequently agreed to by the Presidential 
Committee. On the recommendation of its 
Budget and Organisation Committee, the 
Council approved this budget at its meeting on 
23rd November 1988. In accordance with Rule 
48 of the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly, the 
Presidential Committee submits its decision to 
approve this budget for ratification by the 
Assembly. 
VII. Adoption of the special rules 
on honorary association 
40. Since member countries' delegations to 
WEU are identical with those to the Council of 
Europe, the special rules on honorary association 
with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council 
of Europe which were adopted on 13th January 
1988 could easily be applied by the WEU 
Assembly. The Presidential Committee therefore 
adopted regulations practically identical with 
those in force in the Assembly of the Council of 
Europe. 
41. Consequently, honorary associates of the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe from the delegations of WEU member 
countries will be honorary associates of the WEU 
Assembly and will be notified of the details of 
such membership. 
DOCUMENT 1165 
APPENDIX I 
Letter from Mr. Goerens, President of the Assembly, to 
Sir Geoffrey Howe, Chairman-in-Office of the Council 
-'.PPENDIX I 
Paris, 20th October 1988 
Dear Sir Geoffrey, 
In my letters of 28th September and 7th October 1988, I drew the Council's attention to the 
urgency of work to be undertaken to enable the Assembly to deal with the problems linked to the 
enlargement of WEU. 
The information available to me regarding recent developments in the conversations on this 
question lead me to hope that you will soon be in a position to announce that Spain and Portugal are 
invited to accede to the modified Brussels Treaty. 
It would therefore appear necessary to proceed as soon as possible with the architect's study nec-
essary for an estimate to be made of the type, cost and duration of the work proposed by the Assembly. 
To this end, I wish to commit forthwith, with the agreement of the Council, the expenditure necessary 
for this study, the cost of which has been estimated by the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs at 
between fifty and one hundred thousand francs. This expenditure will be included in the supplementary 
budget of the Assembly for the financial year 1989. 
I shall not fail to communicate this study to the Council as soon as it is completed. 
The Rt. Hon. Sir Geoffrey Howe, Q.C., M.P., 
Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs, 
Chairman-in-Office of the Council of 
Western European Union, 
Downing Street, 
LONDON SW1A 2AL 
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Yours sincerely, 
Charles GoERENS 
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APPENDIX II 
Application of the Rules of Procedure - Report to the Presidential 
Committee submitted by Sir Geoffrey Finsberg, Chairman and Rapporteur 
I. Presence of ministers at sessions 
of the Assembly 
1. Article VI of the Charter provides that 
members of the Council and other ministers of 
member states may be heard by the Assembly at 
their own or the Assembly's request. 
2. There was a period when the Assembly 
regretted that so few governmental representa-
tives took part in its debates. Now fears are 
voiced that too many ministerial speeches are 
reducing the time available for speeches by par-
liamentarians. 
3. The fact is that since 1984 the reactivation 
of the Council has resulted in governments being 
represented more often at plenary sessions and it 
is not unusual for the Assembly to be addressed 
by an outside speaker at almost every sitting. 
4. The Committee on Rules of Procedure has 
been invited by the Presidential Committee to 
examine what measures might be envisaged to 
allow the Assembly to have proper control over 
parliamentary participation in its deliberations. 
5. Consideration should therefore be given to 
liaising with the Council to co-ordinate minis-
terial speeches during sessions, although this 
approach may not produce results because the 
decision to take part in a session is taken com-
pletely independently by each government in the 
light of purely national considerations. 
6. It rests, of course, with the Presidential 
Committee to determine which ministers it is 
desirable to invite on the basis of the interests of 
the Assembly and within the political context of 
each session. 
7. In view of the desire to limit the number 
of ministerial speeches, the Presidential Com-
mittee might consider that, in addition to the 
country with the Chairmanship-in-Office, two 
governments only should be invited to be repre-
sented at a session of the Assembly. It would be 
preferable for these two governments to send 
ministers with different portfolios: if the minister 
for foreign affairs of one of the countries speaks, 
it would be better for the other country to send 
the defence minister. 
8. Admittedly, the Presidential Committee 
cannot under the Charter envisage refusing other 
members of the governments of member coun-
tries access to the Chamber and the right to 
speak. It can, however, ensure that any such 
ministerial speeches take their proper place in 
the debates. Consequently, ifthe speakers invited 
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by the Assembly make their contribution, in 
accordance with the proposals of the Presidential 
Committee, the Presidential Committee can 
inform other ministers wishing to speak that it 
will only be possible to address the Assembly on 
the last day of the session. 
9. An invitation is sometimes sent to the Sec-
retary-General of NATO or the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe (SACEUR). It should be 
stressed that such persons may address the 
Assembly only if expressly invited and the provi-
sions of the Charter do not apply in these cases. 
This also holds for senior officers and other 
experts. Generally the latter are heard in com-
mittee and their comments are incorporated in 
the framework of reports. 
11. Roll-call 
10. In his report to the Presidential Com-
mittee on behalf of the Committee on Rules of 
Procedure and Privileges, dated 22nd October 
1986, Mr. Schulte referred to the need for a lapse 
of time (generally a quarter of an hour) between 
the announcement of a vote and the time a vote 
actually takes place. The provisions proposed 
have so far been applied without difficulty but 
the report by Mr. Schulte did not envisage the 
problems that might arise from a very long break 
between the debate and the vote which should 
conclude it. Complaints were made at the last 
session because on several occasions the vote did 
not follow immediately after the debate on the 
text in question, the Assembly dealing with other 
subjects in the meantime. 
11. The delays thus criticised often stem from 
the wish to group votes at the end of a sitting. 
This measure has the advantage of avoiding the 
vote being held earlier than anticipated, thus 
taking parliamentarians by surprise, and 
ensuring the effective presence at an agreed time 
of parliamentarians who have signed the register 
of attendance. The drawback is to delay until the 
agreed time the natural conclusion of a debate by 
a vote. 
12. However this may be, the Assembly is 
master of its agenda. It gives its views at the 
beginning of a session when it adopts the draft 
order of business and at the end of each sitting 
when it adopts the draft orders of the day for the 
next sitting. It might be proposed that in drawing 
up these draft orders of business and orders of 
the day, the President should endeavour to 
ensure that votes follow immediately after the 
relevant debates. 
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Ill. Voting on separate parts 
13. Mr. Malfatti's proposal would have the 
effect of permitting the Assembly to express an 
opinion on each of the major topics contained 
within the text, as well as on particular amend-
ments and on the text as a whole. 
14. The objections to such a suggestion are 
both practical and procedural. 
15. In practical terms, the way would be 
opened to a multiplicity of votes. In extreme 
cases, each paragraph of a very long text might 
give rise to a separate vote. This would permit 
the opponents of a text to use as a weapon for 
delay the fact that the Assembly meets only twice 
a year for four days on each occasion. The 
Assembly's procedure would cease to be even-
handed as between proponents and opponents of 
a text. 
16. Nor can it be argued that such a change is 
necessary because the rules allow insufficient 
opportunity for a case to be put. Members of the 
Assembly may present their views during the 
general discussion, in the course of the debate on 
amendments, and in explanations of vote after 
the adoption of a text as a whole. A member who 
wishes to omit (or even to abstain on) some par-
agraphs of a text and not others is of course at 
liberty to table the appropriate amendments. In 
those circumstances, there seems no need to 
ensure a further opportunity for debate and 
decision, particularly as a member may make an 
explanation of vote. 
17. Indeed, since debates on amendments 
usually involve discussion on the whole para-
graph in which the change is sought, Mr. 
Malfatti's proposal might in practice involve the 
Assembly's voting twice (perhaps by roll-call 
with all the delay that involves) on much the 
same issue. 
18. Finally, the need for the presidency to 
interpret the phrase " logical significance " when 
distinguishing a case where a separate vote was 
allowable from one where it was not would give 
rise to further dispute. 
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19. The procedural objections are even more 
telling. Rule 29.2 prescribes a time-limit on the 
tabling of amendments. Mr. Malfatti's proposal 
would simply circumvent that rule. The 
Assembly would thus require notice of the lesser 
change - the amendment, perhaps to only one 
word in a paragraph - but not of the greater, the 
proposal to eliminate an entire topic. This would 
be entirely contrary to logic. 
20. Furthermore, the multiplication of sep-
arate votes (some covered by amendments, 
others - under Mr. Malfatti's proposal - not) 
runs the risk of rendering a text inconsistent with 
itself. When notice is given of amendments, the 
President and members can readily see if any 
consequential changes are required should the 
amendment be adopted. If an entire topic is left 
out of a text, there will nearly always be a strong 
case for immediate recommittal for further con-
sideration, since the balance of the report is often 
a fairly delicate synthesis of the position of each 
member of the committee. Under existing rules, 
recommittal is often sought when the Assembly 
adopts amendments more limited in scope than 
the leaving out of an entire topic. Furthermore, 
even if recommittal is not sought after a vote to 
omit a major topic, action will almost certainly 
need to be taken in the Assembly to make conse-
quential adjustments to the text. This in turn (to 
comply with the time-limit on tabling amend-
ments) would lead to the adjournment offurther 
consideration of the text. 
21. Finally, there would inevitably be some 
occasions when the Assembly's prior decision on 
a far-reaching amendment made it procedurally 
impossible for the presidency to permit the 
making of a motion to omit the relevant topic, 
because to do so would be to invite the Assembly 
to contradict the decision it had just taken on the 
amendment. This judgment would have to be 
made without notice, putting the presidency in a 
very awkward position. This would not be an 
easy procedure to operate or to explain. 
22. For these and other reasons, whatever may 
be the practice of some (by no means all) 
European legislatures, the changes for which Mr. 
Malfatti is arguing will certainly not help in any 
way the deliberations of the Assembly of 
WEU. 
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APPENDIX Ill 
Proposed amendments to the Financial Regulations of the Assembly, 
submitted by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration 
Explanatory Memorandum 
(submitted by Mr. Linster, Chairman and Rapporteur) 
1. Rule 48 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Assembly governing budgetary questions was 
amended by decisions of the Assembly on 30th 
November 1987 and 9th June 1988. 
The new text reads as follows: 
the credits specified in the budget, once 
the latter has been approved by the 
Council. 
7. In the course of its first session fol-
lowing the end of each financial year, the 
Assembly shall express its approval or dis-
approval of the accounts for that year, on a 
motion tabled by a member of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration. " " 1. Each year, following a report of the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration drawn up in collaboration The new provisions adopted by the 
with the Presidential Committee, the Assembly should be reflected in its Financial 
Assembly shall approve a provisional Regulations. It is therefore proposed in the 
statement of its expenditure, divided into present report that amendments be made to 
heads and sub-heads. Articles 3, 4 and 5 of those regulations. 
2. The Assembly or, in between sessions 2. The report also proposes amendments to 
or part-sessions, the Presidential Corn- the preamble to the Financial Regulations and to 
mittee, in application of Rule 14, para- Articles 2, 6 and 17 for the following reasons: 
graph 2, of the Rules of Procedure, may, if (a) Preamble: The amendment is intended to 
necessary, approve supplementary esti- make quite clear in what framework the 
mates of expenditure, but if the latter so Assembly's budgetary autonomy must be exer-
acts it shall submit its decision to the next cised. 
sitting of the Assembly for ratification. (b) Article 2: Since 1985, Assembly budgets 
3. The President shall communicate these have been presented in a new, clear and detailed 
documents to the Council which shall manner. The text of this aflticle gives the main 
express a prior opinion. headings of this presentation. 
4. When the prior opinion of the Council (c) Articles 6 and new 7: The new provisions 
includes reductions in appropriations, the take account of the Council's decision to 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and recognise, in the framework of the Assembly's 
Administration may, in consultation with budgetary autonomy, the President's power to 
the Presidential Committee, present a authorise transfers between Heads II to V of the 
draft budget to the Assembly which does operating budget. 
not conform with the prior opinion of the (d) Article 17 (new Article 18): Procedure for 
Council. Acceptance of such a draft budget approving amendments to the Financial Regula-
shall require the votes of a number of rep- tions by a majority of representatives to the 
resentatives or substitutes equal to more Assembly, i.e. an absolute majority, seems 
than half the number of representatives to unnecessarily constraining. Such procedure is 
the Assembly. applicable only to amendments to the Charter. 
5. If the Council refuses to adopt the draft Amendments to the Assembly's Rules of Pro-
budget accepted by the Assembly in these cedure are approved by a majority of votes cast. 
conditions, the Presidential Committee Since the Financial Regulations govern the 
shall be responsible for settling the dispute application ofthe provisions ofthe Rules of Pro-
with the Council and ask for a joint cedure of the Assembly, it is proposed to lighten 
meeting to this end. The Presidential procedure by providing for the Financial Regula-
Committee shall report to the Assembly tions and any relevant amendments to be pre-
on the results of any such meeting and, if pared by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
necessary, propose that it ratify whatever and Administration and adopted by the Presi-
action it had to take, including acceptance dential Committee. 
of the budget as amended by the This procedure seems to conform with the 
Council. powers assigned to the Committee on Budgetary 
6. The President of the Assembly shall be Affairs and Administration and the Presidential 
responsible for authorising expenditure on Committee respectively in Rule 48 of the Rules 
behalf of the Assembly within the limits of of Procedure of the Assembly. 
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FINANCIAL REGULATIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY 
PRESENT TEXT 
These regulations shall govern the 
financial administration of the Assembly of 
Western European Union. 
PART I 
Financial year 
Article I 
The financial year of the Assembly of 
Western European Union shall be from 1st 
January to 31st December. 
PART II 
Preparation of the budget 
Article 1 
The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration shall table a report, prepared in 
collaboration with the Presidential Committee, 
containing a provisional estimate for the 
financial year of the administrative expenditure 
of the Assembly, divided into heads and sub-
heads, and supported by: 
(a) a detailed estimate of the expenditure 
anticipated under each head and sub-
head; 
(b) an explanatory statement covering the 
expenditure proposed in any new field 
of activity or in any expansion of 
existing activity, and the reason for 
any major increase or decrease in 
budget authorisation requested. 
Article 3 
This report shall be considered by the 
Assembly. The approval of the draft budget shall 
require an absolute majority of the votes cast. 
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AMENDED TEXT 
The political independence of the WEU 
Assembly has as a corollary its budgetary 
autonomy. These regulations determine the 
framework in which this autonomy may be exer-
cised and methods to be followed in managing the 
Assembly's budget within the limits of the appro-
priations agreed by the WEU Council. 
PART I 
Financial year 
Article I 
The financial year of the Assembly of 
Western European Union shall be from 1st 
January to 31st December. 
PART II 
Preparation and approval of the budget 
Article 1 
The Committee on Budgetary Affairs and 
Administration shall prepare a report in collabo-
ration with the Presidential Committee. This 
report shall contain: 
(a) an explanatory memorandum recapi-
tulating the Assembly's requirements 
for the financial year in the light of its 
programme; 
(b) separate estimates of expenditure and 
receipts under Part I (operating budget) 
and Part II (pensions budget); 
(c) for each of these two parts, tables 
showing budget estimates divided into 
heads and sub-heads and explanations 
of the criteria governing the calculation 
of these estimates. 
Article 3 
This report shall be transmitted to the 
Council for an opinion. If this opinion is favour-
able and includes no amendments, the draft 
budget shall be submitted to the Assembly which 
shall approve it by a majority of votes cast. In the 
event of the prior opinion of the Council including 
reductions in appropriations, the procedure pro-
vided for in Rule 48, paragraph 4, of the Rules of 
Procedure of the Assembly shall be applied. 
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PART Ill 
Approval of the budget 
Article 4 
The draft budget, as approved by the 
Assembly, shall be communicated to the Council 
by the President of the Assembly not later than 
1st November with a request that, in the event of 
the Council wishing to make amendments to the 
budget of a major order (defined as more than 
20% of any one sub-head), the matter be consi-
dered at a joint meeting between representatives 
of the Assembly and of the Council. 
Article 5 
The approval of the budget by the Council 
shall constitute the necessary authority to the 
President of the Assembly, or to the Clerk of the 
Assembly acting under the authority of the Pre-
sident, to incur expenditure and make payments 
within the limits of the credits approved. 
A supplementary budget shall be sub-
mitted to the Council if the necessity for further 
expenditure arises. 
If the budget is not approved by the 
Council at the beginning of the financial year, 
expenditure may be incurred up to one-quarter 
of the total appropriations in respect of the 
relevant head for the preceding financial year 
increased by one-twelfth of the total appropria-
tions for the head for each completed month; 
this expenditure may not, however, exceed the 
limit of appropriations in respect of the relevant 
head for the preceding financial year or the 
appropriations provided for the head in the draft 
budget. 
Payments may be made monthly in 
respect of any head up to one-twelfth of the 
appropriations in respect of the relevant head for 
the preceding financial year; this may not, 
however, have the effect of placing at the dis-
posal of the Assembly monthly appropriations in 
excess of one-twelfth of the sum provided for in 
the relevant head of the draft budget. 
Should the need arise, the President of the 
Assembly shall, without prejudice to the pre-
ceding paragraph, request authority from the 
Council to make payments under a particular 
head in excess of the amounts authorised 
above. 
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Article 4 
The draft budget, as approved by the 
Assembly, shall be communicated to the Council 
by the President of the Assembly. Ifthe Council 
refuses to adopt it, the procedure provided for in 
Rule 48, paragraph 5, of the Rules of Procedure of 
the Assembly shall be applied. 
Article 5 
If further expenditure proves to be 
necessary in the course of the financial year, sup-
plementary provisional statements may be pre-
pared in accordance with procedure for preparing 
ordinary budgets. 
In between sessions or part-sessions, such 
supplementary budgets shall be approved by the 
Presidential Committee which shall submit its 
decision to the next plenary sitting of the 
Assembly for ratification. 
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PART IV 
Application of the budget 
Article 6 
The President of the Assembly may 
authorise the transfer of credits relating to expen-
diture only between sub-heads within the same 
head and within the limits of the credits voted. 
Such transfers shall require the subsequent 
approval of the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration and the report of that com-
mittee on every such transfer shall be communi-
cated to the Council. 
Article 7 
The President of the Assembly shall set up 
such internal controls as may be necessary to 
maintain a continuous check of all financial 
transactions, in order to prevent any irregularity 
in the application of the funds of the Assembly. 
The Clerk shall be responsible to the President of 
the Assembly for ensuring: 
(a) that all expenditure is in conformity 
with the credits and other financial 
measures voted by the Council; 
(b) that payments are made only on the 
basis of vouchers which ensure that the 
service has been rendered or the goods 
received and that payments have not 
previously been made; 
(c) the utmost economy compatible with 
the proper functioning of the 
Assembly. 
Article 8 
Except in cases where the President of the 
Assembly considers it to be compatible with the 
interests of the Assembly to proceed otherwise, 
contractors from the member countries shall be 
invited to submit tenders for the furnishing of 
equipment, supplies and other services. 
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PART Ill 
Application of the budget 
Article 6 
The approval of the budget by the Council 
shall constitute the necessary authority to the 
President of the Assembly, or to the Clerk of the 
Assembly acting under the authority of the Pre-
sident, to incur expenditure and make payments 
within the limits of the credits allocated to the 
various sub-heads of the budget. 
However, the President may authorise 
transfers within the same head and between 
Heads I! to V of the operating budget without the 
prior agreement of the Council. Such authori-
sation shall be necessary for any transfer relating 
to Head I of the operating budget except in the 
case of technical adjustments made necessary by 
minor overspending under a sub-head due to the 
application of salary scales for existing staff. 
At the close of the financial year, any varia-
tions in the Assembly budgets in application of 
the present article shall be notified to the 
Council. 
Article 7 
If the budget is not approved by the 
Council at the beginning of the financial year, 
expenditure may be incurred: 
- for Head I of the operating budget within 
the limits of the amount of the monthly 
emoluments of the permanent staff; 
- for Heads I! to V of the operating budget 
within the limits of one-twelfth of the 
total appropriations for all these heads 
for the preceding financial year; 
- for the pensions budget within the limits 
of the amount of monthly pensions 
payable to their beneficiaries. 
Article 8 
The President of the Assembly shall set up 
such internal controls as may be necessary to 
maintain a continuous check of all financial 
transactions, in order to prevent any irregularity 
in the application of the funds of the Assembly. 
The Clerk shall be responsible to the President of 
the Assembly for ensuring: 
(a) that all expenditure is in conformity 
with the credits and other financial 
measures voted by the Council; 
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Article 9 
Credits unexpired at the end of the 
financial year shall remain available until 31st 
March of the ensuing year in order to discharge 
liabilities in respect of supplies furnished, ser-
vices rendered, or other charges incurred up to 
the previous 31st December and for which 
payment has not been made. 
Any such credits remaining unexpended 
on 1st April of the ensuing financial year shall be 
cancelled and reimbursed to the Council. 
If payment of a commitment for the pre-
vious year has not been made before 1st April, 
the credits concerned shall be cancelled automa-
tically and corresponding credits will be taken up 
in the budget of the current financial year. 
Such action shall be submitted to the 
Committee on Budgetary Affairs and Adminis-
tration for approval and then brought to the 
attention of the Council. 
PART V 
Working capital fund 
Article 10 
The President of the Assembly may draw 
upon the working capital fund of Western 
European Union to meet current expenditure 
pending receipt of monies corresponding to the 
appropriations voted by the Council or pending 
the approval of the budget by the Council. 
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(b) that payments are made only on the 
basis of vouchers which ensure that the 
service has been rendered or the goods 
received and that payments have not 
previously been made; 
(c) the utmost economy compatible with 
the proper functioning of the 
Assembly. 
Article 9 
Except in cases where the President of the 
Assembly considers it to be compatible with the 
interests of the Assembly to proceed otherwise, 
contractors from the member countries shall be 
invited to submit tenders for the furnishing of 
equipment, supplies and other services. 
Article 10 
Credits unexpired at the end of the 
financial year shall remain available until 31st 
March of the ensuing year in order to discharge 
liabilities in respect of supplies furnished, ser-
vices rendered, or other charges incurred up to 
the previous 31st December and for which 
payment has not been made. 
Any such credits remaining unexpended 
on 1st April of the ensuing fmancial year shall be 
cancelled and reimbursed to the Council. 
If payment of a commitment for the pre-
vious year has not been maqe before 1st April, 
the credits concerned shall be cancelled automa-
tically and corresponding credits will be taken up 
in the budget of the current financial year. 
Such action shall be submitted to the 
Committee on Budgetary Affuirs and Adminis-
tration for approval and then brought to the 
attention of the Council. 
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PART VI 
Currency 
Article 11 
The draft budget of the Assembly shall be 
drawn up in French francs. After approval of the 
budget by the Council, the President shall ask the 
Council to transfer the approved sums to the 
Assembly's bank account. 
PART VII 
Accounting 
Article 12 
The Clerk shall ensure that budget 
accounts are kept showing: 
(a) credits available: 
- initial credits, 
- credits modified by transfers, 
- supplementary credits; 
(b) expenditure incurred; 
(c) payments made; 
(d) the assets and liabilities of the 
Assembly. 
Article 13 
The accounts for the financial year shall be 
submitted by the President of the Assembly to 
the auditor not later than the 15th April of the 
following year. 
PART VIII 
External Audit 
Article U 
Upon the proposal of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration the Presi-
dential Committee shall appoint a parliamentary 
auditor having the rank of Auditor General or its 
equivalent in the various member countries, 
whose tenure of office shall not exceed three 
years in the first instance and may be renewed. 
The duty of the auditor shall be to examine the 
accounts of the Assembly as he may deem 
necessary in order to ensure that all expenditure 
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PART IV 
Working capital fund 
Article 11 
The President of the Assembly may draw 
upon the working capital fund of Western 
European Union to meet current expenditure 
pending receipt of monies corresponding to the 
appropriations voted by the Council or pending 
the approval of the budget by the Council. 
PART V 
Currency 
Article 12 
The draft budget of the Assembly shall be 
drawn up in French francs. After approval of the 
budget by the Council, the President shall ask the 
Council to transfer the approved sums to the 
Assembly's bank account. 
PART VI 
Accounting 
Article 13 
The Clerk shall ensure that budget 
accounts are kept showing: 
(a) credits available: 
- initial credits, 
- credits modified by transfers, 
- supplementary credits; 
(b) expenditure incurred; 
(c) payments made; 
(d) the assets and liabilities of the 
Assembly. 
Article U 
The accounts for the financial year shall be 
submitted by the President of the Assembly to 
the auditor not later than 15th April of the fol-
lowing year. 
APPENDIX Ill 
is in accordance with the budget as approved by 
the Council, that the accounts are properly kept 
and that there are no financial irregularities; he 
shall have the right to make recommendations 
for the more efficient use of the Assembly's 
funds. 
The Clerk of the Assembly shall provide 
the auditor with every facility he may require for 
the accomplishment of his task. 
Article 15 
The auditor shall certify the annual 
accounts submitted to him in accordance with 
Article 13 and shall submit them with his report 
thereon to the Assembly not later than the 30th 
June following the end of the financial year. 
The report and the certificate of the 
auditor, together with any comments thereon 
which the President of the Assembly may desire 
to make, shall be considered by the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
Article 16 
Following the examination of the auditor's 
report by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration, a member of that com-
mittee may table a motion in the Assembly 
approving the accounts for the preceding 
financial year, and discharging the President of 
his financial responsibility. The President will 
submit to the Council for final discharging the 
auditor's report together with any comments the 
Assembly may have made. 
PART IX 
Adoption and amendments 
Article 17 
The adoption, or subsequent amendment, 
of these regulations shall require the approval 
of a majority of the representatives to the 
Assembly. 
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PART VII 
External audit 
Article 15 
Upon the proposal of the Committee on 
Budgetary Affairs and Administration the Presi-
dential Committee shall appoint a parliamentary 
auditor having the rank of Auditor General or its 
equivalent in the various member countries, 
whose tenure of office shall not exceed three 
years in the first instance and may be renewed. 
The duty of the auditor shall be to examine the 
accounts of the Assembly as he may deem 
necessary in order to ensure that all expenditure 
is in accordance with the budget as approved by 
the Council, that the accounts are properly kept 
and that there are no financial irregularities; he 
shall have the right to make recommendations 
for the more efficient use of the Assembly's 
funds. 
The Clerk of the Assembly shall provide 
the auditor with every facility he may require for 
the accomplishment of his task. 
Article 16 
The auditor shall certify the annual 
accounts submitted to him in accordance with 
Article 14 and shall submit them with his report 
thereon to the Assembly not later than the 30th 
June following the end of the financial year. 
The report and the certificate of the 
auditor, together with any 4omments thereon 
which the President of the Assembly may desire 
to make, shall be considered by the Committee 
on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
Article 17 
Following the examination of the auditor's 
report by the Committee on Budgetary Affairs 
and Administration, a member of that com-
mittee may table a motion in the Assembly 
approving the accounts for the preceding 
financial year, and discharging the President of 
his financial responsibility. The President shall 
submit to the Council for final discharging the 
auditor's report together with any comments the 
Assembly may have made. 
APPENDIX Ill 
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PART VIII 
Adoption and amendments 
Article 18 
The present regulations are drawn up and 
amended under the responsibility of the Com-
mittee on Budgetary Affairs and Administration. 
The adoption, or subsequent amendment, of 
these regulations shall require the approval of the 
Presidential Committee. 
APPENDIX IV 
APPENDIX IV 
Guidelines on the work of 
representatives of the media in the chamber 
DOCUMENT 1165 
(a) Those admitted to the hemicycle will abide by any directions given by Assembly staff relating to 
access. 
(b) Filming, photography and related activities and sound recording may take place in the aisles and 
in the well of the Assembly chamber, but not from the tribune, the presidentilil dais or any of the 
adjacent stairways but no interviews shall take place on the floor of the hemicycle whilst a sitting is in 
progress. 
(c) Media representatives and their equipment will not impede members or any other person 
authorised to sit in the chamber from moving to or from their place, or impede Assembly staff from car-
rying out their duties. 
(d) Every effort will be made to minimise the use of equipment which by heat, light or any other 
means is likely to cause nuisance or discomfort to those sitting in the chamber. 
(e) The operation of equipment will be so conducted as not to interfere with the Assembly's debates 
or business related to it. 
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APPENDIX V 
Special rules on honorary association with the WEU Assembly 
adopted by the Presidential Committee on 28th September 1988 
APPENDIX V 
1. Conditions governing the award of the title of honorary associate of the Assembly of Western 
European Union 
The title of " honorary associate of the Assembly of WEU " may be used by: 
(a) any parliamentarian or former parliamentarian who has been a member of the Assembly, as a 
representative or a substitute, for five years, consecutively or accumulatively; 
(b) any former member of the Assembly, however long his or her period of membership, who has 
held the post of President or Vice-President of the Assembly, Chairman of a committee or 
Chairman of a political group. 
A diploma and an identity card mentioning this title shall be issued to such persons at their 
request. 
2. Prerogatives of honorary associates 
(a) All honorary associates of the Assembly shall have access, on presentation of their card, to the 
same premises as representatives and substitutes to the Assembly, both in Paris and elsewhere, except 
the committee meeting rooms when in session. 
(b) At their request, they shall be included on the mailing lists for the Assembly's official documents 
and for certain non-confidential committee documents. 
(c) They may be invited to the Assembly's colloquies and other events, on the initiative of those in 
charge of such events. 
The above rules shall apply to former members of the Assembly who were in office on or after 
1st January 1983. 
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INFORMATION LETTER 
from Mr. Cahen, Secretary-General of WEU, 
on the activities of the intergovernmental organs 
(October-November 1988) 
25th November 1988 
London, 25th November 1988 
Dear President, 
The most important happening in the life ofWEU since my last newsletter of 12th October 1988 
is undoubtedly the signing by the seven member states, Spain and Portugal of the protocol of accession 
to the organisation of Portugal and Spain. 
You yourself were present at this solemn event which took place on 14th November last during 
the Ministerial Council. 
Following this ceremony, the Portuguese and Spanish Foreign and Defence Ministers were 
invited by the presidency to join their colleagues from the Seven as " participating observers " for the 
remainder of the Council's proceedings. 
This same arrangement will apply to ensure that Portugal and Spain are represented on the 
organisation's intergovernmental bodies pending the necessary ratification by national parliaments 
formalising the accession of the two new states. 
This procedure is consistent with the precedents which have already been set, notably on the 
occasion of the accession of Spain and Portugal to the European Communities and their membership of 
European Political Co-operation. 
Thus, the separate negotiations which began on 26th May last with each of these countries have 
now been brought to a close. 
The process consisted of a series of detailed discussions on substantive issues of which you have 
been apprised in my two previous newsletters (14th July and 12th October 1988). 
The last of these discussions took place on 11th October and was followed by several consulta-
tions of a legal nature that were essential to finalise the process. 
All the parties involved thought that the conclusions of these discussions were highly satisfactory. 
The Portuguese and Spanish delegations felt that they had been given a clear idea of how the Seven con-
strued and implemented their WEU commitments, whether in connection with the modified Brussels 
Treaty, the Rome declaration or the platform on European security interests. The Seven, for their part, 
were fully satisfied with the clarifications given by both the Portuguese and Spanish delegations 
regarding the way in which they conceived and would apply these same commitments following their 
accession to WEU. 
It was on this basis that the Nine set out the framework for their future joint action within WEU, 
a framework that was given clear expression in the preamble to the protocol of accession in which the 
Nine: 
- reaffirmed the common destiny which bound them together and recalled their commitment to 
build a European union in accordance with the single European act; 
- stressed their conviction that the construction of an integrated Europe would remain incom-
plete as long as it did not include security and defence; 
- affirmed their determination to develop a more cohesive European defence identity which 
would translate more effectively into practice the obligations of solidarity contained in the 
modified Brussels Treaty and in the North Atlantic Treaty. 
Mr. Charles GoERENS, 
President of the Assembly 
of Western European Union 
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It was therefore in this spirit that, at the end of the substantive discussion referred to above, Por-
tugal and and Spain accepted, unreservedly and in their entirety, the Rome declaration and the platform 
on European security interests and stated that they were prepared to participate fully in their implemen-
tation. 
To be more specific, the discussions finally confirmed that: 
- the Portuguese Government fully accepted the obligations arising from the modified Brussels 
Treaty of 1954 and accepted unreservedly and in their entirety the Rome declaration of 27th 
October 1984 and the WEU platform adopted in The Hague on 27th October 1987; 
- the Spanish Government also accepted these obligations - subject to a reserve on Article X of 
the Brussels Treaty - since the documents in question were compatible in content with the aim 
of the referendum under which the Spanish people agreed in March 1986 to remain in the 
Atlantic Alliance. 
In particular, both countries emphasised that they shared their other partners' common per-
ception, both of European values and of the threat and that they saw the alliance as the fundamental 
instrument of Europe's collective defence now and in the future. They both subscribed unreservedly, in 
Spain's case since the 1986 referendum, to the communiques of the alliance. They both believe that 
there is no alternative, for the foreseeable future, to a strategy of defence and effective deterrence based 
on an adequate mix of nuclear and conventional forces. They are both actively engaged in restructuring 
their armed forces and recognised the need to maintain an adequate level of defence spending. They 
both accept the commitment to defend any member country at its borders. 
It is no exaggeration to say that, under these circumstances - and the preamble to the protocol of 
accession stresses this point - the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain " represents a sig-
nificant step in the development of European solidarity in the field of security and defence". 
In the context of the accession to the organisation ofPortugal and Spain, the Nine adopted the fol-
lowing political declaration: 
" During the consultations which were held with a view to the enlargement of WEU to include 
Portugal and Spain, the member states of WEU with Portugal and Spain, taking into consider-
ation the spirit in which their security co-operation has recently developed, found that a number 
of the provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, did not correspond to the way in 
which they intend to pursue and strengthen that co-operation, on the basis of the Rome decla-
ration of 27th October 1984 and of the platform on European security interests, adopted in The 
Hague on 27th October 1987. Consequently, the member states ofWEU with Portugal and Spain 
consider that the relevant provisions of the Brussels Treaty, as modified in 1954, and its corre-
sponding protocols will be re-examined, as appropriate, having regard to the practice and achieve-
ments of, and the prospects for, their co-operation in security matters. " 
In your,own statement on enlargement which you made during the United Kingdom presidency's 
press conference at the end of the ministerial meeting, you said that: 
" Faced with the process, now under way, of updating the modified Brussels Treaty (the consti-
tutive instrument of WEU), the Assembly over which I preside will clearly wish to be construc-
tively vigilant; in this, it will remain loyal to its role as guardian of the treaty, in accordance with 
Article IX which you know so well. 
What must not happen is that, on the pretext of eliminating outdated provisions, there is any 
undermining, even inadvertedly, of the commitments whose maintenance is essential to the 
pursuit of the oft-repeated objective, namely to develop the European pillar of the Atlantic 
Alliance to which President Kennedy referred as long ago as 1962. " 
I think I can confirm that it is the intention of the member states to ensure that no essential com-
mitment will be overlooked in this process and that the reappraisal in question will relate only to 
obsolete provisions whose removal will be beneficial to the organisation. 
* 
* * 
Both you and the other members of the Assembly's Presidential Committee were briefed- during 
the evening of 14th November by the United Kingdom presidency and their colleagues, the other 
foreign and defence ministers and, in more relaxed fashion, during the morning of 15th November by 
the United Kingdom eo-chairmen- on the exchanges of view which took place during the Ministerial 
Council and on the conclusions of that meeting. 
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Apart from the enlargement of WEU to include Portugal and Spain, which dominated this 
meeting and which has been referred to above, and the operations carried out in the Gulf to which I will 
refer later, ministers discussed the following: 
- a report on the implementation of the platform on European security interests; 
- the interest shown by Turkey in our organisation; 
- a report on arms control and defence requirements; 
- oral reports which I presented to ministers on the activities of the sub~group of the Special 
Working Group on Security in the Mediterranean, on the one hand, and on progress with insti-
tutional questions on the other. 
In my earlier newsletters to you, I reported on the work which culminated in the drafting of the 
report on the implementation of the platform on European security interests and the report on arms 
control and defence requirements. 
As regards the report on the implementation of the platform, the Ministerial Council noted that 
this first exercise in elaborating the platform principles had achieved useful results. These represented 
the initial fruits of the process, which was a continuing one. 
In the ministers' view, a key point was the reaffirmation of the importance of European solidarity 
in its security dimension, and the manifest commitment of the WEU countries to their treaty obliga-
tions. The central importance of Article V ofthe Treaty of Brussels and the principle of" defence at the 
frontiers." was stressed. There was also recognition of the evolving threat which this commitment to 
defend each and every member must meet. 
The clearest evidence of this commitment was the appropriate deployment of forces. The report 
recognised the different situations of different states, and the principle of deployment close to the vul-
nerable frontiers was strongly supported. Stress was laid on the particular importance which several 
member states attached to the commitment to Germany, on whose territory they stationed forces under 
various agreements, and to the constant effort which was required in maintaining these force levels, and 
force levels more generally. 
The ministers also noted that the report proposed some more specific practical measures that 
would lead to increased co-operation among the WEU partners in the field of defence. 
They agreed that this was a difficult task and one which would have to be pursued in a progressive 
and step-by-step manner. 
In part this was because there were already very wide-ranging efforts being made within the 
alliance and in bilateral activities between member states to improve co-operation and strengthen the 
European pillar. And, of course, the fact that WEU was not an operational forum had meant that there 
were limits to what could be done. 
Nevertheless, in the ministers' view, the report has covered a lot of ground and identified worth-
while areas for further work. 
In general, the ministers approved the recommendations made in this context. Thus: 
(a) Under the heading of" improved consultation and co-ordination", the report proposed studies, 
including: 
- the scope for greater harmonisation of defence planning methods; 
- European demographic problems and the means of addressing them. 
The ministers encouraged an exchange of views and experience in these area$. In addition, under 
this section, it was proposed that the United Kingdom presidency should run a seminar on" the changes 
in public perceptions of European defence", which would follow the successful example of the seminar 
on resource allocation held earlier this year in The Hague. 
(b) The report also considered "involving defence ministers in the work of WEU ~·. The Defence Rep-
resentatives Group had already been involved in work on the implementation of the platform. With this 
in mind, the report proposed a study of the case for high-level consultations between member states' 
defence staffs. 
(c) Another subject covered by the report was" contributions to the common defence·: It provided an 
analysis of trends in contributions of WEU members, and pointed up both the extent of our existing 
contributions and the scope for doing more in certain areas. This was a particularly helpful exercise at a 
time when burden-sharing was a key issue in the alliance. 
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(d) Consideration was also given to making" better use of resources': Further studies were here rec-
ommended, including: 
- ways to improve co-operation in the field of logistics, including common use of testing facil-
ities; 
- ways of encouraging joint use of training facilities (simulators were suggested); 
- the impact of the EC progress towards 1992 on European security interests. 
(e) The report also considered WEU common security interests outside Europe. The most current 
example of this was, of course, the activity in the Gulf, mentioned later. The ministers stressed the value 
of WEU in this field. The presidency recognised this and had made the continued development of this 
role one of its aims. It was an area of consultation unique to that forum. To this end, there was a pro-
posal in the report to undertake an exchange of information about the assistance already given to some 
non-European countries. 
Of course, the importance of explaining WEU's role to our publics, those of our allies, was also 
recognised. There was an important emphasis here on the role of the Assembly and the report identified 
the key themes to be projected. 
The ministers then considered how to build upon this work. The fact that many of the proposals 
were for studies should not discourage them. The role of WEU as a " ginger group " was important. It 
could contribute to the strengthening of the European pillar of the alliance through consultation on 
security policy. In this forum where matters were necessarily less tied to the immediate requirements of 
the common defence, there was the opportunity to reflect more widely on the whole issue of European 
security. Some questions were highlighted by certain delegations i.e.: 
- the relevance of 1992 to WEU; 
- the value of defence staff consultations; 
- the discussions on defence planning methods, training and logistics, with particular emphasis 
on defence planning methods; 
- the importance of regular exchanges of research experts and also the value of discussions on 
space questions. 
In conclusion, the Ministerial Council noted the report on the implementation of the platform on 
European security interests and approved all the recommendations which were made, notably those in 
which delegations had shown particular interest. It accepted that the scope of practical defence 
co-operation through WEU was necessarily limited, but also stressed the need for positive step-by-step 
progress to be made in carrying out the studies and other activities which the report recommended. 
With regard to Turkey, ministers discussed that country's interest in joining WEU and recognised 
that it was an important and sensitive subject. A reply in formal terms to that interest had yet to be pre-
pared. This would be considered by the Permanent Council. They took note of Turkish interest in 
joining WEU and recognised the valuable contribution which Turkey, as a member of the Atlantic 
Alliance, was making to the defence of Europe. They also noted the fact that WEU was reviewing its 
programme and structure following the accession of Spain and Portugal to the organisation. They agreed 
that Turkish interest in joining should be kept under active review and were considering the possibility 
of a special consultative arrangement between WEU and Turkey. 
The ministers discussed a report on arms control and defence requirements which gave rise to dis-
cussion of three separate topics, first the conventional stability talks, secondly the implications for 
Europe of the START talks and thirdly the implications of the forthcoming Paris conference on the 
1925 chemical weapon convention. 
On the conventional stability talks, they recognised the importance of the opportunities offered by 
those negotiations to tackle what they regard as the central problem of European security, namely, the 
massive disparities in ground forces favouring the Warsaw Pact. They recognised that they needed to be 
ready to take advantage of more open eastern attitudes, although the real test of those would be in deed 
and not in word. They stressed the importance of continuing European input to the evolution of alliance 
thinking on this topic and the need to be ready with substantive proposals when the talks opened. 
On START, they emphasised the support of all WEU members for a START treaty on the lines 
currently being negotiated. They thought it would be good for European security as well as western 
security because it would remove a substantial part of the Soviet Union's most powerful and 
destabilising missiles. They recognised that it was going to be a long, difficult and important task. They 
noted that the verification provisions were of great importance. When concluded they would enhance 
confidence but it was important that they should be got right. The ministers also considered the implica-
tions of a START agreement in particular for sea-launched cruise missiles. 
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On chemical weapons, everyone welcomed the forthcoming Paris conference on the 1925 con-
vention and emphasised the two limbs to that conference: one, the need to reaffirm and re-establish 
respect for the convention and, two, to press ahead with the negotiations in Geneva for a worldwide ban 
on chemical weapons. The conference in January was not intended to be a substitute for progress in the 
Geneva negotiations. 
The Ministerial Council also took note of my oral report on the work of the Mediterranean sub-
group and invited the group to continue its work, with particular reference to Yugoslavia and the 
Maghreb whose evolution was recognised as crucial to the security of the WEU member states in the 
Mediterranean. 
The Ministerial Council noted my oral report on institutional questions and invited the Per-
manent Council to keep the subject under review. 
Finally, the Council agreed to make available F 100 000 needed by the Assembly to undertake an 
architectural study relating to the WEU premises in Paris as a consequence of the enlargement of the 
organisation. 
* 
* * 
It will come as no surprise to you that the preparation of a meeting such as this and in particular 
the drafting of the reports on the implementation of the platform on European security interests and on 
arms control and defence requirements - both of which were submitted to the ministers - required an 
intense amount of activity on the part of the other intergovernmental organs of WEU. 
Its Special Working Group- at either" heads" or" deputies" level- met regularly in the months 
preceding this ministerial meeting whilst the political directors from the foreign ministries and their 
defence ministry counterparts came together for " enlarged " meetings of the Permanent Council. 
The Permanent Council, in either its enlarged or normal composition, has directed the activities 
of the Special Working Group and also those of the defence ministry representatives and the sub-groups 
of experts, particularly the sub-group concerned with security in the Mediterranean. 
These various meetings also provided an opportunity for participants to continue their exchange 
of information and concertation on topical questions affecting European security as construed in the 
context of Atlantic solidarity. 
Generally speaking, the Permanent Council continued to carry out its role as co-ordinator of 
WEU activities. 
It also continued to ponder the question ofthe collocation of the administrative organs ofWEU. 
* 
* * 
The national (France, Italy) and integrated operations (United Kingdom, Netherlands, Belgium), 
co-ordinated in the Gulf on the basis of political concertation within WEU and with the support of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and Luxembourg, have continued. 
In view of the developments in the region and the reduction of the threat to i!ree navigation since 
the cease-fire, it is quite normal that the operations in their present form should come to an end. Some 
of the states are withdrawing their units from the region, others are adapting their presence to a situation 
that is different from that which led the five member states of the organisation in August 1987 to take 
action over the Gulf. 
The conclusion of this action is in fact a final cleaning-up operation by each of the national and 
integrated fleets in their zones of action, in co-ordination with each other. 
This operation is known as" Cleansweep ".Its aim is to complete the clearance of a shipping lane 
300 miles into the Gulf from the Strait ofHormuz. It will be ofbenefit to all merchant shipping in those 
waters and will assist the return of normality in the region. 
Probably it may not be possible to affirm that this success in the Gulf will constitute an argument 
enabling any form of" out-of-area " action to be taken in the future. 
Specific needs will have to be met as and when they arise. But the WEU p~rtners have proved 
capable of co-operating in connection with dangerous major tasks in a difficult part of the world. In the 
long term, the experience gained in the Gulf can only be of benefit to the security interests - in the 
widest sense - of the WEU partners. 
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It is no exaggeration to say that these operations have highlighted the reality of WEU's reacti-
vation and its ability to put this into concrete form in all the spheres of its competence, including areas 
outside the direct security zone of its member countries whenever this security - taken in its widest 
sense - is threatened. 
Thus substance has been given to Article VIII, paragraph 3, of the modified Brussels Treaty as 
well as Article 8 of the Rome declaration and Part Ill (a) 4 of the platform on European security 
interests, both for the present and potentially for the future, should a similar situation again arise. 
At the ministerial meeting of 14th November, the ministers hailed the success ofthese operations. 
The Belgian and Italian delegations confirmed that their forces would be returning to their national 
ports at the end of the year. 
The ministers concluded their discussions by " noting with approval the success of the member 
countries of WEU in concerting WEU activities in the Gulf. In particular, they noted that all member 
nations had contributed, either directly, or by filling in for national forces deployed to the Gulf, or finan-
cially; and that they are currently involved in the important task of clearing a shipping route (Operation 
Cleansweep). They agreed that the experience of operation in the Gulf would strengthen Europe's 
capacity for concerted action in the future ". 
* 
* * 
Another important matter is the organisation by the Institute for Advanced Defence Studies of 
France of a European advanced defence studies session, within the WEU context since it is directed at 
nationals of the WEU member states. 
This session is taking place as I write. It represents an opportunity for regular information and 
reflection- among the most interested sectors of the public- on problems of European security, seen of 
course in the context of Atlantic solidarity. 
It will have considerable impact on opinion in Europe just as the seminars organised by the 
IHEDN at national level have had an impact on opinion in France. 
Our thanks should be expressed to France for having agreed to launch the idea with the benefit of 
its vast experience - and particularly that of the IHEDN - in the matter. 
This initiative will be continued next year because Belgium has already agreed to organise a 
similar session at the Royal Advanced Defence Institute. 
The session began on 15th November by an address from Mr. Michel Rocard, French Prime Min-
ister. Several members of the governments of our states- Mr. Roland Dumas, French Foreign Minister, 
Mr. Jean-Pierre Chevenement, French Defence Minister, Mr. William Waldegrave, Minister of State at 
the Foreign Office, Mr. Schafer, Deputy Minister at the German Foreign Office, and Mr. Lothar Riihl, 
German State Secretary for Defence - have agreed to speak along with Mr. Malfatti, former Italian 
Foreign Minister and President of the Italian Delegation to the WEU Assembly, General Schmitt, Chief 
of Staff of the French army, Mr. Champenois, Director of Politico-Military Affairs at the Belgian 
Foreign Ministry, several industrial leaders, such as Mr. Gergorin, Director of Strategy at MATRA head 
office, Ambassador Umberto La Rocca, Managing Director of Aeritalia, and experts of repute such as 
Mr. Pierre Lellouche of the French Institute for International Relations and Professor Caesar Voute 
from the Netherlands. 
You yourself have agreed to talk about the " role of WEU in European security " and I shall have 
the honour of making the closing speech. 
In order to inform fully the members of the Assembly I am enclosing herewith the seminar pro-
gramme and the list of attendance. 
The programme shows that the French authorities have organised two visits, one to the Strategic 
Maritime Force in Brest and the other to Aerospatiale at Marignane. Both of these visits are of par-
ticular interest to the participants. 
Following the practice adopted nationally for the former IHEDN students, an association may 
well be set up of former participants in the "European session". This could contribute to the devel-
opment of a European security awareness in our countries. 
* 
* * 
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The organisation's sphere of influence internationally - including outside the member states, 
would appear to be growing because an important colloquium on the theme " the Atlantic Alliance and 
western security as NATO turns forty: setting up the agenda", organised in Washington by the Institute 
for Foreign Policy Analysis and the Atlantic Commission of the Netherlands has been placed by its pro-
moters not only under the auspices ofthe North Atlantic Assembly and Eurogroup but also under WEU. 
Along with the Clerk of the Assembly you have agreed to attend this gathering on 28th and 
29th November where I shall also be present. The event will be of considerable importance. From the 
American side there will be the Defence Secretary Mr. Frank Carlucci as well as several eminent 
members of the Senate and House of Representatives. There will be several personalities from the 
administration and well-known experts. From the European side there will be MM. Hans Dietrich 
Genscher, German Foreign Minister, Ercan Vuralhan, Turkish Defence Minister, and William 
Waldegrave, Minister of State at the Foreign Office. There will also be several parliamentarians 
including the President of the North Atlantic Assembly and well-known former ministers and experts. 
This brief stay in the United States will provide an opportunity for useful contacts at a very inter-
esting juncture, namely, the transition period between two presidents. We shall certainly have some 
impressions to communicate in this respect both to the Assembly and to the intergovernmental organs 
of the organisation. 
The Secretariat-General of the organisation has pursued its public relations activities. I was 
represented: 
- on 14th October, in Lille, by Mr. Arnaud Jacomet at the round table organised under the chair-
manship of Mr. Maurice Schumann in connection with the 1988 UNOR (National Union of 
Reserve Officers) congress; 
- on 25th and 26th October, in Paris, by General Menez at the colloquium on military space 
activities chaired by Mr. Hubert Curien (Deputy Minister to the Minister of State for National 
Education, Research and Sport, responsible for research and President of the Science and 
Defence Association). This colloquium consisted of classified working sessions and a non-
classified round table. The organisers of the colloquium were Science and Defence, the Society 
of the Friends of ENSAE and the Society of the Friends of ENST A; 
- on 28th October, in Bonn, by Colonel Klaus Jacob at the meeting organised by the Peace 
Research Institute Frankfurt. 
For my part, I: 
-from 13th to 15th October participated in Berlin in a conference organised by the Aspen 
Institute on the future of Franco-German relations; 
- on 21st October gave a talk in Ghent to the Cercle Royal Mars et Mercure on the theme" WEU 
at the crossroads of European construction "; 
-from 21st to 23rd October took part in a colloquium organised by the Ditchley Foundation on 
the subject "the European pillar of the North Atlantic Alliance: a security dimension for the 
process of European integration?"; 
- on 31st October in London spoke to the Liberal International British Group on the subject " the 
future of western defence "; 
- on 8th November gave two lectures at the University of St. Andrews (the first on the European 
construction and WEU and the second on a European pillar of the alliance); 
- from lOth to 12th November in Oslo took part in a colloquium on the subject " western security 
posture towards the year 2000 ", organised by the Alumni Association of the Norwegian 
National Defence College. I also gave a lecture to present members on" WEU, the process of 
European construction and the alliance". On that occasion I met the Norwegian Foreign 
Minister Mr. Stoltenberg. 
At the Foreign Ministry I met Mme Helga Hernes, State Secretary, Ambassador Kjeld Vibe, Secre-
tary-General, Ambassador Bjorn Kristvik, Director-General of Policy, and several other offi-
cials; 
At the Defence Ministry I met Mr. Lasse Seim, State Secretary, Mr. Finnmolwig, Director-General 
for Security Affairs, and Mr. Bard Bredrup Knadsen, Adviser for Security Affairs. 
273 
DOCUMENT 1166 
I was also able to talk briefly to members of parliament of the two major political parties, the 
Labour Party (in office) and the Conservative Party, as well as with personalities from the academic 
world 1• 
on 20th November in Valkenburg (Netherlands) spoke at a colloquium organised by the Young 
Europeans for Security (YES) on the theme "European security: what options?". 
* 
* * 
As with my previous communications, this letter is intended to give you and other members of 
the parliamentary Assembly of Western European Union the maximum possible information about the 
main activities of the intergovernmental organs of the organisation. It is drafted and circulated by me 
under my own responsibility. 
I hope that the facts contained herein will be useful for you and the other members of the 
Assembly and will enable you to see that the pace ofWEU activities has by no means slackened over the 
last few months. 
Yours sincerely, 
Alfred CAHEN 
1. The conclusions I have drawn from these contacts are that the Norwegian Government is giving priority to " adapting " to the 
implementation of the Twelve's single market in 1992. In the circumstances, any intention of acceding to WEU is considered as 
premature. The attitude is one of" wait and see". They are nevertheless watching what happens in the organisation, especially the 
discussions leading to the signature of the protocol of accession to WEU of Spain and Portugal. These comments are of a super-
ficial nature being based on brief contacts during a short stay. 
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The Assembly, 
Participation of Mr. Arafat at the United Nations 
General Assembly in New York 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 1 
tabled by Mr. Malfatti and others 
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure 
with a request for urgent procedure 
5th December 1988 
With a view to promoting an international dialogue to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
INVITES THE GOVERNMENTS OF WEU MEMBER COUNTRIES 
To address an urgent appeal to the United States administration to grant a visa to allow 
Mr. Yasser Arafat, President of the PLO, to enter the United States to address the United Nations 
General Assembly. 
Signed: Malfatti, Pieralli, Natali, Gabbuggiani, Pecchio/i, Cannata, Kessler, Scovacricchi, Sarti, 
Fioret 
I. See 7th sitting, 5th December 1988 (motion withdrawn). 
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The Assembly, 
Integration of Europe with a view to European union 
(or the United States of Europe): WEU's role 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 1 
tabled by Mr. Pannella and others 
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure 
with a request for urgent procedure 
5th December 1988 
(i) Considering the reactivation of WEU and its role as a privileged forum for matters relating to 
security and defence at European level; 
(ii) Noting with satisfaction the conclusion of the protocol of accession of Portugal and Spain to 
WEU; 
(iii) Stressing that once the procedure for ratifying their accession to WEU has been completed, WEU 
will be composed of nine of the twelve member countries of the European Communities; 
(iv) Noting that in the abovementioned protocol of accession member states reaffirmed the impor-
tance they attach to the common destiny which binds their countries and recalled their commitment to 
build a European union in accordance with the single European act; 
{v) Considering that in the same protocol the member states ofWEU stated that they were convinced 
that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include 
security and defence; 
(vi) Wishing a new plan for European union to be drawn up in 1989 by the European Parliament to be 
elected next June in accordance with the broad lines of the draft treaty already approved by the 
European Parliament on 14th February 1984; 
1. WISHES to be associated with the preparatory work in accordance with appropriate procedure; 
2. WISHES this new draft treaty, covering several areas of political integration, including security and 
defence, to be ratified by member states at an early date; 
3. AFFIRMS formally that the completion of this process, vital for a closer union of European nations, 
must mean the European union (United States of Europe) progressively assuming the prerogatives and 
duties now exercised by WEU; 
4. ADDRESSES this resolution to the WEU Council, the governments of member countries, the 
European Parliament and the Commission and Council of the European Communities. 
Signed: Pannella, Martino, Pieralli, Scovacricchi, Stegagnini, Triglia, Fassino, Greco, Francese, 
Rauti, Caro 
l. See 8th sitting, 6th December 1988 (motion referred to the General Affairs Committee). 
276 
Document 1169 
The Assembly, 
Banning of low-altitude military training flights 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 1 
tabled by Mr. Buchner and others 
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure 
CALLS ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER STATES 
5th December 1988 
To ban all low-altitude military flights and air-combat exercises over heavily built-up areas and 
also flights towards targets such as nuclear plants, hospitals, schools, places of worship, public buildings 
and factories, etc. 
Signed: Buchner, Biefnot, Holtz, Eicher, Pecriaux, Stoffelen, Schrnidt, Luuk, Blunck, Scheer 
1. See 8th sitting, 6th December 1988 (motion included in the register of the Assembly). 
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The Assembly, 
Banning of demonstration flights at air shows 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 1 
tabled by Mr. Buchner and others 
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure 
with a request for urgent procedure 
CALLS ON THE GOVERNMENTS OF MEMBER STATES 
5th 
To ban demonstration flights, particularly at military and civilian air shows. 
Signed: Buchner, Biefnot, Holtz, Ahrens, Pecriaux, Eicher, Klejdzinski, Blunck, Sto.ffelen, Schmidt, 
Luuk, Steiner, Scheer 
l. See 8th sitting, 6th December 1988 (urgent procedure not agreed to). 
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Document 1171 7th December 1988 
Exchange of armed forces personnel between the national unit$ 
of the individual member nations 
The Assembly, 
MOTION FOR A RECOMMENDATION 1 
tabled by Mr. Hitschler and others 
under Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure 
(i) Believing that additional measures must be adopted to promote partnership relations between the 
individual member nations of WEU; 
(ii) Expressing its satisfaction at the creation of a joint Franco-German brigade which was initiated by 
the formal decision on 13th November 1987 (formalised by an exchange ofletters, dated 22nd January 
1988) by the heads of government of the two nations; 
(iii) Regretting the absence of similar arrangements on the same scale between the other member 
nations; 
(iv) Asking for efforts to be undertaken aiming at enhancing co-operation between the units of the 
other member nations in order to strengthen and consolidate partnership relations, in particular to 
improve mutual understanding through daily co-operation and the dismantling of language barriers, in 
order to thus achieve an intermeshing of forces not only through liaison officers, 
RECOMMENDS THAT THE COUNCIL 
Take the initiative for the creation of exchange opportunities beyond the framework of integrated 
headquarters and other available opportunities, in order for a great number of officers, non-
commissioned officers and other ranks to have the chance of doing duty for a limited period of their 
service in units of allied armed forces. 
Signed: Hitschler, Pfuhl, Unland, Martino, Steiner, Kittelmann, Muller, Niegel, Klejdzinski, Pack, 
Seitlinger, Scheer, Reddemann 
l. See 11th sitting, 7th December 1988 (motion included in the register of the Assembly). 
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